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Propaganda that stimulates thinking, in no





Most previous studies of Soviet montage cinema have concentrated on
its aesthetic and technical aspects; however, montage cinema was essentially
a rhetoric rather than an aesthetic of cinema. This thesis presents a com-
parative study of the leading montage film-makers – Kuleshov, Pudovkin,
Eisenstein and Vertov – comparing and contrasting the differing methods
by which they used cinema to exert a rhetorical effect on the spectator for
the purposes of political propaganda.
The definitions of propaganda in general use in the study of Soviet
montage cinema are too narrowly restrictive and a more nuanced definition
is clearly needed. Furthermore, the role of the spectator in constituting the
rhetorical effectivity of a montage film has been neglected; a psychoanalytic
model of the way in which the filmic text can trigger a change in the
spectator’s psyche is required. Moreover, the ideology of the Soviet montage
films is generally assumed to exist only in their content, whereas in classical
cinema ideology also operates at the level of the enunciation of the filmic
text itself. The extent to which this is also true for Soviet montage cinema
should be investigated.
I have analysed the interaction between montage films and their specta-
tors from multiple perspectives, using several distinct but complementary
theoretical approaches, including recent theories of propaganda, a psycho-
analytic model of rhetoric, Lacanian psychoanalysis and the theory of the
system of the suture, and Peircean semiotics. These different theoretical
approaches, while having distinct conceptual bases, work together to build
a new and consistent picture of montage cinema as a propaganda medium
and as a form of political rhetoric.
I have been able to classify the films of Kuleshov, Eisenstein and Pu-
dovkin as transactive, vertical agitation propaganda and the films of Vertov
as transactive, horizontal agitation propaganda. Furthermore, I show that
montage cinema embeds ideology in the enunciation of its filmic text, but
differs from classical cinema in trying to subvert the suturing process. I
conclude that Vertov at least partly created a non-representational cine-
matography and that he could be regarded as being at least as much a
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1.1 Main focus of the research
To examine the nature of Soviet montage cinema as a form of rhetoric, as I
intend to do in this thesis, is to implicitly make a distinction between aesthetics
and rhetoric. Most studies of Soviet montage cinema have concentrated on its
aesthetic and technical aspects, but montage cinema was essentially a rhetoric
of cinema. It was a conscious attempt to use cinema as a medium for political
propaganda. Whereas aesthetics is the study of what is pleasing and beautiful,
rhetoric is the art of persuasion; that is, it is the set of techniques required to
construct effective discourses. To examine a film as rhetoric is to examine the
effect it has on its intended audience and the means by which it achieves that
effect, and therefore to foreground considerations of the interaction between the
filmic text and the spectator. I believe that what Jacques Aumont wrote two
decades ago remains true even now:
it seems to me that almost all of Eisenstein’s commentators underestimate
the role of the mental processes of the spectator (imperative not only with
regard to the intellectual work necessary for producing “good” association,
but also with regard to the production of emotional “value”). (1987:169)
The fact that film montage itself is a form of rhetoric rather than simply an
aesthetic device has long been recognised. Jowett and O’Donnell, for example,
have stated that
[t]he great Russian propaganda films such as Sergei Eisenstein’s Battle-
ship Potemkin (1925), Vsevolod Pudovkin’s Storm Over Asia (1928), and
1
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Alexander Dovzhenko’s Earth (1930) all used montage as a central tech-
nique for eliciting the proper audience response. (1992:94)
Even Dziga Vertov’s non-fiction documentary films have been recognised to be
rhetorical discourses rather than merely re-presentations of actuality. As Plantin-
ga has noted, “like the fiction film, nonfictions are rhetorical constructs, fashioned
and manipulated and structured representations” (1997:32). Some critics have
even recognised the montage films as a form of rhetorical discourse but have
disapproved of that fact, such as Mikhail Bleiman in 1927:
Visually, [Vertov’s film A Sixth Part of the World (1926)] is disappointing.
It is a speech of an orator, not a picture. It is full of rhetorical devices,
rhetorical repetitions. The film shouts out slogans, sometimes declaims.
Declamation is the film’s main drawback. Too many repetitive, obtrusive
titles. They turn the film into a collection of moving photographs. (Qtd.
in Tsivian 1997:67)
However, there have also been dissenting voices which have tried to downplay
the role of Soviet montage cinema as political propaganda, apparently fearing
that such a label would damage its artistic or even moral status. Richard Taylor
has denied the value of montage cinema’s function as propaganda by claiming
that “to discuss each film in terms of whether it may be regarded as agitation or
propaganda would be a worse than fruitless exercise, for it would actually obscure
the real value of the film” (1998:29), and Peter Kenez has asserted that
[t]o look at the work of Soviet directors purely as an exercise in propaganda
is to miss what is truly interesting in their work. [. . . ] Only after the
artistic vitality of film was destroyed in the 1930s did it become a successful
instrument of propaganda. The study of film as an agent of indoctrination
in the 1920s is ultimately – and fortunately from the point of view of art –
a study in failure. (1985:196)
Such a view assumes two things: that there is a fundamental contradiction be-
tween art and propaganda, and that the films of Soviet montage cinema were
failures as propaganda (and therefore, ipso facto, successes as great art). The
second assumption is dubious at best – Eisenstein’s film Battleship Potemkin
(1926) was banned from being publically screened in Britain until the 1950s, pre-
cisely because of the authorities’ fear of its power as propaganda, and Jowett and
O’Donnell have reported that
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[a] representative study that used attitude-measuring scales to determine
propaganda effects was done by Rosenthal (1934), who found that Rus-
sian silent propaganda films changed socioeconomic attitudes of American
students. (1992:127)
I would also dispute Kenez’s other assumption, that art and propaganda are es-
sentially incompatible things. The Soviet montage directors saw no contradiction
between art and propaganda (Vertov, always the exception among the montage
directors, denied that he was attempting to create art at all). To them, all art
was fundamentally tendentious, political at its very root. To regard films like
Potemkin or The Mother (1926) or The Man with a Movie Camera (1929) as
propaganda is therefore not to denigrate them, or downgrade them from the sta-
tus of great art to “mere” agitprop, but to acknowledge the motivations which lay
behind their creation and to bring out those elements in these works which make
them unique contributions to cinematic art.
1.2 Questions addressed
This thesis will address itself to several distinct yet closely connected questions
relating to the nature and functioning of Soviet montage cinema as propaganda
and the way in which the montage films rhetorically interact with their spectators.
I regard the usual definitions of propaganda in general use in the study of
Soviet montage cinema (Taylor 1998, Kenez 1985) as being too narrowly restric-
tive and having too many ideological presuppositions to properly encompass the
full range and diversity of the actual use of propaganda in the films of montage
directors such as Lev Kuleshov, Vsevolod Pudovkin, Sergei Eisenstein or Dziga
Vertov. How can the concept of propaganda be defined in such a way that it
will be adequate when applied to the Soviet montage directors’ complex use of
their films as political propaganda? Furthermore, how can the concept of propa-
ganda be subdivided into different categories based on its purposes and methods
so as to provide an adequate categorisation of the differing approaches towards
propaganda taken by the various montage film-makers?
When considering a film as a form of rhetoric, the issue of the nature of the
interaction between the filmic text and the spectator arises. What is the actual
mechanism by which the filmic text interacts with the psyche of the spectator in
order to cause a change in that spectator’s psyche? Such a change could be said
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to be what constitutes the rhetorical effect of the film on its spectator.
The “Kuleshov Effect” montage experiment, which Bazin claimed “sums up
perfectly the properties of montage” (2005:25), actually has a rather problematic
status. It has recently been questioned whether the Effect even exists at all
(Aumont 1986, Prince and Hensley 1992) and there has been a general lack of
success of attempts to reproduce the Effect under scientifically rigorous conditions
(Prince and Hensley 1992). Can the application of a psychoanalytic model of
rhetoric (Alcorn 1987) shed some light on the effectivity of the Kuleshov Effect
by providing a plausible psychoanalytic mechanism by which it might operate?
The ideology of the Soviet montage films is generally assumed to exist pri-
marily or solely at the level of their overt content (e.g., Taylor 1998), whereas the
theory of the “system of the suture” (Oudart 1978, Dayan 1974) suggests that,
in classical cinema at least, ideology exists also, and perhaps even primarily, at
the level of the enunciation of the filmic text; that is, in the process by which
fragments of raw film footage are transformed into meaningful cinematographic
statements. Could the theory of the system of the suture be applied to montage
cinema as well as to classical cinema, and if so what would it reveal about the
presence of political ideology in the form of the montage films as well as in their
overt content? Furthermore, how far did montage cinema use the same sutur-
ing process as classical cinema, and how far did it try to subvert that suturing
process? What implications does this have for the functioning of Soviet montage
cinema as ideological rhetoric?
In his article on the system of the suture, Daniel Dayan asked whether there
can be a cinematography not based on the system of representation, and answered
his own question in the negative (1974:28). Could Soviet montage cinema have
constituted, at least potentially, such a non-representational cinematography, and
if so in what sense? Is Malevich’s concept of a “non-objective cinema” comparable
to Dayan’s “non-representational cinematography”, and if so to what extent did
the montage film-makers’ ideas and work conform to Malevich’s concept? And




It is my contention that montage cinema was essentially a rhetoric rather than an
aesthetic of cinema, a conscious attempt to use cinema as a medium for political
propaganda. It is therefore more appropriate, in my view, to apply a functional
rather than a normative analysis to montage cinema, to use Peter Bürger’s ter-
minology (1984:87); that is, to analyse its political and social functioning rather
than its set of aesthetic norms.
In this thesis, I shall analyse the interaction between montage films and
their spectators from multiple perspectives, using several distinct but comple-
mentary theoretical approaches, including recent theories of propaganda (Ellul
1973, Jowett and O’Donnell 1992; 2006, Taylor 1998, O’Shaughnessy 2004), La-
canian psychoanalysis and the theory of the “system of the suture” (Lacan 1977,
Oudart 1978, Dayan 1974) and the semiotics of C. S. Peirce (Peirce 1991, Wollen
1997:116-54). These different theoretical approaches, while having distinct con-
ceptual bases and giving a variety of perspectives on the nature of Soviet montage
cinema, work together to build what I believe to be a consistent picture of mon-
tage cinema as a propaganda medium and as a form of political rhetoric.
Similar theoretical approaches have been used by film theorists in the 1970s
and 1980s, most notably the “Screen theory” group of critics who used Lacanian
psychoanalysis, semiotics and Marxist theory (in particular Althusser’s theorisa-
tion of the role of ideology in modern capitalist society) to analyse mainstream
Hollywood movies in such a way as to attempt to unmask the procedures by
which oppressive ideology is naturalisation by the filmic texts of such movies. As
Lapsley and Westlake put it, “Because misrecognition and delusion still predom-
inate, the task [. . . ] is to unmask the reality of the situation and analyse the
mechanisms producing misrecognition and mystification” (2006:231). However,
while I use many of the same theoretical tools, my own task in this thesis is
rather different. Analysing Soviet cinema in terms of the system of the suture or
Althusserian interpellation, for example, requires a different strategy than that
used in applying a similar analysis to classical cinema. The Soviet montage films,
as will be seen, to some extent already subvert the “reality effect” of the system of
the suture and reveal the operation of ideology in their own textual enunciation;
my analysis is therefore aimed at showing the strategies which the montage film-
makers used to achieve this subversion of the suturing process and to evaluate
how successful or unsuccessful those strategies were.
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1.4 Significance of the research
To some extent, the argument advanced in this thesis can be regarded as being
complementary to the work both of Richard Taylor (1998) and of Jeremy Hicks
(2007). Taylor has examined several montage films as examples of political pro-
paganda, while Hicks has presented Vertov as a film-maker who pioneered the
transformation of newsreel “from the illustration or recording of events into an
overt attempt to persuade through images [. . . ] so as to unleash a tremendous
rhetorical force” (2007:1). However, whereas Taylor restricts his examination to
only three of the films of Soviet montage cinema1 and does not examine theoret-
ical issues pertaining to the enunciation of those films, I shall examine in some
detail both the precise category of propaganda into which the montage directors’
films can be classified and the precise nature of the means by which their films
interact with the spectator to generate meaning and communicate ideology. Gra-
ham Roberts has also examined non-fiction Soviet cinema in terms of its function
as propaganda (Roberts 1999), claiming that his “[a]rtistic and aesthetic eval-
uations are, unashamedly, made with reference to a film’s messages(s) and its
ability to educate or convince an audience” (1999:4). However, while I would
wholeheartedly endorse his sentiments, Roberts concentrates only on the func-
tional role of non-fiction film in “the development of (multi- but Russian-centred)
national myths” (1999:3) of the USSR, whereas I shall concentrate on the cine-
matic and rhetorical means by which Soviet montage cinema attempted to achieve
its propaganda effects. And whereas Hicks restricts his analysis to the work of
Vertov alone, and concentrates on the origins of Vertov’s documentary techniques
in the nature of early Soviet journalism, my own work will present a comparative
study of the leading montage film-makers – Kuleshov, Pudovkin, Eisenstein and
Vertov – comparing and contrasting the differing strategies by which they used
cinema as a form of political rhetoric. I believe it is important to make such a
comparative study, as the Soviet montage “school” was actually a rather diverse
group of film-makers who were often in polemical dispute with each other. As
Bordwell has said, “A historically complete account of Soviet film montage, then,
must include both strands of development; that of Kuleshov and Pudovkin and
that of Vertov and Eisenstein” (1972:16). I would add to Bordwell’s statement
that Vertov and Eisenstein themselves constituted two rather different “strands”
in the development of montage cinema, and that Pudovkin hardly slavishly fol-
lowed Kuleshov’s ideas. The internal contradictions of the Soviet montage cinema
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“school” were more complex than any straightforward binary division.
Furthermore, the reciprocal relationship between propaganda and its audi-
ence is usually neglected when Soviet montage cinema is considered as a form
of propaganda. In most analyses, propaganda tends to be viewed as a one-way
process, as the mere imposition of the propagandist’s views on the propagandee’s
passive psyche, as is the case with Kenez (1985) or Taylor (1998), for example,
who implicitly portray the Soviet people as passive receptacles for Bolshevik pro-
paganda (Kenez 1985:255). There is a tendency to regard cinema audiences as
being particularly passive. As Trotsky rather naively put it in 1923, “The cinema
satisfies [. . . ] in a very direct, visual, picturesque and vital way, requiring noth-
ing from the audience” (Taylor and Christie 1988:95). I hope to demonstrate just
how mistaken such an attitude actually is, particularly with regard to montage
cinema. The link between propaganda and rhetoric as a means of constructing
persuasive discourses is also often denied, for example by Bennett and O’Rourke
(2006), who contrast “good” rhetoric, which they claim appeals to reason, with
“bad” propaganda, which they claim appeals to the emotions. This distinction
was simply not recognised by the Soviet montage film-makers, and my own work
affirms and investigates this link.
By regarding propaganda as a complex phenomenon with various modalities
and strategies rather than taking the restricted and undifferentiated definition
usually employed in studies of Soviet cinema, I believe I have been able to gain
greater insight into the different and sometimes conflicting modes of propaganda
being used by the Soviet montage directors. In particular, I have been able to
classify the films of Eisenstein and Pudovkin as transactive, vertical agitation
propaganda and the films of Vertov as transactive, horizontal agitation propa-
ganda.
Moreover, I have applied the theory of the system of the suture to Soviet
montage cinema in order to provide a new way of understanding the differences
(and the similarities) between Soviet montage cinema and classical continuity
cinema at the level of enunciation rather than merely in terms of their technical
procedures or political content. In particular, analysing the effectivity of the
Kuleshov Effect in terms of the system of the suture can reveal new ways of
understanding the psychoanalytic basis of the Effect itself, and can perhaps make
it more plausible that such an effect does indeed exist (an assumption which has
been challenged in recent years, for example by Aumont (1986) and Prince and
1.4. Significance of the research 8
Hensley (1992)). It is my contention that, just as the analyst’s refusal to suture
(Heath 1981:85) can enable the analysand to be “cured”, the montage film-makers’
refusal to entirely suture the spectator into the filmic text enables them to de-
naturalise the ideology embodied in the enunciation of their films and thereby free
the spectator from the “trap” of being ideologically interpellated by the suturing
process. For the purposes of this thesis, I have adopted the definition of ideology
given by Althusser: “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals
to their real conditions of existence” (2001:109); by this definition, ideology is
analogous to the infant’s misrecognition of its own mirror image in the Lacanian
mirror stage. Combining an Althusserian definition of ideology with the theory
of the system of the suture leads me to conclude that ideology manifests itself in
classical style films and in montage films (to the extent that they use a suturing
process) on the level of the enunciation of the filmic text; that is, in the rhetoric
of the film. As Lacan put it, “What is important is the version of the text, and
that, Freud tells us, is given in the telling of the dream – that is, in its rhetoric”
(1977:57), which echoes Eisenstein’s assertion that “[f]orm is always ideology. And
form always turns out to be real ideology. That is, ideology that really applies
and not what passes for ideology in the idle prattle of the talkers” (Eisenstein
1988:241; original emphasis).
However, I also argue that montage cinema differed from classical cinema, as
far as its embodiment of ideology is concerned, in trying to liberate the spectator
from Althusserian ideological interpellation by subverting the suturing process
by which, according to Oudart and Dayan, classical cinema “traps” the specta-
tor. But when socialist realism was imposed by the Soviet regime as the only
permissible method of artistic creation from 1934 onwards, montage cinema was
suppressed. Socialist realist cinema then reinstated the process of ideological in-
terpellation by returning to the continuity devices and the suturing processes of
classical Hollywood cinema, the “tutor-code of classical cinema”, as Dayan has
called it. The head of the Soviet cinema industry at the time, Boris Shumyatsky,
even had the grandiose ambition of creating a Hollywood-style “Cine-City” on the
Black Sea coast (Taylor and Christie 1988:374). Socialist realist cinema there-
fore became a medium for integration propaganda, like Hollywood, rather than
the kind of agitation propaganda which montage cinema had been. As Graham
Roberts points out,
this ‘enlightening’ approach, wherein an art form has to raise the con-
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sciousness of the audience rather than succumbing to the lowest common
denominator, does not sit well with the urgent exigencies of the Stalin-
ist plan to supercharge the productive powers of the Soviet Union and its
citizens overnight. (Roberts 1999:67)
Since it is the “reality effect” generated by the system of the suture which ulti-
mately naturalises the ideology in the enunciation of the filmic text, it follows
that the only way to ultimately liberate the spectator from the suturing process
is to create “a cinematography not based on the system of representation” (Dayan
1974:28). Dayan denied that such a cinematography exists. However, he did not
speculate as to whether there could be a cinematic equivalent of the codes of
enunciation of avant-garde painting, particularly abstract painting. Such a cin-
ema could well constitute the non-representational cinematography which Dayan
wished for. In my thesis, I investigate whether Soviet montage cinema itself
might, at least potentially, have been such a cinematography by using Peircean
semiotics to compare it with Malevich’s concept of “non-objective cinema”. One
of my conclusions is that Vertov, at least, did indeed go some way towards creat-
ing such a non-representational cinematography and could be regarded as being
at least as much a Suprematist film-maker as a Constructivist one, which is the
status claimed for him by Vlada Petrić (1987).
The ultimate ambition of the montage directors was, I would suggest, far
greater than merely providing propaganda support for whatever “general line”
the Communist Party happened to espouse at any given moment. They actu-
ally aspired to reorganise human consciousness in accordance with the ideolog-
ical principles of revolutionary Communism, and montage provided them with
the rhetorical techniques which could, they hoped, induce that transformation.
Eisenstein and Vertov, in particular, though in somewhat different ways, wished
to produce revolutionary consciousness on a mass scale. In that respect, film
montage was true to its origins as an industrial mass-production technique. The
montage directors regarded their own films as not so much works of art as machine
tools, part of the means of production for a certain sort of human consciousness.
In Jonathan Beller’s words, “Ultimately, the early films [of Eisenstein] are propa-
ganda machines (of a very complex kind) designed to capture the imagination of
the masses” (1995:206).
While this process of production required a transactive interaction between
the filmic text and the spectator and was ultimately aimed at the political en-
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lightenment of the spectator, it was itself largely a coercive process. As Kenez
has noted, montage cinema was supportive of an existing authority structure,
the Soviet state, and its social functioning was to rally support for that author-
ity structure. Kenez denies montage cinema any status as being “revolutionary”
for that reason (2001:48), but in fact I would claim that it actually was a rev-
olutionary cinema, albeit not a liberal one. Its liberational aspirations (which
certainly existed) were postponed to an indefinite future after the achievement of
a peaceful worldwide Communist society. The means used to help achieve that
ultimate liberation and freedom were actually (and, they believed, necessarily)
coercive and authoritarian. This was, of course, fully in accordance with Marx-
ist ideology. Frederick Engels had frankly asserted as long ago as 1872 that “[a]
revolution is the most authoritarian thing there is” (Marx and Engels 1978:733).
André Bazin condemned film montage for its authoritarianism and its alleged
coercion of the spectator. It may have been coercive, but it was no more coercive
than what Lacan has called “the Real”, and its aim was ultimately to stimulate
human consciousness, to awaken the power of human reason, and to force peo-
ple to think about and to intervene in the world around them; to change the
world for the better. After all, as Bertolt Brecht put it, “Propaganda that stim-
ulates thinking, in no matter what field, is useful to the cause of the oppressed”
(1966:146).
1.5 Thesis outline
Firstly, in chapter 2 I shall establish the historical and cultural context of Soviet
montage cinema, and the ways in which that context had a determining influence
on its nature as a form of propaganda and political rhetoric.
Chapter 3 will outline some of the most recent theories of propaganda, which
will be used to find a definition of propaganda which is appropriate for Soviet
montage cinema and which will be adequate to classify the particular modalities
of propaganda used by the different montage film-makers.
I shall present a transactive psychoanalytic model of rhetoric (Alcorn 1987)
in chapter 4, and then apply it to an analysis of the Kuleshov Effect montage
experiment and suggest ways in which this sort of analysis could be extended to
the work of other montage film-makers.
In chapter 5, I shall compare montage cinema with both classical and Tsarist
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cinema, which itself differed in significant ways from the classical style. I shall
then present the theory of the system of the suture (Oudart 1978, Dayan 1974) as
it applies to classical cinema as a means of analysing the way in which ideology
is embedded in the enunciation of a filmic text.
Chapter 6 will present the application of the theory of the system of the suture
to Soviet montage cinema, using the Kuleshov Effect experiment as a test case.
This chapter will also examine how and to what extent the montage film-makers
subverted the suturing process in their films.
In chapter 7, I shall present Kazimir Malevich’s concept of “non-objective cin-
ema”, and investigate to what extent this corresponds to Dayan’s concept of “a
cinematography which is not based on the system of representation” (1974:28). I
shall use Peircean semiotics to relate Malevich’s Suprematist art to montage cin-
ema in order to investigate how far Soviet montage cinema conformed to Male-
vich’s concept of “non-objective cinema”, and the implications this has for the
political and ideological functioning of montage cinema.
Finally, chapter 8 will present a summary of my conclusions, and will end
with suggestions for some possible avenues for future research.
Chapter 2
Soviet Montage Cinema in Context
In order to properly investigate Soviet montage cinema as a form of political
rhetoric, it is first necessary to examine its historical and social context, the
environment out of which it developed and within which it found its particular
function. What Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell wrote about propaganda
applies equally well to any form of political rhetoric, of which propaganda is
merely the most extreme form:
Propaganda as a process is socially determined. The sociohistorical context
provides a heritage that gives a propagandist motivation and even a style of
communication. In order to understand how propaganda works, it is nec-
essary to consider how the existing sociohistoric context allows it to work.
The propaganda that emerges is the product of forces established long be-
fore the activity originated and is controlled by those forces. (1992:264)
Furthermore, film montage must be placed in its context as part of the astonishing
ferment of the artistic avant-garde in 1920s Soviet Russia. David Bordwell has
pointed out that
[n]o doubt the shortage of raw film stock encouraged the re-editing of old
footage; no doubt the study of Intolerance contributed to the consciousness
of the power of editing. But certain preconditions for the montage style lay
in current avant-garde art movements of which Eisenstein and Vertov were
part. (1972:16)
As Eisenstein once put it, “All these theories are not the individual creation of
myself or Pudovkin or Kuleshov, but the tendency of the time” (Seton 1960:490).
This chapter will present the historical and cultural context of Soviet montage
12
2.1. Tsarist cinema 13
cinema, and will examine the ways in which that context influenced its nature as
political rhetoric.
2.1 Tsarist cinema
Tsarist film-makers were less advanced technically and aesthetically than their
contemporaries elsewhere in Europe. Although Peter Kenez has suggested that
“[s]ome works produced in Russia were on as high an artistic level as anywhere
in the world” (2001:18), the only examples he gives of Tsarist films on this high
artistic level are some of the films of Yevgeni Bauer and Yakov Protazanov, in
particular the latter’s Father Sergius (1918) (2001:22). However, those films
appeared only at the very end of the Tsarist era; Father Sergius, for example,
was released in early 1918, thereby barely qualifying as a Tsarist film at all.
It can therefore be said that Tsarist cinema, compared to its contemporaries
in America and elsewhere in Europe, was rather a late developer. Moreover, the
October Revolution cut short any further aesthetic and technical progress it might
otherwise have made. Indeed, the vocal consignment of almost all Tsarist film-
makers to the rubbish heap of history by the leading Soviet montage film-makers2
is symptomatic of the fact that the influence of Tsarist cinema on Soviet montage
cinema was an almost completely negative one – it was what the montage directors
were reacting against when they formulated their own radical ideas about how
films should be made. Tsarist cinema itself has been almost totally overshadowed
by the later Soviet cinema, especially montage cinema; as Jay Leyda (1983:11-
16) and Ian Christie (Taylor and Christie 1988:xx) have noted, before the recent
work of Yuri Tsivian (1990;1998) and other scholars it was relatively neglected.3
Nevertheless, it is vital to have a clear conception of the kind of cinema against
which film-makers like Sergei Eisenstein, Vsevolod Pudovkin and especially Dziga
Vertov were reacting when they formulated their radical film theories. Soviet
montage cinema was not founded in a cultural and political vacuum, but was
created in conscious opposition to a kind of film-making, and a kind of film
consumption, which once dominated the Russian cinema industry.
Early cinema in Tsarist Russia had a tremendous, almost visceral impact on
its audience, which at that time consisted largely of a semi-literate urban prole-
tariat and peasantry who had had little or no contact with modern technology or
mass media. Even a sophisticated spectator like Maxim Gorky felt this powerful
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effect while watching the Lumière brothers’ short film The Arrival of a Train at
La Ciotat Station [L’arrivée du train en gare de la Ciotat, 1895] at the Nizhny
Novgorod fair in 1896:
Yesterday I was in the Kingdom of Shadows.
If only you knew how strange it is to be there. There are no sounds, no
colours. There, everything – the earth, the trees, the people, the water,
the air – is tinted in a grey monotone: in a grey sky there are grey rays of
sunlight; in grey faces, grey eyes, and the leaves of the trees are grey like
ashes. This is not life but the shadow of life and this is not movement but
the soundless shadow of movement.
I must explain, lest I be suspected of symbolism or madness. I was at
Aumont’s café and I was watching the Lumières’ cinematograph – moving
photographs. The impression it produced was so unusual, so original and
complex, that I can hardly convey it in all its nuances, but I can attempt
to convey its essence.
[. . . ] Suddenly there is a click, everything vanishes and a railway train
appears on the screen. It darts like an arrow straight towards you – watch
out! It seems as though it is about to rush into the darkness where you are
sitting and reduce you to a mangled sack of skin, full of crumpled flesh and
splintered bones, and destroy this hall and this building, so full of wine,
women, music and vice, and transform it into fragments and into dust.
But this, too, is merely a train of shadows.4 (Taylor and Christie 1988:25-
26)
Yuri Tsivian has suggested that Gorky’s ambivalent response to the Lumière film
may have been influenced by the fact that the primary money-making enterprise
of Aumont’s café chantant at the Nizhny Novgorod Fair was prostitution. As
Tsivian points out, the way film was received in Russian culture at this time
differed somewhat from the way it was received in the country where it was
invented. The Lumières’ first performances in France were set up as scientific
demonstrations, but in Russia the public was introduced to cinema in rather
more disreputable circumstances (Tsivian 1998:36).
The cinema was initially used almost exclusively as escapism from the squalor
and tedium of everyday life for the urban working class and (when available to
them) the peasantry. In fact, the cinema became widely known in those early
years as “illusions”, a very telling label. In Richard Taylor’s words, “The new
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cinemas were given names like ‘Illusion’, ‘Marvel’, ‘Mirage’, ‘Fantasia’ and ‘World
of Wonders’ and the generic term developed from ‘theatres of living photography’
or ‘electrotheatres’ to the more popular ‘illusions’ ” (1998:22).5
At this stage in its development, the cinema in Russia looked set to become lit-
tle more than one more “opium of the people” (alongside vodka and the church, in
the opinion of the Bolsheviks). This was a period of intense competition between
rival Russian film studios, which aimed to appeal mostly to an unsophisticated
audience with sensationalist and escapist films in order to maximise quick profits
in a financially insecure industry. However, the visceral, non-aestheticised re-
sponse to these films by a relatively untutored audience was to play an important
part in the formation of the Soviet montage directors’ attitudes towards the po-
tential of films to have a powerful effect on the consciousness of an audience, and
towards the uses to which cinema could be put.
The popularity of the Tsarist cinema is attested by the fact that by 1913 there
were 1,453 cinemas in the Russian Empire: 134 in St Petersburg, 107 in Moscow,
25 in Odessa, 21 in Riga and the rest in small provincial towns (Kenez 2001:11).
Moreover, between 1913 and 1916 Tsarist cinemas began to repeat their film
programmes five or six times daily rather than only two or three (Taylor 1979:12).
The size of cinemas also underwent a gradual expansion during this period: as
early as 1908, cinema theatres large enough to hold three hundred people were
being constructed (Tsivian 1998:19). In the year 1913, 129 films were produced
in the Russian Empire, and by 1916 there were 47 Russian film-producing firms
which produced 499 full-length feature films (Taylor 1979:11), and about 1,800
newsreels were released in Russia between 1907 and the First World War (Roberts
1999:11).
However, the ruling class of Tsarist Russia responded rather less enthusias-
tically to the new entertainment medium. Although the first film ever made in
Russia was of Tsar Nicholas II’s coronation in May 1896 (Coronation of the Tsar
[Couronnement du Czar, 1896]) (Leyda 1983:18-19,405),6 the Tsarist government
was at first indifferent if not downright hostile towards the new medium. As late
as 1913, and despite his own private enjoyment of cinema,7 Nicholas II could
write that
I consider cinematography an empty, useless, and even pernicious diversion.
Only an abnormal person could place this sideshow business on a level with
art. It is all nonsense, and no importance should be lent to such trash. (Qtd.
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in Leyda 1983:69).8
This is in striking contrast to the Soviet government’s attitude just a few years
later. By 1922, Lenin was to assert that “of all the arts for us the cinema is
the most important” (Taylor and Christie 1988:57). Lenin’s statement referred
of course to the ideological and agitational uses to which cinema could be put by
a newly installed regime seeking to convince the masses of its political and moral
legitimacy, rather than to any supposed aesthetic superiority of cinema as an art
form. Nevertheless, Nicholas II’s dismissal of cinema tout court is indicative of
the Tsarist regime’s general lack of appreciation of the potential of cinema to
build support for the regime in the general population, and is symptomatic of its
more general failure to understand the need for an ideological justification of its
power beyond the mere assertion of the Tsar’s so-called divine right to rule the
Russian Empire autocratically. As Edward Bernays pointed out in 1928,
Formerly the rulers were the leaders. They laid out the course of history,
by the simple process of doing what they wanted. And if nowadays the
successors of the rulers, those whose position or ability gives them power,
can no longer do what they want without the approval of the masses, they
find in propaganda a tool which is increasingly powerful in gaining that
approval. (2005:54)
The Tsarist regime never seems to have made that transition, a fact which may
have contributed to its downfall. It was only during the First World War that
cinema began to be used even half-heartedly as a medium of propaganda by the
Tsarist regime, to persuade the Russian people that the enemy was immoral and
barbaric and the sacrifices of the war were therefore necessary, and also that the
war effort itself was progressing well. In fact, the outbreak of the Great War in
1914 transformed the nature of Tsarist cinema. The economic blockade caused
by the Great War led to a collapse in the importation of foreign films and a
corresponding (though inadequate) rise of Russian-produced films. Immediately
before 1914, about 90% of films shown in Russia were imported from abroad,
while by 1916 that figure had fallen to only 20% (Taylor 1979:9,11).
2.2 The Great War (1914-18)
In retrospect, the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 can be seen as the beginning
of the institutional and artistic transition between Tsarist cinema and Soviet
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cinema, a transition which was not really completed until the early 1920s.
As was the case for the whole of Europe, the first serious attempts to use
cinema for propaganda purposes in Russia began during the Great War. The
pressures of “total war” led to a new relationship between the rulers and the
ruled. As Jowett & O’Donnell have noted,
For the first time in history nations were forced to draw on the collective
power of their entire populations by linking the individual to a larger so-
cietal need. As DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1982) have pointed out, “It
became essential to mobilize sentiments and loyalties, to instill in citizens
a hatred and fear of the enemy, to maintain their morale in the face of pri-
vation, and to capture their energies into an effective contribution to their
nation.” (1992:172)
Modern propaganda – that is, propaganda associated with secular politics rather
than religion – therefore originated during the Great War as a response to the
need to mobilise the population to meet the unprecedented demands of total
war. As early as March 1914, the Skobelev Committee (a charity which had
been founded to assist veterans of the Russo-Japanese War)9 set up a Military
Film Section, which was later given the monopoly on filming at the front when
the Great War broke out. However, there were press complaints about the spar-
sity and poor quality of its films, and its unsatisfactory performance led to its
monopoly being revoked by the government. The fundamental problem was that
the Skobelev Committee was absurdly under-equipped for the task assigned to
it: it had only five cameramen to deploy on the entire Eastern Front, and two
of them were not even Russian (Roberts 1999:12, Kenez 2001:20). To give the
monopoly of filming the entire Eastern Front of the Great War to such a tiny
organisation is symptomatic of the suspicion with which the Tsarist authorities
regarded any attempt to communicate information or ideas to the masses. The
Tsarist system lacked a coherent ideology, and failed to even see the need for one;
their deployment of cinema for propaganda purposes was therefore half-hearted
and wholly inadequate, in striking contrast to the Bolsheviks’ later exploitation
of cinema’s enormous propaganda potential. More effective as propaganda were
the Tsarist newsreels supposedly filmed at the front by private producers. How-
ever, because of the technical and logistical difficulties of actually filming on the
front lines, many of the political propaganda films of the period involved blatant
deception of the public; often, the privately produced newsreels were merely pre-
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war newsreels with new intertitles added for the occasion (Taylor 1979:12-13).
For example, one contemporary journalist complained that “[a]n excerpt from a
Pathé newsreel of 1911 showing a forest fire near San Francisco was described here
as Fire in Argonnes. We come across such deceptions every day” (qtd. in Taylor
1979:13), and Taylor mentions a film called “The Holy War [1914] (allegedly a
First World War newsreel, but in fact a collection of pre-war film with new and
falsified subtitles)” (Taylor 1998:25).10
Interestingly, this practice of assembling new films from recycled fragments of
old films foreshadowed the later use made by Lev Kuleshov of similar cinematic
deception in his montage experiments of the early 1920s, in which he would assem-
ble a “fabricated landscape” from widely separated locations around the world to
create the illusion of spatial contiguity (Kuleshov 1987:137, Tsivian et al. 1996).11
The “fabricated landcape” was a montage experiment first proposed by Kuleshov
in his 1920 article ‘The Banner of Cinematography’ (Kuleshov 1987:37-55) and
actually carried out by his Workshop some time in the early 1920s (1987:137). In
Kuleshov’s own words,
it is the possibility of ‘creating’ a nonexistent terrain and the fact that the
components of a scene can be shot at any time as long as they are held
together by the time of cinematic action. If we split a scene into major
elements and start shooting in one part of the city, then continue somewhere
else and complete the scene in yet another place, we can get, by splicing the
pieces correctly, our own artificial landscape: different locations will come
together to provide a single setting on the screen. (Kuleshov 1987:43-44)
What was a crude attempt at deception for propaganda purposes by Tsarist
newsreel film-makers would, in Kuleshov’s hands, become a radical new artistic
technique. Kuleshov’s innovation involved much more than merely relabelling
a one-shot scene of a given location as having been shot at a different location
by adding fraudulent intertitles. In his montage experiment, Kuleshov assem-
bled fragments of film which had been shot in widely separated locations, the
assemblage being unified by matches on eyeline and matches on action in order
to create an imaginary single location in the mind of the spectator. This involved
the deconstruction of the unitary space of the single shot and the synthetic cre-
ation of an artificial unified space, existing only in the mind of the spectator,
by juxtaposing montage fragments. This was far more sophisticated than any-
thing being done by any of the propaganda newsreel film-makers of the Great
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War. However, the “fabricated landscape” montage technique could in principle
be used for similar purposes as those of the fraudulent propaganda newsreels –
to inculcate desirable political beliefs in the mind of the audience by consciously
manipulating the way the spectator reads what he or she sees on the screen.
As well as acting as a stimulus for the technical development of film propa-
ganda, one of the most important effects on Russian cinema of the Great War
was the pressure it exerted to establish a government monopoly of the cinema
industry. In 1916, the Minister of the Interior set up a commission to inves-
tigate the possibility of a government film monopoly (Taylor 1979:13-14). The
films produced by this proposed government monopoly would be educational and
propaganda films aimed at the lower classes in order to instil the “correct” politi-
cal opinions into their minds. However, no effective action was taken to establish
this monopoly before the Revolution of February 191712 put an end to the Tsarist
regime itself.
2.3 Revolution and Civil War (1917-21)
The attempts, feeble though they were, to consciously use cinema as an instru-
ment of political propaganda in Tsarist Russia could be seen as the embryo of
the later Soviet government monopoly over cinema (and, indeed, all other art
forms) and as the embryo of its explicit policy towards cinema: to make use of
these artistic and mass media for propaganda purposes. Such ideas, falling on
stony ground in 1916 due to the administrative inadequacies of the Tsarist regime
and the distractions of the Great War, were to resurface after October 1917 with
renewed vigour, and this time they would be acted upon. Russian cinema was
finally nationalised (on paper if not in practice) by the Bolshevik government on
27 August 1919.13 However, this “nationalisation” was more a statement of in-
tent than an actual, implemented policy, and the Soviet cinema industry was not
brought fully under the ownership and control of the Soviet state until the early
1930s. The reasons for this delay include the appallingly poor infrastructure of
the Soviet economy, the difficulties encountered in re-equipping the cinema indus-
try after the devastations of the Revolution and Civil War, and the administrative
failure to properly co-ordinate the initial attempts at nationalisation.14
The initial failure to properly nationalise the cinema industry was at least
partly due to the destruction caused by the long and bitter Civil War (1918-21)
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which followed the October Revolution. While the Bolshevik Revolution itself
was relatively bloodless, the attempted counter-revolution devastated the coun-
try, largely destroyed its infrastructure and led to the deaths of millions of people.
In particular, the Russian urban proletariat, in whose name the Bolshevik Rev-
olution had taken place, was almost completely destroyed as a class. In Lenin’s
own words, “The proletariat has become declassed, i.e., dislodged from its class
groove and has ceased to exist as a proletariat” (qtd. in Harding 1996:154). The
Bolshevik government could therefore not rely on the “natural” class consciousness
of the proletariat in their attempt to create a socialist society, but would have to
rebuild a socially- and politically-conscious working class themselves using all the
means of education and propaganda at their disposal. In this bitter struggle for
its very survival, the Bolshevik government therefore found it absolutely essential
to engage in an ideological propaganda war against capitalism. Graham Roberts
has rightly described how the Bolsheviks “were faced, in Gramsci’s terms, with
the difficulties of having triumphed in a ‘war of position’ without a convincing
victory in the ‘war of manoeuvre’. The citadel had been stormed but the trenches,
in which counter-revolution could form, remained intact” (Roberts 1999:15). At
the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, the only Party Congress in the entire
history of the Soviet Union to discuss the issue of propaganda, Preobrazhensky
argued that the subjective views of the people do not change as rapidly as the
objective social and economic realities (Kenez 1985:125). This meant there was
a gap between the readiness of the Bolshevik government, having seized power
and “expropriated the expropriators”, to lead the people in their task of building
socialism and the readiness of the people to actually carry out that task. Politi-
cal education – propaganda in other words – was therefore essential to create the
necessary subjective views in the minds of the people to enable them to carry out
the objective tasks required to build socialism. As Peter Kenez has said,
the Bolshevik regime was the first to not merely set itself propaganda goals
but also through political education to aim to create a new humanity suit-
able for living in a new society. No previous state had similar ambitions,
and no leaders had paid comparable attention to the issues of persuasion.
(1985:4)
The sheer size and the underdevelopment of Russia as a nation made this task
both vital and extraordinarily difficult. The extent of this difficulty is suggested
by an observation made by Lenin’s wife Nadezhda Krupskaya in her memoir of a
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propaganda tour of the Volga and Kama rivers on the Red Star cruiser in 1919.
She described how the local Red Army soldiers were unaware even of the existence
of the Central Executive Committee more than eighteen months after the Octo-
ber Revolution, and refused to recognise passes issued by it (Taylor 1979:59).15
Because of the backwardness of Russia at that time, it was paradoxically the
most modern of the mass media which therefore proved most useful as a vehi-
cle for propaganda. The fact that cinema was primarily a visual medium meant
that it could be used to communicate even with an illiterate population – in So-
viet Russia in 1920, 60% of the population could neither read nor write (Kenez
2001:28). Cinema was also an attractive medium for the Bolsheviks because it
was a modern technology which provided radically new means of representation
and communication, and was therefore experienced by the majority of the Rus-
sian people as being in itself a symbol of the power and the promise of industrial
modernity. This was something the new, radical, modernising revolutionary gov-
ernment clearly wanted to be associated with.
Before proceeding further, however, an important issue of terminology must
be considered. In Russian Marxism, a distinction has traditionally been drawn
between “agitation” and “propaganda”, a distinction which does not exist so clearly
in English. It was the “father of Russian Marxism”, Georgi Plekhanov, who first
drew the distinction. In 1892, he wrote: “A propagandist presents many ideas to
one or a few persons; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents
them to a whole mass of people” (qtd. in Taylor 1979:27; original emphasis).
Lenin refined the distinction in What is to be Done? :
the propagandist [. . . ] must present ‘many ideas’, so many indeed that
they will be widely understood as an integral whole only by a (compar-
atively) few persons. The agitator, however, [. . . ] will direct his efforts
to presenting a single idea to the ‘masses’ [. . . ]; he will strive to arouse
discontent and indignation among the masses against this crying injustice,
leaving a more complete explanation of this contradiction to the propa-
gandist. Consequently the propagandist operates chiefly by means of the
printed word; the agitator by means of the spoken word. (Lenin 1988:132;
original emphasis)
In other words, propaganda tends to be rational and abstract, appealing to the
minds of its audience, whereas agitation tends to be emotive, making its ap-
peal primarily to the hearts of its audience. Lenin also implied that agitation
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is associated with performance (for example, making a speech), while he asso-
ciated propaganda with a more abstract and discursive form of communication.
By Plekhanov’s and Lenin’s definitions, the agitki films of the Civil War period
were clearly an example of agitation rather than propaganda, as Richard Taylor
has pointed out (1979:28); in fact, the distinction between agitation and propa-
ganda seems to have been generally valid during the Civil War – throughout this
period the Bolshevik government primarily created agitation rather than propa-
ganda (by their own definition), due to the extreme conditions of the period.
However, as social and political conditions stabilised in the Soviet Union during
the 1920s, the distinction between agitation and propaganda became increasingly
blurred. In Richard Taylor’s words, “The elements of agitation and propaganda
in a film such as Bronenosets Potëmkin (Battleship Potemkin) are inextricably
intertwined” (1979:28).16 Taylor’s conclusion that “[i]n a discussion of the Soviet
cinema in the 1920s the distinction made between agitation and propaganda is
not then on the whole a useful one” (1979:28) therefore became increasingly valid
throughout the 1920s. However, Graham Roberts has argued that the distinc-
tion between agitation and propaganda in the Russian political tradition had the
unfortunate effect of distorting the creative development of Soviet cinema, since
it “led to pressures for simplicity and directness which distorted creative devel-
opment, and quite possibly its effectiveness as a propaganda weapon” (Roberts
1999:15). I find this less than plausible, since the distinction between agitation
and propaganda was only maintained with any degree of rigour during the Civil
War period, becoming increasingly blurred thereafter and almost meaningless by
the time the great Soviet montage films were being made from the mid-1920s
onwards. I shall therefore follow Taylor’s example and henceforth use the term
“propaganda” to refer to both “agitation” and “propaganda” in the Russian Marx-
ist sense.17
To return to the development of the nascent Soviet cinema, it can be said that
perhaps the most significant effect of the Great War, the two Revolutions of 1917
and the Civil War which followed was the institutional and material collapse of the
Tsarist cinema industry. The Soviet government was therefore forced to construct
its film industry from almost nothing. After the February Revolution there was an
unstoppable haemorrhage of the raw material of the cinema industry – producers
and directors fled the political and economic instability of revolutionary Russia,
taking props, cameras and precious film stock with them. Following the October
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Revolution, the majority of Russian cinema’s leading producers, directors and
actors were to go into exile, and Soviet cinema was thereby deprived of most of
the human and material assets of Tsarist cinema during its crucial early years.
Problems had already arisen even before the February Revolution – because the
Tsarist film industry had obtained most of its film stock from western Europe
(principally France),18 the blockades and transportation difficulties caused by the
outbreak of the Great War had starved the Russian cinema industry of new film
stock. The shortages were so severe that there was a sevenfold increase in the
price of film stock over five years (Taylor 1979:10-11). The collapse of the Tsarist
regime and the Bolsheviks’ rise to power induced the remaining film producers and
directors to either bury their remaining film stock in the hope that the Bolshevik
regime would collapse within a few weeks, or to flee towards the south of Russia
with their cameras, props and film stock. Following the Bolshevik victory in the
Civil War, most of these Tsarist film-makers and producers fled abroad and the
Soviet Union lost their film-making equipment and film stock forever.19 Tsivian
has described the effects of the chronic shortage of film stock on Soviet cinema
just after the Civil War:
Writing about the conditions under which films were made in 1919, Aleinik-
ov20 recalled that before filming began expeditions were sent throughout the
country (to Kiev and Odessa in particular) to collect any surviving stocks
of unexposed film. What stock they managed to find was usually damaged,
covered with a tracery of fine cracks due to poor storage conditions, or
‘fogged’ due to part exposure. This stock, which earlier would have been
condemned as unusable, was used. (1998:107)
This loss of most of the human and material resources of Tsarist cinema was to
have profound consequences for the development of Soviet cinema, particularly
that part of it which became known as “montage cinema”. The absence of older,
established film-makers allowed a younger generation, more radical in their poli-
tics and more daring and innovative in their technique, to ascend rapidly and to
make their mark sooner and more profoundly than might otherwise have been pos-
sible. Sergei Yutkevich, an early collaborator with Eisenstein and the co-creator
of the concept of the “montage of attractions”, spoke of this in an interview in
the mid-1960s:
We were incredibly young! We were sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds when
we entered upon our artistic lives. The explanation is quite simple: the
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Revolution had made way for the young. It has to be remembered that an
entire generation had disappeared. Our elders had been dispersed through-
out the country, or had perished in the Civil War, or had left Russia. Hence
the Republic lacked a clear organization, lacked people; and our way in was
easy – the country wanted us to work, the country needed people in every
department of culture. (Yutkevitch 1973:13)
Kuleshov himself later summed up in his memoirs the material deprivation as
well as the opportunities these young film-makers faced:
I remember one of the film factories abandoned by its owner in the win-
ter, I think, of 1919: amidst the ramshackle buildings remnant pieces of
broken furniture stood in the snowbanks, while on top of a table, peeking
from underneath a layer of snow was a rusting typewriter with a sheet of
paper left in its roller. This is what the “technical basis” of Soviet artistic
cinematography amounted to in the days of its establishment! (Kuleshov
1974:206)
This difficult period in Russian history created an institutional and political dis-
continuity between Tsarist and Soviet cinema, and set Soviet cinema on its sepa-
rate artistic path. The consequences of this discontinuity for the material condi-
tions of film production in the Soviet Union, and its triggering of a change in the
purposes for which cinema was employed, created the ideological and political
basis for the theories of the montage directors, who were united in a Marxist
interpretation of reality and in their determination to create a consciously polit-
ical and agitational cinema. It was during this period that the men who were to
become the principal Soviet montage directors first emerged as film-makers: Lev
Kuleshov, Vsevolod Pudovkin, Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov. In Richard
Taylor words, “Their experience at this time did much to shape the theories of
the cinema that they developed separately later” (1979:55).
2.4 The early careers of the montage film-makers
Kuleshov
Lev Vladimirovich Kuleshov (1899-1970) started his career as a film-maker in the
Tsarist cinema insustry, working as a set designer for the film director Yevgeni
Bauer before becoming a director in his own right. His film Engineer Prite’s
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Project (1917), completed when he was just 18 years old, was “the first Russian
film made according to the conception of montage”, according to Kuleshov himself
(1973:67). Following the October Revolution, he became head of the Newsreel
and Re-editing Section of Narkompros (the People’s Commissariat for Education,
which was then in charge of the Soviet film industry), where he briefly worked
with Dziga Vertov (Kuleshov 1987:211). At about this time, Kuleshov carried
out a series of film experiments, with the assistance of Vsevolod Pudovkin, which
established the theory and practice of “film montage”. Kuleshov is therefore
credited with the actual invention of film montage itself (Schnitzer and Martin
1973:65-76).
The concept of montage is derived from modern industry and refers to the
assembly of ready-made elements. The word “montage” itself is derived from the
French word monter meaning “to mount”, and in modern times refers specifically
to the mass production of industrial goods on an assembly line. The word has been
applied to certain forms of avant-garde art from about 1910 onwards. Eisenstein
himself gave a definition of montage which emphasised its origin in industrial
production:
Everyday language borrowed from industry a word denoting the assembling
of machinery, pipes, machine tools.
This striking word is “montage” which means assembling, and though it
was not yet in vogue, it had every qualification to become fashionable.
(Eisenstein 1970:17)
In this respect, the use of montage techniques in art represented a rejection of the
“spiritual” or transcendental view of art, popular among the Russian Symbolists
of the 1900s and 1910s, in favour of both a materialist view of art as a branch of
industrial production and of the proletarianisation of artists themselves.
Kuleshov himself went on to make a series of agitki films during the Civil
War. His cameraman on these films, Eduard Tisse, would later work as the
cameraman for most of Eisenstein’s montage films in the 1920s. After the First
State Film School (later to be called VGIK) was founded in Moscow in 1919,
Kuleshov joined it and set up his own “Workshop” as an avant-garde alternative
to the conservative ideas of the head of the Film School, Vladimir Gardin. After
shooting another agitka film, On the Red Front (1920), the Kuleshov Workshop
carried out a further series of montage experiments, including the “films without
film”, theatrical performances which mimicked cinematic techniques and effects,
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a procedure forced on Kuleshov by the acute shortage of film stock at that time.
He also developed a novel approach to film acting based on the concept of the
actor as a “actor-model” [naturshchik ] whose performance could be manipulated
by the film director using montage. For three months, Eisenstein studied at the
Kuleshov Workshop before going on to make his own first film, the short Glumov’s
Diary (1923). The Workshop itself finally completed its own first major feature
film, The Extraordinary Adventures of Mr. West in the Land of the Bolsheviks,
in 1924. The film was a great success, but the Workshop itself disbanded shortly
thereafter and Kuleshov continued to work as a film director before ultimately
being sidelined after the imposition of socialist realism in the mid-1930s.
Kuleshov placed special emphasis on the construction of a film out of montage
fragments and deliberately neglected such things as the composition of particular
shots or the manipulation of contrasts within a shot. Each shot, in Kuleshov’s
view, had to be as simple as possible to serve as a “brick” in the montage con-
struction. As Kuleshov himself said,
we [could not] win on all fronts at once. The war declared by our cine-
matographic faction was basically a battle for montage as the cornerstone
of cinematography . We proclaimed its priority as compared with separate
shots and filmic material, which, we said, were of secondary importance,
and therefore, could be studied later. (Kuleshov 1987:135; original empha-
sis)
Eisenstein, by contrast, from the outset of his career treated the individual shot as
itself a complex “montage cell” rather than a simple “brick” and regarded montage
as occurring within shots as well as between shots.21 Of course, Kuleshov should
not be condemned for the relative crudity and bias of his approach. He was, after
all, the first Soviet montage film-maker and, in his own words,
It is only natural that the first steps in the study of our craft are charac-
terized by a certain formal bias. There is no call to be afraid of this, let
alone protest against it. It is unavoidable in any learner’s first ventures.
(Kuleshov 1987:60)
Pudovkin
Vsevolod Illarionovich Pudovkin (1893-1953) completed his university studies af-
ter serving in the Great War between 1915 and 1918, and worked in a chemistry
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laboratory until 1919. In 1920, he joined Kuleshov’s film Workshop which was
attached to the State Cinema School and assisted Kuleshov in many of his early
film montage experiments. Like Vertov, Pudovkin gained his first experience as
a film-maker by making short agitki films during the Civil War period, under
the tutelage of Vladimir Gardin, the head of the new State Film School, who
had been an experienced producer-director in Tsarist cinema. Gardin taught his
students the conservative fundamentals of film-making, and Kuleshov actually
founded his film Workshop as a radical alternative to the conservatism of the
Film School under Gardin’s direction. Pudovkin had been invited to join the
Kuleshov Workshop as early as 1920, but had chosen to stay with Gardin, col-
laborating with him to make several agitki films. Pudovkin played the part of a
Red Army officer in the agitka film In the Days of Struggle (1920) (directed by
Ivan Perestiani) before working as assistant director and playing the lead char-
acter in Hammer and Sickle (1921) (directed by Gardin). Pudovkin went on to
direct part of Hunger. . . Hunger. . . Hunger (1921), an agitka made as part of
the relief effort for the devastating famine in the Volga region in 1921. Peter
Kenez has noted that “[i]n the most easily measurable terms of money collected,
this film was surely one of the most effective propaganda works ever made for
foreign consumption” (1985:204). The episode directed by Pudovkin and filmed
by Tisse was Pudovkin’s first directorial work with non-actors, an aspect of his
film-making practice for which he later became famous in the 1920s (Dart 1974:1-
2). He then co-wrote another agitka, Locksmith and Chancellor (1923) (directed
by Gardin), before accepting a second invitation to join the Kuleshov Workshop
after it returned from making its own agitki on the Polish front. This was the
beginning of Pudovkin’s study of film montage and his break with the conser-
vative Tsarist traditions of film-making he had learned from Gardin; indeed, he
even assisted Kuleshov in many of his groundbreaking film montage experiments
(Sargeant 2000:4-11). Amy Sargeant has suggested some possible influences of
Gardin on Pudovkin’s work:
Although Pudovkin tends to underplay the influence of Gardin on his work,
Hammer and Sickle is notable for the parallel editing in the final reel [. . . ],
especially in comparison with the end sequences of The Mother ; as in the
war parade in The End of St. Petersburg , the little girl, the mother and
the old man return to the village alone; as in The Mechanics of the Brain,
a mask is used to draw attention to a particular element within a larger
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frame. (2000:2)
However, Pudovkin was later to trace the origin of his basic approach to film-
making back to Kuleshov rather than to Gardin, who seems to have provided him
merely with a solid grounding in the logistics of film-making. Pudovkin acted in
Kuleshov’s films The Extraordinary Adventures of Mister West in the Land of the
Bolsheviks (1924) and The Death Ray (1925), before directing his own first films
such as The Mechanics of the Brain (1926) and Chess Fever (1925).
Eisenstein
Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein (1898-1948), from a middle-class family in Riga22
and originally trained as an engineer, had volunteered for the Red Army in 1918
and had helped construct fortifications and pontoon bridges during the Civil War
before becoming a designer in a Red Army theatre unit at the front. He then
worked in the agit-trains, painting posters and drawing cartoons, before leaving
the Red Army to finish his engineering studies at the Institute of Civil Engineers
in Petrograd. However, in autumn 1920 he dropped out of his engineering course
to briefly study Japanese before joining the Central Proletkult Arena and then
Vsevolod Meyerhold’s Zon Theatre as a designer and eventually a director. Dur-
ing the early 1920s, he worked as a film editor, censoring and altering Western
films for the Soviet market. Eisenstein is believed to have assisted Esfir Shub23
in editing such films as D. W. Griffith’s Intolerance (1916) and Fritz Lang’s Dr.
Mabuse (1922) (Seton 1960:67). In Jay Leyda’s words, “The first time Eisenstein
ever joined together two pieces of ‘real film’ was while assisting Esther Schub
in the re-editing of Lang’s Dr. Mabuse” (Leyda 1983:11,n). It is from this as-
signment that Eisenstein obtained his first detailed exposure to Western films,
particularly films constructed according to the new “classical style” of Hollywood.
Eisenstein had earlier seen many Tsarist films as a small child in Riga, accom-
panied by his nurse (“The boy was enchanted by the ‘illusions’ even though he
cried the first time” (Leyda 1983:25,n)), but Tsarist films at that time were not
yet made according to the principles of the classical style.
Eisenstein then spent three months studying with Lev Kuleshov in his famous
film Workshop before making his first short film, Glumov’s Diary (1923), as
part of his stage production of Alexander Ostrovsky’s play Enough Simplicity for
Every Wise Man.24 The centenary of Ostrovsky’s birth fell on 12 April 1923,
2.4. The early careers of the montage film-makers 29
and Anatoli Lunacharsky, the Commissar who was responsible for the direction
of Soviet theatre, had repeatedly used the slogan “Back to Ostrovsky” in his
public speeches to theatre workers, urging them to emulate Ostrovsky’s realism
and careful craftsmanship. Eisenstein’s adaptation of Ostrovsky’s play Enough
Simplicity for Every Wise Man (which he renamed simply Wiseman),25 with its
irreverent deconstruction of the plot, its unmotivated discontinuities, its circus
tricks and slapstick comedy, in short its “montage of attractions”, was a deliberate
provocation against the artistic traditionalism (or “passéism” as the Futurists
called it) which Lunacharsky had advocated (Gerould 1974:73).26 The “montage
of attractions” was a new artistic principle which Eisenstein had formulated in
collaboration with Sergei Yutkevich; his production of Wiseman was his first
application of this principle (Eisenstein 1988:33-38). However, it is worth noting
that the “cinematic” montage of attractions was anticipated as early as 1899 by
none other than Konstantin Stanislavsky, who
was nurturing the idea of a new stage form that he jokingly called the
‘cinematograph’ [sinematograf]. In the vocabulary of the Moscow Art The-
atre the word ‘cinematograph’ developed as the designation for a show that
presented the audience with a sequence of fragmented excerpts instead of
a single action. (Tsivian 1994:9)
The “montage of attractions” can therefore be said to have been originated by
Stanislavsky under the influence of cinema on theatre, was developed into a theory
of theatrical staging by Eisenstein and Yutkevich, and finally became a new way
of making films with Eisenstein’s Glumov’s Diary.
The short film Glumov’s Diary was intended by Eisenstein to be a parody
of Dziga Vertov’s Kinonedelia (1918-19) newsreels, and imitates their format of
a digest of the previous week’s news by presenting the events of the past seven
days as described by Glumov, one of the play’s characters, in his diary. Ironically,
Dziga Vertov himself was initially sent to supervise Eisenstein and his film crew;
in Eisenstein’s own words,
as at Goskino people thought that I might be too mischievous, so they gave
me as a teacher [. . . ] Dziga Vertov!
After the first two or three sequences Vertov left us to our own devices.
(Eisenstein 1974:15)
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The film was eventually completed with Boris Frantzisson, who also filmed Ver-
tov’s Kinopravda series of newsreels, as the cameraman. Vertov would hardly
have enjoyed the fact that his own newsreels were being parodied, and the the-
atricality of the production of Glumov’s Diary was entirely alien to his own ideals.
The lifelong mutual dislike and professional rivalry between Eisenstein and Vertov
probably originated in this period.27
Vertov
Dziga Vertov (1896-1954) was born into a Jewish family as Denis Abelevich28
Kaufman in Bialystok, Poland, in 1896.29 He later chose the name “Dziga Vertov”
when he decided to become a film-maker; “Dziga” is probably an onomatopaeic
imitation of the sound made by film as it moves through a projector and “Vertov”
in Russian suggests rapid movement or a spinning top (Michelson 1984:xviii).30
It is also possible that Vertov may have been influenced in the choice of his
pseudonym by a saying derived from cinema which was popular in Russia in the
1910s: “If the film was going too slowly [the audience] would call out [to the pro-
jectionist] ‘Turn it, Mickey!’ [Mishka, verti!]” (Tsivian 1994:55). Vertov studied
music at the Bialystok Conservatory between 1912 and 1915, then studied at the
Bekhterev Institute of Psychoneurology in Petrograd between 1914 and 1916.31
Following the October Revolution, Vertov became the editor of Kinonedelia, a
weekly newsreel which appeared between June 1918 and July 1919. He produced
several other newsreels during the Civil war, filmed the battle of Tsaritsyn,32 and
later produced a compilation film called History of the Civil War (1922). In that
same year, he founded the Cine-Eye group,33 led by the “Council of Three”: Ver-
tov himself, his brother Mikhail Kaufman and Vertov’s wife Elizaveta Svilova.34
Jeremy Hicks has pointed out that the Cine-Eye group consisted of more than
just the “Council of Three”, at least after 1925 – from then until its collapse just
before The Man with a Movie Camera was made, the Cine-Eye group was a broad
movement with many members (Hicks 2007:140-41,n.44). According to Vertov’s
own account,
We began with five observers. By the end of the first part [of Kino-Eye]
the number had grown to a hundred. ‘Circles of the Friends of the Kinocs’
were formed, and they also developed their activities on a large scale, under
the slogan Kino-Eye. (Tsivian 2004:119)
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Mikhail Kaufman has described its dissolution after just a few years of existence
in the late 1920s:
Two circumstances contributed to the collapse of Kino-Glaz:35 first of all,
the release of A Sixth of the World ; and the refusal to allow us [to] make The
Man With a Movie Camera. After that it was impossible for us to get work,
so we left for Kiev. Out of the whole Kino-Glaz group only Vertov and I
remained. We felt quite confident about the future. (Kaufman 1979:76)
Vertov first put his newly formulated ideas about film montage into practice as
the editor of the Kinopravda newsreel between 1922 and 1925, excerpts from
which he used to compile his first full-length montage film, Kino-Eye (1924).
Seth Feldman has convincingly demonstrated that Vertov’s earlier Kinonedelia
newsreels did not employ montage techniques to any significant extent, and that
it is the later Kinopravda newsreels which represent the emergence of Vertov as
a montage film-maker. As Feldman puts it,
Kinonedelia appears to be edited in a manner that sacrifices cinematic
potentials in order to meet the practical needs of the new Soviet regime.
There are very few instances of the formal cutting which has received so
much attention in discussions of Vertov’s later work. (Feldman 1977:8)
And he concludes that “the object of almost all of Kinonedelia was to present
these themes in the most straightforward manner possible” (1977:47).
These were the principal directors of Soviet montage cinema. They were of
course a tiny minority of all the people who entered the nascent Soviet cinema dur-
ing the early 1920s, most of whom were by no means as innovative or avant-garde
as the montage directors themselves. Furthermore, there were some few directors
who had been prominent in Tsarist cinema who succeeded in continuing their
careers into Soviet times, most notably Vladimir Gardin and Yakov Protazanov.
Soviet cinema was by no means dominated either numerically or institutionally
by directors who were aesthetically avant-garde or politically committed to the
Communist cause – most directors in the Soviet Union, as in the West, were
making films intended to entertain and divert the public rather than attempting
to transform their political views or their way of perceiving the world.36 Soviet
montage cinema, despite its international artistic prestige from the mid-1920s on-
wards, was by no means the mainstream of Soviet cinema as a whole. In Richard
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Taylor’s words, “The entire population most emphatically did not spend the whole
of the 1920s in a darkened auditorium watching the films of Eisenstein, Vertov
and Pudovkin” (qtd. in Roberts 1999:149).37
2.5 Agitki films and agit-trains
However, during the Civil War period, the mainstream of later Soviet cinema
(that is, full-length commercial entertainment films) did not yet exist. Instead,
cinema served explicitly political and even military purposes. The newspaper
Izvestia published an article on February 4, 1919, calling for the privately-owned
film studios which remained in Russia to make propaganda films to explain to the
soldiers, workers and peasants “(1) what the Red Army is fighting for, (2) what
it is fighting against, and (3) how people could aid this combat” (Dart 1974:3).
The result was the production of huge numbers of short agitational films about
particular topics of political importance – the so-called agitki (literally “little
agitational pieces”). The term agitka (plural agitki) was probably derived from
the poet Demyan Bedny’s satirical agitational poems, which he called “agitki”.
One of Bedny’s agitka poems was filmed in autumn 1918, and this may have been
the means by which the word entered Soviet cinema to describe a certain type of
short agitational film (Leyda 1983:134). From the middle of 1918 to the end of
the Civil War in 1921, approximately 60 agitki were produced in Soviet Russia
(Kenez 2001:33), constituting more than two-thirds of all films made by Soviet
film studios from 1918 to 1920 (Taylor 1979:56). The initial shortage of film stock
during this period meant that almost no feature-length films were being produced,
so throughout the Civil War almost all film production was devoted to creating
these shorter newsreels and documentary films and the agitki. The agitki, usually
being only short single-reel films, were cheaper and quicker to produce and were of
more immediate political use to the new regime than feature-length fiction films.
Whereas 245 feature-length films had been made by Russian studios between
February and October 1917, there were only 57 films made in 1919 (Youngblood
1991:appendix 1), of which the majority were agitki only one to four reels long.
By 1922, only 16 films were made in the Soviet Union, of which seven were short
agitki (Youngblood 1992:14). As Peter Kenez has described,
The Civil War destroyed the film industry: studios were idle, the distribu-
tion system stopped functioning, and the film theatres shut down. Moscow,
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for example, had 143 theatres operating before the World War, but in the
fall of 1921 not a single one remained in operation. During the worst pe-
riod in 1921 film showings in Soviet Russia were limited to the exhibition
of agitational films (agitki) at agitational stations (agit-punkty) and to in-
frequent and haphazard showings of agitki at public places in the open air,
such as railway stations. (1985:197)
By 1923, there had been a slow recovery:
In early 1923 in Moscow, there were 90 functioning movie theatres, and in
Petrograd 49. In Moscow 35 were privately owned, 45 were leased from
the government by private entrpreneurs, and the others were operated by
governmental organisations. (1985:198)
Denise Youngblood has also noted that “[i]n 1927 there were fewer than 1,500
movie theatres (scarcely more than had existed in Russia in 1913); most were
located, moreover, in the largest cities of European Russia” (1992:7). Youngblood
has estimated that the total number of projectors in Russia even as late as 1927
was only 4,600, compared to 20-21,000 projectors in the United States at the
same time (1992:181,n.14). In the Civil War period, this figure would have been
much lower, and the majority of films shown would have been short agitki. Once
Soviet society had stabilised somewhat, it became clear that short agitational
films would hardly attract a paying audience, which is precisely what was needed
if the Soviet film industry was to be able to rebuild its infrastructure, increase
its output and compete with the flood of imported foreign films which followed
the end of the Civil War.38 The dominance of the agitki propaganda films could
therefore only be merely a temporary phase of Soviet cinema, arising out of the
political and military necessities of Civil War and inevitably withering away as
the Civil War itself petered out.
The agitki themselves were overtly political films, usually documentaries deal-
ing with topical issues of direct interest to the local population, and were made
in a simple style in order to best convey their message to the intended audience
of illiterate or semi-literate peasants and urban workers.39 The first films made
after the Revolution by young film-makers like Kuleshov, Pudovkin and Vertov
(though not Eisenstein), even if only as editors or actors, were agitki. This fact
was to have a tremendous impact on their subsequent theorising and practice
as montage film-makers. Richard Taylor has expressed this most clearly, and is
therefore worth quoting at length:
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The agitka genre had a decisive influence on the stylistic development of
the Soviet film: the essence of economy and dynamism in the visual presen-
tation of material was developed in the principles of editing or, as Eisen-
stein was later to call it, ‘dynamic montage’. The agitka had to convey its
message entirely by simple, visual means. It had to attract and hold the
attention of its audience and leave them with an impression of dynamism
and strength. These principles were embodied in different ways in the the-
oretical teachings of Lev Kuleshov and his Workshop at the Film School, in
the documentaries and manifestos of Dziga Vertov’s Kinoglaz (Cine-Eye)
group, in the films of Shub, Eisenstein, Pudovkin and others. (1979:56)
Indeed, although Eisenstein himself did not make any agitki during the Civil War,
there are strong echoes of the agitka style in several of Eisenstein’s classic films of
the late 1920s – in October (1928), for example, Eisenstein interpolates a sequence
in which a rifle is disassembled and re-assembled in stop-motion animation. This
sequence fulfils the same political and agitational function as one of the early
agitki : to demonstrate to the audience how to field-strip a rifle, in order to enable
them to be better revolutionary fighters for the Communist cause.
The agitki were not merely a passive depiction or record of the Revolution;
they were an active part of the Revolution itself, helping to agitate and mobilise
the working class audience. And the cameramen and film-makers in the front
lines of the Civil War were no longer the detached “artists” or profit-seeking
opportunists who had predominated in Tsarist cinema, but were passionately
committed to the political and military struggle. For them, the agitki – short,
documentary propaganda films – were the ideal medium for what they wished to
achieve with cinema. Vladimir Nilsen wrote of the idealism of the cameramen
attached to the Red Army during the Civil War:
Certain cameramen were transferred from story-film cinematography to
newsreel work, and became permanent travelling companions of Red Army
detachments. [. . . ] Already he was far from the neutral position of the
bourgeois newsreel reporter who seeks sensational shots amid the circum-
stances of a fighting front. He became an active agitator and propagandist,
frequently changing his camera for a rifle. In these harsh circumstances
of the civil war he was subjected to an ideological transformation, for he
recognized the importance of this rôle as a Soviet newsreel reporter, and dis-
tinctly understood his social obligations to millions of workers who thirsted
to see on the screen genuine cinema documents of day-to-day events. In
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the process of this continuous active work a new type of cameraman was
created, completely unlike the “artists of photography” of the days of Pathé
and Khanzhonkov [. . . ]. (Qtd. in Leyda 1983:137)
Despite being an artist and theatre designer rather than a film-maker during the
Civil War, Eisenstein never entirely lost sight of this function of his film-making
throughout the 1920s: to agitate and propagandise the population as part of the
historic struggle between capital and labour. However, it must be said that the
montage director whose later work was closest to the style of the agitki was Dziga
Vertov. As Peter Kenez has noted, “in artistic conception, length and style, [the
agitki ] were closely related to the newsreels. The main difference was that in the
agitki actors (not always professional ones) assumed roles” (2001:41). His work on
the Civil War agitki may have served to confirm Vertov in his exclusive allegiance
to documentary film-making. And while the documentary and newsreel form
taken by the agitki may have appealed to Vertov, it was the use of non-professional
actors which probably had the greatest influence on Pudovkin’s later film-making
practice. Kenez’s claim that “[i]t is fair to say that Soviet cinema grew out of
its first original product, the agitka” (2001:44) correctly emphasises the decisive,
formative influence of the propagandistic agitki films on Soviet cinema as a whole
and on montage cinema in particular.40
These so-called agitki were usually distributed and projected to rural audi-
ences using the “agit-trains”, which served as mobile centres of propaganda and
political agitation and which played a vital role in shoring up popular support
for the Bolshevik regime during the desperate struggle of the Civil War. These
founders of Soviet montage cinema – Kuleshov, Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Vertov
– all spent time during the Civil War working as film-makers, editors and actors
on the agit-trains, though Eisenstein worked as an artist rather than a film-maker
on his agit-train. The agit-trains can in fact be regarded as having provided a
crude prototype for Dziga Vertov’s concept of a nationwide network of kinoki.
Vertov’s aim was to create
a permanent establishment of contributors, on-the-spot correspondents, and
the means to maintain them and move them about , an adequate supply of
film stock, and the opportunity for practical links with foreign countries.
(Taylor and Christie 1988:84; my emphasis)41
The footage filmed by these kinoki would be returned to Moscow to be edited
by Vertov, just as the footage filmed on the agit-trains during the Civil War was
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edited by Vertov in Moscow and then sent back out on the same agit-trains to be
exhibited across the Soviet Union (Leyda 1983:138). As Feldman has noted,
Vertov’s experiences on the agit-train and agit-steamboat convinced him
of the importance of mobile projection techniques in the dissemination of
newsreels and other films meant as social and agitational works. (1977:49)
The agit-trains therefore have such a pivotal importance in the development of
Soviet montage cinema that it is worth examining them in some detail.
In Taylor’s words,
The concept of the agit-train was a logical historical development, mixing
the artistic tradition of the strolling player (gastrolër) and his later coun-
terpart in the early history of the cinema with some of the most modern
technological capabilities. (1979:52)
The first agit-train, named after Lenin, had its trial run from Moscow to Kazan on
13 August 1918. It had no cinema component, but the success of the trial run led
to the next generation of agit-trains, almost all of which were equipped with a film
department. While the first agit-train had no separate cinema component, there
was actually a film-crew on board headed by Eduard Tisse, who later became
famous as the cameraman who filmed most of Eisenstein’s classic montage films
of the 1920s. Tisse sent his footage back to Moscow, where it was edited by
Vertov. Later agit-trains had their own film laboratories and cutting-rooms on
board so that films could be shot, developed, edited and exhibited entirely on
the train itself (Leyda 1983:132). Taylor has described this second generation of
agit-trains:
these were composed of sixteen to eighteen coaches and each train had an
internal telephone link and a radio transmitter-receiver for communication
with their home base in Moscow. From fifteen to eighteen political work-
ers were employed and in addition there were on average between eighty
and eight-five technical assistants. [. . . ] The trains were distinctively and
brightly decorated with paintings and slogans; artists of the standing of
Mayakovsky and El Lissitsky were involved, together with many others
who, as a result of their Civil War experiences, later went into the cin-
ema. Eisenstein and Kozintsev were amongst the latter. [. . . ] Inside, the
trains were divided into different working compartments. [. . . ] In addition
most trains had a film department, a book store, a shop and a space for
exhibitions on various themes. (1979:54-55)
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When the first agit-train was refitted in Moscow and sent out on its second
run, this time to the Western Front for three months, it carried the film which
Dziga Vertov had edited from Eduard Tisse’s footage shot during the agit-train’s
first trial run, The October Revolution (1919), to be exhibited to the civilian
population on its route. In the first month of its three-month tour, the staff gave
seventeen screenings for the local population, and twenty-eight special screenings
for children (Leyda 1983:138). Huntly Carter described the mode of operation of
this agit-train in a book published in 1924:
From this “Red Train” of Propaganda over 20,000 pamphlets and books
were sold for ready cash in the first seven days, and 60,000 educational
books were distributed freely to various local Soviets. The weekly sale of
Izvestia, also carried on this train, increased during the same period by
10,000 copies. Twelve mass meetings were held at various stopping places.
Traveling with the train were cinematograph operators taking films, and
painters making sketches of the life of each town visited. The films and
sketches were exchanged in order to acquaint the people of the various
districts with each other’s mode of life, habits, and dress. (Qtd. in Leyda
1983:138)
The agit-trains proved to be highly successful as propaganda weapons during the
Civil War and their use continued into the 1920s and even the 1930s.42 However,
as the Soviet government consolidated itself in power, the agit-trains became less
important and were eventually phased out in favour of fixed propaganda centres
known as “agitpunkti”.43 Following a decree of 13 May, 1919, 140 agitpunkti were
constructed, and a further 220 were established in 1920 (Taylor 1979:52).
2.6 Vertov’s kinoki network
There was a two-way traffic of film material in the agit-trains: completed agitki
films were taken from Moscow to be exhibited to the target audience in the
provinces, and newly-shot footage – mostly newsreel and documentary material
– was returned back to Moscow to be edited. This two-way process is remarkably
similar to Dziga Vertov’s later proposals for a network of kinoki, cinema “worker-
correspondents” who would go out across the Soviet Union and shoot film footage
of the reality of Soviet society, the footage then being sent back to be edited into
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documentary films which would be sent out to be exhibited across the Soviet
Union. Vertov’s ambition was to
create an army of cine-observers and cine-correspondents with the aim of
moving away from the authorship of a single person to mass authorship,
with the aim of organising a montage vision – not an accidental but a
necessary and sufficient overview of the world every few hours. (Qtd. in
Hicks 2007:17-18)
This ambition would require a network of transportation and living accommoda-
tion for the kinoki of which the agit-trains could be seen as a prototype:
Cine-Pravda needs and does not have: a permanent establishment of con-
tributors, on-the-spot correspondents, and the means to maintain them and
move them about, an adequate supply of film stock, and the opportunity
for practical links with foreign countries. (Taylor and Christie 1988:84)
The absence of such facilities after the end of the Civil War was felt by Vertov to
be the main stumbling block to the existence of the kind of newsreel he felt that
a socialist society needed, and was the central motivation behind his creation of
the Cine-Eye movement itself (Hicks 2007:16). As Hicks puts it,
Such a movement would transform newsreel and society, democratise tech-
nology and enact the slogans ‘The world through the eyes of the millions’
and ‘The transfer of authorship to the people’. [. . . ] Vertov’s aspirations
for the movement encompass the democratisation not just of technology
but also of creativity, through a transcending of the distinction between
art and work. (2007:18)
This is a fundamentally Marxist vision, inspired by the ambition to erase the
distinction between manual and mental labour. In Vertov’s words, “there is no
distinction between artistic and non-artistic labour” (qtd. in Hicks 2007:18). It is
therefore very likely that it was his experiences during the Civil War shooting and
editing the short agitki films, and experiencing the unusual mode of production
and distribution of the agitki – so utterly unlike that of Tsarist cinema, or any
other cinema of the period for that matter – which provided Vertov with the
institutional model for his later proposals for a network of kinoki, his “cinema
worker-correspondents”, to provide an alternative to the institutional framework
of commercial cinema. As Vertov asserted, “Existing cinema, as a commercial
affair, like cinema as a sphere of art, has nothing in common with our work”
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(Vertov 1984:74). The fact that Vertov, unlike Kuleshov, had no experience of
working in cinema during Tsarist times may help to account for his far more
radical rejection of the institutional framework of production and distribution
characteristic of commercial cinema. Vertov described his plans in 1925:
In the area of vision: the facts culled by the kinok-observers or cinema
worker-correspondents (please do not confuse them with cinema worker-
correspondents assigned to reviewing) are organized by film editors accord-
ing to party instructions, distributed in the maximum possible numbers of
prints and shown everywhere. (1984:49)
The ultimate aim of this group of kinoki was to be the establishment of a network
of communication links between all the dispersed individual members of the work-
ing class, not only in the Soviet Union but across the entire world: “our cherished
basic goal – to unite all the workers scattered over the earth through a single
consciousness, a single bond, a single collective will in the battle for communism”
(1984:49). Modern industrial society involves a complex web of economic interac-
tion and interdependency which, according to Marxist theory, is usually obscured
by the reifying institutions of capitalism. This obscuring of reality gives rise to
the “false consciousness” of bourgeois individualism in a society in which the indi-
vidual is actually completely dependent on the labour of others. Vertov believed
that the radical Futurist aesthetics of the “kino-eye”, together with a radically new
mode of film production and distribution, could reveal that hidden reality to the
workers:
The textile worker ought to see the worker in a factory making a machine
essential to a textile worker. The worker at the machine tool plant ought
to see the miner who gives his factory its essential fuel, coal. The coal
miner ought to see the peasant who produces the bread essential to him.
(1984:52)
In short, “Workers ought to see one another so that a close, indissoluble bond can
be established among them” (1984:52).
Vertov’s use of the name “cinema worker-correspondent” to describe the kinoki
is very significant. It deliberately echoed the phrase used to describe the contrib-
utors to the “wall newspapers” (stengazeti) which sprouted everywhere in Russia
after the Bolshevik Revolution: the “worker-correspondent” (rabkor). Wall news-
papers, which have existed since at least the time of ancient Rome,44 became
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enormously popular in Russia after the October Revolution, and were regarded
by the Bolsheviks as an important propaganda medium. Workers and schoolchil-
dren were encouraged to paste news clippings, documentary photographs and
commentaries, cartoons and jokes on a wall set aside for the purpose. Wall news-
papers could be found on the streets, in factories, schools and hospitals, in fact in
almost any public space in the Soviet Union. They were written by a new kind of
journalist, the “worker-correspondent”, who would ideally bridge the dichotomy
between writer and reader; any worker could contribute to a wall newspaper and
become a rabkor. The wall newspaper was regarded not merely as a medium for
the communication of ideas, but as a way of transforming the consciousness both
of its readers and of its writers. Vertov’s film The Man with a Movie Camera
(1929) contains a long sequence in which a wall newspaper assembles itself in
stop-motion animation; Vertov was thereby making a visual connection between
his own activity as a film-maker and the wall newspapers. The kinoki (Vertov’s
neologism for the “cinema worker-correspondents”)45 are, Vertov is implying, the
“rabkors” of cinema, and the Cine-Eye group has the same propaganda role as
the wall newspapers and the same aspiration to transform the political and so-
cial consciousness of the masses. The decentralised and populist institutional
framework of the wall newspapers, together with the example of the agitki pro-
paganda films, was to be the model for the nationwide (and ultimately, Vertov
hoped, worldwide) network of kinoki, the cinema worker-correspondents.46 In his
‘Provisional Instructions to Kino-Eye Groups’, Vertov wrote:
A bulletin-board newspaper [i.e. a wall newspaper] is issued monthly or
every two weeks and uses photographs to illustrate the life of a factory,
plant, or village; it participates in campaigns, reveals surrounding life as
fully as possible, agitates, propagandizes, and organizes. (Vertov 1984:70)
The Bolsheviks regarded the wall newspaper as such an important propaganda
medium that they subjected it to quite close supervision. Whereas the ideal was
that the wall newspapers represented the “spontaneous” agitational organisation
of the worker-correspondents, in Kenez’s words they were actually “the most
extraordinary examples of organized ‘spontaneity’ ” (1985:238). The “reading
rooms” [izba chital’nia] which the Bolsheviks set up in most provincial towns
each had their own wall newspaper. The journal devoted to the reading rooms,
Izba chital’nia, gave detailed instructions in 1924 to the directors of the reading
rooms as to precisely how their wall newspapers should be edited:
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Every issue had to have an ‘editorial’ about an important current event in
40-60 lines; short news articles from abroad, each no more than 3-5 lines, for
a total of 30 lines; 15-20 lines devoted to Party news; 30-40 lines on the work
of the local soviet; 20-30 lines on Komsomol work; and 30-40 lines on the
economy and also on the work of the cooperative. The wall newspaper had
to contain caricatures, poems, and, very importantly, letters from readers.
(Kenez 1985:139)
While Vertov laid out approximate guidelines for his kinoki to follow (Vertov
1984:67-79), and the films they produced were to be edited at a central loca-
tion47 rather than by the kinoki themselves, he at no point imposed such detailed
supervision upon the kinoki as the Soviet government imposed upon the wall
newspaper. It seems he wanted the Cine-Eye Group to consist of genuinely spon-
taneous agitators, as his rejection of the use of scenarios in the work of the kinoki
indicates (1984:72-75).
The extreme conditions of the Russian Civil War had led to a collapse of the
commercial institutional framework of cinema production and distribution which
had been built up in Tsarist times.48 Vertov hoped to transform this tempo-
rary breakdown into a permanent one. However, the collapse of the institutional
framework of commercial cinema and its replacement with a radical and politi-
cised alternative occurred out of political and economic necessity rather than as
a spontaneous avant-garde experiment. As social and economic conditions im-
proved after 1921, the traditional institutional framework of commercial cinema
was gradually re-established, much to Vertov’s vocally expressed disappointment.
For example, on January 20, 1923, the “Council of Three” issued a somewhat des-
perate ‘Appeal to Cinematographers’:
Five seething years of universal daring have passed through you and gone,
leaving no trace. You keep pre-revolutionary ‘artistic’ models hanging like
ikons within you, and it is to them alone that your inner piety has been
directed. [. . . ] The Council of Three observes with unconcealed regret
film production workers leafing through literary texts in search of suitable
dramatizations. (1984:13)
By this time, however, Vertov and his Cine-Eye group were fighting a losing
battle: the “played” cinema had returned to Soviet cinema screens, this time to
stay.
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2.7 Intolerance in the Soviet Union
The impact on Soviet montage cinema of D. W. Griffith’s films was not merely
or even primarily aesthetic or technical; as Tsivian has pointed out, “crosscutting
was only a part of a larger story of Griffith’s reception in Russia” (1997:51). A
very significant aspect of his impact on the Soviet montage directors was his
demonstration that cinema could be used to produce powerful political and even
intellectual effects on a mass audience. As Richard J. Meyer put it, “The major
contribution of [The Birth of a Nation] was [. . . ] its demonstration to the world
that film was the greatest medium for propaganda yet devised” (qtd. in Geduld
1971:116). This political aspect of Griffith’s films was central to the montage
directors’ reception of them, even though the particular form which Griffith’s
politics took was essentially incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.49
Indeed, when Griffith’s epic film Intolerance was exhibited in the Soviet Union
in 1919, it had an electrifying effect, not just on the emergent montage directors
themselves, but on the entire Soviet film industry. This was despite the fact
that Griffith’s films were not shown in the Soviet Union in exactly the same
form in which they were shown in the West but were re-edited for ideological
and political reasons (Intolerance, for example, had its intertitles edited and the
Christian epilogue was removed entirely).50 Lenin himself was so impressed by
Intolerance that he reputedly asked Griffith to become the head of the Soviet
film industry (Drew 1986:139). This was not because he admired Griffith’s use
of parallel editing; rather, Lenin recognised Griffith’s brilliant use of cinema for
political agitation and wished to enlist his expertise to help the Soviet cinema
industry achieve the same effect. One of Lenin’s emissaries even told Griffith that
Intolerance “was a powerful influence [. . . ] in cementing the feeling for the new
government” and that “you – unknown to yourself – were one of our biggest agents”
(qtd. in Drew 1986:138). While Intolerance had its greatest success in Soviet
Russia, where it ran for ten years, it also received tremendous critical acclaim
across the world and helped to establish cinema as a mass medium capable of
directing thought rather than being merely a vulgar form of mass entertainment.
For example, David Lloyd George, the British prime Minister, said of Griffith
that “he had the greatest power in his hands for the control of men’s minds
that the world has ever seen” and that “it was only a question of time when
governments would recognize this and subsidize pictures that would help them
nationally and internationally” (qtd. in Drew 1986:136), thereby anticipating
2.7. Intolerance in the Soviet Union 43
Lenin’s pronouncement that “of all the arts, for us the most important is cinema”.
In fact, it was to be the British rather than the Soviets who made the first direct
use of Griffith’s talents as a propagandist, by importing him into Britain during
the Great War to direct Hearts of the World (1918), an anti-German film intended
to strengthen the wartime alliance between Britain and America, filmed against
authentic backgrounds on the Western Front (Jowett and O’Donnell 1992:92).
The lesson that Griffith had taught concerning the propagandistic power of
cinema was also not lost on the Soviet montage directors themselves; Eisenstein
later proclaimed that “all that is best in the Soviet cinema has its origins in
Intolerance” (Barna 1973:74) and he paid tribute to Griffith by saying that
I wish to recall what David Wark Griffith himself represented to us, the
young Soviet film-makers of the ’twenties.
To say it simply and without equivocation: a revelation (Eisenstein 1977:201).
It was seeing Intolerance for the first time which inspired Pudovkin to abandon
the study of chemistry and become a film director. Until seeing Griffith’s film,
Pudovkin had despised cinema as an art form (Dart 1974:2). The caption of
his high school yearbook photograph even read, “This sixth year student at the
Moscow gymnasium loved music and very much liked to draw. He wasn’t inter-
ested in cinematography – he had absolutely no liking for it” (1974:209). He later
described how
[a]bout that time [1920] I happened to see Griffith’s great film, Intolerance.
In that wonderful work I saw for the first time the possibilities of the epic
picture. Yes, Griffith was really my teacher. Later on I saw Broken Blos-
soms, and I fell more and more under the spell of Griffith. My first three
pictures, therefore, were really influenced by this great American director.
(Qtd. in Drew 1986:139-40)
Even Lev Kuleshov, the founder of Soviet film montage, acknowledged the seminal
influence of Griffith when he wrote, “Two universally recognized masters created
the school of cinematography; they are David Wark Griffith and Charles Chaplin”
(Kuleshov 1987:165).
In fact, it was only Vertov alone of the montage directors who never publically
acknowledged Griffith as an influence. Vertov actually asserted that Kino-Eye
(1924) was the first “film-thing”, which “does not satisfy any of the demands made
of a fiction film. It is made as if the studios, the directors, Griffith, Los Angeles,
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had never existed” (Tsivian 2004:119). This refusal to acknowledge Griffith was
almost certainly a result of Griffith’s status as a maker of sentimental, fictional
films; even if his pioneering use of parallel editing and the rhetorical power of
his films did impress Vertov, he could never acknowledge it without undermining
his own position as a polemical enemy of fictional, “played” film. Whatever the
reason may have been, in Tsivian’s words, “An enfant terrible in the family of
great Russian film-makers, Dziga Vertov alone had no word of thanks for Griffith”
(1997:63). This is not entirely true, however: Vertov grudgingly acknowledged
the fact that, while he was independently developing his own rapid montage style
in The Battle of Tsaritsyn (1920), Griffith’s film indirectly helped to prepare the
ground for the reception of Vertov’s own films. As Vertov himself said, “After
a short time there came Griffith’s film Intolerance. After that it was easier to
speak” (qtd. in Kepley 1979:23). However, Vertov’s brother Mikhail Kaufman
was perhaps more candid than Vertov himself when he asserted the importance
of Griffith’s Intolerance in an interview published in the journal October in 1979:
Kaufman: Kuleshov’s experiments in editing? But they didn’t excite us.
To be quite honest, it was the editing of Intolerance that influenced us.
October : Directly? Griffith?
Kaufman: Yes, Griffith.
October : Through Kuleshov?
Kaufman: No, Griffith. (Kaufman 1979:63; original emphasis)
The other montage directors did not hesitate to openly acknowledge that they
learned much from Griffith’s film-making techniques, such as his crowd scenes
or his presentation of character through a crude form of associational montage.
Sergei Yutkevich, in his essay ‘D. W. Griffith and His Actors’, even claimed
Griffith to be the inventor of “type casting”, a crude precursor of Eisensteinian
“typage”, and Kuleshov pointed to Griffith as a common denominator linking his
films to those of Eisenstein in their handling of crowd scenes:
The most interesting thing about The Death Ray51 is its crowd scenes.
They have been compared to those in Strike. That is understandable.
We had researched crowd scenes together with Eisenstein in the Kuleshov
Workshop, using Griffith’s Intolerance as our model. (Kuleshov 1987:227)
Eisenstein himself admired Griffith’s “cinematic” method of presenting characters:
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The Americans use this technique brilliantly for characterisation – I re-
member the way Griffith ‘introduced’ the ‘Musketeer’, the gang-leader in
Intolerance: he showed us a wall of his room completely covered with naked
women and then showed the man himself. How much more powerful and
cinematic this is, we submit, than the introduction of the workhouse su-
pervisor in Oliver Twist in a scene where he pushed two cripples around:
i.e., he is shown through his deeds (a purely theatrical method of sketching
character through action) and not through provoking the necessary associ-
ations. (Eisenstein 1988:42)
As Tsivian points out, “This, claimed Eisenstein, is how ‘film attractions’ work:
by way of stimulating a chain of emotional responses (‘reflexes’) in order to project
them on a character or event” (1997:53). Eisenstein, however, took this technique
much further than Griffith ever did, developing it into his theory of associational
montage.
But perhaps the most innovative film-making technique for which Griffith
became famous was “parallel editing”. This technique – usually used in the chase
scenes with which his films often ended – involved cross-cutting between two
actions occurring at the same time but in separate locations. If this had been as
far as Griffith had taken the method, as is often claimed, then it would hardly
qualify as a significant precursor to montage as it was later developed by the
Soviet directors. However, Griffith’s use of parallel editing was actually more
subtle than he is often given credit for. His earliest experiments in parallel editing
and cross-cutting had been confined to using the technique to create suspense or
to unfold the narrative. However, from his one-reel Biograph film A Corner
in Wheat (1909) onwards, Griffith started using parallel editing to dramatise
abstract ideas. In that short film, by repeatedly cutting between the banquet
of a wealthy wheat speculator and the breadlines of the starving who are the
victims of his market manipulation, Griffith developed his technique of parallel
editing to express an ideological conception of society – to direct the thinking of
his audience. As Robert Henderson has put it, A Corner in Wheat shows “a firm
and obvious rhythm [. . . ] based on the ideological content of each shot” (1970).
This, superficially at least, seems not very far from the “intellectual montage” of
Eisenstein, or the montage of Pudovkin’s early films, as Eileen Bowser has noted
(1976:42). Indeed, the genealogy of the sequence in Pudovkin’s The End of St
Petersburg (1927) in which he crosscuts between scenes of frenzied speculators
at the stock market and the horrors of the trench warfare from which they are
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profiting can be traced almost directly from Griffith’s A Corner in Wheat. And,
as William Drew has said,
In succeeding films, Griffith continued to experiment with this technique. It
reached its apogee with his “drama of comparisons” [Intolerance] in which he
not only cut between the oppressors and the oppressed within the individual
stories but used thematic cross-cutting between the four stories to reinforce
the unity of his historical vision. (1986:99-100)
Through his use of cross-cutting between causally unrelated narratives in order
to project a common theme running between them, Griffith was using parallel
editing – a primitive form of film montage – to achieve ideological and rhetorical
effects on the audience. And in fact, it was the rhetorical power of this technique
which most impressed the Soviet montage directors when they saw Intolerance
for the first time, rather than any sense of aesthetic pleasure. Despite the dubious
nature of Griffith’s ideology from a Marxist perspective, the fact that Griffith had
found a way – however crude and untheorised – to convey that ideology into the
minds of his audience so powerfully and so effectively is ultimately what made
Griffith such a seminal influence on Soviet montage cinema. His use of a consistent
social-historical vision to unify causally unrelated shots into a thematically linked
whole had a particular influence on Pudovkin, whose first three films in particular
owe a great debt to Griffith, as he himself readily acknowledged (Drew 1986:140).
However, it is important not to overstate the extent to which Griffith had
anticipated the creation of film montage. Eisenstein was later to describe what
he saw as some of the deficiencies of Griffith’s “montage”:
People still speak of ‘American montage’. I am afraid that the time has
come to add this ‘Americanism’ to the others so ruthlessly debunked by
Comrade Osinsky.
America has not understood montage as a new element, a new opportunity.
America is honestly narrative; it does not ‘parade’ the figurative character
of its montage but shows honestly what is happening .
The rapid montage that stuns us is not a construction but a forced portrayal,
as frequent as possible, of the pursuer and the pursued . The spacing out of
the dialogue in close-ups is necessary to show one after another the facial
expressions of the ‘public’s favourites’. Without regard for the perspectives
of montage possibilities. (Eisenstein 1988:81; original emphasis)
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Eisenstein, who was unfamiliar with Griffith’s Biograph films, was perhaps being
somewhat unfair to Griffith by implying that he only used rapid montage and
cross-cutting for chase scenes. Based on his viewing of about 100 of Griffith’s
early Biograph one- and two-reelers, William Johnson has suggested that “[o]ne of
Griffith’s most distinctive editing devices is a single direct cut between physically
distant scenes in order to stress their contrast or similarity” and that “[s]uch varied
contrasts play as large a part in Griffith’s editing repertoire as the more notorious
cross-cutting which leads to a last-minute rescue” (1976:4). He concludes that
“Griffith’s use of the last-minute rescue came from one predilection among several
rather than from a dominant obsession” (1976:4). Charlie Keil has also noted that
“the Griffith formula for the last-minute rescue was subject to modification more
often than is indicated in standard accounts” (1989:31), or indeed in Eisenstein’s
account.
However, Eisenstein was correct to point out that Griffith failed to make the
crucial transition from using montage elements to represent events and actions
to using them to achieve genuinely abstract “montage tropes” – what Eisenstein
called the “figurative character of montage” – despite coming close in such works
as A Corner in Wheat. Without this abstraction, montage as a metaphoric and
associational filmic discourse is impossible, and cannot be developed beyond being
merely a method of building tempo and emotional pitch. In Eisenstein’s words,
Our conception of montage has far outgrown the classic dualistic montage
esthetic of Griffith, symbolized by the two never-convergent parallel racers,
interweaving the thematically variegated strips with a view towards the
mutual intensification of entertainment, tension and tempi.
For us montage became a means of achieving a unity of a higher order –
a means through the montage image of achieving an organic embodiment
of a single idea conception, embracing all elements, parts, details of the
film-work. (Eisenstein 1977:254; original emphasis)
And Eisenstein passed a rather dismissive judgement on Griffith during one of
his lessons at the State Cinema Institute when he said that
[i]t is noteworthy that Griffith, first to put into practice, twenty years ago,
parallel and cross-cutting, could take its possibilities no further. For him
there existed only the plot cross-cutting of the action, he did not realise that
such parallel presentation of action contained further possibilities. (Qtd.
in Nizhny 1979:83)
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The aesthetic influence of Intolerance on Soviet montage cinema is therefore by
no means as overwhelming or as straightforward as it is often presented.52 As
Vance Kepley has asserted, “more balanced studies argue that Intolerance was ac-
tually one of several sources for the Soviets and that the Soviet montage aesthetic
originated in Russian and avant-garde art, theater and literature” (1979:22). So
far as montage cinema is considered purely as an aesthetic, Kepley is undoubtedly
correct; however, if we consider it as a form of rhetoric, then Griffith – especially
through his epic Intolerance – can be said to have had a decisive impact on the
Soviet montage directors as rhetoricians and propagandists. Only Vertov could
be said to be an exception to this; but as he himself admitted, his own polemical
tasks in advancing the cause of montage as a vehicle for political rhetoric became
easier after Griffith’s films became more widely known among Soviet audiences
(1979:23).
Griffith claimed in 1926 that
as long ago as 1910, I was carrying on a series of experiments in film tempo:
making one picture at normal pace, the next with underpacing, and the
reactions of many audiences were carefully recorded. (Qtd. in Jesionowski
1987:138)
The parallel with the montage experiments carried out by Kuleshov about a
decade later is remarkable. Both Griffith and Kuleshov were especially concerned
with the audience: they both wanted to manipulate the reactions of the audi-
ence using cinematic technique, the best techniques being those which gave the
most control over the emotional state of the spectator. It is therefore important
not to overstate the extent to which Griffith was a “merely intuitive” film-maker.
However, Griffith’s experiments seem to have been far cruder than Kuleshov’s and
their results seem to have been used as rules of thumb for his film-making practice
rather than as the basis of any theoretical formulation, and it remains broadly
true that Griffith was an essentially (though not entirely) intuitive artist who
never consciously formulated his film-making practice into abstract or universal
principles. Moreover, he drew back from fully developing a form of intellectual
montage, due to his apparent mistrust of abstract thought. Griffith was strongly
influenced by the trend towards primitivism in American culture at that time,
which stressed a faith in instinct and emotion rather than abstract thought. In
fact, as Drew puts it, “It was through Griffith, intuitively incorporating the more
compressed style of the modern novel, that ‘primitivism’ became the characteris-
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tic mode of expression in the cinema” (1986:101). The intellectual and ideological
power of Griffith’s innovative editing techniques was therefore fatally undermined
from the outset by his primitivism and by his tendency towards sentimental narra-
tive rather than rigorous political analysis. These tendencies were symptomatic of
Griffith’s petty-bourgeois subjectivism, to use Marxist terminology. Or, as John-
son phrases it, “He believes in the importance only of personal acts and decisions,
not of those dictated from the outside” (1976:9). This limitation in his thinking
meant that Griffith was incapable of analysing a situation in terms of objective
economic, historical or class forces, which is almost certainly the source of what
are now regarded as his extraordinary lapses from “political correctness”, such
as his whitewashing of slavery. To Griffith, “there was a personal bond between
master and slave which stood higher than the cold commercial relationship of
employer and employee” (1976:9). A clearer example of petty-bourgeois idealism,
disconnected from historical and economic realities, could hardly be imagined.
Griffith’s idealism (in the negative, Marxist sense of that word) is also the source
of what Tsivian has called “the distance separating the political message of Ok-
tyabr ’ from Griffith’s moralizing message in Intolerance” (1997:53).
2.8 Mayakovsky, montage cinema and the “social
command”
The ideological tendentiousness of Soviet montage cinema – its status as a form
of political rhetoric rather than a purely aesthetic endeavour – found another
powerful model in the tendentious approach towards poetry taken by Vladimir
Mayakovsky, who in some respects was regarded (and regarded himself) as the
unofficial spokesman for the entire Russian left-wing avant-garde of the 1920s.
Mayakovsky had asserted that “[p]oetry is at its very root tendentious” (Mayakov-
sky 1970:17), a claim which Eisenstein later echoed by asserting that “by ‘film’
I understand tendentiousness and nothing else” (Eisenstein 1988:75), and which
is analogous to Vertov’s use of the Kino-eye for “the communist decoding of the
world” (Vertov 1984:42). Mayakovsky had publically called for progressive artists
to obey the “social command”; that is, to put their creative talent at the service
of the political and social needs of the working class of revolutionary Russia.53
This meant the repudiation of aestheticism or l’art pour l’art54 – art had a duty
to serve a political and ideological function in Soviet society, to be a weapon in
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the class struggle. Peter Wollen quotes Mayakovsky’s own words:
The problem of art became that of the production of agitational verse: ‘I
want the pen to equal the gun, to be listed with iron in industry. And
the Politburo’s agenda: Item 1 to be Stalin’s report on “The Output of
Poetry”.’ (1997:37)
It is important, however, to make a distinction between the “social command”
and a direct order or artistic commission from the Soviet government. The “social
command” actually refers to the direct social, cultural and political needs of the
working people themselves, which the artist is presumed to understand from his
own direct experience of life.55 It must be distinguished from Eisenstein’s call in
1927 for an official State Plan for Soviet cinema (Eisenstein 1988:89-94), which
was linked to his political support for the abolition of the NEP and for state
planning of the economy as a whole. Moreover, his article describes only the
state planning of the logistics of film-making – the efficient accumulation and
distribution of the raw material out of which films can be constructed – rather
than state control of the subject matter and political content of films. Eisenstein
seems to have assumed that there would be an automatic congruence between
the film-makers’ political and artistic ideas and those of the Soviet state, and
moreover that the Soviet state was necessarily the embodiment of the political
will of the working class. In organisational terms, then, Eisenstein’s vision of a
State Plan was top-down, whereas Mayakovsky’s concept of the “social command”
was bottom-up.
Mayakovsky himself had been actively involved in cinema from as early as
1913, as a critic, scenarist and actor.56 In his first three articles on cinema,
Mayakovsky had been able to perceive only the potential of cinema to passively
record events and its own capacity to be mechanically reproduced. He therefore
denied that cinema could be an art form in its own right, and regarded it merely
as a stimulus to advance theatrical art in the same way that photography had
advanced easel painting in the direction of abstraction. Cinema would therefore
serve as an example of what not to do:
This is where cinema sneaks up: ‘If your task is solely to copy nature, why
do you need all these complicated theatrical props when on ten yards of
canvas you can show both the ocean in its “natural” size and the movement
of millions of people in the city?’ (Taylor and Christie 1988:35)
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His conclusion was forthrightly negative: “Only the artist evokes from real life the
images of art, while cinema can be either a successful or unsuccessful multiplier of
his images [. . . ]. Cinema and art are phenomena of a different order” (1988:36).
Mayakovsky was certainly not alone at that time in his low estimation of
the artistic potential of cinema; even a stage director as progressive as Vsevolod
Meyerhold was hostile to the idea of cinema as a legitimate art form. However,
that negative attitude did not last long. Once film-makers began to cut and to edit
their films, Mayakovsky began to perceive the potential of cinema to articulate
new forms of narrative and new forms of quasi-poetic rhetoric. This, allied with
its capacity to directly record actuality, led him to recognise that cinema had the
potential to be a significant new art form in its own right. By 1918, he had written
three scenarios which were actually filmed, with Mayakovsky himself playing the
leading roles. He went on to write eleven film scripts altogether, only three of
which were produced: The Young Lady and the Hooligan (1918) (directed by
Yevgeni Slavinsky), Not Born to be Rich (1918) (directed by Nikandr Turkin),
and Shackled by Film (1918) (also directed by Turkin).57 At the same time, his
critical writing about cinema revealed an increasing awareness of cinema as a
potentially radical new art form.
By the mid-1920s, during his editorship of the journal LEF, Mayakovsky vehe-
mently supported Dziga Vertov and Esfir Shub in their advocacy of documentary
film, and he joined them in denouncing the rising tide of commercial Soviet films
and the foreign imports of Hollywood romances which sharply increased during
the NEP period.58 Mayakovsky, like Vertov, believed that cinema could be used
as an ideological weapon to change the political consciousness of its audience, if
only they could first be weaned off their addiction to what both he and Vertov
saw as the saccharine movies of the Hollywood “Dream Factory” and their So-
viet equivalents. Mayakovsky’s support for Vertov was symbolised by the issue
of Kino-fot59 in which Mayakovsky published a humorous poem about cinema
above a photograph of Vertov. Mayakovsky’s connection with Vertov was always
far closer than with Eisenstein or Pudovkin; if anyone can be called Mayakovsky’s
disciple in cinema, it was Dziga Vertov.
In fact, the connection between Mayakovsky and Vertov went deeper than
merely Mayakovsky’s public support for Vertov’s film-making. Throughout his
career, Vertov had written Futurist poetry in the style of Mayakovsky, and most
of his manifestos and published articles were imitative of the declamatory rhetor-
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ical style of the Futurist manifestos written by Mayakovsky, Burliuk and others.
Vertov even seems to have modelled his working procedures as a film-maker on
what he understood to be those advocated by Mayakovsky for poetic production.
It is worth quoting in full the list of what Mayakovsky put forward as the essential
prerequisites for the creation of socially and politically useful poetry in his book
How are Verses Made? :
What basic propositions are indispensable, when one begins poetical work?
First thing. The presence of a problem in society, the solution of which is
conceivable only in poetical terms. A social command [. . . ].
Second thing. An exact knowledge, or rather intuition, of the desires of
your class (or the group you represent) on the question, i.e. a standpoint
from which to take aim.
Third thing. Materials. Words. Fill your storehouse constantly, fill the
granaries of your skull with all kinds of words, necessary, expressive, rare,
invented, renovated and manufactured.
Fourth thing. Equipment for the plant and tools for the assembly line. A
pen, a pencil, a typewriter, a telephone, an outfit for your visits to the
doss-house, a bicycle for your trips to the publishers, a table in good order,
an umbrella for writing in the rain, a room measuring the exact number
of paces you have to take when you’re working, connection with a press
agency to send you information on questions of concern to the provinces
and so and so forth, and even a pipe and cigarettes.
Fifth thing. Skills and techniques of handling words, extremely personal
things, which come only with years of daily work: rhymes, metres, alliter-
ation, images, lowering of style, pathos, closure, finding a title, layout, and
so on and so forth. (Mayakovsky 1970:18-19)
These five “basic propositions” for poetic creation directly correspond very closely
with the working methods used by Vertov when making his documentary films:
Firstly, there must be a “social command” in obedience to which the film is
made. Secondly, the film-maker must serve the needs of a particular social class,
the proletariat, and the film must be made from the viewpoint of that class.
Thirdly, raw film material must be assembled over an extended period of time
so that it is to hand when it is needed, to be assembled into a new film. Vertov
kept archives of such raw footage, and even displays his archive to us in The Man
with a Movie Camera. Fourthly, in his films, Vertov foregrounded the actual
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equipment used in film-making – the editing table and of course the camera are
themselves filmed. And fifthly, Vertov’s films are of course veritable tours de force
of skill and technique in filming and editing.
Eisenstein did not directly follow Mayakovsky’s example, though he did pay
tribute to Mayakovsky as a progenitor of montage in his poetic technique; Eisen-
stein claimed that Mayakovsky “does not divide his verse by lines [. . . ] but by
‘frames’ [. . . ] Mayakovsky chops up the line in the way that an experienced mon-
tage editor would do it” (Eisenstein 1991:322). However, Eisenstein did not high-
light Mayakovsky as an inspiration more than he did Dickens, Griffith or Pushkin.
Eisenstein was essentially using Mayakovsky’s poetry merely as another example
of montage as a universal artistic principle, which was a theoretical interest of his
at the time, rather than claiming Mayakovsky as a direct progenitor in the way
that Vertov did.
One reason for Eisenstein’s reticence may have been Mayakovsky’s insistence
on the importance of using documentary materials in artistic work:
(1) Let’s drop all this gibberish about unfurling the ‘epic canvas’ during
a period of war on the barricades – your canvas will be torn to shreds on
all sides. (2) The value of factual material (and this is why documentary
reports from the workers’ and peasants’ journalists are so interesting) must
be marked at a higher price – and under no circumstances at a lower one –
than so-called ‘poetical works’. Premature ‘poeticization’ only emasculates
and mangles the material. (Mayakovsky 1970:34)
As Elizabeth Henderson has said of one of Mayakovsky’s major poems, “Instead
of metaphors and imaginative fictions, It’s Good! ‘drinks from the river named
“Fact,” ’ to quote the poem’s prologue” (1978:158) and “[f]or the storming of the
Winter Palace Majakovskij tried to achieve the effect of a newsreel” (1978:159).
This idea resonated more with Dziga Vertov’s film-making practice than with
Eisenstein’s; indeed, Petrić goes so far as to claim that “Mayakovsky’s ‘factual
poetry’ [. . . ] inspired Vertov to formulate his ‘Film-Eye’ and ‘Radio-Eye’ meth-
ods” (1987:35). Both Eisenstein and Pudovkin, by contrast, created films which
sought to encompass epic historical-political events and present them in a fiction-
alised form, something Mayakovsky specifically advised against. Vertov followed
Mayakovsky’s advice more closely; his films are constructed out of documentary
material of life in contemporary Soviet society, and Vertov resolutely refused to
aestheticise the raw material he worked with. Eisenstein and Pudovkin were
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much more willing to “unfurl their epic canvases”, and were quite prepared to fic-
tionalise and aestheticise historical events. Eisenstein’s depiction of the storming
of the Winter Palace in October, for example, while wildly inaccurate in its de-
piction, has almost completely supplanted the actual historical event itself in the
minds of most people. Such a falsification of the public consciousness of historical
reality would have been abhorrent to Mayakovsky and to Vertov; Mayakovsky’s
bitter criticism of the way Eisenstein portrayed Lenin in October, using the un-
trained actor Vasili Nikandrov to pose as Lenin rather than using authentic news-
reel footage, indicates his feelings in this regard. By contrast, the treatment of
Lenin in Vertov’s film Three Songs About Lenin (1934) is directly comparable to
Mayakovsky’s treatment of Lenin in his poem Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1924). Both
are concerned with the historical documentation of the presented events, which
can be related to the Constructivist concept of the “art of fact” which required
the artist not to falsify the actual matter, but to register or record it faithfully
before putting it into a new context.
It seems clear that Dziga Vertov consciously modelled himself on Mayakovsky,
and aspired to be to Soviet cinema what Mayakovsky was to Soviet poetry. Petrić
has certainly endorsed that idea:
And if there is a Soviet contemporary of Vertov to whom he should be com-
pared, both ideologically and psychologically, it could only be Mayakovsky.
To equate Vertov with Trotsky (“cinema’s Trotsky”)60 seems unjustifiable
[. . . ]. It is therefore more appropriate to call Vertov the “Mayakovsky of
cinema.” (1987:35)
Vertov himself even directly compared Mayakovsky’s poetic consciousness with
the “kino-eye” with which Vertov hoped to reveal the inner truth of the world:
Mayakovsky is a kino-eye. He sees that which the eye does not see [. . . ].
Kino-eye is a Mayakovsky61 against the background of international film
production’s clichés. (Vertov 1984:180)
Vertov’s self-identification with Mayakovsky could not be clearer.
Moreover, Vertov believed that he could avoid the twin pitfalls of formalism
and of naturalism by following Mayakovsky’s example in ensuring the unity of
form and content in his work:
The problem lies in not separating form from content. The problem is one
of unity of form and content. Of not permitting oneself to confuse the
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viewer by showing him a trick or technique not generated by the content
and uncalled or by necessity. (1984:187)
He believed he could achieve this unity by studying both folk art and the poetry
of Mayakovsky:
The unity of form and content – that is what strikes one in folk art, and
that’s what strikes one in Mayakovsky as well.
I work in the poetic documentary film. That’s why both the songs of
the people and Mayakovsky’s poetry are very near and familiar to me
(1984:183).
However, the most important example which Mayakovsky provided Vertov’s film-
making was to show that startling and complex images could be created by break-
ing linear continuity and by subverting narrative expectations. In Petrić’s words,
Mayakovsky produced complex poetic images by breaking up common syn-
tax and by forcing the reader to abandon the rational search for a sequen-
tial order and thematic progression in poetry. Similarly, Vertov relied on
the intricate juxtaposition and inversion of filmed fragments (shots) with
the intention of disrupting the film’s linear development and thwarting the
reader’s narrative expectations. (1987:29)
It was in this sense that montage film-making was, as Viktor Shklovsky pointed
out at the time, a “poetic” form of cinema as opposed to the “prosaic” film-
making practice of conventional mainstream Hollywood or Soviet films. Indeed,
Alexandra Smith has referred to “the striking analogies between poetry and [mon-
tage] cinema” (Smith 2006:34). Vertov even claimed inspiration from the Cubo-
Futurists’ poetic device of zaum62 while filming Three Songs about Lenin:
I had to write poems and short stories, dry reports, travel sketches, dra-
matic episodes, and zaum word-combinations; I had to make outlines and
diagrams – and all this to achieve the graphic, crystalline combination of a
particular sequence of shots. (1984:135)
The Cubo-Futurist poets, of whom Mayakovsky was a leading member, were con-
cerned with the function and aesthetic impact of the “word as such”, that is, the
word detached from any literal meaning. In the “transrational” zaum language,
in the words of Anna Lawton, “the images in this poem are liberated from any
2.8. Mayakovsky, montage cinema and the “social command” 56
kind of causal relationship and arranged in rhythmic segments”, thereby “endow-
ing the text with a new and fresh meaning based on analogical relationships –
a meaning which relies on the participation of the reader’s intuition” (1977:66).
The weakening of the link between the signifier and the signified associated with
the use of zaum led to the poetic language of zaum deriving much of its signif-
icance and meaning from the particular juxtaposition of signifiers rather than
from their reference to their signifieds. This is analogous to the way in which
the montage fragments of Vertov’s films – and of montage films in general –
are given their meaning retrospectively by their juxtaposition with other mon-
tage fragments rather than from the signified objects the images in the montage
fragments supposedly represent. In the most extreme cases, the images in the
montage films become almost completely abstract and “non-objective”, to use
Malevich’s phrase, pure signifiers detached from any signified object.63 For ex-
ample, the spinning reel of steel cable repeatedly shown towards the end of The
Man with a Movie Camera (Fig. 7.2) is reminiscent of some of Malevich’s ab-
stract canvases. As Petrić has noted, Vertov even claimed Mayakovsky as his
inspiration in the development of sound montage: “Reflecting back on his earlier
work, he confirms that he ‘discovered the key to recording documentary sounds
while analyzing the musical rhythms of Mayakovsky’s poems’ ” (1987:36). This
is actually quite plausible, as Vertov’s earliest experiments in montage were with
recorded sounds in the 1910s, and these experiments were directly inspired by the
Futurist poets’ experimentation with the “word as such” and with zaum, in which
the actual sounds of poetry were detached from any literal meaning and were
then fragmented and juxtaposed, as in the poetry of Khlebnikov or Kruchenykh.
Only five days before committing suicide, Mayakovsky presented a lecture
at the Plekhanov Institute of Economics in Moscow in which he responded to
criticism of his poetry as being “difficult”:
In fifteen or twenty years, the cultural level of the workers will be raised
so high that all my works will be understood [. . . ]. I am amazed at the
illiteracy of this audience. I never expected such a low cultural level from
the students of such a high and respected educational institution. (Qtd. in
Marshall 1965:71)
Vertov shared with Mayakovsky the somewhat contradictory position that poetry
or cinema should educate the masses and that the poet or film-maker should
therefore be in the artistic and political vanguard (literally, the “avant-garde”),
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leading the masses to an appreciation of more complex art and to greater political
consciousness, while at the same time their work should have popular appeal.
Maintaining that contradictory position required a certain act of faith on the part
of Vertov: he believed that his films could not be understood by a certain type
of audience, namely the petty-bourgeois “NEP audience”, but would be readily
understood and appreciated by a working class audience. As Vertov asserted,
Kinopravda is being shown daily in many workers’ clubs in Moscow and the
provinces, and with great success. And if the NEP audience prefers “love”
or “crime” dramas that doesn’t mean that our works are unfit. It means
the public is. (1984:32)
Like Mayakovsky, Vertov had faith in the revolutionary and intellectual poten-
tial of the working class: “As if in mockery of their literary nursemaids, the
workers and peasants turn out to be brighter than their self-appointed nurse-
maids” (1984:38). This faith led him to make films for the working class which
required active intellectual effort from the audience in order to be understood.
As Mayakovsky said of his own poetry, “I agree that poems must be understood,
but the reader must be understanding as well” (qtd. in Marshall 1965:66). Vertov
expressed the same idea in very similar terms:
One of the chief accusations leveled at us is that we are not intelligible to
the masses.
Even if one allows that some of our work is difficult to understand, does
that mean we should not undertake serious exploratory work at all?
If the masses need light propaganda pamphlets, does that mean they don’t
need the serious articles of Engels, Lenin? (1984:37-38)
Vertov was virtually accusing his critics of being condescending towards the work-
ing class. The principal aim of Vertov’s politically committed film-making was to
raise the cultural and political consciousness of the working class. As far as Ver-
tov was concerned, to criticise his films for being incomprehensible to the masses
was to display a lack of faith in the intelligence and the potential for intellectual
growth of the working class itself. Vertov was undoubtedly strengthened in his
resolve to maintain that position in the face of increasing critical attacks that
were to be mounted against him in the 1930s as a “formalist” whose work was
incomprehensible to the masses by Mayakovsky’s own principled stand on this
issue.
Chapter 3
Soviet Montage Cinema as
Propaganda
The Soviet montage directors all perceived themselves, in various ways, as pro-
pagandists. However, before Soviet montage cinema can be properly investigated
as a form of propaganda, it is first essential to define what is meant by the word
“propaganda”, as well as to establish and investigate the link between propaganda
and rhetoric as a means of constructing persuasive discourses. The fact that pro-
paganda is a complex phenomenon with various modalities and strategies has
implications for the relationship between the spectator and the filmic text and
for the effect (both intended and actual) of a propaganda film on its audience.
This chapter will therefore establish the link between the montage method and
the construction of political propaganda, and will present the differences between
the montage directors’ various approaches to propaganda, especially regarding the
particular mode of propaganda they employed, as well as noting the progressive
divergence between their views of how cinema should be used as a propaganda
medium and that of the Soviet government in the 1930s.
3.1 Defining “propaganda”
The definition of the word “propaganda” is highly contentious, its meaning and
status having changed radically over the course of the twentieth century. Indeed,
the word “propaganda” has distinctly negative connotations now, and is usually
used in a deprecatory sense to describe something which is felt to be artistically
crude and which deliberately presents a false image of reality. However, this was
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certainly not the way that propaganda was viewed in the Soviet Union, especially
not in the 1920s. At that time and that place, propaganda was seen as a means
of enlightening the masses, of revealing reality to them rather than distorting or
concealing it.
Defining propaganda is notoriously problematic; one person’s “propaganda”
might be another’s “education”. As Nicholas Jackson O’Shaughnessy points out,
“How we define propaganda is in fact the expression of the theories we hold
about propaganda” (2004:14); even the recognition of an act of communication
as a form of propaganda can be seen to be dependent on the ideological distance
which separates the observer from the act of communication observed. Peter
Kenez has emphasised the (sometimes unconscious) ideological motivation which
underlies most attempts to define propaganda:
we have no precise definition that would be value free and valid regardless
of time or political culture. Social scientists, no doubt unwittingly, have
often defined propaganda in such a way as to make their definition into an
ideological weapon. They have searched for a definition that covers only
the activities of people whose point of view they do not like. (1985:1)
Indeed, Leonard W. Doob has gone so far as to assert that “a clear-cut defini-
tion of propaganda is neither possible nor desirable” (1989:375), and it certainly
seems impossible to provide a definition which captures some abstract conceptual
essence of propaganda, as O’Shaughnessy has pointed out (2004:18). However, a
working definition of what precisely is meant by the term “propaganda” in a given
context is absolutely necessary. As Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell have
said, “in order to analyze propaganda, one needs to be able to recognize it. A
definition sets forth propaganda’s characteristics and aids our recognition of it”
(1992:3).
In its most ideologically neutral sense, “propaganda” merely refers to the dis-
semination or promotion of particular ideas. The word is derived from the Latin
propagare, meaning “to sow”, and its original usage was not pejorative. The ear-
liest use of the term “propaganda” was in the early seventeenth century: the
Vatican established the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (the Sacred Con-
gregation for Propagating the Faith [of the Roman Catholic Church]) in 1622, as
part of the Counter-Reformation. This project of “propagating” the Catholic faith
met with resistance from the Protestants of Europe as well as from the natives of
the Americas, which it aggressively sought to overcome. The word “propaganda”
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thereby acquired some of its current negative connotations, especially among the
ruling elites of the nations targeted by that propaganda. Jowett and O’Donnell
have noted that
[i]n his study of propaganda, Qualter (1962) points out that the Catholic
origins of the word [‘propaganda’] gave it a sinister connotation in the
Northern Protestant countries that it does not have in Southern Catholic
countries” [. . . ]. This largely negative connotation [. . . ] continues to cloud
the discussion of propaganda. (1992:54)
The negative connotations of the word “propaganda”, especially in the Anglo-
Saxon world, therefore have a specific historical origin in the Counter-Reformation,
a historical experience not shared by Russia. Russian culture in the early twen-
tieth century was therefore far more receptive than Western societies to the idea
of propaganda as a positive and even necessary practice, both on the part of
governments and even creative artists.
In this respect, there tends to be a certain element of self-righteous hypocrisy
in Western nations where the issue of propaganda is concerned. For example,
despite their attempts to blame the Germans for starting the propaganda war,64
it was actually the Allies who were the first to employ modern propaganda tech-
niques during the Great War, as the German Chief of Staff General Ludendorff
belatedly recognised in a letter sent to the Imperial Ministry of War in 1917:
The war has demonstrated the superiority of the photograph and the film
as means of information and persuasion. Unfortunately, our enemies have
used their advantage over us in this field so thoroughly that they have
inflicted a great deal of damage [. . . ]. For this reason it is of the utmost
importance for a successful conclusion to the war that films should be made
to work with the greatest possible effect wherever any German persuasion
might still have any effect. (Qtd. in Furhammer and Isaksson 1971:11)
As Ellul has observed,
It is a remarkable fact worthy of attention that modern propaganda should
have begun in the democratic states. During World War I we saw the
combined use of the mass media for the first time; the application of pub-
licity and advertising methods to political affairs, the search for the most
effective psychological methods. [. . . ] Contrary to some belief, the author-
itarian regimes were not the first to resort to this type of action, though
they eventually employed it beyond all limits. (1973:232-33)
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The Soviet government’s use of propaganda, while more overt and more inten-
sive than that of Western governments, was not something which set the Soviet
government apart from its Western counterparts; it was a difference of degree
rather than of kind. Likewise, the Soviet montage directors’ use of cinema for
the purposes of political propaganda was not essentially different from Hollywood
cinema’s status as propaganda for a certain ideology, as Edward Bernays frankly
admitted in 1928 (2005:166) and as Oudart (1978) and Dayan (1974) among oth-
ers have sought to demonstrate. The difference was in the mode of propaganda
being used and in the relationship between the spectator and the filmic text and
the particular effect on the audience which the montage film-makers wished to
achieve with their propaganda films. In this chapter, I shall try to determine the
precise nature of that difference.
Moreover, the current negative connotations surrounding the word “propa-
ganda” in the West only really became widespread in the 1920s following the
revelations of the manipulation of public opinion by the Allies during the Great
War. Before then, the public had not been widely conscious of the existence of
propaganda65 and the negative view of the Catholic Church’s propaganda was
largely confined to the numerically small ruling class of the Northern European
Protestant countries, who viewed it as a tactic used by subversives to under-
mine legitimate authority rather than used by governments to manipulate their
subjects. For example, an English encyclopedist called W. T. Brande wrote in
the mid-nineteenth century that “[d]erived from this celebrated society [of Pope
Gregory] the name propaganda is applied in modern political language as a term
of reproach to secret associations for the spread of opinions and principles which
are viewed by most governments with horror and aversion” (qtd. in Jowett and
O’Donnell 1992:54); his choice of words indicates that he believed it was specifi-
cally the ruling elite who regarded only a certain type of propaganda directed at
a certain target in a negative light.
In his seminal comparative study of Soviet and Nazi film propaganda, Richard
Taylor begins by attempting to give a definition of propaganda: “What then is
‘propaganda’? Propaganda is the attempt to influence the public opinions of an
audience through the transmission of ideas and values” (Taylor 1998:15). And he
concludes that “[p]ropaganda is concerned with the transmission of ideas and/or
values from one person, or group of persons, to another. Where ‘propagation’ is
the action, there ‘propaganda’ is the activity” (1998:7). This definition has the
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merit of emphasising the connection between propaganda and communication,
specifically the rhetorical communication of ideas and values, while not passing
any value judgement on the truth or worth of those ideas and values. It also
has the merit of not implying that propaganda necessarily appeals only to the
emotions rather than the reason of its audience. In fact, Taylor does raise the
question of whether a “rational propaganda” could indeed exist, which has impli-
cations concerning the distinction between propaganda and education (1998:12).
Taylor, however, seems to imply that propaganda can never encourage critical
thinking when he claims that
[w]riting of the distinction between education and ‘propaganda’, Brown66
remarks that ‘education’ teaches people how to think, while propaganda
teaches them what to think. This is a distinction that might usefully be
adapted to distinguish between information and ‘propaganda’. (1998:12;
original emphasis)
He goes further, claiming that propaganda actually aims to close people’s minds,
to end critical thinking:
But education is concerned with opening minds, ‘propaganda’ with closing
them. Therein lies the vital difference, for education will ultimately lead
its audience to question the values upon which it is itself based, whereas
‘propaganda’ aims only to make its audience accept those values, and some-
times to act upon the acceptance too. (1998:13)
This approach is similar in intent to Jowett and O’Donnell’s attempts to specifiy
a distinction between propaganda and informative communication. According to
them,
Communication has been defined as a convergence process in which sender
and receiver, either through mediated or nonmediated means, create and
share information. When the information is used to accomplish a purpose
of sharing, explaining, or instructing, this is considered to be informative
communication. (Jowett and O’Donnell 1992:19)
They also claim that
[i]nformative discourse is communication about subject matter that has
attained the privileged status of being beyond dispute. Whenever informa-
tion is regarded as disputable by either the sender or receiver, it is difficult
for the communication to proceed as information. (1992:18-19)
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This seems to me to miss the point: if propaganda works on a population, if it
is successful in its aim of forming their opinions, then by definition the relevant
subject matter will of course be “beyond dispute” in the sense that it will not
even occur to anyone to dispute the truth of what they are being told. As Kenez
has remarked,
The Soviet people ultimately came not so much to believe the Bolshe-
viks’ world view as to take it for granted. Nobody remained to point out
the contradictions and even inanity inherent in the regime’s slogans. In
circumstances where only one point of view can be expressed, the distinc-
tion between belief and nonbelief and truth and untruth is washed away.
(1985:253)
It might be added that Jowett and O’Donnell’s distinction between “propaganda”
and “informative discourse” is also washed away.
Attempts to deprecate propaganda as an “illegitimate” form of discourse are
usually accompanied by attempts to define a contrasting “legitimate” form of
discourse; for example, either “information” in Taylor’s case (1998), “informative
discourse” in the case of Jowett and O’Donnell (1992) or “rhetoric” in the case
of Bennett and O’Rourke (2006). Such attempts are seldom convincing, and ac-
tually stem from an impoverished understanding of the nature of propaganda
itself. Far from there being a meaningful distinction between propaganda and
rhetoric, the two are actually closely and inextricably linked, rhetoric being one
of the indispensible means employed by a propagandist to persuade his or her
audience of something. In O’Shaughnessy’s words, “Along with symbolism and
myths, rhetoric performs a key role in propaganda and the three are intertwined”
(2004:66). Likewise, a propagandist often regards his or her own propaganda as
a form of “informative discourse”, and in fact even Josef Goebbels insisted that
Nazi propaganda must be as factually accurate as possible (Ellul 1973:54,n).67
Bernays also made the point in 1928 that “[t]he only propaganda which will
ever tend to weaken itself as the world becomes more sophisticated and intelli-
gent, is propaganda that is untrue or unsocial” (Bernays 2005:122). Propaganda
therefore cannot be fundamentally distinguished from the concept of informa-
tive discourse, being essentially a particular type of informative communication:
persuasive communication, in the sense defined by Jowett and O’Donnell:
Persuasion as a subset of communication is usually defined as a commu-
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nicative process to influence others. A persuasive message has a point of
view or a desired behavior for a recipient to adopt in a voluntary fashion.
(1992:21)
As will be seen, the voluntary nature of the recipient’s adoption of the desired
viewpoint or behaviour is open to dispute. It can be argued that the recipient
may believe his adoption of a particular viewpoint or new behaviour under the
influence of a “persuasive communication” to be entirely voluntary, when in fact
it is involuntary or even altogether unconscious. This is in fact what Jean-Pierre
Oudart (1978) and Daniel Dayan (1974) claim to be the case with the “system
of the suture” in Hollywood movies, the famous “tutor-code of classical cinema”.
They insist on “the brutality, on the tyranny with which this signification im-
poses itself on the spectator or [. . . ] ‘transits through him’ ” (Dayan 1974:31), a
“tyranny” of which they claim the spectator is not consciously aware.
And it is insufficient to define (illegitimate) “propaganda” as being directed
at a mass audience while (legitimate) “persuasion” is directed at the individual,
as Jowett and O’Donnell claim when they say that “[p]ropaganda tends to be
linked with a general societal process whereas persuasion is regarded as an in-
dividual psychological process” (1992:17). On the contrary, as Ellul has pointed
out, propaganda addresses both the mass and the individual simultaneously:
Any modern propaganda will, first of all, address itself at one and the
same time to the individual and to the masses. It cannot separate the two
elements. [. . . ] [P]ropaganda does not aim simply at the mass, the crowd.
[. . . ] Modern propaganda reaches individuals enclosed in the mass, yet it
also aims at a crowd, but only as a body composed of individuals. (1973:6)
And this is never more true than in the case of cinema:
The movie spectator also is alone; though elbow to elbow with his neighbors,
he still is, because of the darkness and the hypnotic attraction of the screen,
perfectly alone. This is the situation of the “lonely crowd,” or of isolation
in the mass, which is a natural product of present-day society and which is
both used and deepened by the mass media. The most favorable moment
to seize a man and influence him is when he is alone in the mass: it is at
this point that propaganda can be most effective. (1973:8-9)
This implies that cinema is actually, in many respects, the mass medium most
ideally suited to being used for propaganda purposes and for the rhetorical per-
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suasion of an audience, both for the way in which it simultaneously gathers people
together and isolates them, and for its creation of a stream of visual images on
the audience’s sensoria. Rhetoric has traditionally relied on visual images and
metaphoric figures for its effect, as O’Shaughnessy has emphasised:
the key to rhetorical persuasion is the manufacture of visual images. [. . . ]
Through reflection, images accumulate meaning. For Mason (1989) a live
metaphor is a switchboard ‘hopping with signals’: important issues are up
for grabs via such rhetorical devices because they are the ones with inher-
ent indeterminacy, an absence of analytical proof. Potentially metaphors
can fracture existing paradigms of thought and introduce new ones because
their very vividness assaults our attention and lives on in our memory, and
in this they are special, since subverting existing and often culturally de-
termined ideologies is the hardest thing for a propagandist to do. (2004:72)
Eisenstein’s concept of the “generalised image” (Eisenstein 1991:26-27) can there-
fore be seen in this light: as an embodiment of the generalising, rhetorical power
of images, which lends itself to the creation of propaganda.
3.2 Cinema and propaganda in the Soviet Union
The usual Western attempts to define propaganda are therefore, to my mind, too
narrow and have too many ideological presuppositions built into them to properly
encompass the full uses to which propaganda was being put in the Soviet Union,
especially in the 1920s and 1930s. It is worth noting that O’Shaughnessy also
takes the standpoint that “current understandings [of propaganda] have erred in
restricting its meaning” (2004:29). For cultural and historical reasons, propa-
ganda did not have the same negative moral and political connotations in the
Soviet Union which it had and still has in the West, and the Soviet montage di-
rectors’ understanding of what propaganda is and what it could accomplish was
far richer than is current in our own society. The Soviet authorities and many
Soviet artists (especially those committed to a Marxist worldview, who included
Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Vertov) had an essentially positive view of propaganda.
They saw it as an essential and constructive part of the new Soviet society, and
one of the chief means by which they could contribute to the building of that
society. To regard films like Potemkin or The Mother or The Man with a Movie
Camera as propaganda is therefore not to denigrate them, or downgrade them
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from the status of great art to “mere” agitprop, but to acknowledge the motiva-
tions which lay behind their creation, and to bring out those elements in these
works which make them unique contributions to cinema art.
The Soviet authorities themselves certainly regarded cinema as being ideally
suited to be used as a propaganda medium. Lenin famously asserted that “of
all the arts for us the most important is cinema” (Taylor and Christie 1988:57).
When used as a medium for propaganda, it certainly had some advantages for
the Bolsheviks over other art forms such as the theatre. Its status as a mass-
produced industrial product meant that it had a certain reliability of reproduction
– the authorities could send out a film from the centre to be exhibited in the
provinces and be sure that the content of the performance was fixed in advance
and precisely reproducible, thus making it the most reliable and controllable form
of political propaganda available to them. As Taylor has asserted, “cinema [was]
the ideal propaganda weapon for the second quarter of the twentieth century”
(1998:17). Trotsky summed up the view which the Soviet authorities took towards
the propaganda potential of cinema when he bemoaned their own failure to make
proper use of it in 1923:
The fact that we have so far, i.e., in nearly six years, not taken possession
of cinema shows how slow and uneducated we are, not to say, frankly,
stupid. This weapon, which cries out to be used, is the best instrument for
propaganda [. . . ] a propaganda which is accessible to everyone, cuts into
the memory and may be made a possible source of revenue. (qtd. in Taylor
1998:35)
In fact, Stalin was merely echoing Trotsky when he proclaimed in 1924 that “[t]he
cinema is the greatest means of mass agitation. The task is to take it into our
own hands” (qtd. in Taylor 1979:64). In Taylor’s words,
Trotsky felt that, whereas religion had been the opiate of the people in
feudal society, and vodka had played a similar role in the capitalist stage of
Russia’s development, cinema would serve as the great eye-opener for the
masses, the liberating educational weapon of a socialist society.68 (1998:35)
The Soviet government would have understood an “educational weapon”, of course,
to be a propaganda weapon in the hands of the political vanguard of the prole-
tariat. For the Soviet authorities, as for the montage directors, to educate and
to propagandise were essentially the same activity; as Kenez has pointed out,
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“a synonym for propaganda in early Bolshevik parlance was ‘political education
work’ ” (1985:8). As A. I. Krinitsky put it in his report to the 1928 cinema con-
ference, ‘The Results of the Construction of Cinema in the USSR and the Tasks
of Soviet Cinematography’:
Cinema, like every art, cannot be apolitical. Cinema must be an instrument
of the proletariat in its struggle for hegemony, leadership and influence in
relation to other classes and ‘in the hands of the Party it must be the most
powerful medium of Communist enlightenment and agitation’ (in the reso-
lution of the 13th. Congress of the Party). (Taylor and Christie 1988:208)
It was not just the Soviet government itself which had this attitude, and not just
regarding cinema. From the beginning of the 1920s, many artists in the Soviet
Union, such as the Constructivists, were vehemently proclaiming that industrial
art and propaganda were the proper fields for the artist’s endeavours rather than
the creation of autonomous works of art separate from everyday life. Mayakovsky,
for example, asserted that his advertising jingles for Mosselprom69 or his window
posters for ROSTA70 were as valuable as anything else he had written.
Mayakovsky’s advertising work for Mosselprom is a salutary reminder that not
only governments make propaganda: “There is little doubt that under any defini-
tion of propaganda, the practice of advertising would have to be included” (Jowett
and O’Donnell 1992:117). Indeed, Edward Bernay’s seminal 1928 book on propa-
ganda (Bernays 2005) dealt almost exclusively with the commercial application
of propaganda techniques, or “public relations” as he called them. Interestingly
enough, Vertov also made some short animated advertisements in the early 1920s,
most notably Soviet Toys (1924); these could therefore also be included among
his works of propaganda. Of course, Vertov took the opportunity while mak-
ing commercial “propaganda” (in Bernays’ sense of the term) to create political
propaganda at the same time, as Tsivian has noted (2004:93). In fact, the divid-
ing line between commercial propaganda (advertising) and political propaganda
was somewhat blurred throughout Vertov’s career: during the NEP period, Ver-
tov created many advertisements for commercial enterprises (Vertov 1984:25-31),
and his film A Sixth Part of the World (1926) was sponsored by GOSTORG, the
state agency for foreign trade, as a feature-length advertisement of its activities
(Feldman 1977:121).
It is in the context of this determination to use cinema for propaganda pur-
poses that the famous “Leninist proportion”, which provided such grist to Dziga
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Vertov’s polemical mill, should therefore be interpreted. Contrary to Vertov’s
claims that Lenin was insisting on the presence of a certain proportion of newsreel
and propaganda films in any exhibition of commercial films, Lenin was actually
proposing a restriction on the proportion of such films. In other words, the sta-
tus quo which Lenin was challenging was one in which predominantly agitational
and newsreel films were being shown in cinemas, as had been the case during the
Civil War period; Lenin was now insisting on the need for some commercial fic-
tion films to be exhibited also. Lenin considered such a restriction on the number
of propaganda films exhibited in cinemas to be desirable because of the need to
attract audiences into the cinema theatres in the first place (a propaganda film
which no-one watches is useless as propaganda, as Lunacharsky pointed out),
and to bring in much-needed revenue from popular commercial films in order to
rebuild the precarious finances of the Soviet film industry. Vertov was therefore
being slightly mischievous in the way in which he deliberately chose to interpret
the “Leninist proportion”: he was invoking the magic name of Lenin in order to
support his own polemical position, yet was essentially reversing the thrust of
Lenin’s argument.
The idea of newsreels and documentary films – which supposedly present re-
ality rather than fiction – serving propagandistic aims should not regarded as
oxymoronic. After all, one of the most famous documentaries of all, Robert Fla-
herty’s Nanook of the North (1926), had originally been made as a propaganda
film for a fur company (Jowett and O’Donnell 1992:93). Its status as propaganda
does not automatically undermine its status as a “truthful” documentary; propa-
ganda can be either factually accurate or factually inaccurate, or may even use
factual inaccuracy to try to express a “higher truth”.
Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Vertov all agreed with this aim of using cinema
as a propaganda weapon. In fact, the founder of Soviet montage cinema, Lev
Kuleshov, asserted that the montage method itself was inseparable from the po-
litical ideology of the film-maker, in the sense that the montage juxtaposition
of images and facts, no matter how politically neutral that raw material might
be in itself, inevitably communicated an ideological position. Kuleshov quoted
an example given by Eisenstein in one of his lectures at the State Institute of
Cinematography concerning the editing of a newspaper:71
In a capitalist paper all the events would be edited so that the bourgeois
intention of the editor, and accordingly, of the paper, would be maximally
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expressed and emphasized through the character of the montage of the
events, their arrangement on the newspaper page. The essential exploita-
tiveness of the capitalist system would be clouded over in the bourgeois
paper in every conceivable way, with the evils of the system concealed and
the actuality embroidered. (Kuleshov 1974:185)
Kuleshov is describing something very close to what would later be called the
“system of the suture”, which analyses how the ideology of a classical Hollywood
film is simultaneously embodied in and concealed by the way in the film is con-
structed. Kuleshov continues by describing how
[t]he Soviet paper is edited completely otherwise: the information about
these very same events would be edited so as to illuminate the entire condi-
tion of things in the capitalist world, to reveal its essential exploitativeness,
and the position of the workers as it is in reality. (1974:185)
Leaving aside the issue of the accuracy of this account as a description of the
actual practice of Soviet newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s, it at least makes
clear how the Soviet montage film-makers regarded their own efforts to make films
embodying a particular political ideology. Kuleshov goes on to assert that
[i]t can be proved, with the facts related to each other in this fashion, that
the ideological sense of these facts would be differently apprehended by the
reader of the paper. In the communist paper the class nature of the fact
will be revealed, while in the bourgeois press this nature will be fogged
over, perverted. (1974:185)
Kuleshov, and by his own implication Eisenstein too, clearly regarded the bour-
geois newspaper – and by extension the bourgeois films of the classical cinema – as
having a fundamentally obscurantist effect on the audience. This obscurantism is
the result of the film communicating an ideological position to the audience while
simultaneously concealing the fact that it is doing so, thereby naturalising that
ideological position in the mind of the audience. Montage, on the other hand, is
presented by Kuleshov as a means of revealing the truth, of presenting a particu-
lar ideological position openly and without concealment, thereby “illuminat[ing]”
and “reveal[ing]” the situation “as it is in reality”. The similarity with Vertov’s
stated aspiration to reveal “life as it is” to the audience of his films is obvious.
Kuleshov’s conclusion was that “film montage, as the entire work of filmmak-
ing, is inextricably linked to the artist’s world-view and his ideological purpose”
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(1974:184). In other words, the montage method itself was inevitably and inextri-
cably linked to the mode of propaganda being used by the montage film-makers.
Indeed, Kuleshov is strongly implying that the montage method cannot be un-
derstood other than as a method of constructing political propaganda, as a form
of political rhetoric.
It should be noted, however, that Kuleshov’s films are among the least politi-
cally tendentious of all the montage directors’; indeed, he came under increasing
pressure from hostile Soviet critics in the late 1920s and early 1930s for precisely
this reason. Kuleshov himself even admitted that
in the beginning of my work in cinema the question of montage, the ques-
tions of aesthetic theory generally, were questions which were substantially
murky for me, and I did not connect them with class interpretations, with
the world-view of the artist. (1974:185-86)
Kuleshov seems to have initially regarded montage as no more and no less than
what Peter Bürger called it: “In the film, the montage of images is the basic tech-
nical procedure. It is not a specifically artistic technique, but one that lies in the
medium” (1984:73; original emphasis). This attitude may account for Kuleshov’s
relatively conservative use of the montage method, his obsession with the popular
genres of Hollywood classical cinema, and the generally apolitical nature of his
earliest feature films. Kuleshov was initially seeking merely to use the “basic tech-
nical procedure” of montage to achieve a maximal efficiency of filmic discourse and
maximal control over the signification process – to take bland or meaningless raw
footage and use montage to construct meaningful cinematographic statements
out of it. It seems that it was only when he fell under the influence of the other
montage directors, especially Eisenstein, that Kuleshov’s understanding of film
montage became more politicised and he eventually perceived it as inextricably
linked to ideology.
Indeed, Eisenstein himself made the link in 1930 between the political and
propaganda needs of the Party at a given historical moment and the role of
cinema in fulfilling those needs:
In the Soviet Union art is responsive to social aims and demands. One day,
for example, all attention is centred on the village; it is imperative to raise
the village from the slough of ancient custom and bring it into line with
the Soviet system as a whole; the peasant must learn to see the difference
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between private ownership and individualistic survivals on the one hand,
and co-operation and collective economy on the other. SOS!
The seismograph of the Party apparatus notes a vacillation in this section of
Soviet life. At once, all social thought is directed towards it. Throughout
the country the press, literature, the fine arts are mobilised to ward off
danger. The slogan is: ‘Face the Village!’ The smitchka [i.e., smychka], the
union of proletarian and poor peasant, is established. Opponents of Soviet
aims are ousted. The strongest propaganda guns are put into action; there
begins a bombardment on behalf of socialist economy. Here the cinema
plays a big role. (Qtd. in Taylor 1998:50-51)
Jacques Aumont has even pinpointed this as one of the elements of Eisenstein’s
thinking which was present from the beginning of his career and which never
disappeared:
from the manifestos on the “aggressiveness” of the attractions (theatrical
or filmic) to the militant declarations of principle in his last years, there is
no break – the “fundamental activity” of the Soviet cinema is “to reeducate
and exercise an influence upon the people” (Aumont 1987:189)
The political tendentiousness of montage cinema was actually considered note-
worthy even for its time and place, as was its concentration on political education
and propaganda at the expense of characterisation and other aesthetic criteria
normally considered essential for cinema. In fact, Gorky himself is said to have
disapproved of Pudovkin’s film version of his novel The Mother, precisely be-
cause of its propagandistic tendencies – he regarded it as too politically tenden-
tious and as paying too little regard to the maternal motivation of the central
character (Leyda 1983:206,n, Sargeant 2000:70). This is especially significant, as
Pudovkin is usually considered the montage director who is most concerned with
characterisation.
Dziga Vertov also made clear his own commitment to the use of cinema as a
“film-weapon” in the hands of the Communist state:
The battle against the blinding of the masses, the battle for vision can and
must begin only in the USSR, where the film-weapon is in the hands of the
state.
To see and show the world in the name of the worldwide proletarian revo-
lution – that is the most basic formula of the kinoks. (Vertov 1984:39-40;
original emphasis)
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Throughout the 1920s, the montage directors were left free to work out for them-
selves the details of how to use cinema as a propaganda weapon in the service
of the Communist cause. And indeed, while Eisenstein and Vertov in particular
may have agreed on the overall purpose of cinema as propaganda, they certainly
did not see eye-to-eye regarding the means by which that aim was to be achieved.
However, this relatively tolerant attitude of the Soviet regime regarding the pre-
cise way in which cinema could be used as a propaganda medium was not to last
beyond the early 1930s.
3.3 Rhetoric and transactive propaganda
The techniques and resources of rhetoric are often removed entirely from the realm
of propaganda for ideological reasons. This is done, for example, by Bennett and
O’Rourke, who have criticised
the conflation of rhetoric and propaganda, with little more than simplistic
and often unexplored distinctions between reason and emotion or instruc-
tion and indoctrination. (2006:60)
Such a distinction is essentially based on whether the discourse’s appeal is to
reason or emotion. Their definition of “propaganda” largely conforms to that of
Taylor, contrasting a rhetorical appeal which stimulates reason with a propagan-
distic appeal which (in their view) suppresses reason and is intended to arouse
only emotion:
Rhetoric, in this way, seeks to promote a thinking response. [. . . ] Pro-
paganda usually seeks to short-circuit a thinking response. It prefers a
reactionary, behavioral response where thought is minimized, reflection di-
minished, and investigation largely eliminated. It seeks to limit the aspects
of response to the affective dimension and envisions nothing less desirable
than a thinking target. (2006:68)
However, in many respects it is precisely this concept of “rhetoric” (which Bennett
and O’Rourke oppose to what they call “propaganda”) which is close to what the
Soviet montage directors themselves regarded as “propaganda” and which corre-
sponds to what Brecht called for in 1934: “Propaganda that stimulates thinking”
(Brecht 1966:146). The distinction between “good” rhetoric and “bad” propaganda
was simply not one which was recognised by the Soviet montage film-makers. To
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include rhetoric within our definition of propaganda might therefore enrich it
sufficiently to enable us to analyse the ways in which the Soviet montage direc-
tors used montage in the enunciation of their filmic texts in order to achieve a
rhetorical and propagandistic effect on the spectators.
Bennett and O’Rourke put their finger on what is usually taken to be the
essential difference between rhetoric and propaganda when they state that “[w]e
see important differences in the way rhetoric and propaganda approach the “other”
(2006:66). In their view, propaganda (at least in the pejorative Western sense)
does not respect the autonomy of the “other”; it is a monologue rather than a
dialogue, and merely imposes its message on its audience. In reality, of course,
propaganda is rarely as crude as that; what is crude and deficient is actually
the concept of propaganda in our culture, and it is deficient precisely so far as
it omits the rhetorical aspect of propaganda. In fact, the reciprocal nature of
successful propaganda had been recognised by Bernays even as early as 1928
when he asserted that
[t]he public is not an amorphous mass which can be molded at will, or
dictated to. Both business and the public have their own personalities which
must somehow be brought into friendly agreement. [. . . ] The relationship
between business and the public can be healthy only if it is the relationship
of give and take. (2005:86-87)
The montage directors also understood the rhetorical aspect of effective propa-
ganda, although they deployed that rhetorical aspect in subtly different ways.
Their definition of propaganda was such that it did respect the “other”, at least
to the extent of understanding the need for a two-way interactive process to occur
for propaganda to be effective, and the need for an appeal to the reason as well
as the emotions of the audience. In fact, it is precisely the reciprocal relationship
between the propagandist and the propagandee which is often absent from West-
ern analyses of propaganda, which tends to view propaganda one-sidedly as a
one-way process, an imposition of the propagandist’s views on the propagandee’s
passive psyche. Taylor’s study of the film propaganda of the Soviet Union and
Nazi Germany (1998) seems to me to suffer from this failing, despite its other
great merits; hence his entirely negative view of propaganda as a sedative rather
than a stimulant, and as aimed at ending the thought process rather than stim-
ulating it. O’Shaughnessy, by contrast, has emphasised the interactive aspect of
successful propaganda:
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When critics claim that propaganda is ‘manipulative’, they perhaps envis-
age a passive recipient. While some propaganda exchanges may resemble
this stumulus-response form, what is often going on in the propaganda pro-
cess may be more subtle. The idea of people willingly misled strikes at the
root of concepts of man as a rational decision maker, yet surely this is what
occurred in Serbia, Rwanda and elsewhere. (2004:114)
To examine Soviet montage cinema as propaganda, it must therefore be examined
as a form of rhetoric, a method of persuasion. Furthermore, it is impossible to
draw a clear line separating propaganda from rhetoric, from education or from
the communication of information. That this is so can be seen, for example, in
the logical weakness of Jowett and O’Donnell’s attempts to specify a distinction
between propaganda and informative communication.
The purpose of propaganda in the minds of Eisenstein, Pudovkin or Vertov,
despite their different attitudes towards the necessary or appropriate relationship
between the propagandist and the propagandee, was essentially the same: to
persuade the audience of the truth of a political ideology which they, the montage
directors themselves, believed to be true. And it was essentially a dynamic and
interactive process. As Jowett and O’Donnell put it,
Persuasion is a reciprocal process in which both parties are dependent upon
one another. It is a situation of interactive or transactive dependency. In-
teractive suggests turn-taking; whereas, transactive suggests a more con-
tinuous and dynamic process of co-creating meaning. The persuader who
understands that persuasion is interactive or a transaction in which both
parties approach a message-event and use it to attempt to fulfill needs will
never assume a passive audience. (1992:21)
The fact that the meaning of a text or communication is created through a
transactive process has also been pointed out by Hovland and Janis (1959) and
by Kellner (1995); Kellner in particular has described meaning as ultimately a co-
production between text and viewer-receiver, who is more than merely a passive
receptor of a pre-existent meaning.
Once that principle has been established, the question can then be raised as
to the actual mechanism by which this transactive process occurs. The work of
Alcorn and Bracher (1985) and of Alcorn (1987) is particularly relevant to this
issue. Alcorn has proposed a psychoanalytic mechanism by which rhetoric could
operate on the reader of a literary text so as to have a persuasive effect on him or
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her, in the sense of producing a change in that reader’s value structures through
a transactive process linking the author (or rather, the text) and the reader of
that text. I shall apply Alcorn’s approach in order to investigate the means by
which Soviet montage cinema achieves some of its rhetorical effects in the next
chapter of this thesis.
3.4 Agitation propaganda and integration
propaganda
In his major study of film propaganda, Richard Taylor claimed that “[t]he ‘pro-
pagandist’ deals not in the drugs of stimulation but in those of sedation; it is
through anaesthesia that he hopes to achieve a reaction” (1998:13). This seems
to me to be far too limited a way of regarding propaganda, particularly the forms
of propaganda which existed in the Soviet Union. In a dictatorial society in
which the authorities have the aim of pacifying the population and lulling them
into political slumber, as for example in Franco’s Spain, the propagandists will
indeed “deal not in the drugs of stimulation but in those of sedation”. However,
the dictatorship of the Soviet Union (and also that of Nazi Germany) had as one
of its chief aims the mobilisation of the population, not their sedation. The effect
of most Soviet propaganda was far from sedative (at least in its intention); its
aim was to provoke and agitate the audience, both emotionally and through their
powers of reasoning. Far from wishing to sedate and pacify the Soviet people,
the Soviet propagandists wished to raise the cultural level of the audience, to
increase their awareness of the worldwide proletarian struggle, and to heighten
their level of political and social consciousness. They repeatedly stated as much;
for example, K. Mal’tsev said in 1927 that “[c]inema is not merely a medium
of agitation and propaganda, but it is a powerful and a key factor with the aid
of which we shall raise the masses to a higher cultural level” (qtd. in Taylor
1998:40). Stalin himself even called cinema “the greatest means of mass agita-
tion”, a phrase which inspired the wording of the ‘Resolution of the Thirteenth
Party Congress on Cinema’ (Taylor and Christie 1988:111), as Taylor himself
notes (1998:217,n.25). The point I wish to make here is that Soviet propaganda
was being used to consciously try to raise the level of culture and the political con-
sciousness of the audience, with the aim of agitating and mobilising them for the
purpose of building socialism. This purpose required highly conscious and active
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citizens, who were politically aware and could think rationally and critically. The
Soviet regime’s desire for politically conscious and activist citizens is indicated
by the fact that, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, there were many campaigns
in which the Soviet government called upon ordinary workers and peasants to
openly criticise the bureaucratic apparatus and to suggest methods of improving
productivity.
In this respect, it is useful to draw a distinction between two different forms
of propaganda, differentiated with respect to the audience response they attempt
to elicit: agitation propaganda and integration propaganda. This distinction
has been made by, for example, Jacques Ellul (1973:70-79) and by Jowett and
O’Donnell (1992:8), who summarise the distinction as follows:
Sometimes propaganda is agitative, attempting to arouse an audience to
certain ends, usually resulting in significant change; sometimes it is in-
tegrative, attempting to render an audience passive, accepting, and non-
challenging. (1992:8)
Ellul has pointed out the particular use made of agitation propaganda by the
Soviet government in particular:
Propaganda of agitation [. . . ] reached its height with Lenin, which leads
us to note that, though it is most often an opposition’s propaganda, the
propaganda of agitation can also be made by government. For example,
when a government wants to galvanize energies to mobilize the entire nation
for war, it will use a propaganda of agitation. [. . . ] Governments also
employ this propaganda of agitation when, after having been installed in
power, they want to pursue a revolutionary course of action.72 (1973:71)
And he makes the important point that, while agitation propaganda is charac-
teristic of developing nations such as the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin,
it is integration propaganda which is actually the dominant mode of propaganda
in developed nations such as our own:
In contrast to this propaganda of agitation is the propaganda of integration
– the propaganda of developed nations and characteristic of our civilization;
in fact it did not exist before the twentieth century. It is a propaganda of
conformity. (1973:74)
The social and political purpose of integration propaganda is precisely the oppo-
site to that of agitation propaganda. Ellul describes it succinctly:
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Propaganda of integration thus aims at making the individual participate
in his society in every way. It is a long-term propaganda, a self-reproducing
propaganda that seeks to obtain stable behavior, to adapt the individual
to his everyday life, to reshape his thoughts and behavior in terms of the
permanent social setting. [. . . ] Integration propaganda aims at stabilizing
the social body, at unifying and reinforcing it. It is thus the preferred
instrument of government [. . . ]. The most important example of the use of
such propaganda is the United States. (1973:75-76)
Such integration propaganda is not produced by the American government alone,
of course. Perhaps the most persuasive and effective example of integration pro-
paganda in the world is Hollywood cinema.73 The “system of the suture”, as
developed by Jacques-Alain Miller (1978), Jean-Pierre Oudart (1978) and Daniel
Dayan (1974) among others, is a method of analysing classical Hollywood cin-
ema using the principles of Lacanian psychoanalysis to reveal the way in which
classical cinema embodies the hegemonic ideology of society at the level of filmic
enunciation. They suggest that the viewer is “sutured” into the film, and thereby
into that hegemonic ideology, in a process analogous to Althusserian interpel-
lation. Dayan has given the name “the tutor-code of classical cinema” to this
system, which is clearly an example of integration propaganda (in Ellul’s sense
of the term) of a particularly effective kind.
The essential deficiency of Taylor’s approach is that he fails to make a dis-
tinction between agitation propaganda and integration propaganda, implicitly
regarding all propaganda as integrative in its aim, as a sedative rather than a
stimulant. Taylor mentions the distinction made by the Bolsheviks between “ag-
itation” and “propaganda” and specifically states that he will not make such a
distinction in his own analysis (1998:29).74 While the distinction between agita-
tion and propaganda is not precisely the same as the distinction between agitation
propaganda and integration propaganda, Taylor’s claim that “to discuss each film
in terms of whether it may be regarded as agitation or propaganda would be
a worse than fruitless exercise, for it would actually obscure the real value of
the film” (1998:29) is symptomatic of his general failure to distinguish between
different modes of propaganda.75
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3.5 Truth and falsehood in propaganda
Taylor’s essentially negative attitude towards propaganda, regarding it as a “seda-
tive” and implicitly as misleading or untruthful, seems to have negatively influ-
enced the way he regards the films of Vertov in particular. For example, Taylor
claims that there is a fundamental contradiction between Vertov’s commitment
to “catching life unawares” and his use of montage:
For Vertov, as for Eisenstein, montage was the key to the new reality, but its
use was incompatible with his other fundamental belief in what he termed
‘life caught unawares’ [zhizn’ vrasplokh] [. . . ]. Reality in Vertov’s formula
was not then ‘life caught unawares’ or ‘life as it is’ but ‘life as it ought
to be’, and that formula contained the germ of the distortions of Socialist
Realism. (Taylor 1998:74)
Taylor seems to regard Vertov’s use of montage as merely a means for him to dis-
tort reality; that is, he regards his films as “propaganda” in the negative sense of
that word, as being essentially untruthful, and that this untruthfulness is essen-
tially connected with his use of the montage method. In one rather limited sense
of the word, “propaganda” can indeed be thought of as a reconstructed relation of
events that deliberately fabricates or constructs a mythology.76 Being based on
fragmentation, isolation, displacement and juxtaposition, montage could be used
to deform objective reality, deleting significant details and highlighting others.
The montage method, by its nature, therefore lends itself easily to be used for
propaganda purposes, and specifically to construct a mythology. The concept of
deconstructing objective reality (by cutting up supposedly “objective” film shots)
and re-constructing it into a new image is therefore the basis of a certain type of
propaganda as well as the basis of montage. This is clearly the sense in which
Taylor seems to regard Vertov’s use of montage as presaging the “distortions” of
socialist realism; that is, as presaging the propaganda of socialist realism, in the
negative sense in which Taylor understands the concept of propaganda. It is this
view which probably lies behind Taylor’s somewhat contradictory evaluation of
Vertov’s film Three Songs of Lenin (1934):
as Vertov’s biographer, Nikolai Abramov, has pointed out, it is also ‘an
outstanding work of Socialist Realism in the documentary cinema [. . . ] a
classic of Soviet cinema art’. But, despite the accuracy of these descriptions,
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the film can still be regarded as a development of the experimental tradition
of the 1920s. (1998:76)
Taylor’s assertion seems on the face of it to be inconsistent. The two charac-
teristics which Taylor ascribes to the film – as being “an outstanding work of
Socialist Realism” and as being “a development of the experimental tradition of
the 1920s” – are actually mutually contradictory. Taylor seems to have simply
taken Abramov’s judgement at face value, neglecting the political reasons behind
it. Abramov had to claim Three Songs of Lenin as a classic of socialist realism
in order to artistically rehabilitate Vertov in the Soviet Union of the 1960s – in
doing this, he was (perhaps unconsciously) actually resurrecting Shumyatsky’s
somewhat eccentric view of Vertov’s film when it was first released (Taylor and
Christie 1988:365-67). However, as Richard Taylor points out elsewhere, “Ver-
tov specifically denied that Three Songs of Lenin represented a rejection of the
principles of the ‘Cine-Eye’ movement” (1998:225,n.13), whereas Shumyatsky ex-
plicitly (and Abramov implicitly) had claimed it did represent such a rejection.
In fact, despite Shumyatsky’s and Abramov’s politically motivated attempts to
claim otherwise, Vertov’s Three Songs of Lenin is not a socialist realist film and
does indeed represent a continuation of the principles of the Cine-Eye movement
of the 1920s. Far from “presaging the distortions of Socialist Realism”, Vertov was
to stubbornly refuse to compromise his radical film-making principles to conform
to the strictures of socialist realism in the 1930s, a decision which was to ruin his
career.
Vertov’s use of montage, by his own account, was therefore not an attempt to
distort reality but an attempt to better reveal it. Vertov believed, as a Marxist,
that the surface appearance of reality can be misleading. To simply present
that surface reality without first interpreting and rearranging it to reveal its
hidden meanings would be to become complicit in the mystification created by
the operations of capitalism. As Vertov himself asserted,
it is not enough just to film bits of truth. These bits must be organized
in order to produce a truth of the whole. And this task is no less difficult,
perhaps even more difficult, than the filming of the individual bits of truth.
(Vertov 1984:120)
Moreover, he emphasised that the complex editing of the montage method is
required precisely in order to avoid distorting reality in the mind of the audi-
ence: “The elimination of falsity, the achievement of that sincerity and clarity
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noted by critics in Three Songs of Lenin required exceptionally complex editing”
(1984:122). Taylor himself even seems to accept this idea:
Vertov’s early feature films [. . . ] while consisting of film material of ‘life
caught unawares’, are none the less organised through montage and it is this
organisation that gives them rhythm, direction and, indeed, coherence. Life
may have been caught unawares, but the director is concerned to make life
more aware of itself. (Taylor 1998:75)
“[T]o make life more aware of itself” is a good way of describing what Vertov was
aspiring to achieve – to raise the political and social consciousness of the audience
by confronting them with life itself, with all its normally hidden meanings and
connections revealed through montage.
However, it must be noted that Vertov himself was not above mixing actuality
footage and visually staged scenes in order to make his political rhetoric more
effective. For example, in Kinopravda No. 8, which deals with the trial of the
Socialist Revolutionaries, Vertov actually appears in the film in the role of a
tram passenger, an “ordinary” member of the Soviet public, who buys a copy of
a newspaper containing the trial’s verdict. Vertov’s brother, Mikhail Kaufman,
also plays a member of the public who buys a copy of the same newspaper and
discusses the verdict with another “ordinary” Soviet citizen who is actually Ivan
Beliakov, a member of the film crew.77 They even make a bet with each other as
to whether the defendants will be shot or merely imprisoned, and the film ends
with the “joke” that some are shot and others are spared, hence neither of the
“bystanders” wins the bet. Vertov was clearly trying to introduce an element of
suspense into what was actually a foregone conclusion – the guilty verdict and the
death sentences for the majority of the accused – by deliberately misleading the
audience. Such examples, while rare, certainly do exist in Vertov’s documentary
films, and indicate that his desire to achieve a powerful rhetorical effect was so
strong that it could sometimes override his usual obsession with documentary
truthfulness in cinema as the antidote to the “poison” of staged fictional films.
Vertov’s aspiration, however, always remained the same – he clearly believed
that by staging some elements in Kinopravda No. 8, he was thereby helping the
audience to understand a higher political truth: that the Socialist Revolutionaries
were a danger to the Soviet government and therefore to the working class of the
Soviet Union and had to be severely punished.78
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Vertov’s aspiration to capture and preserve factual truthfulness in his films,
while sometimes honoured in the breach rather than the observance, contrasts
with the attitude of Eisenstein towards the issue of factual truthfulness. The
many elements in October in which Eisenstein departs from the historical record
were particularly galling for Vertov, and for the LEF critics who supported Ver-
tov’s documentarist approach. In particular, the portrayal of Lenin by an (un-
trained) actor, Vasili Nikandrov, rather than purely through newsreel footage
of the real Lenin aroused particular anger among the LEF critics, including
Mayakovsky. Even more galling for them, if they had only known it at the
time, would have been the way in which October actually came to displace the
historical record of the October Revolution in the popular memory. As Richard
Taylor has said,
Ironically enough, the very absence of documentary material [. . . ] meant
that subsequent historians and film-makers have turned to October as their
source material, and Eisenstein’s fictional re-creation of reality has, because
of its verisimilitude, acquired the legitimacy of authentic documentary
footage. That is a measure of its success as a propaganda film. (1998:64)
Despite his occasional use of such subterfuge himself, Vertov detested the way in
which the audience’s perception of historical reality itself could be distorted by
this sort of mixing of documentary and newsreel techniques with fictional modes
of film-making. This “contamination” of the historical record by fictionalised
inventions epitomises the danger which Vertov saw in any hybrid or “mediating”
form of cinema which attempted to mix the documentarist and fictional modes of
film-making, as Eisenstein attempted to do in his earliest films (Vertov 1984:58).
Vertov believed that propaganda must be truthful to the facts of reality, whereas
Eisenstein believed that a higher truth than mere facts might be better served
by fiction. This attitude is epitomised by an incident which Eisenstein himself
recorded, in which the memory of a real event was distorted by his own fictional
recreation of it: just after Potemkin had been released, Eisenstein received a
letter from one of the 1905 mutineers who signed himself as “one of those under
the tarpaulin”. In actual fact, Eisenstein had invented the idea of the tarpaulin
being placed over rather than under the condemned sailors, which was the normal
practice to prevent their blood from staining the ship’s clean deck (Eisenstein
1991:51). His invention had proved so powerful that even one of the veterans of
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the 1905 mutiny on the Battleship Potemkin itself remembered the event the way
Eisenstein had invented it rather than the way he had actually experienced it.79
This incident is symptomatic of a fundamental difference between the ways
in which Eisenstein and Pudovkin on the one hand and Vertov on the other used
propaganda, a difference which lay in their view of the appropriate relationship
between the propagandist and the propagandee, the film-maker and his audience.
Eisenstein’s approach was that a film should communicate the propagandist’s
message as clearly as possible, and that the audience’s role was to be an unfree
(though not passive) receiver of that message. The audience was unfree in the
sense that they could not invent their own meaning for the film; the director, as
a creative artist, aimed to transfer the unique meaning of his film as accurately
as possible into the audience’s psyche. The audience was not passive in the sense
that they had to do work in order to recreate that unique meaning of the montage
film. In fact, Eisenstein’s ideal was for the audience to experience the director’s
vision in precisely the same way in which he himself had first experienced it; that
is, the spectator would replicate the director’s creative thought processes. As
Eisenstein put it,
The spectator is forced to follow the same creative path that the author
followed when creating the image. The spectator does not only see the
depicted elements of the work; he also experiences the dynamic process of
the emergence and formation of the image in the same way that the author
experienced it. (Eisenstein 1991:309)
This required an essentially unfree but active spectator. Eisenstein used a vivid
metaphor to describe this process: “a work of art [. . . ] is first and foremost a trac-
tor ploughing over the audience’s psyche in a particular class context” (Eisenstein
1988:62). Eisenstein imposes his truth on the audience, even on those members
of the audience who actually know better, such as the Potemkin mutineer. Ver-
tov’s approach was different, so different in fact that Eisenstein dismissed it as a
form of “primitive Impressionism” and described Vertov’s use of montage as being
like “a pointillist painting” (1988:62). To better understand this distinction be-
tween the approach towards propaganda taken by Eisenstein and Pudovkin and
that taken by Vertov, it is helpful to to make a further distinction between two
different modes of propaganda: vertical propaganda and horizontal propaganda.
Ellul was one of the first to make such a distinction, and he has described
vertical propaganda in the following terms:
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Classic propaganda, as one usually thinks of it, is a vertical propaganda –
in the sense that it is made by a leader, a technician, a political or religious
head who acts from the superior position of his authority and seeks to
influence the crowd below. Such propaganda comes from above. (1973:79-
80)
He differentiates this from what he calls “horizontal propaganda”, which
can be called horizontal because it is made inside the group (not from the
top), where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no leader.
The individual makes contact with others at his own level rather than with
a leader; such propaganda therefore always seeks “conscious adherence.”
(1973:81)
Vertical propaganda is, of course, by far the oldest and is still the most widespread
of the two. It is what is usually thought of when the term “propaganda” is used.
Horizontal propaganda, on the other hand, is a much more recent development,80
and tends to be both more difficult than vertical propaganda and more effective
when successful. As Ellul puts it,
To produce “voluntary” rather than mechanical adherence, and to create a
solution that is “found” by the individual rather than imposed from above,
is indeed a very advanced method, much more effective and binding than
the mechanical action of vertical propaganda. (1973:81-82)
The “condescension” towards the Soviet public which Kenez detects in the Bol-
shevik propagandists (1985:6-7) was a direct result of their overwhelming use of
“vertical” propaganda, and is also present in their capitalist counterparts too, as
Bernays approvingly noted: “Ours must be a leadership democracy administered
by the intelligent minority who know how to regiment and guide the masses”
(2005:127). This “condescension” is in fact an inevitable consequence of the act
of creating “vertical” propaganda, in Ellul’s sense of the term. One of the reasons
Vertov favoured “horizontal” propaganda was probably his wish to avoid this very
problem.
It is clearly the case that Kuleshov, Eisenstein and Pudovkin used the methods
of vertical propaganda. Eisenstein talked about “ploughing over the audience’s
psyche” and of hitting them with his “kino-fist” (Eisenstein 1988:62,64), while
Pudovkin affirmed the need “to force even people with opposing views to be dis-
turbed, directly and against their will” (Pudovkin 2006:23) and asserted that
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“[t]he director [. . . ] despotically manipulate[s] the viewer’s attention. The viewer
sees only what the director shows him; there is neither space nor time for reflec-
tion, doubt or criticism” (2006:35). Pudovkin even describes montage itself as
being merely the means by which to achieve this despotic control over the viewer:
“It must be remembered that montage is essentially the forcible manipulation of
the viewer’s thoughts and associations” (2006:60). By contrast, Vertov’s use of
propaganda was far less coercive and corresponded rather closely to Ellul’s def-
inition of “horizontal propaganda”. Vertov outlined the procedure he expected
the cinema worker-correspondents, the kinoki, to follow when creating their films
in his ‘Provisional Instructions to Kino-Eye Groups’ (Vertov 1984:67-79), and he
summarised it by asserting that
[t]his departure from authorship by one person or a group of persons to
mass authorship will, in our view, accelerate the destruction of bourgeois,
artistic cinema and its attributes: the poser-actor, fairy-tale script, those
costly toys – sets, and the director-high priest. (1984:71)
Vertov clearly expected the worker-correspondents of the the Kino-Eye Group
to “create a solution that is ‘found’ by the individual rather than imposed from
above”, as Ellul puts it. The distinction between the producers and the consumers
of a film would be abolished – the cinema worker-correspondents would be both
the producers and the consumers of the ideologically charged films created by the
Kino-Eye Group, both the propagandists and the propagandees. One potential
advantage of such horizontal propaganda would be that, as Kenez puts it, “there
is no better way to convince people than to ask them to agitate” (1985:255).
3.6 The infectious art of montage cinema
By regarding propaganda as a complex phenomenon with various modalities and
strategies rather than taking the simplistic, restricted definition usually employed
by Western scholars, it is possible to classify the mode of propaganda being used
by the Soviet montage directors in their classic films of the 1920s as transactive
agitation propaganda. In the cases of Eisenstein and Pudovkin, this propaganda
was also vertical, while in the case of Vertov it was (in aspiration at least) hori-
zontal propaganda.
The powerful effectiveness of the montage films – their rhetorical power to
move even audiences ideologically opposed to Communism – is undeniable. No
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less a person than Krupskaya had endorsed October as a propaganda film in an
article in Pravda: “Krupskaya, recalling that Lev Tolstoy ‘measured the artistic
quality of a work by the extent to which it was capable of “infecting” others’,81
argued that ‘There is no doubt that October is infectious” ’ (1998:73), and as
Taylor says, “it may well lay claim to having been the most effective propaganda
film ever made” (1998:73). Taylor also describes how Vertov’s Three Songs of
Lenin
was awarded a prize at the Venice Film Festival in the same year [1935]. It
is rather surprising that a Soviet film praising Lenin and his achievements
should have received such an accolade in fascist Italy and this is perhaps a
tribute to the power of the film. (1998:84)
The critics at Venice were effectively endorsing Joseph Goebbels’ earlier praise
for the rather different montage film Potemkin:
It is a fantastically well made film and displays considerable cinematic
artistry. The decisive factor is its orientation. Someone with no firm ide-
ological convictions could be turned into a Bolshevik by this film. This
proves that a political outlook can be very well contained in a work of art
and that even the worst outlook can be conveyed if this is done through
the medium of an outstanding work of art. (Qtd. in Taylor 1998:144)
It is noteworthy that Goebbels emphasised that the powerful effectiveness of the
film was the result of the unity of art and propaganda. The aim of the artistry
of Potemkin, as of all the Soviet montage films, was to enhance the rhetorical
effectiveness of the films in order to maximise their power as propaganda. This
was “infectious” art indeed.
Hitler actually adopted a rather different approach than the one employed by
Eisenstein and advocated by Goebbels:
The Führer preferred a complete separation of propaganda from art. (This
separation was to serve Leni Riefenstahl well in the early post-war years,
because she felt able to claim that Triumph of the Will [1935] was ‘art’
rather than ‘propaganda’.) (Taylor 1998:148)
The Soviet montage directors, by contrast, did not make this distinction; they
saw no contradiction between art and propaganda. To them, all art was fun-
damentally tendentious, political at its very root. Even Eisenstein’s later films
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were essentially propagandistic: “Alexander Nevsky was both conceived and exe-
cuted primarily as a work of political propaganda; the artistic considerations were
therefore secondary” (1998:86). This was of course consistent with the general
approach of the Soviet government itself towards cinema even into the 1950s, as
Taylor has noted:
Soviet film criticism had been moulded into part of the official propaganda
apparatus. Its function was no longer criticism in the sense that a contem-
porary reader would understand the term but political education: the ex-
planation and clarification of the propaganda message of a film. (1998:121)
But this was propaganda understood somewhat differently than the way the mon-
tage directors understood it in the 1920s. From the early 1930s, coinciding with
the imposition of socialist realism as the only permissible method of artistic cre-
ation, there was an increasing mismatch between propaganda as the montage
directors understood it, in their various ways, and propaganda as the Soviet gov-
ernment increasingly came to understand it. The montage film-makers and the
Soviet government still shared the same view that cinema should serve primar-
ily as a medium of propaganda, but their positions had diverged regarding the
artistic techniques which were permissible to achieve that end. The range of pos-
sibilities for cinema as a medium of propaganda were to be narrowed in the 1930s
to exclude montage as a permissible artistic method.
Chapter 4
Soviet Montage Cinema as
Transactive Rhetoric
In any propaganda activity, the nature of the recipient of the propaganda message
must be taken into consideration if the propaganda is to be persuasive. Rhetoric
can be regarded as the art of persuasion; to examine Soviet montage cinema as a
form of political rhetoric is therefore to examine the effect it has on its intended
audience and to foreground considerations of the interaction between the filmic
text and its spectator. The task faced by the Soviet montage film-makers was
how to rhetorically persuade the individual members of a heterogeneous audience
consisting of a mixture of social classes, ages and genders, of the truth of their
political message in a predictable and therefore effective way. However, the het-
erogeneous nature of the cinema audience meant that the effect of a given stimulus
or attraction was inherently unpredictable. In fact, the role of the spectator in
the constitution of the rhetorical effect of the montage films is so problematic
that a transactive model of their rhetorical effectivity is clearly necessary. The
model must be transactive in the sense that it takes into account the subjectivity
of the spectator in such a way that the two-way mutual interaction between the
filmic text and its spectator could lead to transformations in the psyche of the
spectator. In the following chapter, I shall suggest an appropriate model and
apply it to analyse the rhetorical effectivity of the “Kuleshov Effect” montage
experiment.
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4.1 The “problem of the spectator” in Soviet
montage cinema
In any propaganda activity, the addressee of the propaganda message must be
considered if the propaganda is to be effective. Propaganda ia usually targeted
at specific groups, as Jowett and O’Donnell suggest:
A target audience is selected by a propagandist for its potential effective-
ness. The propaganda message is aimed at the audience most likely to be
useful to the propagandist if it responds favorably (1992:218).
Soviet montage cinema was no exception to that rule, as Eisenstein acknowledged
in 1925 when he noted rather ruefully that
a particular stimulant is capable of provoking a particular reaction (effect)
only from an audience of a particular class character. [. . . ] [A]n audience
of, let us say, metal workers and one of textile workers [. . . ] will react quite
differently and in different places to one and the same work. (Eisenstein
1988:67)
In fact, Soviet montage cinema was always aimed specifically at a proletarian
audience; indeed, film montage itself had originated with the observational ex-
periments carried out by Kuleshov and his co-workers when they toured the cin-
emas of Moscow in 1914-16 and observed which films the working-class audiences
responded to enthusiastically and which they found boring (Kuleshov 1987:40).
However, Soviet montage cinema also had universalist aspirations – the montage
film-makers wanted to use the rhetorical power of montage cinema to influence
everybody, no matter what their class background, in favour of the Communist
cause. The montage directors’ aim was, as Pudovkin put it, “to influence the
masses, to convey a particular enthusiasm, and to force even people with oppos-
ing views to be disturbed, directly and against their will” (Pudovkin 2006:23).
This rather contradictory position proved highly problematic, especially as the
earliest model adopted by the montage film-makers to understand the effectivity
of a montage film was the stimulus-response dyad of reflexology. This deter-
ministic and crudely materialist model was championed in the early 1920s by
Eisenstein in particular, who once wrote that “[h]ad I been more familiar with
Ivan Pavlov’s teaching, I would have called the ‘theory of the montage of at-
tractions’ the ‘theory of artistic stimulants’ ” (Eisenstein 1970:17). Eisenstein,
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in line with the mechanicist materialism in vogue in Soviet Russia at the time,
attempted to connect a particular stimulant in a montage film with a particular
response on the part of the audience through an iron law of causality; the work
of Bekhterev and Pavlov was cited to lend scientific respectability to this model.
Eisenstein even designated the “content” of a film to be no more or less than the
“socially useful effect” it has on its audience using “suitably directed stimulants”:
Class character [klassovost’ ] emerges:
[. . . ] in the determination of the purpose of the film: in the socially useful
emotional and psychological effect that excites the audience and is com-
posed of a chain of suitably directed stimulants. I call this socially useful
effect the content of the film. (Eisenstein 1988:65; original emphasis)
The task which the montage film-makers faced was this: how to determine with
any degree of certainty just what the “content” of a film actually was, and how to
gain control over the supposed causal link between stimulus and reflex response in
order to rhetorically persuade – to propagandise – every member of the audience
in a predictable and therefore effective way. However, the heterogeneous nature
of any audience, composed as it usually was of a mixture of social classes, ages
and genders, meant that the effect of a given stimulus or attraction was inherently
unpredictable.
Soviet montage cinema, considered as a form of propaganda, therefore seemed
to require a particular kind of spectator to be effective: a spectator with the right
sort of pre-existing class consciousness. This was in apparent contradiction with
the aspiration of the montage film-makers to be able to convert even socially
and ideologically hostile spectators to the Communist cause. The role of the
spectator in the creation of the rhetorical effect of the filmic text was so obviously
problematic that it seems clear that a transactive model of rhetoric is necessary in
order to understand how Soviet montage cinema exterted, or at least attempted
to exert, its rhetorical effects on its spectators.
The montage film-makers themselves were certainly aware of the need to con-
sider the heterogeneous nature of the audience when calculating the effectiveness
of the stimuli being used in their films. For example, Eisenstein found that bour-
geois audiences responded differently to the slaughter of the bull at the end of
Strike than did proletarian or peasant audiences. What was horrific and shocking
for one type of spectator was merely part of workaday life for another:
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Class-based ‘inevitability’ in matters of effectiveness is easily illustrated
by the hilarious failure of one attraction that has had a very powerful
influence on film-makers in the context of the worker audience. I have
in mind the slaughter [sequence in The Strike]. Its exaggeratedly bloody
associative effect on a certain stratum of the public is well enough known.
[. . . ] But on a worker audience the slaughter did not have a ‘bloody’ effect
for the simple reason that the worker associates a bull’s blood above all
with the processing plants near a slaughter-house! While on a peasant,
used to slaughtering his own cattle, there will be no effect at all. (Eisenstein
1988:65; original emphasis)
Eisenstein confessed that
I was crushed by this defeat until I realised that the ‘slaughterhouse’ can
also be perceived as something completely unlike a poetic commonplace,
not as a metaphor. A slaughterhouse can also be [. . . ] the place where
meat is produced [. . . ] [For the working class audience] upon the sight of
these shots, the impression arose above all not of death and blood, but of
beef and cutlets. (Qtd. in Nesbet 2007:48)
This meant that, if watched by the wrong type of spectator, there would be a
breakdown of the expressive power of associational montage. The metaphoric
“figure” created by montage would fall flat, would become merely a bare, literal
fact and would lose all its power to agitate or persuade the spectator. In Marshall
Alcorn’s terminology (Alcorn 1987), the process of projective idealisation would
break down and would fail to generate meaning for the spectator out of the film’s
signifiers. This is what could be called the “problem of the spectator” in Soviet
montage cinema.
To be effective, propaganda must be able to produce calculable effects on its
audience. Yet to achieve any degree of control over the effect of their films on the
audience, it seemed that the montage film-makers might have to pre-select the
audience to consist only of factory workers, or even only specific kinds of factory
worker (“an audience of, let us say, metal workers and one of textile workers [. . . ]
will react quite differently and in different places to one and the same work”
(Eisenstein 1988:65)). To be able to create the right sort of class consciousness in
the spectator, it seemed that they first had to start with a spectator who already
possessed the right sort of class consciousness. How was this circle to be squared?
The unwelcome implication was that a separate work of propaganda might have
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to be constructed for each and every one of the members of the audience; hardly
an efficient use of the Soviet state’s limited resources.
One possible solution to the “problem of the spectator” would be to separate
out the audience into sheep and goats, proletarians and bourgeois, and address
only the proletarian spectators. This was certainly Vertov’s proposed solution:
Newsreels, the best examples of which are the issues of Kinopravda, are
boycotted by film distributors, by the bourgeois and semibourgeois pub-
lic. But this state of affairs has not forced us to accomodate ourselves to
established, philistine taste. It has only led us to change our audience.
Kinopravda is being shown daily in many workers’ clubs in Moscow and the
provinces, and with great success. And if the NEP audience prefers ‘love’
or ‘crime’ dramas that doesn’t mean that our works are unfit. It means the
public is. (Vertov 1984:32)
However, this solution essentially meant abandoning any attempt to convert non-
proletarian audiences to the Communist cause. The political rhetoric in Vertov’s
films would therefore be preaching only to the already converted. This would
actually be a useful activity in its own right, due to the importance of making
the proletariat conscious of itself as a class for itself rather than merely a class in
itself, to use Marxist terminology. However, the numerical weakness of the pro-
letariat in Soviet society made this a dangerously restricted role for propaganda
to play. A form of propaganda was required which could imbue peasant and
even petty-bourgeois audiences with proletarian political values. In the Soviet
Union of the 1920s, the proletarian class itself was rather small, and one of the
main purposes of Soviet propaganda of the period was to strengthen proletarian
class consciousness (which Vertov certainly tried to do) but also to expand the
proletarian class by imparting a proletarian class consciousness to peasant and
petty-bourgeois elements who were being proletarianised by the industrialisation
of the Soviet economy (and this Vertov refused to do).
Eisenstein adopted a rather more ambitious attitude than Vertov towards the
“problem of the spectator”. Despite a passing reference to a possible need to
pre-select the audience in order for the “socially useful” effect of his films to work
properly, Eisenstein ultimately thought of this effect as something which could
actually change the political consciousness of the spectator rather than merely
enhance it, as Vertov seemed to believe. After all, Eisenstein publically deplored
“the sweet petty-bourgeois poison in the films of Mary Pickford that exploit and
4.1. The “problem of the spectator” in Soviet montage cinema 92
train by systematically stimulating the remaining petty-bourgeois inclinations
even among our healthy and progressive audiences” (Eisenstein 1988:66). If the
wrong sort of film could have a negative effect on the mind of a proletarian spec-
tator, then surely the right sort of film could have a positive effect even on a
petty-bourgeois spectator? There was independent evidence that this might ac-
tually be possible, not the least of which was the enormous success of Eisenstein’s
own film Potemkin in the West, even among bourgeois audiences. For example,
Walter Benjamin described his own response as a bourgeois intellectual on seeing
Potemkin for the first time:
The proletariat is the hero of those spaces to whose adventures, heart
pounding, the bourgeois gives himself over in the cinema, because he must
enjoy the ‘beautiful’ precisely where it speaks to him of the destruction of
his class. (Qtd. in Hansen 1987:212)
Moreover, the artist Francis Bacon was so affected by the emotional power of the
images of Potemkin that it transformed his whole approach to easel painting.82
And of course the greatest example of films altering the consciousness of their
audience is the so-called Dream Factory of Hollywood, which has successfully
inculcated petty-bourgeois American values into the minds of its working-class
audiences across the world (Bernays 2005:166).
In order to solve the “problem of the audience”, the montage directors there-
fore had to carry out a delicate balancing act: to use sophisticated rhetorical
devices based on film montage and on some of the continuity devices of classical
cinema to enhance or even to alter the consciousness of the spectator, while si-
multaneously taking into account the heterogeneous mix of pre-existing attitudes
and political values which constituted the subjectivity of the particular members
of the audience. Such a balancing act could only be accomplished by taking into
account the subjectivity of the spectator when constructing a montage film, so as
to obtain the maximal rhetorical effectiveness. The non-dialectical mechanicist
materialism which dominated the discourse of “left-wing” avant-garde art in the
Soviet Union in the 1920s was clearly inadequate for this task, as it could be
the basis only of a one-way model of the interaction between the filmic text and
the spectator. For example, in the reflexology which Eisenstein, and to a lesser
extent Pudovkin,83 used as a model for the influence exerted by a montage film
on its audience, the stimulus-response dyad is linked by a non-dialectical one-way
causality. The chain of “attractions” assembled according to Eisenstein’s montage
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method would, in principle at least, cause a chain of specific and predictable re-
flex responses in the spectator in a deterministic and repeatable way, rather like
a strict scientific experiment in Pavlov’s famous “Tower of Silence”.
Eisenstein later moved away from the crude mechanicism of his position in
the early 1920s and he gradually adopted a more dialectical approach to the con-
struction of montage films. He later specifically criticised Kuleshov and Pudovkin
for not moving beyond a mechanicist and constructive approach to film montage
(Eisenstein 1988:144). This dialectical approach to the montage method meant
that Eisenstein could now conceive of a two-way interaction between the filmic
text and its spectator, in which their mutual interaction could lead to trans-
formations in the psyche of the spectator which would in principle be far more
complex than merely being “ploughed over” or being hit by Eisenstein’s “kino-fist”
(Eisenstein 1988:62,64), though he never specified a precise mechanism for this
process.
A psychoanalytic mechanism by which these transformations might occur is
that proposed by Marshall Alcorn to describe the two-way interaction between
a literary text and its reader (Alcorn 1987). The essence of Alcorn’s approach,
expressed in cinematic terms, is that the film brings rhetorical pressure to bear
on the spectator while the spectator simultaneously brings his or her “projective
idealization” to bear on the filmic text. Alcorn describes this as a continuous,
transactive process which opens the possibility of the interaction between the film
and its viewer changing the viewer’s psychic structures, which in turn will change
the particular projective idealisations he or she brings to bear on the filmic text.
The process will thereby have altered the spectator’s “linguistic construction of
the self”, in Alcorn’s words. Such a change in the spectator’s “value structures”
was precisely what the Soviet montage directors were hoping to achieve through
the rhetorical power made available to them by the montage method.
4.2 Projective idealisation and transactive
rhetoric
One of the fundamental claims of this thesis is that Soviet montage cinema was
essentially a rhetoric of cinema rather than an aesthetic: it was a conscious
attempt to use cinema as a medium for political persuasion, and the montage
directors saw this as the primary function of their films. Eisenstein even called
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the “socially useful effect” of his films their “content” (Eisenstein 1988:65). It
is worth noting in this regard that Peter Bürger, in his seminal study of the
theory of the avant-garde, actually denied that film montage is a specifically
aesthetic technique: “In the film, the montage of images is the basic technical
procedure. It is not a specifically artistic technique, but one that lies in the
medium” (Bürger 1984:73; original emphasis). Of course it is true that he did
not mean by this that film montage is a specifically rhetorical technique either,
but rather that it is an inescapable part of the material basis of cinema as an
artistic medium. Bürger gave an essentialist definition of film montage as a mere
technical procedure which is invariably present in all films, whether realist or
avant-garde, which meant that it was therefore of no relevance to a theory of the
avant-garde. However, the function of a technical procedure, the use to which it is
actually put, is highly significant. Although montage, in the sense of the cutting
of the film stock, is indeed used in (almost) all films,84 its function differs greatly
depending on the type of film in which it is used. For example, in classical cinema
“montage” (i.e. the technical procedure of cutting the film) is used to produce
an effect of seamlessness, to suture the spectator into the filmic text; in Soviet
montage cinema, by contrast, the same technical procedure is used to produce an
effect of conflict and discontinuity. While Bürger’s assertion that film montage
is a technical procedure rather than a specifically artistic technique may be true,
film montage can and does serve a range of different and contradictory functions
in different films, and it is the particular function a given technical procedure
serves which determines the status of a film as avant-garde or realist, politically
engaged or purely aesthetic. I would argue that the Soviet montage film-makers
were using the “technical procedure” of film montage for essentially rhetorical
rather than aesthetic purposes.
The status of Soviet montage cinema as a form of rhetoric has sometimes been
asserted before; however, it is also important to ask the question, what does it
actually mean to assert that Soviet film montage was a form of rhetoric? Rhetoric
can be regarded as the art of persuasion; that is, the set of techniques required to
construct effective discourses. To examine a film as a form of rhetoric is therefore
to examine the effect it has on its intended audience, and the means by which
it achieves that effect. To consider Soviet montage cinema as a form of rhetoric
therefore has the effect of foregrounding considerations of the interaction between
the filmic text and its spectator. In this respect, as I have already suggested, a
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useful approach towards literary rhetoric has been outlined by Marshall Alcorn,
who suggests that the interaction between the reader’s “projective idealization”
which they bring to bear on the text and the rhetorical forces which the text
brings to bear on the reader creates a change in the reader’s “value structures”, an
alteration in their “linguistic construction of the self”, to use Alcorn’s terminology.
The fact that Alcorn examines the process of “projective idealization” exclu-
sively in relation to the literary text and that he describes the transformation this
process evokes in the reader as changes to “the linguistic construction of the self”
does not mean that the same model is not also applicable to the primarily visual
medium of cinema. The montage directors themselves often wrote about montage
as the “language” of cinema.85 Furthermore, in his analysis of the applicability of
linguistic models to cinema, Christian Metz has concluded that
[t]he cinema is certainly not a language system (langue). It can, however,
be considered as a language, to the extent that it orders signifying ele-
ments within ordered arrangements different from those of spoken idioms
[. . . ]. Filmic manipulation transforms what might have been a mere visual
transfer of reality into discourse. (1982a:105)
A film, though it might consist mostly or even entirely of images, can therefore
contribute to “the linguistic construction of the self”86 to the same extent, and
in fundamentally the same way, as a literary text. Furthermore, the concept of a
work of art as exerting rhetorical pressure on its reader or viewer is possibly even
more appropriate when applied to cinema than to the printed text, as the rules
of rhetoric were originally derived in the ancient world from the practice of aural
and visual modes of communication rather than written ones. In fact, Alcorn’s
approach is applicable to any text which exerts a rhetorical pressure on its reader
or viewer and which in turn receives their projective idealisations.
Alcorn summarises his approach as follows:
Texts are not purely the product of a reader’s projection. Texts have par-
ticular properties of their own. These particular properties, however, do
not exist as categories of referential meaning; they exist as something we
might call rhetoric. Our discussion of the linguistic structure of the self en-
courages us to hypothesize a relation between the projective forces brought
to bear upon the text by the reader and the rhetorical forces brought to
bear upon the reader by the text. [. . . ] Words in this manner absorb pro-
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jective forces and deflect them, thereby exerting “rhetorical” pressure upon
self-functions. (1987:147)
Alcorn’s model employs psychoanalysis, rhetoric and semiotics in order to un-
derstand the interaction between a literary text and its reader. The fact that
the meaning of a literary text (or, by extension, a filmic text) is not an inherent
property of the text itself, but is generated by the dialectical interaction between
the text and its reader or spectator through a process of “projective idealization”,
means that the texts achieve their meaning and signification by a process which
can be regarded as rhetorical. As Alcorn puts it, “Texts are not blank screens
reflecting the projections of a reader; textual signifiers do things to projections”
(1987:142). He summarises the nature of the complex, transactive interaction
between reader and text in terms of a particular kind of rhetoric:
Projective idealization is a meaning effect, a rhetorical effect, produced by
an angle of vision. Projective idealization uses an angle of vision to pro-
duce a personal organization of the rhetorical effects of signifiers. (Alcorn
1987:154)
In other words, the subjectivity of the spectator constitutes the signification of
the text while the text simultaneously constitutes the subjectivity of the reader.
What Lapsley and Westlake say about film applies equally well to the literary
text or to propaganda texts:
the subject is as much constituting as constituted because, according to
Lacan, the subject halts the slide of the signifier, thereby becoming the
producer as well as the product of meaning. [. . . ] Meaning and subjectivity
come into being together, each engendering the other in a process of endless
dialectic. (Lapsley and Westlake 2006:53)
The meaning of the text is generated by this complex transactive process, which
is itself essentially a rhetorical process.
This view of how meaning is generated when a reader meets a text, or a
spectator meets a film, is of course very close to Roland Barthes’ concept of
the “death of the Author” (1977:142-48), with the addition of a psychoanalytic
interpretation of the actual process by which this occurs and an emphasis on the
text or film as a form of rhetoric.87 It should also be noted that this view of how
the meaning of a text or film is generated effectively corresponds to the “open”
form of a montage work as opposed to the “closed” form of an organic work of
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art, as Peter Bürger defines them (1984:55-82), and further endorses the status
of Soviet montage cinema as part of the historical avant-garde.
The meaning of a film is therefore not held within it as a pre-existing content
to which the spectator has only to gain access through a transparent form in order
to “understand” the film; rather, there is a unity of form and content (something
which all the montage directors emphasised they were striving to achieve) in
which the meaning of a film is generated by the dialectical interaction between
film and spectator. As Alcorn puts it,
We normally assume rhetoric is a force in language that manipulates emo-
tion in humans. [. . . ] Rhetoric, then, is not in language. It is in selves. It
is a force in the linguistic construction of the self. (1987:148)
This is essentially a psychoanalytic definition of rhetoric, as Alcorn makes clear:
“Rhetoric designates the forces in the linguistic construction of the self that struc-
ture affect” (1987:148). In this respect, Alcorn’s approach therefore represents a
psychoanalytic interpretation of the interaction between reader and literary text,
or spectator and filmic text. In fact, the use of psychoanalysis to understand the
means by which montage cinema achieves its effects has a precedent in Eisen-
stein’s own interest in the work of Freud.88 Alcorn’s concept of the “projective
idealization” directed by the reader at the text and the way in which it is modi-
fied by the rhetorical pressures exerted by the literary text on the reader suggests
a definite psychoanalytic mechanism by which rhetoric – the art of persuasion –
can stimulate thought rather than suppress it, by inducing the reader to recognise
“the authority of the signifiers” of the filmic text and thereby change his or her
value structures. This sort of rhetorical pressure can be regarded as creating the
kind of propaganda called for by Brecht in 1935: “Propaganda that stimulates
thinking, in no matter what field, is useful to the cause of the oppressed” (Brecht
1966:146).
The main advantage of Alcorn’s approach as a model of the interaction be-
tween reader and text is that it recognises the transactive, dialectical interaction
between text and reader or film and spectator – the rhetorical effect of the text
is not merely imposed on the passively receptive reader, but is the result of a
dynamic interaction. This reinstates political intervention as being both possible
and desirable for the reader or spectator, since the meaning of the text or film
is no longer inescapably fixed by the writer or film-maker, nor, conversely, can
an arbitrary meaning simply be imposed by the reader or spectator. Rather, the
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meaning is generated by the dynamic interaction between reader and text, which
is analogous to the dialectical interaction between the individual and material
reality to which Marxism gives the name “praxis”. The reader or spectator is
neither passive nor arbitrarily free, but is engaged with reality in a creative, in-
teractive way. In this regard, Alcorn has suggested that personal and cultural
change in general may be produced by the same sort of psychoanalytic processes.
As he says,
since idealizing projection (the very mode of subjectivity that processes and
digests textuality) is influenced through an upwelling of primary process
affect, then personal change and cultural change might well be a function
of idealist projection operating upon material signifiers. (1987:149-50)
Alcorn also claims that “[o]ften, change begins as a revolutionary rhetorical re-
sponse to a culturally prescribed rhetorical effect” (1987:150), an assertion which
the Soviet montage film-makers would undoubtedly have endorsed. Indeed, they
saw the main function of their montage films as being precisely to provoke such
social and political change by stimulating a revolutionary rhetorical response in
their audience. Alcorn’s psychoanalytic model of how this rhetorical response is
stimulated could therefore provide a new perspective on, for example, Eisenstein’s
concept of “pathos” (which Dana Polan has defined as an “empathic projection by
the perceiver of the film”) by providing a mechanism by which such projections
could be evoked and then modified by the rhetorical pressures exerted by the
filmic text itself.
However, it might be objected that the active participation of the reader or
spectator in generating the meaning of a literary or filmic text seems to be at odds
with some of the stated aims of the montage directors themselves. Eisenstein in
particular seemed keen to suppress individual subjective interpretations of the
meaning of his films; he talked about using his “kino-fist” to strike the audience,
to force them to think in a certain way (Eisenstein 1988:64). He even asserted
that in a montage film “[t]he spectator is forced to follow the same creative path
that the author followed when creating the image” (1991:309). But it is also the
case that he noted that different audiences will respond in different ways to the
same montage trope (for example, the killing of the bull in Strike), depending
on their class origin and their life experiences (1988:65), and therefore implicitly
recognised the active role of the spectator in generating the meaning of such
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montage tropes. It is therefore surely the case even for Eisenstein’s films that, in
Alcorn’s words,
reading is not a simple process whereby the unity of a subject responds
to the unity of a text. Instead, reading reflects the rhetorical friction pro-
duced at the intersection between the self (as a plurality of textual codes)
encountering the orienting and disorienting “order” of another plurality of
codes (the text). (1987:151)
Indeed, Marc Scheurers has noted that “essential to a montage construction is
what is not told, but must be revealed by the interpretative activity of the spec-
tator or reader” (Schreurs 1989:172).
Alcorn suggests that his approach could help to solve the same type of prob-
lems which Lapsley and Westlake claim afflicts film theory in general:
Without [give-and-take between spectator and film], the subject can only
be thought of as either inescapably determined by the text or as voluntaris-
tically creating meanings. [. . . ] In each case political intervention becomes
a redundancy, in the one because meanings are unalterably fixed, in the
other because they are already fluid. Instead the relation of subject and
text is a movement of exchange: ‘the subject makes the meanings the film
makes for it, is the turn of the film as discourse’.89 (2006:54)
However, Lapsley and Westlake also raise an important issue which Alcorn largely
ignores: the implications of the model of the interaction between spectator and
film (or reader and text) for the possibility of political intervention in the real
world. This is especially significant for Soviet montage cinema, which was overtly
political in nature. The absence of a transactive model of the way that film –
or indeed propaganda in general – exerts its rhetorical pressure on the spectator
will lead to a one-sided view of the effect such a film or propaganda will have on
its audience. For example, Kenez implicitly portrays the Soviet people as passive
receptacles for Soviet propaganda when he writes that
[f]irst the people came to speak a strange idiom and adopt the behavor
patterns expected of them, and only then did the inherent ideological mes-
sage seep in. The process of convincing proceeded not from inside out but
from outside in. That is, people came to behave properly, from the point
of view of the regime, not because they believed its slogans but because
by repeating the slogans they gradually acquired a “proper consciousness.”
(1985:255)
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Kenez’s account neglects the complex interaction going on between the propa-
ganda text and the propagandee, and offers a rather impoverished description
of the way in which propaganda actually operated in the Soviet Union. The
transformation in the consciousness of the Soviet people did not merely proceed
“from outside in”, as Kenez states, but was an internal transformation of their
value structures as a result of their “projective idealizations” being modified by
the rhetorical pressures from the propaganda. According to Alcorn’s model, this
is not a passive process at all, but involves the active participation of the pro-
pagandee. The portrayal of the propagandee as being inescapably determined
by the propaganda text is also to be found in Taylor’s analysis of some Soviet
films as works of propaganda (1998). In both Kenez’s and Taylor’s analyses, the
spectator of a film is portrayed as being passive and the filmic text as constituting
the subjectivity of the spectator in a deterministic one-way process rather than
also having its own meanings at least partially constituted by the spectator him-
or herself in a transactive process. The result is that, as Lapsley and Westlake
suggest, the spectator is nullified as a political subject; political intervention be-
comes a redundancy because the meanings of the filmic text are unalterably fixed
and cannot be constituted or challenged by the spectator.
Alcorn’s approach, on the contrary, emphasises the fact that the meaning of
a literary text (or, by extension, a filmic text) is created by a transactive pro-
cess involving both the reader and the literary text, the spectator and the filmic
text, or the propagandee and the propaganda text. This restores the possibility
of political agency to the spectator, since the functioning of a film as propa-
ganda is then an interactive process requiring the co-operation of the spectator
to produce the meaning of its political discourse. Many analysts of propaganda
have previously emphasised the importance of the mutual interaction between
the propaganda text and its audience. For example, Jowett and O’Donnell have
described how “the predispositions of the audience are canalized by the propa-
ganda message, having the effect of resonance” (1992:269). This, in broad outline
at least, echoes Alcorn’s model of the interaction of the reader with a literary
text, and is analogous to Vertov’s claim that his own montage films enabled their
viewers to accomplish “the communist decoding of the world” (Vertov 1984:42).
Vertov was implying that the practice gained by the spectator in decoding his
films – which, after all, he believed to have captured “life as it is” – could be
directly transferred to the spectator’s own everyday experience, enabling him or
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her to subject real, everyday life itself to a similar “communist decoding”, to an
ideological reading of reality itself. As Peter Wollen puts it,
just as the text, by introducing its own decoding procedures, interrogates
itself, so the reader too must interrogate himself, puncture the bubble of his
consciousness and introduce into it the rifts, contradictions and questions
which are the problematic of the text.
The text then becomes the location of thought, rather than the mind. The
text is the factory where thought is at work, rather than the transport
system which conveys the finished product. (1997:163-64)
It is the work of Vertov more than that of any other of the Soviet montage
directors which comes closest to achieving this aim. Vertov’s films are propa-
ganda films, but a form of propaganda which encourages and requires the active
participation of the spectator in constituting the meaning of the filmic text, or
“decoding” the text as Vertov himself put it. Both Eisenstein and Pudovkin,
by contrast, tended to be far more manipulative of the spectator and (rightly
or wrongly) regarded the text of their films as having a unique meaning which
pre-exists the viewing of the film, and which the spectator would then read more
or less accurately but could not constitute or modify (Eisenstein 1988:64 and
1991:309, Pudovkin 2006:16,23,35). The difference between Eisenstein and Pu-
dovkin on the one hand, and Vertov on the other, can be encapsulated by labelling
Eisenstein’s and Pudovkin’s films as “vertical propaganda” and Vertov’s films as
“horizontal propaganda”, as I have already indicated. The fact that Vertov made
documentary films, that he went out into the world to see what was there and
to capture it on film, is an important aspect of the “horizontal” nature of his
propaganda film-making. By not staging the profilmic material of his films and
by not writing a scenario before filming began, Vertov was choosing not to im-
pose a pre-existing meaning on his filmic text but to reveal the meanings hidden
behind the surface appearances of reality. The spectator would then be an active
participant in generating those meanings by consciously decoding Vertov’s filmic
text in accordance with Communist ideology. This required Vertov to foreground
those codes, which meant foregrounding the enunciation of his films rather than
trying to conceal it, as classical cinema generally aims to do. Eisenstein and Pu-
dovkin were far more willing to impose pre-existing meanings onto the spectator,
and were therefore quite prepared to stage the profilmic material of their films in
order to obtain greater control over it.
4.2. Projective idealisation and transactive rhetoric 102
In his model of the interaction between reader and literary text, Alcorn uses
the Freudian psychoanalytic concept of “projection”.90 The projective forces de-
scribed by Alcorn are a modified form of the “primitive mechanism” described by
Freud in Totem and Taboo:
The projection outwards of internal perceptions is a primitive mechanism,
to which, for instance, our sense perceptions are subject and which therefore
normally plays a very large part in determining the form taken by our
external world. [. . . ] [I]nternal perceptions of emotional and intellective
processes can be projected outwards in the same way as sense perceptions;
they are thus employed for building up the external world, though they
should by rights remain part of the internal world [. . . ]. (Freud 1989:81)
However, whereas Freud defined projection to be a one-way process, it is impor-
tant to note that the projection which Alcorn ascribes to the reader is a two-way
process, as Alcorn himself emphasises: “Projective idealization refers to the pro-
cess by which material from the internal world encounters material in the external
world and becomes modified by it” (1987:146). This means that, unlike Freudian
projection, “projective idealization” is not an entirely subjective process but is
modified by the objective nature of the text or film itself (what Alcorn refers
to as the “authority of the signifier”). Alcorn makes a distinction between the
entirely subjective form of projection (which he calls “projective occlusion” and
which is approximately what Freud meant by “projection”), which is a one-way
imposition of meaning onto the text by the reader, and a form of projection which
is not completely subjective (which he calls “projective idealization”), which is a
two-way, transactive process:
Unfortunately, the term “projection” can refer to two distinctly different
kinds of activity. On the one hand, projection can refer to a subjective
replacing or deleting of an objectively present signifier (an avoidance of
the perceptible features of the object). On the other hand, projection can
refer to the subjective interpreting and contextualizing of signifiers actually
encountered. For clarity, I will term the projective covering up of the
text “projective occlusion,” and the reworking of signification “projective
idealization.” (1987:145)
His introduction of an element of reciprocity into the Freudian concept of pro-
jection is what enables the encounter between the reader and the literary text,
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or the spectator and the film, to trigger change in the reader or spectator’s value
structures or sense of self. Alcorn makes this clear when he writes that
[p]rojective occlusion is not a personal reworking of signifiers already present
in the text but an avoidance of signifiers, especially an avoidance of signi-
fiers that challenge one’s values and sense of self. Projective idealization
encounters possibilities for meaning that it organizes and reworks; projec-
tive occlusion denies the presence of some potential meaning that needs to
be taken into account. (1987:146)
The concept of “projective occlusion” could also shed some light on the “problem of
the spectator” in Soviet montage cinema which I have already briefly described,
namely the idea that the rhetorical effect of a montage film would vary in an
unpredictable way, depending on the class background of the particular spectator
of that film. For example, as Eisenstein stated in 1924,
[i]t is quite clear that for a worker and a former cavalry officer the chain of
associations set off by seeing a meeting broken up and the corresponding
emotional effect in contrast to the material which frames this incident, will
be somewhat different. (Eisenstein 1988:41-42)
For a spectator with a hostile class consciousness, such as a former Tsarist cavalry
officer, class prejudices or traditional narrative expectations might be so strong
that projective occlusion would prevent the montage film from achieving its in-
tended effect on the consciousness of that spectator. The rhetorical pressure of
the film would be nullified by the spectator’s subjective occlusion of the filmic
text. This problem was to have significant consequences for Soviet montage cin-
ema as a viable artistic movement. The perceived difficulty of the montage films
for Soviet audiences was one of the main reasons why the Soviet government ef-
fectively banned montage cinema in the 1930s in favour of socialist realism, in
order to create a cinema which would be easily comprehensible to the masses
and could therefore be more effective as a propaganda weapon. However, the
relative difficulty of the montage films should not be exaggerated. Potemkin, for
example, was a box-office hit in the Soviet Union in 1926, despite possible official
massaging of the figures (Youngblood 1992:5), and was apparently understood
(or at least enjoyed) by millions of people around the world. The same can be
said for the films of Pudovkin and Vertov, which were far from being box-office
disasters. Clearly, in Alcorn’s terms, projective idealisation rather than merely
projective occlusion is at work for most spectators of montage films.
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However, the concept of “projective occlusion” can still provide a useful way of
understanding the sense of confusion and bafflement with which audiences often
met the montage films of Eisenstein or Vertov in particular, when these films
were first screened in the Soviet Union. Pudovkin’s films, being more closely
modelled on the classical style, tended to be easier for audiences to comprehend
since they already possessed a repertoire of techniques for “reading” such filmic
texts. But despite this, even Pudovkin encountered the problem of audiences
failing to comprehend his films. For example, his (for him) daringly experimental
film Life is Very Good (1930) was received with such bewilderment on the part of
its audience at a test screening that Pudovkin was forced to substantially rework
the film and release it two years later as A Simple Case (1932).91 In terms of
Alcorn’s concept of “projective occlusion”, it is possible that audiences, coming
to these films with certain cultural and cinematic expectations, were projecting
those expectations onto the montage films and the resulting mismatch between
the projected expectations and the actual signifiers of the filmic texts themselves
generated a sense of cognitive dissonance and confusion.
Indeed, Vertov seems to have actually exploited the mismatch between the
audience’s narrative expectations of a movie and the actual signifiers of his film
The Man with a Movie Camera by deliberately triggering and then frustrating
these narrative expectations. Vertov was, in effect, absorbing the spectator’s
projective forces and deflecting them towards political ends. By frustrating the
spectator’s projected narrative expectations, Vertov was using his film to evoke
and then interrupt the spectator’s usual habits of reading a commercial film in
the classical style to obtain what Vertov regarded as frivolous pleasure (cinema
as an “opium of the people”) in order to divert those habits of reading a film to-
wards a political reading of the real world. The overtly political nature of such a
reading of the world was an essential aspect of Vertov’s formal techniques. This is
why I regard Graham Roberts as being profoundly mistaken when he claims The
Man with a Movie Camera to be essentially a self-reflexive Modernist film and to
be “practically useless as a documentary of a historical or propagandist nature”
(Roberts 1999:86). On the contrary, I would suggest that its self-reflexive Mod-
ernism is precisely what gives the film its political and ideological power. Vertov’s
method of achieving this was to use the images and “intervals” of his film in the
same way that Alcorn claims that words function in a literary text: “Words in
this manner absorb projective forces and deflect them, thereby exerting “rhetor-
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ical” pressure upon self-functions” (1987:147). Williams (1979) has analysed the
formal methods by which Vertov’s film The Man with a Movie Camera
perverts one type of coding to substitute another: instead of a narrative
development, causally orientated, we are presented a highly unified series
but in which unification is ‘logical’ only in terms of abstract relationships
(1979:13)
and he has claimed that Vertov’s formal strategy throughout the film is “to present
the possibility of one type of organizational logic [i.e. narrative] while denying it”
(1979:13). While Williams analyses Vertov’s strategy within a formalist frame-
work, it might be illuminating to examine it instead using Alcorn’s model. Such
an analysis would have the effect of foregrounding the interaction between the
spectator and the filmic text rather than focusing solely on the text itself, and
would perhaps give more insight into the psychoanalytic mechanisms by which
Vertov’s rhetorical strategy operates on the spectator.
The concept of “projective idealization” developed by Alcorn allows the active
participation of the spectator in the rhetorical process to be factored into the
analysis of montage cinema as a form of rhetoric – the rhetoric is not something
done to a passive spectator by a montage film, but demands their active, con-
scious participation.92 Alcorn’s approach emphasises the importance of a film’s
enunciation, its rhetoric. The fiction of the film is spoken, and its meaning is cre-
ated, by a transactive process between the spectator and the filmic text. It also
has the benefit of helping to illuminate the nature of Soviet montage cinema as a
form of propaganda, since rhetorical strategies are an important element in any
propaganda medium. I shall proceed to investigate the appropriateness of this
approach by applying it to the Kuleshov Effect, the canonical example of early
Soviet film montage. It could then be applied as a general method of analysing
other montage tropes used in the films of other montage directors. Since Soviet
montage cinema is part of the historical avant-garde, this approach might also
have the potential to be a move towards providing the kind of functional rather
than normative analysis of the avant-garde called for by Peter Bürger; that is, an
analysis of the social and political effect of an artwork rather than merely of a
set of aesthetic norms (Bürger 1984:87).
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4.3 The Kuleshov Effect and “projective
idealization”
The “Kuleshov Effect” experiment, sometimes also known as the “Mozzhukhin
experiment”, is the canonical example of film montage;93 if there was a found-
ing moment of Soviet film montage, it was probably this. However, despite this
experiment being the one for which Kuleshov is best remembered and the one
which demonstrated the cinematic effect to which his name has ever after been
attached, Kuleshov himself actually regarded his other montage experiments as
being more significant. Even as late as 1965 he asserted that “I think that the
experiments carried out subsequently in collaboration with my students were
much more interesting” (Kuleshov 1973:70).94 Furthermore, despite its fame, a
strange aura of uncertainty and ambiguity has gathered around the Kuleshov Ef-
fect experiment: the film footage itself no longer survives, yet stills are sometimes
published purporting to be from Kuleshov’s actual experiment; it is often claimed
that the film was shown to a random audience and their reactions scientifically
observed, yet it has also been suggested that Kuleshov assembled the film exper-
iment and watched it with just a few colleagues who gave their opinion as to its
effect on them. Even the objective validity of the Kuleshov Effect itself has been
questioned (Aumont 1986, Prince and Hensley 1992). Dana Polan has actually
suggested that
[t]o a large degree, the very discrepancies in the available historical re-
ports of Kuleshov’s experiments may be part of the appeal of a reference
to Kuleshov in writing on film. The ‘Kuleshov Effect’ becomes the film
theorist’s equivalent of a palimpsest, an ink-blot test out of which one can
read almost any aesthetic position. (1986:98)
Part of the reason for this ambiguity is undoubtedly the lack of scientific rigor
in Kuleshov’s montage experiments, despite his scientific aspirations. As Amy
Sargeant has noted, Kuleshov’s montage experiments of the early 1920s “are un-
satisfactory by any scientific criteria” (2000:8). Stephen Prince and Wayne E.
Hensley list some of Kuleshov’s scientific deficiencies:
For such a seminal and basically uncontested study, there is virtually no
information available about Kuleshov’s actual method and procedure. Did
he, for example, interview the subjects individually or in a group? What
did he tell them beforehand about the purpose of the presentation? What,
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if anything, did he tell them about the nature of film editing or montage?
What was the frequency of outlier opinions, e.g., people who did not think
Mozhukin was saddened by the dead woman? Published accounts suggest
the responses were uniform. Was this so? Unfortunately, we do not know
the answers to any of these questions. (1992:65)
It is even unclear when Kuleshov carried out the experiment, or the precise condi-
tions under which it was carried out. In the late 1960s, Kuleshov gave the fullest
available account of his most famous experiment:
It was about that time [i.e. around 1920] that I made an editing experiment.
Only when I went to Paris in 1962 did I learn that my experiment was known
abroad as the “Kuleshov effect”. [. . . ]
Now here is what the “effect” is all about.
I alternated the same shot, a close-up of the actor Mozhukhin, with different
other shots (a plate of soup, a girl, a child’s coffin, etc.). When juxtaposed
by montage, the shots acquired different meanings. The emotions of the
man on the screen became different. Two shots gave rise to a third notion, a
new image that neither of them contained: a different third. I was stunned.
I saw the great power of montage. Here was the pivot, the essential basis
of any film! At the director’s will montage infused a different meaning into
the content. That was my conclusion. (Kuleshov 1987:211)
A shorter description in an interview given in 1965 contains details which con-
tradict this account somewhat:
The shot of Mozzhukhin, always identical, was variously juxtaposed – now
with a plate of soup, now with images suggesting some erotic situation.
I recall that there was also a montage with a child’s coffin. In short, all
sorts of combinations. Unhappily no stills or notes have been preserved.
The pictures that have been published abroad, as for instance in an issue
of Cinéma pratique in 1962, are not mine at all. Mine were not kept.
(Kuleshov 1973:70)
The standard description of the experiment has it that the film was shown to
an audience who believed that the expression on Mozzhukhin’s face was different
each time he appeared, depending on whether he was “looking at” the plate of
soup, the girl, or the child’s coffin and “showing” an expression of hunger, desire
or grief respectively, when in actuality the footage of Mozzhukhin was absolutely
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identical every time it appeared. Pudovkin (who later claimed to have been the
co-creator of the experiment)95 described in 1929 how
[t]he audience raved about the actor’s refined acting. They pointed out
his weighty pensiveness over the forgotten soup. They were touched by
the profound sorrow in his eyes as he looked upon the dead woman, and
admired the light, happy smile with which he feasted his eyes on the girl
at play. But we knew that in all three cases the face was exactly the same.
Such is the powerful effect of montage. (Pudovkin 2006:160)
This response of the audience to a certain kind of film montage is known as the
“Kuleshov Effect”.
The experiment itself was created by simply assembling fragments from copies
of old Tsarist films. When Kuleshov created his experiment, then, he was not
shooting any new material but was merely assembling ready-made fragments;
in this respect, it was a true “montage” experiment. This is consistent with
Kuleshov’s stated view that it is not the material out of which a film is con-
structed which is important, but the way that the material is assembled. Indeed,
by incorporating found footage of a Tsarist matinee idol in his montage experi-
ment, Kuleshov was effectively detaching the image from the object it claimed to
represent in order to juxtapose it with other images to achieve new effects. As
Vance Kepley has put it, describing another of Kuleshov’s montage experiments,
The image’s new relationship with contiguous images in an editing sequence
displaced its association with its original referent. Kuleshov’s shot of the
White House in his ‘Fabricated Landscape’ sequence no longer referred
innocently to a building in Washington, but to a building that existed in a
fictional landscape in the minidiegesis of the sequence. (1992:139)
This is, of course, an essentially formalist position: images have more in common
with other images than they do with any object being represented. It is not
the content of those images which is important, but their combination with each
other. This partial detachment of signifiers from their signifieds96 is characteristic
of montage cinema, and was regarded by Kazimir Malevich as symptomatic of
the tendency for montage cinema to become the sort of “non-objective” cinema
of which he approved.97
Mozzhukhin himself had been the leading romantic matinee idol of Tsarist
cinema, and had fled Russia following the October Revolution. The audience
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would therefore have been very familiar with the sight of Mozzhukhin’s face on a
cinema screen, and Kuleshov and Pudovkin (who assisted Kuleshov in conduct-
ing the experiment) deliberately tried to select footage of Mozzhukhin from old
Tsarist film footage in which his face was emotionally neutral and expressionless.
In Pudovkin’s words, “We took from some film or other a close-up of the well-
known Russian actor Mosjoukine [Mozzhukhin]. We deliberately chose a close-up
that was static and did not express any feeling at all” (Pudovkin 2006:160). They
thereby sought to minimise any possible emotional response which the material
in itself could possibly evoke from the audience. It is worth noting in this re-
gard that Mozzhukhin himself was famous in Tsarist times for his static facial
expression. One critic in 1916 stated that “[e]ach and every one of our best film
actors has his or her own style of mime: Mosjoukine has his steely hypnotised
look” (Tsivian 1994:15; original emphasis). Both Kuleshov and Pudovkin would
doubtless have been aware of Mozzhukhin’s famous “steely hypnotised look” and
this may have motivated their selection of his face rather than that of some other
actor for their experiment. However, Sargeant has suggested that Mozzhukhin’s
expression “seems remote from the use of blank models”, and that Mozzhukhin
was well-known in Tsarist cinema “for his ‘full’ style, his formidable gaze and mes-
merising intensity, the concentrated static internalisation of emotion” (Sargeant
2000:9). While this suggests that Prince and Hensley are correct in their specula-
tion that Mozzhukhin’s expression may have been ambiguous rather than actually
blank, the essential point is that Mozzhukin’s famous “stare” was regarded even in
Tsarist times as inducing the audience to project emotion onto it. Although they
do not explicitly say so, Kuleshov and Pudovkin were almost certainly consciously
using this (at the time) well-known fact as the basis of their experiment.
The material itself therefore had little emotional affect for the audience; it
consisted only of everyday objects like a bowl of soup or a coffin or a matinee
idol’s blank face. It was by combining and juxtaposing this bland material that
Kuleshov could evoke an emotional response in the audience, a response which
could not be triggered by the material itself but only by its organization and jux-
taposition, in other words by film montage. The unchanging blank (or, as Prince
and Hensley suggest, perhaps ambiguous) expression on Mozzhukhin’s face is par-
ticularly significant in this respect; the actor is simply one object among others,
of no more affective significance in itself than a bowl of soup. The spectator is
therefore unable to decide which particular emotion to project onto Mozzhukhin’s
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face since in itself it gives no affective cues to the spectator. When the mon-
tage sequence cuts from, say, a bowl of soup to Mozzhukhin’s face (using the
continuity device of matching on eyeline to imply that Mozzhukhin is “looking
at” the bowl of soup), this cut exerts a rhetorical pressure on the spectator –
that is, it persuades him or her that Mozzhukhin is looking at the bowl of soup
and that the particular emotion his face “must” be expressing is therefore that
of hunger. The spectator’s projection of an (abstract) feeling of hunger onto the
image of the bowl of soup then becomes the projection of that (now supposedly
real, since ascribed to a subject) feeling of hunger onto Mozzhukhin’s face. The
spectator’s projective idealisation has therefore been modified by the montage,
in the sense that the spectator has been induced to decide on a definite emo-
tion which Mozzhukhin “must” be feeling and to project that emotion onto his
actually blank but now apparently expressive face. When there is another cut
from Mozzhukhin’s face to, say, a beautiful young woman and then back to Moz-
zhukhin’s face, the montage again exerts rhetorical pressure on the spectator to
further modify their projective idealisation of the filmic text, this time to change
the emotional state which the spectator will project onto Mozzhukhin’s face from
hunger to desire. Without this process of projection, and the ability of the mon-
tage to alter those projections, the Kuleshov Effect would not operate. The Effect
requires a transactive process in which the signification of the filmic text – that
is, which particular emotion is “visible” on Mozzhukhin’s face – is constituted by
the spectator’s projective idealisations, and the spectator’s affect – that is, his or
her emotional response to what they see or think they see on the screen – is itself
changed by the rhetorical pressures exerted by the montage construction of the se-
quence. The spectator projects things onto the filmic text which are not actually
present in the text itself, while the assembly of the montage fragments is used to
rhetorically persuade the spectator as to which particular emotion Mozzhukhin’s
face is “expressing” at any given time. It is the mutual interaction of these two
processes which constitutes the meaning of the montage sequence and generates
the Kuleshov Effect. The affect (that is, the emotional content) of the montage
sequence is not present in the material itself, which was deliberately chosen to be
as bland and emotionally empty as possible; rather, it has been rhetorically trig-
gered by the montage method interacting with the projective idealisation of the
spectator. What Bazin asserted concerning deep-focus cinematography actually
therefore applies to montage cinema too, albeit in a somewhat different way than
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he intended: “It is from [the spectator’s] attention and his will that the meaning
of the image in part derives” (Bazin 2005:36). Contrary to Bazin’s view, however,
the spectator of the Kuleshov Effect, according to my analysis, is not exercising
existential choice but is engaged in a transactive rhetorical process by which the
meaning of the cinematic text is generated.
Kuleshov’s appraisal of one of his other montage experiments is equally ap-
plicable to the “Kuleshov Effect” experiment itself. He claimed that it
confirmed the immense possibilities of montage, which turned out to be so
powerful that it could radically alter the material itself [. . . ] because by
means of montage it was possible to destroy, put right, or ultimately alter
filmic material. (Kuleshov 1987:137)
The blankness (or at least the ambiguity) of Mozzhukhin’s face is very important
for the operation of the Kuleshov Effect. The issue of acting is central to the
theory as well as the practice of montage cinema, even from its inception with
Kuleshov’s montage experiments of the early 1920s. Even the Kuleshov Effect
itself can be regarded as being as much an investigation of the function of the
actor within cinema as an investigation of the artistic implications of the material
basis of film itself.98 The experiment can also be interpreted as demonstrating
the fact that in cinema the audience is an active participant in the creation of
the meaning of a film. The actor Mozzhukhin’s face displays no emotion to the
audience, yet it acquires an emotional affect by its juxtaposition with images of
food or a girl or a coffin. In other words, contrary to the theatrical tradition in
which the actor must project emotion towards the audience, in the cinema it is
the audience which projects emotion onto the actor, as Kuleshov discovered, and
this process is triggered by montage. This can be regarded as another example
of the fact that audience projection – specifically the “projective idealization”
described by Alcorn – is required for the Kuleshov Effect to operate. As Sargeant
puts it,
Kuleshov [. . . ] recognise[d] that, with the advent of cinema, expression is
no longer signified by the actor alone, the emotion can be conveyed and
stirred by montage of a number of elements between and within shots as
much as by an actor’s performance. (2000:17)
Contrary to Alcorn’s model, it is therefore not merely the signifiers themselves of
the filmic text which impose their “authority” on the spectator, but the montage
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of those signifiers – their juxtaposition (Kuleshov and Pudovkin), their collision
(Eisenstein), or the “intervals” between them (Vertov) – which exerts rhetori-
cal pressure on the spectator’s projective idealisations, modifies the spectator’s
affective response to it, and thereby generates the meaning of the filmic text.
My application of Alcorn’s model of the interaction between a reader and a
literary text in an analysis of the Kuleshov Effect could also shed light on the
problematic status of the Kuleshov Effect itself; in particular, the general lack of
success of attempts to reproduce the Effect in modern times under scientifically
rigorous conditions. This lack of success is puzzling if the Kuleshov Effect is anal-
ysed only on Kuleshov’s and Pudovkin’s own terms: as a deterministic, one-way
process in which a predetermined response is mechanistically evoked in the spec-
tator by montage. Evidence of the need for an analysis of the Kuleshov Effect
in terms of a complex interaction between the rhetorical use of film montage and
the projective idealisation brought to bear upon the film by a spectator can be
found in the attempt to recreate the Kuleshov Effect experiment under scientific
conditions by Prince and Hensley (1992). In their recreation of the experiment,
Prince and Hensley fail to replicate the Kuleshov Effect as it was described by
Kuleshov and Pudovkin. In their words, “there seems little reason to believe that
the Kuleshov effect, as reported, any longer exists even if the effect did play a
role at one time” (1992:69; original emphasis). They speculate about three pos-
sible causes for this failure (assuming that the Effect did occur in Kuleshov’s
own experiment):99 (i) early audiences were cinematically naive and lacked crit-
ical distance from what they were seeing on the screen; (ii) a response bias was
introduced into the sample audience by Kuleshov communicating to them his
own enthusiasm for montage; or (iii) there were stronger associational cues in the
original footage used by Kuleshov than those he describes. Their general conclu-
sion is that the Kuleshov Effect is probably a threshold phenomenon, and that
a modern audience requires a more systematic and complex set of associational
cues before they are able to project a changing affect onto a blank, unchanging
face. The redundancy of the “classical style” of Hollywood cinema described in
Bordwell et al. (1985:5) may be significant in this respect: there are almost always
multiple cues to prompt a particular desired response from the audience at any
given moment in a modern film. Prince and Hensley also speculate that Kuleshov
may have used footage in which Mozzhukhin’s face had an ambiguous expression
rather than a blank or neutral one. If the Kuleshov Effect is indeed a threshold
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effect, then an ambiguous expression would be more likely to trigger it than a
neutral expression, since the objects (soup, coffin, child) would provide a context
for the spectator to resolve that ambiguity. The fact that Kuleshov was using
actual “found footage” from Tsarist films rather than footage specially shot for
his experiment suggests that Mozzhukhin’s expression actually was ambiguous,
rather than being neutral as Kuleshov and Pudovkin had claimed.100
Prince and Hensley also cast doubt on the theoretical framework within which
Kuleshov carried out his experiment, which they characterise as a mixture of
formalism and Taylorism. As they say,
By all received accounts, the Mozhukin sequence proceeds like an assem-
bly line efficiently producing meaning. As in the analogy of cinema and
language, each shot performs almost like a word, combining with others to
form a larger concept or phrase [. . . ]. Like an assembly line, the production
process of the montage is both sequential and predetermined. The viewer’s
interpretations form an orderly pattern and fall neatly into place, cued by
each shot combination [. . . ]. Of course, the production of meaning in the
Mozhukin sequence depends on the viewer’s contribution, the ability to use
contextual cues to infer conventional meanings from associated images. But
accounts of the experiment, characteristically, do not report a wide range
of viewer interpretations [. . . ]. The terms of this communication paradigm
would seem to leave no place for our contemporary reception theories. How
might the viewer contribute to the co-construction of cinematic meaning
in a Kuleshov-type sequence? More precisely, what elements of film form
might invite such participation? (1992:63-64)
This seems to me to be the crux of the matter. The intellectual framework
within which Kuleshov was working and which largely determined the form of
his thoughts on film montage was essentially that of mechanical (that is, non-
dialectical) materialism. Film montage originated at the meeting point of the
various and sometimes contradictory ideas of Ivan Pavlov and Henry Ford, Fred-
erick Taylor and Karl Marx. The attitude of the avant-garde in Soviet Russia in
the early 1920s was that film should operate like an industrial assembly line, pro-
ducing meaning in a deterministic, mechanical fashion. Even Eisenstein initially
shared this mechanistic approach to film montage, though he quickly recognised
its limitations and later specifically singled out Kuleshov and Pudovkin for criti-
cism due to their lack of dialectical thinking:
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The worst of the matter is that an approach like this does really, like an
insurmountable tram, block the possibilities of formal development. An
approach like this condemns us not to dialectical development but to [the
process of] mere evolutionary ‘perfection’, in so far as it does not penetrate
to the dialectical essence of the phenomenon. (Eisenstein 1988:144)
In my view, it is precisely this non-dialectical, mechanical approach to film mon-
tage which created the problems with the Kuleshov Effect which Prince and
Hensley describe. Kuleshov was effectively using contextual cues such as implicit
eyeline matches to trigger the projection of predetermined emotional affect onto
an actor’s neutral (or perhaps ambiguous) face, in the same sort of way that
Pavlov was trying to trigger a predetermined reflex in his dogs as the invariable
response to a given stimulus, such as the ringing of a bell. Kuleshov apparently
succeeded in this aim at the time he carried out his experiment, yet a mod-
ern recreation of the same experiment apparently fails to show the Effect as he
described it. The Kuleshov Effect may therefore indeed be a threshold effect,
as Prince and Hensley suggest, which depends on a certain degree of ambiguity
rather than neutrality in the expression on Mozzhukhin’s face and a certain crit-
ical threshold of editing cues such as eyeline matches. It is therefore necessary
to grasp the interaction between the edited film footage and the spectator as a
complex and dialectical one in order to properly understand the operation of the
Kuleshov Effect. The deterministic and manipulative interpretation of the Effect
which Kuleshov himself proposed, based on a crudely understood scientism and
a mechanicist materialism, is inadequate for a proper analysis of his own Effect.
As Metz has shown, the single shot is more analagous to a phrase or sentence
rather than to a single word (1982a:26) and therefore cannot easily serve as a fun-
damental building block for a linearised construction of meaning. Furthermore,
Kuleshov’s understanding of the process of signification in montage as being se-
quential and predetermined does not take any account of the role of the spectator
in actively constituting the meaning of a montage sequence. Alcorn’s approach,
in which the spectator’s projections are modified by the rhetorical pressure of the
film’s signifiers (or in this case, the montage of the film’s signifiers), is surely a
better model for the way in which “the viewer contribute[s] to the co-construction
of cinematic meaning in a Kuleshov-type sequence” (Prince and Hensley 1992:64).
The canonical example of film montage, the so-called Kuleshov Effect, can
therefore be interpreted as a modification of the projective idealisation of the
4.3. The Kuleshov Effect and “projective idealization” 115
audience. This modification is prompted by the film-maker’s rhetorical manip-
ulation of the audience’s emotional responses to repetitions of the same image,
Mozzhukhin’s expressionless (or at least emotionally ambiguous) face. In his
most famous montage experiment, Kuleshov demonstrated a rhetorical method
of directly manipulating and changing the audience’s affective response to a given
cinematic image by playing on the way their projective idealisation of that im-
age is modified by its juxtaposition with the shots preceding and following it.
Film montage itself can therefore be regarded as a rhetorical device, a means of
changing the consciousness of the audience by persuading them in a transactive
rhetorical process. And, raised onto the level of “intellectual montage” that Eisen-
stein aspired to, it even offers a means of changing their abstract ideas about, as
well as their emotional responses to, a given image or shot.
Chapter 5
Classical Cinema and the System of
the Suture
The relationship between Soviet montage cinema and classical cinema can by no
means be reduced to one of simple opposition. The Soviet montage directors were
reacting specifically against Tsarist cinema, which they (with the notable excep-
tion of Vertov) contrasted unfavourably with the modern, fast new style of the
cinematic products of Hollywood. In order to explore the complex and sometimes
contradictory relationship between Soviet montage cinema and classical cinema,
it is necessary to examine the nature both of the classical cinema and of Tsarist
cinema, which differed in significant ways from the classical style. Furthermore,
the analysis of the “system of the suture” used by the classical style must be used
to understand the way in which the ideology of a film exists not merely on the
level of the fiction or narrative of the film, but also on the level of the enunciation
of the filmic text itself, in the process by which fragments of raw film footage are
transformed into meaningful cinematographic statements.
5.1 Hollywood classical cinema and Soviet
montage cinema
When the October Revolution occurred, cinema was already a quarter of a cen-
tury old and Hollywood was in the final stages of establishing the “classical style”
(also sometimes referred to as the “continuity style”) of film-making which would
dominate first American and then world cinema to the present day.101 In Kristin
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Thompson’s words, “from about 1909 to 1916, the transitionary phase toward
the classical cinema occurred, with the classical paradigm in place by 1917”
(1985:159). The “classical style” therefore came into existence at almost the same
time that the first experiments in montage cinema were being carried out by
Kuleshov.102 Though it certainly existed by 1917, the classical mode was not yet
dominant – certainly not in Tsarist Russia – and had not yet achieved its current
hegemony, either economically or stylistically. The Hollywood classical style was
therefore received by the early Soviet montage directors as a breath of fresh air;
it was seen as a modern, daring, even avant-garde new style, both dynamic and
economical in its constructive principles and its effect on a mass audience.
Eisenstein in particular gained “hands-on” exposure to the new Hollywood
continuity style in the early 1920s, when he assisted Esfir Shub in editing and
censoring Western movies to make them ideologically acceptable for Soviet au-
diences.103 In particular, he is believed to have helped modify D. W. Griffith’s
Intolerance (1916) and Fritz Lang’s Dr Mabuse (1922). Noël Burch has suggested
the particular importance of Eisenstein’s exposure to Fritz Lang’s Dr Mabuse in
developing his understanding of the classical style:
Fritz Lang’s Mabuse diptych (1922) is an early example of the [classical
Hollywood] system mastered to a perfection that has perhaps never been
surpassed. And it is not without interest that Eisenstein had the opportu-
nity of studying closely such a supreme example of the system [. . . ], having
been involved – in what capacity has not, I believe, been clearly established
as yet – with the editing of the Soviet version of Mabuse. (Burch 1979:83)
Pudovkin had, by his own admission (Dart 1974:209), despised cinema as an artis-
tic medium until he saw Intolerance for the first time. Griffith’s film was a reve-
lation to him of cinema’s artistic and propagandistic potential (Leyda 1983:150).
Vertov, of course, was hostile towards any sort of fictional film-making; the more
significant influence on his own film-making practice was the tradition of So-
viet journalism and reportage rather than Hollywood’s classical style of fictional
film-making, as Jeremy Hicks has convincingly demonstrated (2007:5-21). His
conclusion is that, “Stylistically and in its approach to information, persuasion
and communication, Vertov’s film-making of the 1920s extends the model of the
Bolshevik newspaper” (2007:8).
The Soviet montage film-makers’ exposure to the early classical cinema of
Hollywood (and of western Europe) in the early 1920s was crucial to their devel-
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opment of montage cinema. At this early period, the classical style was not yet
completely established as the hegemonic mode of film-making it was to become
in later decades, as the dominant mode against which artistically and politically
radical film-making had to define itself by challenging or subverting it. Kuleshov,
Eisenstein and Pudovkin therefore felt able to use the new classical style as an ally
in their attempt to develop a radical avant-garde alternative to what had been the
dominant cinematic mode of their own time and place – Tsarist Russian cinema.
Despite the nearly total collapse of the Tsarist film industry itself following the
Revolution and Civil War (1917-21), the shortage of new films being made in the
early years of Soviet power meant that old films made during the Tsarist era were
still being widely exhibited throughout Russia even into the early 1920s (Taylor
1979:50-51), so Tsarist films still dominated the cinema screens even in the first
years of Soviet power. The newness of the classical Hollywood mode was also an
important factor here; it was a mode which had not yet entirely completed its
formal development. Indeed, Burch has suggested that
[t]his “unfinished” state in which the system found itself, especially in Eu-
rope, played a decisive role in the orientations of the most important Soviet
directors who, with only one exception, were otherwise quite prepared to
accept the system’s claim to a privileged status. (1979:84)
The Soviet montage directors were therefore not actually reacting against the new
classical style which was emerging from Hollywood (and also from western Euro-
pean film-makers influenced by Hollywood), which they actually rather admired,
but specifically against Tsarist cinema, which they contrasted unfavourably with
the cinematic products of Hollywood (Kuleshov 1987:38-41).
However, while Tsarist cinema was a late developer in terms of its adoption of
the narrative and continuity techniques associated with the classical Hollywood
style of film-making, it would not be correct to regard it as still being entirely
stuck in the “primitive cinema” mode of film-making described by Kristin Thomp-
son (1985:157-173). By the beginning of the Great War, Tsarist film-makers were
already becoming more sophisticated than they had been only a few years previ-
ously; as Peter Kenez points out, “[t]he difference between Stenka Razin [1908]
and The Defence of Sevastopol, made only three years later, is extraordinary”
(2001:13). However, this increased sophistication was very uneven in its develop-
ment – as late as 1916, even as relatively “progressive”104 a director as Yevgeny
Bauer (with whom Kuleshov had worked as a young set designer) would make
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very few cuts within each individual scene of his films.105 He would usually use a
static or slow-moving camera set-up to film a complete scene in one take. Even
dreams or hallucinations would be superimposed in the same frame above the
head of the sleeping character, as in The Dying Swan (1916) for example.106
Even more significant is the fact that despite the increasingly sophisticated
techniques of its film-makers, Tsarist cinema retained some unique characteristics
which marked it out from the cinema of other nations. Tsivian has referred to
“the distinguishing features of the Russian film style that set it apart from the
generally accepted practice of the 1910s” (1994:7). Most of these features were
in fact culturally determined, as Tsivian has convincingly argued (1998). In
particular, the slowness of Tsarist cinema was notorious. In Tsivian’s own words,
The Russian cinema of the 1910s – not uninfluenced by the theories of
dramatic timing associated with the Moscow Art Theatre – raised this
style of acting to the level of a conscious aesthetic programme. As Kevin
Brownlow observed, Russian cinema seems to have only two speeds: ‘slow’
and ‘stop’.” (1998:54)
One critic in 1916 even approvingly noted that “the involvement of our best actors
in cinema will lead to the slowest possible tempo [. . . ] their entire acting process
is subjugated to a rhythm that rises and falls particularly slowly” (qtd. in Tsivian
1994:15). This connection between the entry of professional theatrical actors into
Russian cinema in the 1910s and the slowness of the films they appeared in may
help to explain the montage directors’ reluctance to use professional actors in
their own films, and their preference for non-actors or “types”. Tsivian has even
calls this slowness of Tsarist Russian films “a unique attribute of Russian cinema”
(1998:54), and he ascribes it to the cultural milieu of Russia itself in the early
twentieth century:
Traditionally, the kinesics of social life in Russia presumed an inverse re-
lationship between the importance of an event and the speed with which
it unfolded: as the importance of an event or a person increased, the ac-
tion slowed down. The rule affected theatrical mise-en-scène, diplomatic
protocol and, to a certain extent, the kinesics of everyday behaviour. Rus-
sians generally judged American films to be ‘too hectic’ [suetlivyi ], and a
standard epithet for a foreigner was ‘fidgety’ [vertlyavyi ]. (1998:56)
This may have been more true for the educated upper classes of Tsarist Russia
than for the working class, however – Kuleshov observed in 1914-16 that working
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class audiences preferred the fast-paced American movies to the slow, ponderous
products of Russian movie studios (Kuleshov 1987:40).
Moreover, the use of camera movements by even as sophisticated and influen-
tial a director as Bauer still bore the traces of what Burch has called “the primitive
mode of representation (PMR)”, which he calls “a stable system with its own in-
herent logic and durability” (Burch 1990:220). As Tsivian has noted, Bauer’s
use of “in” and “out” tracking shots was “interpersonal rather than space-bound”
(Tsivian 1998:205); that is, rather than being used to activate the space of the set
(as the so-called “Cabiria movement” was), such camera movements were used to
play “the role of a transformer of energy: the energy of the moving camera was
converted into the energy of the face, figure, or detail that was coming towards
the viewer” (1998:206). This was a use of camera movement which was not part
of the classical style and depended on the tendency of early cinema audiences to
“project discourse upon diegesis”, to use Tsivian’s phrase (1998:199). Such cam-
era movements as Bauer did use, then, tended to belong to the “primitive mode
of representation” rather than the new classical mode.
In fact, what the montage directors rejected in Tsarist cinema were essentially
those aspects of it which made it a specifically Russian cinema – the slowness,
the introspection, the mystical psychologism, the melodramatic narratives. Yet
as Tsarist cinema absorbed some of the lessons of the newly emerging classical
style, it actually seemed to strengthen those characteristics which the montage
directors disliked so much – in effect, from the viewpoint of the montage film-
makers, Tsarist cinema was learning all the wrong lessons from American cinema,
adopting the psychologism and seamless narratives of the classical style but not
the rapid cutting or the dynamic plots. The montage directors therefore did
not reject Tsarist cinema tout court, but were actually nostalgic for an earlier
period of Tsarist cinema, the period when it was still a “cinema of attractions”
before beginning to adopt the worst aspects of the Hollywood classical style of
film-making.107 In some respects, montage cinema (especially as theorised and
practiced by Eisenstein) represented a self-conscious return to an earlier phase
of Tsarist cinema, rejecting the narrative-based introspective psychology and the
characteristically Russian slowness of the later Tsarist cinema. They embraced
the spectacle and the attractions of the “primitive cinema” of Tsarist Russia,
combined with the speed, dynamism, rapid cutting and concentration on objects
rather than people of the new Western classical style of films, especially the
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Hollywood comedies and detective movies.
Vance Kepley has brought out the essential difference between Tsarist cinema
and American cinema of this period very instructively by comparing D. W. Grif-
fith’s Biograph movie The Lonely Villa (1909) with Yakov Protazanov’s re-make
of it, Drama by Telephone (1914). As well as substituting an obligatory unhappy
ending (characteristic of Tsarist cinema) for Griffith’s happy ending (character-
istic of Hollywood cinema), Protazanov “is not concerned with the rhythm or
tension of the attempted rescue, and he does not exploit parallel editing” (Ke-
pley 1979:23). As Kepley notes, “The Russian artist, in borrowing Griffith’s
tale, specifically rejects Griffith’s most famous stylistic contribution to the genre”
(1979:24). And this was not merely a failing of the Tsarist directors of the time;
Tsarist audiences too found Griffith’s rapid cutting and parallel editing unac-
ceptably avant-garde. Despite being imported into Russia as early as 1916,108
Griffith’s epic film Intolerance was shelved by the Tsarist distributors in the be-
lief that Russian audiences would be confused by it. For them to forego potential
profits despite having already paid for the film, there must have been some basis
in reality for their conviction.
It is worth noting that Tsivian has ascribed this propensity for unhappy end-
ings in Tsarist Russian films not to the “the gloomy Russian soul” but to the fact
that the narratives of Tsarist films were often derived from nineteenth-century
Russian theatrical melodrama, which (unlike the Western theatrical melodrama)
was itself derived from an adaptation of classical tragedy to a mass audience
(Tsivian 1994:8). The pessimistic “Russian ending” in Tsarist films of the 1910s
is therefore merely another symptom of Tsarist cinema’s aspiration to emulate
the forms of high art, to put the roof on the edifice of their own cinema before
digging the foundations.
Kuleshov in particular admired the narrative efficiency and the energy of the
American films, which he believed to be in such contrast to the theatrical longeurs
of the Tsarist cinema. However, we must be careful not to misread such longeurs.
As Tsivian has reminded us,
It is quite possible that some of the idiosyncrasies of Russian film style
(certain static pauses, for example) will some day be explained by the music
that was supposed to be played with these films – especially because the
‘moods’ themselves were often induced into actors by ‘mood music’ played
on the set. (1998:92)
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Needless to say, such “mood music” accompanied by static pauses would have
been anathema to Kuleshov’s style of film-making. Indeed, Kuleshov wrote
scathingly about “those who cling to the vapid psychological porridge of the old
Russian movies born of the syphilitic theatre” (Kuleshov 1987:56). Incidentally,
it was probably Mozzhukhin’s adaptation to such a mode of film-making which
led to “his formidable gaze” and the “concentrated static internalisation of emo-
tion” (Sargeant 2000:9) of his acting style, a static blankness of expression which
Kuleshov found useful when constructing his famous montage experiment.
Kuleshov’s ambition when making his own films was to use montage to achieve
a similar efficiency as that of Hollywood film-makers. For Kuleshov, “the classical
Hollywood film style [. . . ] epitomized an efficiency of filmic discourse” (Kepley
1992:137). The contrast with Tsarist cinema could not have been greater. As
Kuleshov said of his observations of Russian audiences of the time:
I was always struck by the reaction of audiences to American films. The
reaction was violent, and showed how much the audience was carried away
by the film, the extent to which they lived the action on the screen. I
thought a lot about this and arrived at the conclusion that the power of
this cinema lay in the montage and in the use of close-ups, methods which
were never used by the Russian film-makers. This was the first influence
on me. (Kuleshov 1973:71)
He identified the source of this effect on the audience – the means by which the
films aroused it to a state of excitement and induced a physical response to what
the audience saw on the screen – as being the American use of rapid cutting,
which he referred to as “American editing”.
There is an interesting and significant parallel here between the physical re-
sponses which the American films induced in the proletarian audience, observed
by Kuleshov, and the involuntary motor responses which Eisenstein believed plays
and films constructed according to the “montage of attractions” should be able
to induce in their audience. Eisenstein believed that the ability to induce such
involuntary motor responses through montage was necessary in order to be able
to condition the reflexes of the audience in a similar way to Pavlov’s conditioning
of dogs’ reflexes under laboratory conditions (Eisenstein 1988:125,155). The pur-
pose of such conditioning was of course propagandistic: to inculcate a desired set
of political beliefs into the audience through physiological conditioning. Eisen-
stein even went so far as to place firecrackers under the audience’s seats during
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the performances of Wiseman to provoke precisely such involuntary motor re-
sponses in the audience (1988:36). American movies were using rapid cutting
and the “attractions” of car chases, fights and slapstick as similar stimuli which,
according to Kuleshov’s observations, also induced involuntary motor responses
in the audience.
Kuleshov later said of his observations that
[w]hat immediately caught our attention when we watched American films
was that they consisted of a whole series of very short shots, or brief se-
quences joined together in some definite order, unlike Russian films, which
at the time were made up of a few long scenes, monotonously following one
after another. (Kuleshov 1987:133)
Kuleshov’s assertion that “[r]apid montage was then called American montage,
and slow montage, Russian” (1987:135) is indicative of the fact that continuity in
the classical style of American film-making is achieved through cutting. As Bor-
dwell says, “the classical cinema is a cinema of cutting; the single-shot sequence
is very rare” (1985:46). The “continuity” of the classical style is really an effect
in the mind of the spectator rather than a quality inherent in the film material
itself, which is often almost as fragmented as a montage film. Burch has called
this “the [classical Hollywood] system’s greatest ‘secret’: the fact that a film is
made up of fragments of montage, that it is not by nature but by artifice that
the classical découpage produces an effect of continuity” (1979:92). André Bazin’s
position can therefore be seen to have been just as hostile towards the analytical
editing of classical cinema as it was towards montage cinema. Bazin dreamed of
“a film form that would permit everything to be said without chopping the world
up into little fragments, that would reveal the hidden meanings in people and
things without disturbing the unity natural to them” (Bazin 2005:38). Classical
cinema was clearly not such a film form, any more than was montage cinema.
The development of the continuity style film was also, and necessarily, accom-
panied by the simultaneous development of what might be called the “continu-
ity style spectator”, trained to expect and to effortlessly read the narrative and
continuity cues of the classical style. Burch has stated that “the extraordinary
expansion of the American cinema and its rise to world domination after World
War I was a direct consequence of the creation of that audience during the pe-
riod 1905-15” (1979:78); that is, the creation of a mass audience which included
the various strata of the bourgeoisie as well as the working class. The “continu-
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ity style” of classical cinema therefore developed together with its training of its
necessary mass audience; the various continuity devices of classical cinema were
not merely clever innovations of a few “inspired” geniuses for which the cinema
audience had been passively waiting. Classical cinema did not merely “perfect”
itself by adapting to the pre-existing cognitive abilities of its audience; rather,
there was a period during which the classical cinema and its audience adapted
themselves to each other through a complex process of interaction. As Burch has
pointed out, some of the “primitive” films dating from before the establishment
of the classical continuity style can be almost incomprehensible for a modern
spectator at first viewing. He uses the example of a Biograph film, Tom Tom the
Piper’s Son (1905), in the opening shot of which
what is meant to be the central action – the preliminaries leading up to
the theft of the pig, the theft itself, and the start of the chase as the thief
escapes – is nearly invisible for the modern spectator at first glance. For
he is accustomed to having each shot in a film carefully organized around
a single signifying center and to the linearization of all the iconographic
signifiers through composition, lighting, and/or editing. (Burch 1979:82)
Metz has also emphasised the point that
the cinematic institution is not just the cinema industry [. . . ], it is also the
mental machinery – another industry – which spectators ‘accustomed to
the cinema’ have internalised historically and which has adapted them to
the consumption of films.109 (1982b:7)
The effect of continuity in the classical Hollywood cinema is achieved through
cutting and then suturing those cuts, using matches on action, eyeline matches,
and so on. It is important to note that this process begins with the way the
material is actually shot, and is not merely a particular method of editing. By
the same token, Kuleshov asserted that “montage is unquestionably subordinate
to shooting” (Kuleshov 1987:42), and then described the best way in which a
hypothetical scene should be shot according to montage principles (1987:43).
Vertov even insisted that montage begins before shooting (Vertov 1984:72), and
he listed the stages of editing a film as:
1. Editing during observation
2. Editing after observation
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3. Editing during filming
4. Editing after filming
5. Gauging by sight (hunting for montage fragments)
6. The final editing. (Vertov 1984:72)
Vertov defined editing very broadly as “the organization of the visible world”, in
contrast to editing in the “artistic cinema”, which he considered to be merely “the
splicing together of individual filmed scenes according to a scenario” (1984:72).
Furthermore, Eisenstein often insisted on the necessity of considering the framing
of a shot and the issue of montage at the same time in order to “shatter the
dualism ‘shot – montage’ [. . . ] [and] apply our experience of montage directly
to the problem of the theory of the shot” (Eisenstein 1988:146), and he asserted
that “montage is a stage derived from the shot [. . . ]. Montage is the leap made
by internal shot composition into a new quality” (1991:12).
In its complex interaction between fragmentation and continuity, the classi-
cal Hollywood style therefore bears a similarity to the Kuleshov Effect, which
achieves its famous effect on an audience by means of a dialectical interaction
between fragmentation and continuity. In one sense, the Kuleshov Effect demon-
strates the power of continuity in film: without the propensity of the audience to
link together the montage fragments into a coherent whole by means of eyeline
matches (so that Mozzhukhin is “looking at” each object in turn) there would be
no “Effect” at all. Kepley even goes so far as to assert that “[t]hese experiments,
appropriated by so many film historians for so many purposes, in fact betray
Kuleshov’s appropriation of classical continuity” (1992:138). However, without
fragmentation there would be no Kuleshov Effect either: the emotional impact
which Kuleshov and Pudovkin described the experiment as having had on its au-
dience was achieved not through the images themselves, which were deliberately
chosen to be innocuous and to have no emotional power in their own right, but
through their juxtaposition against each other. So the Kuleshov Effect can be
seen from two mutually contradictory yet complementary perspectives: as demon-
strating the power of continuity and the power of montage. As Amy Sergeant
puts it, the Kuleshov Effect experiment “seemingly produce[s] results which, if
not entirely contradictory, are at least not simultaneously sustainable” (2000:8).
The apparent contradiction can be resolved by regarding the relationship between
continuity and fragmentation in Kuleshov’s theory of montage as being a dialec-
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tical one: they are complementary and opposing poles, held in dialectical tension,
and both are necessary for a full understanding of montage theory. The Kuleshov
Effect montage experiment may have made use of some of the devices of classical
continuity style, but it went beyond the continuity style itself to achieve new
effects and exert a new and unique influence over the cinema audience.
Kuleshov’s enthusiasm for American movies was itself part of a larger “Amer-
icanitis” which infected Soviet society in the early 1920s. Kuleshov referred to
his own “Americanitis” in preferring the products of American cinema to those
of Tsarist Russian cinema (Kuleshov 1987:40-41). The word seems to have been
generally used in Soviet Russia in the 1920s to refer to the “disease” of those
who regarded the industrial modernity, radical and populist new art forms and
dynamic progress of American society of the time as a model to be emulated by
Russia, much to the disapproval of many of the older generation:
Perfunctory critics and wise old officials used to be horrified by ‘Americani-
tis’ and suspense in films, and attributed the success of such pictures to
the loose morals and bad taste of the young and working-class audiences.
(1987:40).
Ian Christie has referred to “the cultural pulse of the period – Eccentric, pop-
ulist and fascinated by all things American” (Christie 1994:97,229,n.65). As a
relatively young, dynamic society which had invented many of the modern tech-
niques of mass production, America held a fascination for the intelligentsia of a
backward, agrarian society which had just undergone an unprecedented political
revolution and wanted to catch up with the modern world as quickly as possi-
ble. For example, the rationalisation of work processes which had recently been
invented by the American Frederick Winslow Taylor110 was fashionable even in
Soviet government circles. Lenin himself had expressed admiration for Taylor’s
system as a means of improving labour productivity and had asserted in 1918
that “[w]e must organise in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system
and systematically try it out and adapt it to our own ends” (Lenin 1968:414).
Aleksei Gastev, who organised the Central Institute of Labour in Moscow in 1920,
was also an ardent proponent of Taylorism.111 This obsession with rationalisa-
tion and efficiency quickly spread to the arts, finding its most uncompromising
expression in Russian Constructivism. The rationalisation of work processes was
to be taken up by the montage film-makers themselves, via both Meyerhold’s
system of “Biomechanics” and Kuleshov’s “actor-model” [naturshchik ].
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It is also important to remember that, as Kepley has said, “In the historical
circumstances in which Kuleshov found himself, Hollywood film-making practice
represented cinema’s closest approximation to Constructivism” (1992:144). The
Hollywood studio system of the time could be seen as the cinematic equivalent
of Henry Ford’s factories: assembling the ready-made elements of a film into a
maximally efficient mass-produced and mass-distributed finished product. In fact,
cinema itself could be seen as the Constructivist art form par excellence: film-
making involves collaborative labour using sophisticated modern technology in a
studio, or “film factory” as they were known in Russia,112 in the most economically
efficient way possible. And nowhere at that time was this industrial approach to
film-making more apparent than in Hollywood.
Furthermore, this efficiency and rationalism could be put to directly agita-
tional uses; the methods of the new Hollywood classical style seemed ideally
suited for the purposes of political propaganda. As Boris Arvatov asserted, “The
American film is not merely constructive; it is, in addition, of maximum agita-
tional value in its very forms” (qtd. in Taylor 1979:38). However, to serve this
agitational purpose, the function of the devices and techniques used by Hollywood
would have to be changed, since (from the viewpoint of the Soviet film-makers)
American cinema was wasting its own tremendous political and social potential by
using it by creating frivolous entertainment for a petty-bourgeois mass audience.
As Arvatov put it:
Agitation is not dreaming; agitation is practical action . . . .
America has opted for pure entertainment.
The R.S.F.S.R.113 must give entertainment its special, social purpose. (Qtd.
in Taylor 1979:38)
The Russian Constructivist A. Filippov made a direct link between this use of a
functional, agitational art and a fundamental Marxist principle:
The aspirations of the new productional art can be formulated by applying
to artists K. Marx’s idea about scientists: artists in varying ways have
merely depicted the world but their task is to change it. (Qtd. in Bann
1974:23)
Such a task, if taken seriously, would require a systematic study by film-makers
of the way in which a given cinematic technique (for example, the fast cutting
in American comedy films) achieved its emotional and physical effects on an
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audience. Once this was understood, then the montage film-makers could deploy
that technique as one of an array of cinematic techniques to achieve any desired
effect on a given audience, which would in principle enable them to perfect cinema
as a propaganda weapon. Such an ambition was the ultimate motivation which lay
behind the experiments of the Kuleshov Workshop in the early 1920s. Kuleshov’s
aim was to take those elements of Hollywood cinema which he regarded as most
progressive, such as its rapid editing and its concentration on physical action,
and change their function from providing entertainment to communicating and
reinforcing political points. These progressive elements of Hollywood classical
cinema would be united with a Constructivist ethos in which a work of art is
an artificial construct rather than a simple reflection of reality. The purpose of
such a procedure was to exert an overwhelming influence on the state of mind
of the cinema audience, to change their state of excitation and their political
consciousness.
It is important to note that the contrast between Soviet montage cinema and
Hollywood classical cinema does not lie simply in the fact that montage cinema
involves the active, productive participation of the audience while classical cinema
presupposes a passively consuming audience. As Bordwell has noted, “The belief
that classical narration is invisible often accompanies an assumption that the
spectator is passive” (1985:37), but in fact the spectator is an active participant
when he or she views a “classical style” film: “Classical films call forth activities
on the part of the spectator. These activities may be highly standardized and
comparatively easy to learn, but we cannot assume that they are simple” (1985:7).
Indeed, if this were not the case then there would hardly have been any need for
the process by which the classical style and its mass audience conditioned each
other in the process of its formation between the approximate dates of 1909 and
1917.114 Consumption itself is not a simple act, and the spectator must be trained
to be a good consumer of movies. The fundamental distinction is therefore not
between the active audience of a montage film and the passive audience of a
classical film, but between the consciously active audience of a montage film and
the non-consciously active audience of a classical film. The “activities on the part
of the spectator” which Bordwell rightly claims to be necessary in the consumption
of a classical Hollywood movie are in fact largely non-conscious activities, rather
as the mechanics of driving a car are largely non-conscious for an experienced
driver. It is for this reason that watching a film in the classical style feels “natural”
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and effortless to the spectator; the active mental processes involved in watching
a classical style film are more akin to trained reflexes than conscious cognitive
engagement. The Soviet montage directors – especially Eisenstein – were certainly
interested in training the reflexes of the audience, but they also wished to arouse
the conscious mind of the spectator, to make him or her consciously think about
what they were seeing. The activity involved in watching a Soviet montage film
is therefore of a different quality than that involved in watching a continuity style
film: it is actually conscious activity. This is related of course to the montage
directors’ wish, as Marxists, to raise the level of political and social conciousness
of the audience of their films. In other words, the aesthetic “difficulty” of a Soviet
montage film as compared to a classical Hollywood movie is inseparable from its
function as political rhetoric, as propaganda.
It must also be emphasised that the Soviet montage directors did not adopt
the methods and approach of the American classical cinema tout court. As Anna
Lawton has pointed out,
Kuleshov’s conception of cinema took shape in the atmosphere of Russian
Constructivism, and [. . . ] he borrowed only those elements of ‘American-
ism’ – dynamism, energy, and economy – that fit into the Constructivist
philosophical frame. (Lawton 1992:4)
This selective adoption of certain aspects of the continuity style, and its fusion
of these aspects with avant-garde artistic trends dominant in the Soviet Union
in the early 1920s such as Constructivism, Productivism and Futurism, meant
that Soviet montage cinema was always going to be a distinctive method of film-
making, independent from the American classical style and challenging some of
its fundamental principles. The montage directors adopted only certain aspects of
the emerging classical style of Hollywood – economy of construction, certain tech-
nical devices such as the match on action, eyeline matches, etc. – but not other,
equally important aspects, such as the use of a causally deterministic narrative
based on the goal-oriented motivations of individual characters as the fundamen-
tal organising principle (“[c]haracter-centered – i.e., personal or psychological –
causality is the armature of the classical story,” in Bordwell’s words (1985:13)).
This rejection of narrative was critical, and was probably motivated to a great
extent by political considerations. As Bordwell has emphasised, there is a con-
nection between the smooth psychologically-motivated narratives of Hollywood
and a political ideology based on individualism and personal ambition:
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It is easy to see in the goal-oriented protagonist a reflection of an ideology
of American individualism and enterprise, but it is the peculiar accomplish-
ment of the classical cinema to translate this ideology into a rigorous chain
of cause and effect. (1985:16)
Soviet montage directors, by contrast, tended to conceive of causality as social
rather than individual, economic rather than psychological; causality in their
films is generally supraindividual and historical.115 The classical cinema of Holly-
wood could not contain such an attitude towards characters and causality without
bursting the bounds of its own style. Within the limits of that style, history is
unknowable apart from its effects upon individual characters. The montage di-
rectors, in contrast, wanted to make history knowable to their audience, and
knowable in an “objective” Marxist sense rather than a subjective personalised
sense. A film such as Pudovkin’s The End of St Petersburg (1927), with its aim
of imparting a Marxist vision of the historical process to its audience, would
be inconceivable in the form of a classical style film: its form would be hope-
lessly at odds with its political message. The same is true for the montage films
of Eisenstein: as Schreurs has pointed out, “Eisenstein’s objective was not to
recount history, but to ‘explain’ the significance and ideological background of
what happened. The basic historical linearity of the film [October ] is constantly
interrupted, complicated by intellectual attractions” (Schreurs 1989:15).
The essential point to understand here is that, as Kristin Thompson points
out, “what the psychological character was in the unification of the longer narra-
tive, the continuity rules were in the unification of time and space” (Thompson
1985:162). The montage directors took only those devices of the continuity style
which enabled them to “linearize the iconographic signifiers”; that is, to construct
a linear series of cinematographic signs which could be “read” by the spectator
instead of the chaotic jumble of iconographic signifiers in early cinema (Burch
1979:82). They ignored the classical style’s use of the goal-oriented psychological
character to motivate and unify narrative. This selective borrowing from classi-
cal cinema led to the creation of a method of film-making which, while it used
some of the same devices as the Hollywood continuity style, was radically differ-
ent from that style in its political and social assumptions and in its effects on an
audience. In terms of the analysis of the classical style given by Bordwell (1985:1-
84), the Soviet montage directors adopted and adapted many of the devices of
the continuity style, but did not adopt its systems (narrative, time and space),
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nor its relations of systems (1985:6). As Bordwell rightly says, “In sum, Soviet
montage cinema constituted a challenge to classical narrative and decoupage on
almost every front: narrative unity, narrational voice and point-of-view, spatial
and temporal continuity” (1985:73).
The montage directors responded to the newly-established classical style of
Hollywood in differing ways; Kuleshov, Pudovkin and Eisenstein took from it, in
varying degrees, those elements and techniques which they believed would best
serve their differing rhetorical strategies in their own film-making, while Vertov
rejected it completely. For example, in the early 1920s, Kuleshov and Pudovkin
set themselves the task of studying and appropriating the major genres of the
Hollywood movie industry for their own purposes because of their belief that
the institutional mode of representation, the genres and other coded sys-
tems founded upon it, offered ideal vehicles in the ideological struggle be-
cause of the privileged relationships which they already enjoyed with mass
audiences. (Burch 1979:85)
Kuleshov, the founder of Soviet montage cinema, was actually the montage di-
rector who owed the most to the classical Hollywood cinema, in terms of genre
and technique. The classical style movie, especially the Hollywood genre films
such as the Western, the slapstick comedy or the spy movie, was simply the most
efficient and direct way of gaining access to the minds of a mass audience. As
Burch puts it,
The urban masses were already quite familiar with the current mode of rep-
resentation and forms of expression, and it was obvious that one important
way of reaching them consisted in acquiring the theoretical mastery of that
mode and in appropriating its forms of expression. (1979:85)
What Kuleshov rejected were the commercial aims of Hollywood cinema, and its
implicit petty-bourgeois ideology of individualism.
Pudovkin, Kuleshov’s erstwhile pupil and collaborator, had a similar approach
but was more willing to extend the limits of the Hollywood classical style and to
some extent go beyond those limits, particularly in the construction of diegetic
space. In fact, Burch identifies Pudovkin’s commitment to using and extending
the linearised and rationalised narrative of classical cinema as being the funda-
mental root of his periodic disputes with Eisenstein:
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Pudovkin’s writings and his polemic with Eisenstein clearly bear out the ev-
idence of his films: his chief concern was to draw the ultimate consequences
from that historical process of linearization of the iconographic signifiers.
(Burch 1979:86)
What Burch refers to as the “linearization of the iconographic signifiers” is the
tendency of Hollywood cinema to assign only a single, easily-read meaning to
each element of its films; this tendency is connected with the “redundancy” which
Bordwell identifies as being characteristic of the classical style (1985:5). Ambi-
guity and multiple meanings tend to be avoided in the classical style; both the
narrative and the meaning of a film are, in principle, linear. Pudovkin, of all
the major montage directors, sticks closest to this linearised way of constructing
a film. Pudovkin’s “constant concern is [. . . ] to regulate the ‘flow of signs’ as
closely as possible” (Burch 1979:86). His aim in doing so, however, in contrast to
Hollywood cinema, is primarily rhetorical rather than commercial: to grasp and
control the spectator’s attention and to convince him of something. Pudovkin
even describes this rhetorical process as the fundamental purpose of montage
itself: “Of course everyone knows that the essence of correct montage is the cor-
rect management of the viewer’s attention” in order “to influence the masses, to
convey a particular enthusiasm, and to force even people with opposing views to
be disturbed, directly and against their will” (Pudovkin 2006:16,23), and Burch
refers to “Pudovkin’s analytical penchant, his concern to make each picture into
a ‘brick’ as elementary as possible in a chain of signification which he can control
as closely as possible” (1979:87).
Eisenstein, on the other hand, was much more prepared to violate the linearity
of the classical style. October is full of such moments; one example Burch gives
is of the mechanical peacock which Eisenstein intercuts with Kerensky entering
a room of the Winter Palace. It is “so tightly meshed into the movement of the
door itself that it resists any reduction to a single signifying function” (Burch
1979:90). This example is characteristic both of the lack of redundancy in Eisen-
stein’s films and the breaking of the “linearization of the iconographic signifiers”,
which enables him to give the signifiers complex and multi-layered meanings and
functions within the film as a whole. Eisenstein can therefore be assigned a posi-
tion further from the classical style than either Kuleshov or Pudovkin. However,
Eisenstein still in some sense takes that classical style for granted, as the ground
against which he can create dissonance and counterpoint, whose syntax he can
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disrupt and whose tropes he can exploit for rhetorical and emotional effect. In-
deed, Burch goes so far as to claim that “Eisenstein became the first to succeed
in relativizing certain fundamental norms of the institutional mode of represen-
tation” (1979:92). But such innovation could only be possible by remaining, as it
were, in the orbit of that mode of representation rather than entirely disengaging
from it. Burch has said that Eisenstein
shared with Pudovkin and Kuleshov the deep conviction that the ‘language’
with which the name of Griffith was then so closely associated was tanta-
mount to a basic language. [. . . ] This is the nerve center of his polemic
with Vertov. (1979:93)
Vertov can therefore be regarded as having been more radical in his approach
to the institution of cinema than Eisenstein or the other montage directors in
the sense that he explicitly rejected the “basic language” of fictional films tout
court. However, this total rejection of the institution of classical cinema meant
that Vertov, unlike Eisenstein, was unable to revolutionise or even to reform it
in any way. He therefore risked becoming marginalised by the cinematic main-
stream, which is indeed what actually happened, both in the Soviet Union and
in the West, until the 1960s. Vertov, of course, was the only one of the Soviet
montage directors who utterly rejected the classical style of fictional film-making,
and who wanted to replace it with a radically new institutional framework of film
production and distribution, to create a truly revolutionary cinema which would
owe nothing to the genres or narrative modes of commercial cinema. In The Man
with a Movie Camera, Vertov plays with some of the tropes of the standard genres
of the commercial cinema – the romance, the adventure film, and so on – but only
in order to parody them and expose them as a cinematic opium poisoning the
minds of the working class. As Burch has said, Vertov’s “chief target is the fun-
damental linearity of filmic representation, a linearity contested in all its aspects,
and no longer simply in that of syntax, as was chiefly the case with Eisenstein”
(1979:94). Vertov’s films resist being read in the way a film in the Hollywood
classical style is read; if such a reading is attempted, then they appear to be
merely a pointless display of “cinematic fireworks”. This may explain Eisenstein’s
otherwise puzzling misjudgement of The Man with a Movie Camera as “formalist
jackstraws and unmotivated camera mischief” (Eisenstein 1977:43). He seems to
have been reading Vertov’s film as though it had been made in accordance with
the norms of the classical style, and of course when read in such a way it could
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only appear to be a display of mere virtuosity, devoid of purpose or sense. The
fact that Eisenstein could not read Vertov’s film according to its own standards
(which Vertov had clearly outlined in the intertitles which open the film) indi-
cates Eisenstein’s own debt to that institutional mode of representation and his
refusal to entirely repudiate it.116 This complex and sometimes contradictory re-
lationship with the Hollywood continuity style of fictional film-making – neither
entirely accepting nor entirely rejecting it – was actually characteristic of Soviet
montage cinema as a movement in general; it was Vertov’s complete rejection of
it which was unusual, in fact unparalleled.
5.2 The system of the suture
The relationship between Soviet montage cinema and classical cinema was there-
fore a complex one, and can by no means be reduced to one of simple oppo-
sition. However, there were fundamental differences between the two modes of
film-making, both in their political and social aims and in the way in which ide-
ology is embodied in their films. In order to investigate this difference, it is first
necessary to introduce the “system of the suture” as it applies to classical cinema.
The notion of the “system of the suture” was developed as a means of using
Lacanian psychoanalysis to understand the process by which a film, especially
in classical cinema, achieves narrative coherence and closure by “stitching” the
subjectivity of the viewer into the filmic text. Stephen Heath has likened the
system of the suture to “a stitching or tying as in the surgical joining of the
lips of a wound” (1981:13), the wound in question being, in Lacanian terms, the
gap which opens in the human psyche between the Imaginary and the Symbolic
orders. Daniel Dayan (1974) has characterised the system of the suture as “the
tutor-code of classical cinema”, and has defined it to be the particular historical
articulation of cinema as a discourse which reinforces the hegemonic ideology of
society, implying that it operates to interpellate the spectator in an Althusserian
sense (Althusser 2001:85-126).
The analysis of the system of the suture began as a development by Jacques-
Alain Miller (1978) of some aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis,117 and was first
applied to film theory in 1969 by Jean-Pierre Oudart (1978), one of the critics
writing for Cahiers du cinéma. It gained popularity in Britain and North America
following an exposition of Oudart’s work in English by Daniel Dayan (1974).
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However, before the cinematic system of the suture can be described, it is first
necessary to introduce some of the basic concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis.
The mirror stage in Lacanian psychoanalysis
Lacan used the term “suture” in his studies in child psychology to refer to the re-
lationship between the conscious and the unconscious, which he regarded as being
characterised by an unstable relationship between what he called the Imaginary
and the Symbolic orders; these orders are formed in early childhood and there-
after always co-exist with each other.118 According to Lacan, the Imaginary is
that order of mental existence which originates in infancy when a child sees its
own reflection in a mirror for the first time (usually while being held in the arms
of its mother) and perceives itself as a unified being at the centre of the world.
Lacan describes this as a moment of jouissance or jubilation, a moment of un-
troubled narcissistic identification with the perceived unified being of the mother.
This is the famous Lacanian “mirror stage” (Lacan 1977:3-9), which occurs when
the child is weaned from its mother and which normally lasts from the age of six
to eighteen months. Lacan associated this stage of development with the child’s
formation of an identity separate from that of its mother and with the child’s first
understanding of the concepts of space, distance and position. This connection
between the mirror stage and the visual grasp of a coherent, three-dimensional
space in which people and objects are located and through which they move is
highly significant for the system of the suture as applied to cinema, as will be
seen. Before the mirror stage, the child had an illusory notion of unity with its
mother and had no concept of having an existence separate from her. This ini-
tial undifferentiated identification with the mother is the first stage of Lacan’s
Imaginary order, of which the mirror stage is the second. The Imaginary itself is
constituted through the mirror stage, at a time when the infant does not yet have
control over its own body as a unified whole, but only over isolated discrete parts
in an incoherent fashion. However, although the child’s motor control is not yet
mature, its visual faculty is already highly developed119 and the child therefore
identifies itself with the visual image of the mother and thereby perceives its own
body as a unified whole by analogy with the visual image of the mother’s body
and its own body in the mirror. The notion of possessing a unified body and a
unified ego therefore comes to the infant from outside; it is a fantasy before it
becomes a reality. Identity is therefore one effect of the Imaginary, which is the
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structure through which images are formed.
However, during the later phases of the mirror stage, the male child120 recog-
nises its difference from the mother and identifies itself as separate from her. The
mother becomes the “other” for the male child (Lacan calls it l’object petit-a [the
little-a object, “a” standing for autre], meaning the “little-o other”, the (m)other)
and this leads the child to experience a sense of the absence and loss of the
mother. According to Lacan, it is now that the Oedipus complex intervenes in
the process of maturation to dissolve the mirror stage and push the child into the
Symbolic order. The child senses its separation from the mother and desires to
be reunited with her, a desire which is now sexually driven. The child wishes to
make itself as indispensible to the mother as she is to it by imagining itself to
be what the mother lacks and therefore desires: the phallus, as Lacan terms it.
By imagining itself as the phallus – the signifier without a signified which repre-
sents the necessarily absent object of desire – the child imagines it will complete
the mother and therefore itself be completed by her. However, the male child is
forbidden to achieve his incestuous reunification with the mother by the father.
This intervention by a third party, whom the mother desires, forbids the child’s
desire to be what the mother desires and therefore prevents the imaginary state
of union with the mother. The child fears castration by the father and therefore
obeys the Law of the Father, the repression of his desire constituting his uncon-
scious. Since the Law of the Father is a verbal prohibition (the commandment
“Thou shalt not desire what was my desire”), patriarchal law is therefore a Sym-
bolic order and the unconscious is therefore structured like a language; desire is
repressed as that which cannot be spoken. Furthermore, by the act of obeying
the Law of the Father, the male child enters into the Symbolic order, which is
the patriarchal order and represents social stability under the Law of the Father.
By entering this Symbolic order, the male child adopts a speaking position which
makes his separation from the mother irreversible. He becomes a subject of the
Symbolic; he becomes a speaking subject whose spoken “I” comes from the same
position of authority as the voice of the Father. He therefore conforms to the
patriarchal law, he upholds it and fulfils his Oedipal trajectory by seeking a fe-
male other than his mother with whom to sexually unite. Since the Law of the
Father is verbal, Lacan was therefore proposing a linguistic basis for subjectivity
– human subjectivity, the unconscious and language are all closely interrelated
in Lacanian psychoanalysis. As Heath puts it, “The unconscious is the fact of
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the constitution-division of the subject in language; an emphasis which can lead
Lacan to propose replacing the notion of the unconscious with that of the subject
in language” (1981:79).121
The Symbolic order does not simply replace the Imaginary order; rather, it
functions to regulate the Imaginary. Both the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders
are always co-present once the mirror stage has been passed. The psyche fluctu-
ates between a desire for the unified being of the Imaginary, with its associated
untroubled jouissance and narcissism, and the realisation imposed by the Sym-
bolic that it is not a unified being at the centre of the world but is merely part
of a larger order, a field of contradiction and conflict within which the individual
must struggle to define and assert him- or herself. Upon entry into the Symbolic,
the child feels no longer whole but divided, and attempts to signify itself through
language, which comes from outside itself as the Law of the Father. The Symbolic
is what Lacan called “the Other” (the capital letter signifying the authority of
the Law of the Father),122 and the child as a subject represents itself in the field
of the Other, of language. However, the subject can never be fully represented
in speech, since language cannot express the unconscious, which is precisely the
repressed and therefore unspeakable desire for the mother. The subject can only
represent itself at the cost of dividing itself, into conscious and unconscious, self
and Other. What gets repressed into the unconscious is that which recalls the
subject’s lack of unity; the unconscious therefore represents a threat to that sense
of unity.
Furthermore, as the conscious subject seeks to represent itself in the field of
the Other, it can only do so by coming after the fact (after the word), by which
time the unconscious subject has already become something else (Lacan refers
to this situation as the “future anterior” (1977:304)). This means that when the
conscious subject enunciates “I” and thereby becomes presence, the unconscious
subject has already moved beyond that “I” and become something else; the spoken
subject has now become absence. In other words, the spoken subject is constantly
fading, becoming loss or lack (Lacan calls this process “aphanisis”, the constant
eclipsing of the subject). Until the mirror stage, the child was pre-linguistic and
pre-lack. Entry into the Symbolic order is entry into language and into lack.
Language itself is therefore irreducibly based on and linked with the concept of
lack. As Toril Moi puts it,
The speaking subject that says ‘I am’ is in fact saying ‘I am he (she) who has
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lost something’ – and the loss suffered is the loss of the imaginary identity
with the mother and the world. [. . . ] To speak as subject is therefore the
same as to represent the existence of repressed desire: the speaking subject
is lack, and this is how Lacan can say that the subject is that which it is
not. (1985:99-100)
To counteract this fading or eclipsing, the subject will attempt to recapture its
vision of itself as a unified being, the idealised image of the Imaginary. However,
since its desire for the mother is taboo, these libidinal drives must be repressed
into the unconscious, and the child must therefore seek an alternative moment of
imagined unity to compensate for its sense of loss and the lack represented by the
mother (her lack of the phallus, and the absence of the mother, the separation
from the mother following the mirror stage). However, this image of the ego-
ideal is a delusional one, the self seen from outside, in a mirror, as both same
and other (l’objet petit-a). Thus the attempt to reproduce that unified image
of the Imaginary is to produce a misrecognition of the self. It also produces
alienation: the ideal image is the one the (m)other is holding up to be seen in
the mirror, so the child identifies with what it assumes is the mother’s perception
of it (“I am who my mother desires me to be”). Identification is only possible
in relation to another, which exposes a gap between the idealised image and the
subject. The child is therefore a divided self – divided between the ideal image
and the need for its subjectivity to be confirmed by another. It is at this point
that the conjunction occurs between the Imaginary and the Symbolic – the suture
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic – to close the gap opened up by this
breach in the subject’s identity between conscious and unconscious, recognition
and misrecognition. The “aphanisis” or constant fading of the subject prompts
the child to seek compensation in an idealised image which will fend off the lack.
Such an idealised image, whose prototype is the image in the mirror, produces
a misrecognition of the self, thereby effecting the stitching together, the suture,
of the Imaginary and Symbolic orders. Suture is the process by which the ego
strives to stitch these two orders – the Imaginary and the Symbolic – together,
to prevent the rupture between them from splitting the psyche in two. And since
subjectivity, the unconscious and language are inextricably linked, this suture
manifests itself on the level of discourse. As Jacques-Alain Miller puts it, “Suture
names the relation of the subject to the chain of its discourse: [. . . ] it figures
there as the element which is lacking, in the form of a stand-in” (qtd. in Heath
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1981:84).
Suture, enunciation and rhetoric
Suture therefore occurs at the level of enunciation. According to Emile Ben-
veniste (1971), “enunciation” is the act of making a speech act, the “enunciator”
is the person making the speech act, and the “enounced” is the verbal result
of that speech act. The enunciation is a time-bound speech act, whereas the
enounced is outside the temporal flow, being the atemporal result of that speech
act. Benveniste makes a distinction between the subject of the enunciation (the
enunciator) and the subject of the enounced. This distinction corresponds to the
division of the self caused by the inevitable co-existence of the unconscious with
language, the unconscious being the field of exclusion entailed by signification.
The fact that the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enounced are
not identical can be seen from the example of the “liar paradox”. If an enunci-
ator says “I am lying”, then it follows that if the enunciator is telling the truth
then the subject of the enounced is lying. They are not both lying because the
subject of the enunciation, being time-bound, has already moved on, whereas the
subject of the enounced is not time-bound. On the other hand, if the subject
of the enounced is telling the truth then the subject of the enunciation is lying.
This adds an extra layer of difference between the enunciation and the enounced:
as well as their temporal difference, they also have different subjects. This fact
can be directly related to Lacan’s concept of the “future anterior” – when the
conscious subject enunciates “I” and thereby becomes presence, the unconscious
subject has already moved beyond that “I” and become something else, so that
the spoken subject has now become absence. As the conscious subject seeks to
represent itself in language, it can only do so at the cost of coming after the word,
by which time the unconscious subject has already moved on. This means that
the conscious subject of the enunciation utters “I” and in becoming situated as
“I” becomes the subject of the enounced, and thereby becomes presence. But the
unconscious subject is already beyond that “I” and so the subject of the enunci-
ation now becomes absence. As Susan Hayward puts it, “To say ‘I’, therefore, is
not to be it, because the subject of the enunciation (who in enunciating is mak-
ing a time-bound speech act) has already gone past it and is saying and being
something else” (2000:99-100). To believe that both subjects are identical, when
in fact they are not, is to misrecognise the self, analogous to the way in which
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the child misrecognises itself as a unified being in the mirror.
The cinematic “system of the suture” likewise exists at the level of the enun-
ciation of a film, as Dayan has stated:
filmic enunciation, the system that negotiates the viewer’s access to the
film – the system that ‘speaks’ the fiction [. . . ] is built so as to mask the
ideological origin and nature of cinematographic statements. (1974:22).
The system of the suture therefore does not analyse the way that ideology is em-
bodied at the level of the fiction of a film (for example, in what the characters say
or do, or in the narrative of the film); rather, it analyses the system of enunciation
by which individual shots are transformed into cinematographic statements. In
Dayan’s words,
The system of the suture is to classical cinema what verbal language is
to literature. Linguistic studies stop when one reaches the level of the
sentence. In the same way, the system [of the suture] [. . . ] leads only from
the shot to the cinematographic statement. Beyond the statement, the level
of enunciation stops. The level of fiction begins. (1974:22)
The level of enunciation is of course the same level on which montage exists as
a method. It is significant in this respect that Kuleshov frequently referred to
montage as the basic “language” of cinema. For example, Kuleshov describes how
[i]f one has an idea-phrase, a fragment of the story, a link in the chain of
events comprising its plot, then this idea should be expressed, laid out in
shot-signs as if they were bricks. A poet places one word after another in
a definite rhythm, like one brick after another. Cemented together by him,
the word-images produce complex notions. Shots, too, like conventional
signs or Chinese characters, can produce images and concepts. The edit-
ing (montage) of shots is equivalent to the construction of entire phrases.
(1987:164)
It is important not to take Kuleshov’s claim to have discovered the “language” of
cinematography too seriously. Kuleshov had rather crude ideas concerning the
nature of language, and seems to have meant only that montage was the correct
method of piecing together the basic elements of cinema (i.e. the individual
shots or montage fragments) into coherent cinematographic statements. This is
not logically equivalent to claiming that cinema is a specific language system
(langue, in Saussurian terminology), still less is it equivalent to claiming to have
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discovered that actual language system. As Metz has repeatedly asserted, cinema
is a language (langage) but not a language system (langue) (1982a:105,116,224,n).
What Metz says of Eisenstein’s theoretical formulations can therefore also be said
of Kuleshov’s writings on cinema: “His thoughts on language systems [. . . ] will
have to be restated in terms of language” (1982a:40,n). It is also worth bearing
in mind the point Aumont makes when he says,
it seems to me very unlikely that this conceptual distinction between the
language-system [langue] and language [langage] could have been made
by [Russian] filmmakers in any case. It is all the more unlikely because
the Russian term yazyk , which means langue, can also, in many cases,
be translated as langage (and designate, in fact, a language situation in
general). When Eisenstein, or Vertov, uses the term ‘cine-language,’ he
should not necessarily be taken at his linguistic word. (1987:34)
Eisenstein also used a rather lax definition of “language” when he claimed in 1926
that
[o]ur understanding of cinema is now entering its ‘second literary period’.
The phase of approximation to the symbolism of language. Speech. Speech
that conveys a symbolic sense (i.e. not literal), a ‘figurative quality’, to a
completely concrete material meaning through [. . . ] contextual confronta-
tion, i.e. also through montage. (Eisenstein 1988:80; original emphasis)
As Aumont has pointed out, Eisenstein should not necessarily be taken “at his lin-
guistic word” when he makes claims for montage as a “cine-language”: “Never does
he confuse the film image, the fragment (the ‘shot’), with a word; nor does he ever
confuse any assembly of fragments with a verbal type of statement” (1987:35).
According to Aumont, Eisenstein “is concerned with a much looser analogy be-
tween certain semantic operations in film (related essentially to montage, in the
limited, technical sense of the word) and certain ‘figures’ of thought” (1987:158).
The level of the enunciation of a filmic text is also the level on which a film
exists as a rhetorical utterance. As Metz has noted,
Rhetoric in fact originally covered all the techniques of coded acts of utter-
ance, and reached its limit only in ‘poetics’ [. . . ]. Poetics was the theory
of the fictional (usually written), as opposed to that of public speeches in
real life situations. (1982b:304,n.17:4; original emphasis)
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In terms of the traditional division of labour between rhetoric and poetics outlined
by Metz, rhetoric can be assigned to the level of the enunciation of a filmic text
(the same level on which the system of the suture operates) while poetics can be
assigned to the level of the fiction.
The system of the suture and classical cinema
This “system of the suture” was first applied to film theory by Jean-Pierre Oudart
in 1969 (Oudart 1978), as a way of understanding the process by which the
spectator is stitched into the film text using the Lacanian concept of “suture”.
Oudart (and, following him, Dayan (1974)) placed special emphasis on certain
basic filmic codes as being mechanisms by which suture is achieved; in particular
the system of shot/reverse-angle shot was put forward as the paradigmatic code
of filmic suture.
Oudart and Dayan outline the process of suturing as having three basic stages.
At first, the spectator feels the same jouissance upon encountering a cinematic
image as the child felt at seeing its own image in the mirror. The cinematic
image at first appears to be complete and unified, just as the child’s image in
the mirror first appeared to it. However, as Metz has pointed out, there is one
important difference between the mirror stage of infant development and the
adult spectator’s encounter with the cinematic image:
So, is this the mirror stage [. . . ]? Yes, to a large extent [. . . ]. And yet,
not quite. For what the child sees in the mirror, what he sees as an other
who turns into I , is after all the image of his own body; so it is still an
identification (and not merely a secondary one) with something seen. But in
traditional cinema, the spectator is identifying only with something seeing :
his own image does not appear on the screen; the primary identification is no
longer constructed around a subject-object, but around a pure, all-seeing
and invisible subject, the vanishing point of the monocular perspective
which cinema has taken over from painting. (1982b:97)
In other words, the spectator’s body is not visible on the screen, so that instead
of identifying with their own unified body they identify instead with their own
unified look. As Metz describes,
the spectator is absent from the screen as perceived , but also (the two things
inevitably go together) present there and even ‘all-present’ as perceiver . At
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every moment I am in the film by my look’s caress. (1982b:54; original
emphasis)
The spectator’s identification with his own look leads directly to his identification
with the camera’s point of view:
as he identifies with himself as look, the spectator can do no other than
identify with the camera, too, which has looked before him at what he is
now looking at and whose stationing (=framing) determines the vanishing
point. (Metz 1982b:49)
In Jean-Louis Baudry’s words, “The ideological mechanism at work in the cinema
seems thus to be concentrated in the relationship between the camera and the
subject” (1999:354). The title of Vertov’s self-reflexive film The Man with a Movie
Camera indicates that one of the purposes of that film is to investigate and to
question that relationship.
This substitution of the look in place of the body is only possible if the original
mirror stage of development has already been experienced. Metz has pointed out
that
the reflection of the own body has disappeared. The cinema spectator is not
a child and the child really at the mirror stage (from around six to around
eighteen months) would certainly be incapable of ‘following’ the simplest of
films. Thus, what makes possible the spectator’s absence from the screen –
or rather the intelligible unfolding of the film despite that absence – is the
fact that the spectator has already known the experience of the mirror (of
the true mirror), and is thus able to constitute a world of objects without
having first to recognise himself within it. (1982b:46; original emphasis)
The Symbolic order is therefore already present alongside the Imaginary while
watching the cinematic image: “The imaginary of the cinema presupposes the
symbolic, for the spectator must first of all have known the primordial mirror”
(Metz 1982b:57). This co-existence of the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders
means that after the initial Imaginary jouissance, the spectator becomes aware of
the limits of the cinematic image – the frame surrounding the image – and thereby
becomes aware of the unseen and absent off-screen space, whose absence is always
present (so to speak). This awareness threatens the spectator’s imaginary unity
with the viewpoint of the camera. The spectator begins to wonder whose look is
framing the image, whose viewpoint this actually is. In Oudart’s words,
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In a hypothetical and purely mythical period [. . . ] space was still a pure
expanse of jouissance, and the spectator was offered objects literally with-
out anything coming between them as a screen and thus prohibiting the
capture of the objects. Suddenly however, prohibition is there in the guise
of the screen; its presence first puts an end to the spectator’s fascination, to
his capture by the unreal. Its perception represents the threshold at which
the image is abolished and denounced as unreal, before then being reborn,
metamorphosized by the perception of its boundaries. (1978:42)
This absence, the lack of a point of view, felt by the spectator is analogous to the
division or wound in the subject’s identity between absence and presence, same
and other, which had opened up in the mirror stage. In Dayan’s words, “Thus:
to any filmic field defined by the camera corresponds another field from which an
absence emanates” (1974:29). Oudart has personified this process in terms of an
“Absent One” who haunts the cinematic image: “Every filmic field is echoed by an
absent field, the place of a character who is put there by the viewer’s imaginary,
which we shall call the Absent One” (1978:36).
It is at this point that the seamlessness and unity of the cinematic image is
threatened. The image begins to reveal its true nature as an illusion, to reveal film
as a system of signs and codes, a field of conflict and contradiction. As Baudry
puts it, “Both specular tranquility and the assurance of one’s own identity collapse
simultaneously with the revealing of the mechanism, that is, of the inscription
of the film work” (1999:354). It is at this dangerous juncture that the system
of the suture operates to prevent the threatened exposure of film’s signifying
practices and to stitch the spectator back into his or her imaginary unity with
the cinematic image. According to Oudart (1978), the canonical suturing device
in classical narrative cinema is the shot/reverse-angle shot, in which the second
shot reveals to the spectator that the first shot was actually seen from the point of
view of the character seen in the second shot. The absent off-screen space thereby
retrospectively becomes on-screen space, so that absence has become presence and
lack has become plenitude. The artifice of cinema has been successfully concealed
once more and the narrative can now continue, the spectator having been safely
reinscribed back into the filmic discourse. “The reverse shot has ‘sutured’ the
hole opened in the spectator’s imaginary relationship with the filmic field by
his perception of the absent-one” (Dayan 1974:30). Dayan also claims that this
process of suturing also produces the meaning of shot one of the shot/reverse-
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angle shot dyad: “In this way, shot two establishes itself as the signified of shot
one. By substituting for the other field, shot two becomes the meaning of shot
one” (1974:30). This process of establishing the meaning of a shot is therefore a
retrospective one, as Dayan has emphasised:
Within this system, the meaning of a shot depends on the next shot. [. . . ]
The character presented in shot two does not replace the absent-one corre-
sponding to shot two, but the absent-one corresponding to shot one. The
suture is always chronologically posterior to the corresponding shot; i.e.,
when we finally know what the other field was, the filmic field is no longer
on the screen. The meaning of a shot is given retrospectively, it does not
meet the shot on the screen, but only in the memory of the spectator.
The process of reading the film (perceiving its meaning) is therefore a
retroactive one, wherein the present modifies the past. (1974:31)
Oudart has pointed out that there is also an anticipatory as well as retroactive
aspect to this process: “the suture [. . . ] has a dual effect. On the one hand it
is essentially retroactive on the level of the signified [. . . ]. On the other hand,
it is anticipatory on the level of the signifier” (1978:37). By this means, the
system of the suture generates the process of enunciation by which raw footage
is transformed into cinematographic statements: “The system of the absent-one
distinguishes cinematography, a system producing meaning, from any impressed
strip of film (mere footage)” (1974:29), while at the same time concealing this
process of enunciation behind the reality effect. This is similar to the way in
which montage places the significance or meaning of a shot in its interaction with
other shots rather than inhering in the actual shot itself. The individual shot is
incomplete as a signifying unit both in the montage method and in the system of
the suture. Montage finds the meaning between the shots (as in Vertov’s “theory
of intervals”) or even above the shots (as in Eisenstein’s “dialectical montage”).
However, whereas the montage method does not attempt to conceal the film’s
method of construction, the system of the suture is used to produce an effect
of seamlessness in order to allow the spectator to be easily stitched into the
narrative. As Metz puts it, “the basic characteristic of this kind of discourse, and
the very principle of its effectiveness as discourse, is precisely that it obliterates
all traces of the enunciation, and masquerades as story” (1982b:91). Classical
cinema tries to erase all traces of the enunciation, to hide its ideological rhetoric,
so that the narrative seems to speak itself and the ideology inscribed in the
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discourse is naturalised and seems to have no origin. As Oudart puts it, the
system of the suture “makes the cinema a unique form of speech, one which
speaks itself” (1978:43). This is where the Symbolic and Imaginary orders come
together in order to produce the reality effect, the illusionism of classical cinema:
“The conjunction of the language system and the imaginary produces the effect of
reality: the referential dimension of language” (Dayan 1974:25). It is important
to note that the reality effect, the peculiar impression that we are experiencing
reality while watching a film, derives from the subjectivity constructed in the
psyche of the spectator by the system of the suture rather than from the content
or formal organisation of the filmic text itself.
There is an intriguing parallel between the retrospective creation of the mean-
ing of a shot or montage fragment and the philosopher C. S. Peirce’s idea that
every thought is a sign without meaning in itself until that sign is interpreted
by a subsequent thought, which he called an “interpretant”, so that the meaning
of a thought is arrived at by retrospectively interpreting the thought as a sign
of a determining object. The meaning of our thoughts is therefore established
retrospectively, just like the meaning of a shot in the system of the suture:
From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every
thought must address itself to some other, must determine some other,
since that is the essence of a sign. This, after all, is but another form of
the familiar axiom, that in intuition, i.e. in the immediate present, there
is no thought, or, that all which is reflected upon has past. [. . . ] To say,
therefore, that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a time,
is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in
another, or that all thought is in signs. (Peirce 1991:49)
Furthermore, it may be possible to connect Peirce’s idea with Eisenstein’s belief
that montage form is actually a reconstruction of the processes of human thought
itself:
Cinema seems to us by its specific character to reproduce the phenomena
according to all the indications of the method that derives from the reflection
of reality in the movement of the psychic process. (There is not one specific
feature of cinematic phenomenon or method that does not correspond to
the specific form of the process of human psychic activity.) [. . . ] That is
part of what we understand by ‘montage form as the reconstruction of the
thought process’. (Eisenstein 1988:248; original emphasis)
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Eisenstein hoped to base such a montage reconstruction of the thought process
on his use of “inner monologue”, whose theoretical basis was to be the concept of
“pre-logical thought” as developed by Lévy-Bruhl. Unfortunately for Eisenstein,
Lévy-Bruhl himself later abandoned his own concept of “pre-logical thought” (Au-
mont 1987:64) and this fact, together with the dangerous accusations of “Idealism”
and subjectivism which Eisenstein’s suggestion attracted, led to the concept of
inner monologue being very short-lived in Eisenstein’s theoretical work and to its
complete absence (with the possible exception of the unfinished Bezhin Meadow)
in his actual films. Rather than basing the montage reconstruction of the thought
process on a dubious linguistic model of “pre-logical thought”, it might be given
a more secure theoretical foundation by basing it on a semiotic model using the
Peircean categorisation of thoughts as signs whose meaning is produced retro-
spectively, in an analogous way to the method by which the system of the suture
retrospectively produces the meaning of a shot. The enunciation of a montage
film (i.e. the way meaningful cinematographic statements are constructed out of
montage fragments) could then in principle reconstruct the enunciation of human
thought (i.e. the way meaning is constructed out of fragmentary thought-signs).
Such an analysis might help to illuminate the way in which montage cinema,
especially through the concepts of “intellectual montage” and “inner monologue”
proposed by Eisenstein, actually does (or does not) imitate or reconstruct human
thought processes.
The cinematic system of the suture itself, as presented by Oudart and Dayan,
has been subjected to criticism or modification by critics such as William Roth-
man (1975), Kaja Silverman (1999) and Stephen Heath (1981), among others. In
particular, Rothman and Heath have separately argued that Oudart and Dayan
placed too much emphasis on the shot/reverse-angle shot as the canonical device
of the system of the suture. As Rothman points out, this is not a particularly
dominant shot in classical cinema.123 Dayan himself mentions this fact in a foot-
note towards the end of his article, almost as an afterthought:
shot/reverse shot is itself merely one figure in the system(s) of classical
cinema. In this initial moment of the study of enunciation in film, we have
chosen it as a privileged example of the way in which the origin of the glance
is displaced in order to hide the film’s production of meaning. (1974:31,n)
However, he does not take the opportunity to propose ways of extending his
analysis of the system of the suture to encompass a wider array of the devices
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of classical cinema. This left his analysis vulnerable to attack by critics such
as Rothman, who treats the shot/reverse-angle shot as the only or at least the
primary device by which Dayan proposed that the spectator is sutured into the
filmic text. However, while Rothman uses this point to attack the general validity
of the system of the suture, Heath argues instead that the concept of the cinematic
suture must actually be extended so that the shot/reverse-angle shot is seen as
merely one particular device of suture and not necessarily the most important
one (though it is a particularly “obvious” one which makes the presentation of
the system of the suture relatively straightforward, which is the probable reason
for Oudart’s and Dayan’s valorisation of that device). The process of suturing the
spectator into the filmic text would then be seen to be the outcome of a wide array
of devices consistent with continuity editing. In fact, Oudart had actually noted
that “[t]he ideal chain of a sutured discourse would be one which is articulated
into figures which it is no longer appropriate to call shot/reverse-shot” (1978:40).
Silverman (1999) goes even further than Heath in relating the system of the suture
to filmic narrative in a broad sense, including even such elements of film discourse
as lighting, for example. According to Silverman, narrative itself is indispensible
to the system of the suture, as it provides the spectator with a subject position
with respect to the filmic text. This extension of the system of the suture would
place it no longer purely on the level of the enunciation of the filmic text, but also
on the level of the fiction, whereas Dayan specifically located it exclusively on the
level of enunciation, as “the system that negotiates the viewer’s access to the film
– the system that ‘speaks’ the fiction”, or rather which “speaks the codes on which
the fiction depends” (1974:22). Such an extension of the system of the suture to
the level of the narrative of a film would, it seems to me, directly contradict
Dayan’s assertion that the system of the suture “leads only from the shot to the
cinematographic statement. Beyond the statement, the level of communication
stops. The level of fiction begins” (1974:22). Silverman’s suggestion is therefore
highly problematic, and I shall restrict my use of the system of the suture in this
thesis only to the level of the enunciation of a filmic text.
5.3 Suture, propaganda and rhetoric
The system of the suture, as outlined by Oudart and Dayan, has as its immediate
purpose the task of suturing the spectator into the filmic text, thereby creating
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the “reality effect” of classical cinema. However, according to Oudart and Dayan,
it also has another purpose beyond that of sustaining the illusionism of the filmic
text, and that purpose is ideological. I am using the word “ideology” in the
Marxist sense in which, in Althusser’s words, “Ideology represents the imaginary
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (2008:36). Oudart
and Dayan make a connection between the linguistic basis of the subjectivity
of the individual established by Lacan and the role of ideology as the discourse
which invests a society with meaning, usually a false one, as outlined by Althusser
(2008:1-60).
According to Althusser, ideology interpellates individuals as subjects. “Inter-
pellation” is a term coined by Althusser to describe the process by which ideology
addresses the (abstract) pre-ideological individual, thereby producing him as a
subject.124 To be interpellated therefore means to identify with a particular idea
or identity; to use Althusser’s example, if a policeman shouts a person’s name at
them in the street, that person would interpellate that call to mean themselves.
In this respect, the way in which the media “speak” to viewers by addressing them
(usually as part of a specific demographic or subculture rather than specifically
as individuals) is an important source of the media’s persuasive power over the
viewers. By recognising that he or she is being spoken to, the spectator engages
more deeply with the text and, more importantly, also accepts the social role
being offered to him or her, thereby being produced as subjects by the ideology
implicit in the media. Interpellation can thus be seen as an important element of
the rhetoric of the mass media, and also of classical Hollywood cinema.125
Individuals are the subjects of social and cultural institutions which Althusser
collectively refers to as “ideological state apparatuses” (ISAs). Althusser argued
that the individual is interpellated as a subject by the ideologies embodied in
such ISAs such as the education system, religious institutions, the police, the
family and the mass media. Cinema is another of these ISAs, and has the same
ideological functioning as other ISAs: it interpellates the spectator, thereby con-
stituting the spectator as a subject. A film projects ideal images in front of us
in the form of movie stars (similar to the infant’s ego-ideal in the mirror) and a
seamless pseudo-reality, produced by the system of the suture, that conceals the
illusory nature of its imaginary unity. Film therefore functions metonymically for
the imagined unity of the ego-ideal and as such allows us to (falsely) re-enter the
Imaginary order by identifying ourselves with that ego-ideal. Dayan argues that
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because the system of the suture renders a film’s signifying practices invisible to
the spectator, his or her ability to read or decode the film is limited. This allows
the ideological effect of the film – its interpellation of the spectator as a subject
– to slip by unnoticed. The ideological bias of the film seems to be natural to
the spectator, a pre-existing part of reality itself and therefore beyond thought
or question. As Heath puts it, “Ideology is in the suture” (1981:14). The illusion-
ism of classical cinema, the reality effect created by the suturing process, plays a
crucial role in this naturalisation of ideology. In Hayward’s words, “Cinema is an
ideological apparatus by nature of its very seamlessness. We do not see how it
produces meaning – it renders it invisible, naturalizes it” (2000:194). Dayan has
summarised this process with admirable clarity:
This invisible functioning of the figurative codes can be defined as a “nat-
uralization”: the impression of reality produced testifies that the figurative
codes are “natural” (instead of being ideological products). It imposes as
“truth” the vision of the world entertained by a certain class. [. . . ] This ex-
ploitation of the imaginary, this utilization of the subject is made possible
by the presence of a system which Oudart calls “representation.” (1974:26)
The ideology of a film can therefore be seen to exist not merely on the level of
the fiction, the narrative of the film (i.e. what the characters say or do, or the
sequence of events shown), but on the level of the enunciation of the filmic text
itself, in the process by which fragments of raw film footage are transformed into
coherent and meaningful cinematographic statements. The spectator is therefore
not free to agree or disagree with that ideology, since he or she is never conscious
of its nature as ideology. As Dayan puts it,
By means of the suture, the film-discourse presents itself as a product
without a producer, a discourse without an origin. It speaks. Who speaks?
Things speak for themselves and of course, they tell the truth. Classical
cinema establishes itself as the ventriloquist of ideology. (1974:31)
The objection could be raised that this position overstates the extent to which
the spectator is enthralled to the reality effect generated by the system of the
suture and that in fact, in Plantinga’s words,
When viewing a film, we are aware that what we see is a representation,
and not the actual world [. . . ] the realist film spectator often rejects rep-
resentations with which she does not sympathize. (1997:216-17).
5.3. Suture, propaganda and rhetoric 151
This is an important point. The reality effect is indeed far from being a full-blown
delusion in the mind of the spectator, and is actually a rather complex process,
as Metz has pointed out:
It is understood that the audience is not duped by the diegetic illusion,
it ‘knows’ that the screen presents no more than a fiction. [. . . ] Any
spectator will tell you that he ‘doesn’t believe it’, but everything happens
as if there were nonetheless someone to be deceived, someone who really
would ‘believe in it’. [. . . ] In other words, [. . . ] since it is ‘accepted’ that the
audience is incredulous, who is it who is credulous and must be maintained
in his credulousness by the perfect organisation of the machinery (of the
machination)? (1982b:72; original emphasis)
Metz uses the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal to conceptualise the process
by which the spectator is simultaneously credulous and increduous towards the
diegetic illusion produced by the system of the suture, the “reality effect”:
This credulous person is, of course, another part of ourselves, he is still
seated beneath the incredulous one, or in his heart, it is he who contin-
ues to believe, who disavows what he knows [. . . ]. But by a symmetrical
and simultaneous movement, the incredulous person disavows the credulous
one; no one will admit that he is duped by the ‘plot’. (1982b:72; original
emphasis)
Metz also presents the device of the “film within a film” as being closely connected
with the complex process of disavowal which accompanies the reality effect in
cinema. He claims that the “film within a film” device
downgear[s] the mechanism of our belief-unbelief and anchor[s] it in several
stages, hence more strongly: the included film was an illusion, so the in-
cluding film (the film as such) was not, or was somewhat less so. (1982b:74)
The role of the “film within a film” device in a movie which does not use the reality
effect is of course very different. In Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera,
we see the diegetic audience watching the movie which we are watching and in
which they themselves appear. Such self-reflexivity is not being used by Vertov
to reinforce the credulity of the real audience towards the diegetic illusion, but
rather the reverse: to emphasise the existence of the movie as an object in the real
world (a “film-object” as Vertov called it) rather than as a transparent window
into an illusionistic diegetic world.
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As far as the involuntary nature of the operation of ideology through suture
is concerned, it is clear that though it may be involuntary it is not immediate,
overwhelming or irreversible in its operation, due to the complex process of dis-
avowal taking place in the psyche of the spectator. The actual process by which
ideology is naturalised in the mind of the spectator was probably described best
by Brecht when he analysed his own reactions while watching the pro-imperialist
American film Gunga Din (1939), based on the Kipling poem.126 The film pre-
sented the Indians of the British Raj as being either comical (when loyal to their
British masters) or wicked (when hostile to them). The British characters, on
the other hand, were presented as being honest and good-humoured. When an
Indian sacrificed his life in order for his own compatriots to be defeated by the
British, Brecht described how the audience applauded, and admitted that he too
felt like applauding. He had even laughed at all the right places in the film. But
at the same time he recognised that the film’s representation of the Indians and
the British was completely false and that in fact Gunga Din could instead be seen
as a traitor to his own people. Brecht concluded that:
Obviously artistic appreciation of this sort is not without effects. It weakens
the good instincts and strengthens the bad, it contradicts true experience
and spreads misconceptions, in short it perverts our picture of the world.
There is no play and no theatrical performance which does not in some
way or other affect the dispositions and conceptions of the audience. Art
is never without consequences. (Brecht 1964:151)
In other words, art is always-already ideological in its very forms, and to some
extent or other fulfils a propagandistic function.
Another possible objection to Oudart’s and Dayan’s position concerning the
operation of ideology through the suture, one that was applied initially to the
assertion of Jean-Louis Baudry (1999) that bourgeois ideology is implicit in the
cinematographic apparatus itself, is that, in Plantinga’s words, “Despite his refer-
ence to historical origins, Baudry assumes a universal, ahistorical ideological effect
for the motion picture apparatus” (1997:42-43), as in fact do Oudart and Dayan.
Plantinga believes that “[s]uch broad claims about effect emerge from ideologi-
cal formalism, a formalism that asserts universal ideological effects for certain
forms of cinema” (1997:217; original emphasis). The best counterargument to
this objection is undoubtedly that of Athusser, who asserted that “ideology has
no history”. Althusser did not mean by this that particular ideologies have no
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history; clearly, ideologies are determined by material, economic and historical
factors. Instead, Althusser claimed that ideology in general (as distinct from par-
ticular ideologies) has no history, not in the negative sense defined by Marx (i.e.
that it has no history because its history lies outside itself, in the economic and
class development of society) but in the positive sense that
it is endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-
historical reality, i.e. an omni-historical reality, in the sense in which that
structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form through-
out what we call history [. . . ]. (Althusser 2008:35; original emphasis)
In other words, ideology is always with us, though it may take the form of dif-
fering particular ideologies which are historically and socially determined. It is
in this sense that Oudart and Dayan (and Baudry) are justified in “assum[ing] a
universal, ahistorical ideological effect for the motion picture apparatus”.
It may have been his awareness of this effect which prompted Vertov to de-
nounce commercial cinema as a sedative drug, echoing Marx’s comment about
religion being an ideological “opium of the people”:
The most powerful weapon and the most powerful technology are in the
hands of the European and American film-bourgeoisie. Three-fourths of the
human race is stupefied by the opium of bourgeois film-dramas. (Vertov
1984:39)
Vertov clearly regarded Hollywood movies as a form of propaganda, whose pur-
pose was to sedate the audience and to inculcate bourgeois values and ideology
into the proletarian audience; in other words, to act as an Althusserian ideological
state apparatus. In this respect, Vertov regarded the importing of European and
American commercial movies into the Soviet Union during the 1920s as ideologi-
cally extremely damaging to the Communist cause. He regarded such movies as
a form of bourgeois propaganda, a subtle poison working on the consciousness of
the Soviet proletariat. This poison was being administered through the system
of the suture. Metz has summed up the way in which the “reality effect” (which
he calls “plausibility”), continuity editing and propaganda all work together to
naturalise the ideology of the classical film:
The plausible work [. . . ] attempts to persuade itself, and to persuade the
public, that the conventions that force it to restrict its possibilities are not
laws of discourse or rules of “writing” – are not in fact conventions at all
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– and that their effect, observable in the content of the work, is in reality
the effect of the nature of things and derives from the intrinsic character
of the subject represented. The plausible work believes itself to be, and
wants us to believe it to be, directly translatable into terms of reality.
It is then that the plausible attains its full use: Its function is to make
real . The Plausible [. . . ] is therefore that suspicious arsenal of devices and
“tricks” whose purpose is to naturalize discourse and to hide control [. . . ].
(1982a:249)
However, it might be objected that Hollywood cinema is not in fact a form of
propaganda and that its only function is to provide entertainment to a mass
audience. In fact, unequivocally identifying the mass media, including cinema,
as a form of propaganda is problematic for reasons which O’Shaughnessy has
outlined:
Attempts to stigmatise the mass media as propaganda are usually doomed
to failure because of the ideological elusiveness of much of their content.
[. . . ] Entertainment is both an important source of propaganda and encap-
sulates the conundrum of its definition. [. . . ] Classification as propaganda
may represent the coercive imposition of a rigid interpretation that the
facts do not support if ‘facts’ are taken to include the complete ensemble –
narrative structure, surface decoration of texts, stylistic devices, dialogue,
meaning brought to the role by actors from their previous roles. The re-
sult is a complexity which does not so conveniently sustain classification as
propaganda. (2004:27-28)
As O’Shaughnessy states, the content of a Hollywood film (that is, the level of
its fiction rather than of its enunciation) is usually free of any overt propaganda
or political rhetoric. However, the argument of Oudart and of Dayan is pre-
cisely that the ideological effect of a classical film on its audience is not primarily
by means of the fiction or content of the film, but by means of its enunciation,
through the system of the suture. The suturing process operates in an analogous
way to the Althusserian ideological interpellation of the individual as a subject.
The fiction of a classical film may not be overtly ideological, but its enunciation
is always ideological. It is this fact which enables classical Hollywood cinema
to function as a highly successful form of propaganda, specifically as what El-
lul has called “integration propaganda”. As Ellul has said, “these activities are
propaganda because they seek to adapt the individual to a society, to a living
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standard, to an activity. They serve to make him conform, which is the aim of
all propaganda” (1973:xiii).127 It is not just so-called totalitarian regimes which
employ propaganda, as O’Shaughnessy has pointed out:
Propaganda is ubiquitous. While such saturation is an obvious and defini-
tive characteristic of totalitarian regimes, in democracies it is more con-
cealed, because it is more sophisticated and naturalised as part of suppos-
edly objective mass media communication. (2004:244)
Indeed, it could be argued that propaganda in democratic societies – particularly
classical Hollywood cinema – is actually far more successful than in totalitarian
societies, precisely because it conceals and naturalises its ideology and therefore
avoids the tedium and the hectoring quality of more overtly propagandising films.
As Jowett and O’Donnell put it,
American films managed to develop a most potent combination of being
able to entertain and propagandize at the same time, thus “getting the
message across” while also attracting the large audiences that obvious pro-
paganda and documentary films were seldom able to do. (1992:96)
O’Shaughnessy, following David Thorburn (1988), has claimed that the Western
mass media are in fact what he calls “consensus narratives”:
Television and film are ‘consensus narratives’, so created by myriad inter-
actions between the text, its ancestors, competitors, authors, audience and
socio-economic order. This communality explains their unoriginality and
also their power to articulate the wisdom of the community: ‘that inherited
understanding is no simple ideological construct, but a matrix for values
and assumptions that undergo a continuous testing, rehearsal and revision
in the culturally licensed experience of consensus narrative’. (2004:29)
The concept of “consensus narratives” is clearly almost indistinguishable from
that of “integration propaganda”, as defined by Ellul (1973:75). The “wisdom of
the community” which such media texts supposedly embody is, more often than
not, little more than a vague articulation of the hegemonic ideology of society, in
Gramsci’s sense of the term, and its nature as ideology is concealed behind the
naturalising process of the suture. Furthermore, the process of “testing, rehearsal
and revision” which Thorburn describes sounds very like the process by which
“horizontal propaganda” achieves its hold over the minds of its recipients, as de-
scribed by Ellul (1973:81-84). In fact, O’Shaughnessy even adds the afterthought
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that “if the meaning of such cultural texts were clearer they might indeed func-
tion as propaganda” (2004:29). I would suggest that the lack of clarity which
O’Shaughnessy refers to in these cultural texts is actually due to the fact that
the ideology is embodied in their enunciation rather than in their fiction, and
is thus not (or very seldom) explicitly stated. Their operation as propaganda is
therefore concealed rather than open, yet is no less real for that. O’Shaughnessy
even ends by admitting that “a consistent theme of Hollywood down the years
has been integration propaganda (in Ellul’s terminology)” (2004:207). So much
for the “wisdom of the community” embodied in “consensus narratives” then: as
Stuart Hall has noted, because the majority of people have “little real, day-to-day
access to decisions and information, commonsense ideologies are usually a com-
posite reflection of the dominant ideologies, operating at a passive and diffused
level in society” (Hall 1988:362-63). In Jowett and O’Donnell’s words,
One could argue that movies do, in fact, succeed as propaganda vehicles
in a much more subtle way, by presenting one set of values as the only
viable set. Over a period of years, these values can both reflect and shape
society’s norms. (1992:90)
In fact, the propaganda aspect of Hollywood movies was recognised and asserted
by Edward Bernays with admirable honesty when he wrote as early as 1928 that
“[t]he American motion picture is the greatest unconscious carrier of propaganda
in the world today. It is a great distributor for ideas and opinions” (2005:166).
Chapter 6
Montage Cinema and the System of
the Suture
The system of the suture, as outlined in the previous chapter, can provide a
new perspective on the montage method itself as a process of enunciation which
transforms raw footage into cinematographic statements. Furthermore, it can
provide a new way of understanding the difference between Soviet montage cinema
and classical continuity cinema at the level of enunciation rather than merely
in terms of their technical procedures or political content. In particular, an
analysis of the ways in which montage cinema subverts the suturing process,
foregrounding its own enunciation and revealing its own ideological operations,
could shed light on the rhetorical functioning of Soviet montage cinema as a form
of political propaganda. Such a study would be an analysis of the social and
political effectivity of Soviet montage cinema rather than of its set of aesthetic
norms; that is, a functional analysis rather than a normative analysis of montage
cinema, in Bürger’s sense (1984:87).
6.1 Suture and the Kuleshov Effect
Interpreting the Kuleshov Effect experiment which, as Bazin said, “sums up per-
fectly the properties of montage” (2005:25) in terms of the system of the suture
has two potential benefits. Firstly, the system of the suture can potentially reveal
new ways of understanding the psychoanalytic origin of the Kuleshov Effect, and
can perhaps make it more plausible that such an effect does indeed exist, which
is a question which has been raised repeatedly over the years – for example, by
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Aumont (1986) – and has been inconclusively investigated by Prince and Hens-
ley (1992). And secondly, the Kuleshov Effect (presuming that it exists) can
potentially illuminate aspects of the system of the suture itself.
There is an obvious point of similarity between the system of the suture and
the Kuleshov Effect: they both imply that the individual shot in itself is incom-
plete as a unit of signification, so that the meaning of a given shot does not inhere
in that shot itself but is created by adjacent shots in a suturing process. As far
as the suturing process in classical cinema is concerned, in Dayan’s words,
within the system of the suture, the absent-one represents the fact that
no shot can constitute by itself a complete statement. The absent-one
stands for that which any shot necessarily lacks in order to attain meaning:
another shot. [. . . ] Within this system, the meaning of a shot depends on
the next shot. [. . . ] The process of reading a film (perceiving its meaning) is
therefore a retroactive one, wherein the present modifes the past. (1974:30-
31)
However, as I hope to demonstrate, with the montage method this process can in
principle operate in either temporal direction, whereas the system of the suture
operates only retrospectively.
Reducing the Kuleshov Effect to its essential two-shot kernel,128 if shot one
is an image of a bowl of soup and shot two is an image of Mozzhukhin’s expres-
sionless face, then we can postulate the following process by which meaning is
ascribed to the shots:
1. The viewer sees shot one, the bowl of soup. He or she experiences a(n
abstract) feeling of hunger, but cannot associate that feeling with themselves,
since it is not their gaze which frames the image of the soup, but the absent-
one’s gaze. According to the system of the suture, the viewer asks him- or herself,
whose gaze is this? In this particular case the viewer also asks, whose hunger is
this?
2. The viewer then sees shot two, Mozzhukhin’s expressionless face. He or she
now understands, by the system of the suture, that it is Mozzhukhin’s gaze which
framed shot one, and it is therefore his hunger which the viewer experienced
when they saw shot one. The viewer therefore projects his or her own emotional
or visceral response to shot one (i.e. a sensation of hunger) onto the absent-one
of shot one, who appears in shot two and thereby gives shot one its meaning.
A significant departure from the system of the suture is that shot two also
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obtains its meaning from shot one – a two-way process is at work. Without the
preceding image of the bowl of soup, Mozzhukhin’s blank face would be empty of
emotional affect and would be meaningless to the viewer. The (abstract) feeling
of hunger aroused in the viewer by the sight of shot one has been ascribed to
the absent-one of shot one, who appears in shot two; the “lack” of shot two – the
blankness of Mozzhukhin’s expression – has become plenitude, just as the “lack”
of shot one – the unseen absent-one – has become presence. It should be noted
that there is also a two-way process of a different sort at work in the system of
the suture, as Dayan has emphasised: “On the one hand, a retroactive process
organizes the signified. On the other hand, an anticipatory process organizes the
signifier ” (1974:31). The two-way process which I am proposing operates in the
Kuleshov Effect is distinct from this and should not be conflated with it.
Analysed in this way, it becomes clear that the montage of the Kuleshov Effect
depends on more than merely an “appropriation of classical continuity” as Kepley
has asserted (1992:138). There is a psychoanalytic basis to the effect, beyond the
merely cognitive manipulations implied by Kuleshov’s use of classical continuity
devices such as matches on eyeline, and so on. Furthermore, the nature of the
Kuleshov Effect as enunciation is clarified – film montage, like the system of
the suture, exists on the level of enunciation, the level on which raw footage is
transformed into cinematographic statements. Viewing the Kuleshov Effect in
the light of the system of the suture also makes clearer the way in which the
meaning of each shot does not inhere in the shot itself, but in its juxtaposition
with adjacent shots in a suturing process.129 Oudart (1978) and Dayan (1974)
have emphasised the coercive nature of the system of the suture – “Oudart insists
on the brutality, on the tyranny with which this signification imposes itself on
the spectator or, as he puts it, ‘transits through him’ ” (Dayan 1974:31); in other
words, the viewer is manipulated by the process of suturing. This is of course also
true for the Kuleshov Effect, but in a significantly different way. While the system
of the suture attempts to conceal its own artifice – and indeed it can only work if
its artifice is successfully concealed – the Kuleshov Effect would, in principle, still
work even if the montage were not concealed; it does not depend on the reality
effect. This “laying bare of the device”, as the Russian Formalists called it, leaves
open the possibility of subverting the system of the suture by foregrounding the
enunciation of the filmic text. However, Kuleshov himself seems not to have taken
advantage of that possibility, preferring instead to use montage almost exclusively
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as a means of achieving efficiency of discourse rather than to interrupt continuity
or disrupt the “reality effect” (Kuleshov 1987:139). It was the later montage
film-makers such as Eisenstein, Pudovkin or Vertov who would use the montage
method to subvert the suturing process.
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with coercion in itself – after all, ma-
terial reality itself is coercive in the way it imposes itself upon the individual.
However, the system of the suture imposes a false answer to all the viewer’s
questions without the viewer’s conscious awareness of that coercive imposition
occurring. The system of the suture conceals its own coercive nature behind a
seamless narrative which seems to have no enunciation and no enunciator, a nar-
rative which seems to speak itself. What liberates the mind of the spectator from
that coercion is not its removal, but the conscious recognition of its existence. In
fact, this liberating awareness of coercion is analogous to Frederick Engels’ defi-
nition of freedom as being the recognition of necessity; the montage film-makers
hoped to induce such a recognition in the minds of their proletarian audience as
a vital element in their attempt to politically agitate and thereby liberate the
audience. I have explored this idea in greater detail in a published paper (Russell
2005).
Furthermore, the interpretation of the Kuleshov Effect in the light of the
system of the suture might actually shed light on the system of the suture itself.
For example, the fact that the process of suturing in the Kuleshov Effect also
works (assuming that the Kuleshov Effect itself “works” at all) with other images
in shot one than just a bowl of soup, leading to different emotions being projected
by the spectator onto the same image of Mozzhukhin’s blank face in shot two,
serves to emphasise the essential falsity of the system of the suture, the fact that
it gives false answers to our questions. The Kuleshov Effect, by enabling us to
ascribe many different emotions and feelings to the same image, thereby poses
in a particularly acute form the question raised by Dayan, which he describes as
the “point of attack” of Oudart’s analysis: “what happens to the spectator-image
relation by virtue of the shot-changes peculiar to cinema?” (1974:28).
Moreover, the Kuleshov Effect, when interpreted in the light of the system of
the suture, suggests that within that system the present can modify the future
as well as the past, in the sense that the meaning of a shot can be determined by
a previous shot. For example, whether shot one is of a bowl of soup, a coffin or
a beautiful young woman determines which particular emotion the spectator will
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ascribe to Mozzhukhin’s actually blank expression in shot two, and therefore the
meaning of that subsequent shot.
Kuleshov can now be seen as having done more than merely adopt some of
the technical continuity devices of classical Hollywood cinema, such as matches
on eyeline, to join the fragments of his Mozzhukhin experiment, as Kepley and
others have claimed (1992:138). In fact, Kuleshov was also, like Hollywood film-
makers, employing the system of the suture to stitch the spectator into the filmic
text. However, he was employing it in a slightly modified form, and it is this
modification which represents the originality of Kuleshov’s approach. He was not
trying to subvert the system of the suture, still less trying to break with it, but was
extending it and demonstrating some of the ways in which it could be used to unify
fragmentary material and give that material meaning by juxtaposition. Before
the system of the suture was developed by classical cinema, most film-makers
had either avoided cutting their films altogether or had attempted to conceal any
unavoidable cuts by masking them with trick photography, as Méliès for example
had sometimes done. At this early stage in the development of cinema, the cut
was perceived as a threat to the spectator’s imaginary identification with the
image, as Dayan has noted:
the cinematic succession of images threatens to interrupt or even to ex-
pose and to deconstruct the representation system which commands static
paintings or photos. [. . . ] The viewer’s identification with the subjective
function proposed by the painting or photograph is broken again and again
during the viewing of a film. (1974:28)
The development of the system of the suture enabled film-makers to cut their films
without risking the loss of the jouissance of the Imaginary. In fact, the cutting and
fragmentation of the image was actually a necessary precursor to the construction
of meaning and narrative coherence and the system of the suture was developed to
counteract what Burch has called “the unfortunate ‘dissociative’ effect” (1979:87)
caused by such cutting. It can be argued that Kuleshov, in his famous montage
experiments of the early 1920s, took this process even further by demonstrating
that the cut – even between apparently unrelated or contradictory objects or
scenes – was actually indispensible to the creation of meaning out of fragments
of film footage that in themselves had no meaning, such as a bowl of soup or
Mozzhukhin’s blank stare. By demonstrating how montage – the assemblage
of autonomous fragments of film footage – could be combined with a modified
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suturing process, Kuleshov was indeed “making cinematography”, for the Soviet
montage cinema “school” at least, as Pudovkin famously claimed (“We make films
– Kuleshov made cinematography” (Kuleshov 1974:41)); that is, he established
the system of enunciation by which meaningful cinematographic statements could
be constructed out of fragments of raw film footage by the montage method.
6.2 Montage cinema: subverting the system of
the suture
My analysis of Kuleshov’s Mozzhukhin experiment in the light of the system of the
suture has implied that both classical cinema and the Kuleshov Effect experiment
use the system of the suture to generate meaning; that is, to produce meaningful
cinematographic statements out of raw film footage. It is therefore clear that
there are similarities between montage cinema (at least as implemented by its
originator Lev Kuleshov) and classical cinema on the level of the enunciation of a
filmic text. This similarity is primarily due to the fact that they both employ the
system of the suture to a greater or lesser extent, though in significantly different
ways. Burch, in his analysis of Soviet montage cinema in terms of its relationship
with what he calls the “institutional mode of representation” of classical cinema,
has also suggested such a similarity (1979). Burch frames the relationship in
terms of the linearisation of the iconographic signifier; that is, the creation of an
easily readable discourse out of raw film footage:
the dissection of the tableau into successive fragments (closer shots), each
governed by a single signifier, so that each frame would be immediately
decipherable (at least in accordance with certain norms of legibility) at
first viewing. (1979:82; original emphasis)
However, it is also possible to frame the relationship in terms of the system of
the suture, thereby emphasising the ideological effects of the discourse of classical
cinema. The montage directors were not only following the example of classical
cinema’s “institutional mode of representation” (to a greater or lesser extent)
by linearising the iconographic signifiers, but were also following its example by
using the system of the suture both to stitch the spectator into the filmic text
and to simultaneously subvert that suturing process, in the same sort of way that
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Kuleshov both made use of the continuity devices of classical cinema and also
subverted that continuity in the Kuleshov Effect experiment.
It is important to note that it is impossible to avoid the suturing process to
some degree or other, since the suturing is simply the stitching together of the
Imaginary and the Symbolic orders, which actually occurs in every meaningful
discourse. As Lapsley and Westlake point out, “all texts suture, though they
do so differently” (2006:89). It is not my claim that the films of the Soviet
montage directors do not suture the spectator into the filmic text; my claim is
that they do not do so in the same way as the films of classical cinema, nor to the
same extent. In particular, classical cinema has the aim of producing a seamless
narrative and an illusionistic “reality effect”, thereby naturalising the ideology
embedded in the filmic text. It achieves this aim by suturing the spectator into
the filmic text in such a way that the act of enunciation is concealed. The
montage film-makers also suture the spectator into the filmic text to some extent
– my analysis of Kuleshov’s Mozzhukhin experiment in terms of the system of
the suture has, I hope, demonstrated this – but they are continually unpicking
the stitches of that suture, repeatedly opening up the wound again, opening
the gap between the Imaginary and the Symbolic in the spectator’s psyche. This
prevents the enunciation of their films from becoming invisible, and it foregrounds
the ideological position which the montage method presents to the spectator, as
Kuleshov described (1974:185). Far from naturalising that ideological position
and slipping it unnoticed into the spectator’s psyche, the montage film-makers
(to a greater or lesser extent) wished to make the spectator consciously aware
of ideology, to make the spectator consciously choose an ideological position and
occupy it. This required that the spectator consciously “reads” the codes of the
filmic text – “to read themselves inside it rather than simply being written into
it again and again”, to use Burch’s phrase (1979:96) – which can only be made
possible by the film-maker refusing to fully suture the spectator into the filmic
text.
Moreover, while montage cinema, especially during its original development
at the Kuleshov Workshop, may have employed a modified form of the system
of the suture in the enunciation of its films in order to produce meaningful cin-
ematographic discourse, that system was progressively challenged and subverted
by the montage directors who followed after Kuleshov. Whereas classical cinema
embraced the system of the suture and thereby concealed the enunciation of the
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filmic text in favour of an illusionistic “reality effect” produced by the suturing of
the spectator into the filmic text, the montage film-makers instead foregrounded
and made explicit the enunciation of their films.
Their motive in doing this was primarily political: to raise the level of social
and political consciousness of the audience by revealing the falsity of bourgeois
ideology and, by making the codes by which a film is constructed explicit, to en-
able the spectator to decode the filmic text, thereby leading to what Vertov called
“the communist decoding of the world” itself (1984:42). There is an interesting
parallel between this decoding of the filmic text and the process of psychoanal-
ysis by which a patient is made conscious of the hidden codes governing his or
her psyche, and by achieving insight into those codes is enabled to gain greater
control over his or her life experience. As Heath has pointed out,
it is not surprising that in reaction to Miller’s paper, the psychoanalyst
Leclaire should be found eager to insist that the analyst be recognised as,
by definition, the person who ‘does not suture’. (1981:85)
In this respect, the montage film-makers themselves could be regarded almost
as psychoanalysts attempting to “cure” an analysand by refusing to suture that
analysand into the text of the analysis.
The montage directors therefore had a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards
the system of the suture – they both utilised it to help give coherence and meaning
to their cinematographic statements, and they were simultaneously subverting it
to foreground the enunciation of their films. Kuleshov was probably the closest
to fully accepting the suturing process, just as he was the closest to the genres of
classical Hollywood cinema – his self-styled “Americanitis” itself is symptomatic
of this fact. In contrast, Eisenstein always emphasised the necessity of “choos[ing]
pieces of shots that do not fit” (Mayer 1972:13), and even Kuleshov’s erstwhile
collaborator Pudovkin would frequently “weaken the verisimilitude of the diegetic
spatial continuum” (Burch 1979:87). But it was Vertov, of all the montage film-
makers, who went furthest in challenging the illusionistic, fictional world created
by the system of the suture.
Dayan has presented Jean-Luc Godard as an example of a film-maker who
also refuses to suture the spectator into the filmic text (1974:31). While the
Soviet montage directors perhaps did not go as far as Godard in breaking the
suture and foregrounding the enunciation of their films, they did challenge the
suturing process far more than classical cinema habitually does, and the extent
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and the means by which they did this is of crucial importance in understanding
the nature of Soviet montage cinema as a form of political rhetoric and as a
distinct and fundamental challenge to the norms of classical cinema.
The “trap” of suture, distanciation, and ecstacy
To understand the means by which the system of the suture can be challenged,
we can take as a starting-point Dayan’s assertion that
[t]o understand the ideology which the painting conveys, I must avoid pro-
viding my own imaginary as a support for that ideology. I must refuse
that identification which the painting so imperiously proposes to me.130
(1974:27)
The system of the suture is a “trap” for the psyche of the unwary spectator, an
“imperious” system by which a particular ideological view of the world is natu-
ralised and imposed on the spectator. Its method is to induce the identification
of the spectator with the camera’s viewpoint and an illusory unification of the
spectator’s Imaginary and Symbolic orders by “stitching” him or her into the
filmic text. That identification and false unification must, according to Dayan,
be challenged and disrupted in order to free the spectator from the trap set by the
system of the suture. For example, the absence of an individual hero in Potemkin
and the substitution of the “mass hero” in his place can be construed as part
of Eisenstein’s attempt to prevent the spectator’s absorption or “stitching” into
the filmic text by withholding an ego-ideal for the spectator to identify with.
Such a denial of identification with an ego-ideal “hero” can also be related to the
Brechtian technique of “alienation” or “distanciation” in his epic non-Aristotelian
theatre: in both cases, the effect is to prevent the spectator from being absorbed
or stitched into the narrative by identifying with the hero, and, by keeping a
distance between the spectator and the narrative, to allow the spectator to main-
tain a conscious awareness of the codes governing the discourse of the play or
film, so that the spectator is able (at least in principle) to consciously decode the
discourse of the film and be thereby enabled to decode reality itself in a similar
way.
In fact, the refusal to entirely suture the spectator into the filmic text has
in general many similarities with Brecht’s concept of Verfremdung, or distanci-
ation.131 However, while the concept of distanciation may be applicable to the
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films of Vertov, and to some extent the films of Pudovkin, Eisenstein often under-
mined the suturing process in order to reduce the distance between the spectator
and the spectacle of the film. As Bordwell has said, “Eisenstein will have noth-
ing of Brechtian ‘distancing’; his conception of sensuous spectacle calls for the
spectator to be carried away” (2005:197). The endpoint of this tendency was of
course Eisenstein’s concept of “ecstasy”, the dialectical leap out of oneself to a
higher level of feeling or consciousness. This ecstasy was, however, closely linked
with the rhetorical and agitational aspects of his films. It is likely, as Bordwell
has suggested, that Eisenstein’s concept of ecstasy was derived from Longinus’
conception of the sublime in rhetoric:
Genius does not merely persuade an audience but lifts it to ecstasy. The
astonishing is always of greater force than the persuasive or the pleasing
[. . . ]. That is truly effective which comes with such mighty and irresistible
force as to overpower the hearer. (Qtd. in Bordwell 2005:194)
It is easy to see why this concept of ecstasy would be attractive to Eisenstein; the
“montage of attractions”, after all, had been designed to “overpower” the spectator
with “mighty and irresistible force”. Eisenstein’s understanding of the concept of
ecstasy should also be differentiated from the jouissance which Lacan describes
the infant as experiencing when it (mis)perceives its own unity in a mirror and
which Oudart and Dayan claim is felt by a spectator at their imaginary unity
with the image, though there are superficial similarities between the two. As
Bordwell says, “Ecstasy is similar to [. . . ] a process whereby the concreteness of
prelogical thought obliterates distinctions between part and whole, self and other”
(2005:194); the jouissance of the mirror stage, by contrast, is associated with a
distinction between the infant’s body and the external world, a distinction the
infant is enabled to make for the first time by passing through the mirror stage.
In montage cinema, as in classical cinema, ideology is embedded in the film on
the level of enunciation as well as overtly on the level of the fiction or narrative
of the film. However, whereas this ideology is concealed in classical cinema –
by using the system of the suture to conceal the enunciation itself – in montage
cinema the ideology built into the enunciation is made explicit by making the
enunciation itself explicit through the disruptive effects of montage. Aumont has
implicitly indicated this by suggesting that
Eisenstein could have taken as his own this statement of Tretyakov’s: ‘Ide-
ology is not in the material which art uses, ideology is in the processes of
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the development of that material, ideology is in the form’. (1987:207,n.26)
Kuleshov and the system of the suture
As previously noted, Kuleshov was the montage director whose film-making prac-
tice was closest to that of classical Hollywood cinema. Burch has indicated
Kuleshov’s motives in remaining so close to the model of classical cinema: to
Kuleshov,
the institutional mode of representation, the genres and other coded sys-
tems founded upon it, offered ideal vehicles in the ideological struggle be-
cause of the privileged relationships which they already enjoyed with mass
audiences. (Burch 1979:85)
Furthermore, Kuleshov had little interest in revealing these coded systems to the
audience by using montage to disrupt and fragment the enunciation of his films.
On the contrary, he always insisted on the need to smooth out the disruptive
potential of montage in favour of a smooth, transparent discourse:
When we began using montage in our own films, we were attacked with
reproaches: “You are out-and-out futurists, that’s what you are. You show
films comprised of tiny fragments. Their impression on the viewer is one
of total chaos. Sequences follow each other with such speed that it be-
comes thoroughly impossible to understand what is actually happening.”
We then began to think what could be done to avoid these abrupt shifts
when combining shots and sequences. (Kuleshov 1987:139)
Kuleshov was driven by his desire to create a filmic text which could be easily
read; precisely the same motive lay behind the “linearization of the iconographic
signifiers” which Burch proposes as the essential element of the classical cinema
which ensures that “each frame would be immediately decipherable [. . . ] at first
viewing” (1979:82; original emphasis). Kuleshov asserted that
[a] single film shot should act as a sign, a letter of the alphabet, so that you
can read it instantly, and so the viewer will immediately and fully grasp
what it expresses. [. . . ] If we want the viewer to apprehend the given shot
as a sign, we must do a great deal of work to organize it properly, and for
this there are limited means. (Kuleshov 1987:144)
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The wish to create an easily legible filmic text overrode, in the case of Kuleshov,
any tendency to use the montage method to disrupt or fragment the enunciation
of the film. Kuleshov used the continuity devices of classical cinema, together
with its system of suturing the spectator into the filmic text, in order to create
a smooth and therefore transparent discourse. In this regard, Kuleshov used the
example of a train shown first of all in the left-hand corner of the screen in one
shot, then shown moving from right to left of the cinema screen in the next shot.
Kuleshov claimed that
[i]f these two segments were joined together, the visual leap from one side
of the screen to the other would be perceived as a sudden jerk which would
irritate and disturb the viewer. He would not get the impression of a
smooth transition. [. . . ] If you remember this, you will avoid involuntary
flickerings and jerks. If you don’t, the end result will be a jumble of shots
and sequences which only irritate the eye. (Kuleshov 1987:139)
Kuleshov here explicitly asserted the need to achieve “the impression of a smooth
transition” from shot to shot, to render the cut as unobtrusive as possible and
the enunciation – the creation of meaningful cinematographic statements out of
raw film footage – as invisible as possible. The film-maker must above all never
“irritate the eye” of the spectator.
For Kuleshov, obsessed as he was with criteria of comprehensibility, legibility
and efficiency of filmic discourse, the purpose of film montage was no more or less
than to create the desired meaning of a shot or sequence, independently of the
actual nature of that shot itself, since montage allows the meaning of a shot to be
created by the shots preceding or following it. For example, Kuleshov described
how
[t]he montage was done in such a way that without being aware of it, we
mentally imbued a serious face with a different expression in keeping with
the spirit of that episode in the film. Montage had the greatest influence
on the effect of the filmic material. (Kuleshov 1987:139)
The crucial phrase here is “without being aware of it”. Kuleshov wanted the way
in which montage creates the meaning of the shot – that is, the enunciation of
his films – to be concealed from the spectator in the interests of maximising the
effectiveness of such signification on the spectator’s emotions and on their ideol-
ogy. This meant staying close to the linearisation of the iconographic signifiers
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which was and is characteristic of classical cinema, and striving for the smooth,
efficient, seamless narrative which the system of the suture could achieve.
The “Pudovkin contradiction”
Pudovkin’s own theoretical writings make it very clear that he was concerned just
as much as Kuleshov with the need for clarity and legibility of the filmic discourse,
and the need to direct the viewer’s attention and to control their understanding
of the film’s theme and ideological message. Pudovkin, in that respect, had the
same fundamental aims as classical cinema, at least in terms of creating a linear,
easily readable filmic text. He used many of classical cinema’s continuity devices
and remained closer to its ideal of a seamless narrative and transparent enunci-
ation than did either Eisenstein or Vertov. With the exception of a brief period
of rather avant-garde radical experimentation (probably in emulation of Eisen-
stein’s successful example) which began with The End of St Petersburg (1927)
and ended with the failure of A Simple Case (1932), Pudovkin used the montage
method in a relatively conservative manner. As Burch has said, “Pudovkin was
striving principally to extend the possibilities of the existing system [of classical
cinema], while maintaining its essential principles” (1979:85). These “essential
principles”, in Pudovkin’s case, consisted principally of what Burch has called
“the linearization of all the iconographic signifiers” (1979:82).
This linearisation was implicitly described by Pudovkin as the creation of a
linear discourse out of the potentially polyvalent signification of each shot. This
arrangement of the iconographic signifiers in a linear ordering has the effect of
creating a filmic discourse which has syntagmatic signification. The paradigmatic
aspect of signification is usually largely absent from the cinematic text due to the
fact that, as Metz has indicated, “Since these images are indefinite in number,
only to a small degree do they assume their meanings in paradigmatic opposition
to the other images that could have appeared at the same point along the filmic
chain” (1982a:26).132 Pudovkin pushed this tendency of cinema to an extreme.
Almost all the signification in Pudovkin’s films was therefore achieved horizon-
tally rather than vertically by a thoroughgoing linearisation of the iconographic
signifiers, which he actually pushed further than was consistent with the suturing
process of classical cinema. To achieve this linearisation, cinema had to become
more like a literary text: a linear discourse in which each “brick” in the struc-
ture, each montage fragment, had to be as much like a word and as least like a
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statement as possible, a discourse in which “the viewer’s attention can be drawn
to each detail separately [. . . ] just as one would describe them in sequence in
a literary work” (Pudovkin 2006:46). Metz has emphasised that cinema is not
a language system (langue), in part because each shot “yield[s] to the receiver a
quantity of indefinite information, like statements but unlike words” (1982a:26);
Pudovkin, against this fact, was trying to push cinema as close to being a lan-
guage system as he could, through his obsessive linearisation of the iconographic
signifiers. He was motivated by the desire to control and direct the spectator’s
attention at every moment of the film; he once asserted that “[o]f course every-
body knows that the essence of correct montage is the correct management of the
viewer’s attention” (Pudovkin 2006:16). In this respect, Bazin’s condemnation
of Eisenstein for exercising a despotic control over the spectator’s attention and
over their reading of his films’ meaning would actually have been more appro-
priately directed against Pudovkin. Eisenstein certainly wished to “plough over
the audience’s psyche”, but he did not linearise the iconographic signifiers of his
films to anything like the extent to which Pudovkin did. Eisenstein’s shots and
montage fragments are organised in his films in such a way that they have a
significant degree of ambiguity of signification and are open to multiple possible
readings, hence his greater use of associational montage and metaphoric tropes
than Pudovkin.
While Kuleshov strove to achieve a smooth, seamless narrative through a
suturing process, Pudovkin was more concerned with achieving maximal control
over the attention of the spectator by linearising the iconographic signifiers. This
attempt by Pudovkin to limit the number of possible ways of reading a film and
to thereby control the signification process was sometimes in contradiction to
the establishment of a self-consistent diegetic spatial continuum, which tended to
undermine the suturing process. However, Pudovkin shared Kuleshov’s view of
the montage method as essentially constructive and he therefore did not strive
for the kind of disruptive and dislocating montage effects which Eisenstein was
able to achieve with his more dialectical and conflictual approach to the nature
of film montage.
Where Pudovkin’s work represents an advance on that of Griffith is that the
cutting and fragmentation of his films (a necessary precondition for the lineari-
sation of the iconographic signifiers) does more than merely isolate the series of
signifiers and present them to the spectator in a certain order. In Pudovkin’s
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films, it also controls the production of meaning of the filmic discourse by mod-
ifying the dynamics and tempo of the succession of montage fragments; what
Eisenstein referred to as “rhythmic montage”. The meaning of the montage frag-
ments, their emotional and rhetorical effect on the spectator, is created by the
precise way in which they are juxtaposed with adjacent fragments. The sequence
near the beginning of The Mother in which the father tries to remove the house-
hold clock from the wall to pawn it for vodka is a good example of this effect, as
Burch has pointed out (1979:86).
Pudovkin considered the watching of a film to require considerable conscious
effort of concentration on the part of the spectator, in contrast to the apparent
effortlessness of watching a classical film:133
It should always be borne in mind that a film, by the very nature of its
construction (the rapid succession of fragments), requires of the viewer an
exceptional concentration of attention. [. . . ] [T]here is neither space nor
time for reflection, doubt or criticism, which is why the slightest lapse
in clarity or structural coherence is perceived as an unpleasant muddle
[sumbur ] or simply as an ineffective blank. (2006:35)
Pudovkin ascribed the necessity for the spectator’s concentration of attention to
rapid cutting. However, this cannot be the correct explanation, since the appar-
ently seamless narratives of classical cinema are relatively easy for the audience
to read, yet such films have almost as many cuts as a montage film and likewise
consist of “the rapid succession of fragments”. The true reason is undoubtedly
the way in which the classical film sutures the spectator into the filmic text, con-
structing a seamless narrative and a “reality effect” which makes the watching
of a classical film seem to be almost like the passive contemplation of reality it-
self. Pudovkin’s montage films require an “exceptional concentration of attention”
because he has little interest in suturing the spectator into the filmic text; his
neglect of the construction of a self-consistent diegetic space is symptomatic of
this fact. The absence of a seamless narrative required Pudovkin to seize hold of
the spectator’s attention and guide it through the linear succession of signifiers,
a necessity which led Pudovkin to pursue the linearisation of the iconographic
signifiers as far as he possibly could, even to the detriment of other aspects of
classical cinema such as the construction of a self-consistent diegetic space-time.
Because the system of the suture is based on the Lacanian account of the mir-
ror stage of development during which the infant first establishes a clear sense
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of space and time, the cinematic suturing process is therefore closely connected
with the construction of a self-consistent diegetic space and time. To subvert or
to refuse to construct such a self-consistent diegetic space and time is to challenge
the reality effect created by the system of the suture, and thereby to undermine
the suturing process itself. Pudovkin’s films do not recapitulate the mirror stage
in order to suture the Imaginary and Symbolic orders in the spectator’s psyche,
and the unified and self-consistent spatial continuum (which the mirror stage is
instrumental in enabling the infant to mentally construct for the first time) is
therefore not an essential element in them and he is relatively unconcerned with
maintaining it, as Burch has demonstrated (1979).
Pudovkin, who had directly collaborated with Kuleshov in the early 1920s,
even assisting him with the Mozzhukhin experiment which demonstrated the
Kuleshov Effect, initially adopted a similar approach towards the use of the mon-
tage method as Kuleshov. However, he increasingly diverged from Kuleshov’s
seamless use of montage during the 1920s, largely due to the example Eisen-
stein was setting with his much more radical and extremely successful montage
films. This culminated in 1927 with the release of The End of St Petersburg,
Pudovkin’s most aesthetically radical film. Kepley has emphasised Pudovkin’s
debt to Eisenstein in this regard:
Even as a work-in-progress, Eisenstein’s October influenced Pudovkin’s
evolving conception of The End of St Petersburg [. . . ]. Pudovkin especially
admired those sequences in October in which the editing defied conventional
time and space. (2003:37)
Pudovkin was influenced by Eisenstein precisely in his refusal to construct a self-
consistent diegetic space and time; this was essentially a refusal to suture the
spectator into the filmic text.
Pudovkin’s films, in this respect, represent a return to an earlier stage in
the development of cinema when the increased number of cuts required by the
linearisation of the iconographic signifiers led to a disruption of the diegetic spatial
continuum and thereby risked a loss of the imaginary unity of the spectator with
the image. The result is that, in Dayan’s words,
the cinematic succession of images threatens to interrupt or even to expose
and to deconstruct the representation system [. . . ]. The viewer’s identifica-
tion with the subjective function proposed by the painting or photograph
is broken again and again during the viewing of a film. (1974:28)
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In fact, Soviet montage cinema is perhaps the most extreme example of this –
some shots in Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera are only a few frames
long, and deliberately push the limits of human perception. Burch calls this
“the unfortunate ‘dissociative’ effect which the first interpolated close-ups had
upon the unity of films” and which was “the price that had to be paid for an
increase in ‘expressiveness,’ in other words, a greater control over the production
of meaning” (Burch 1979:87-88). This “dissociative effect” is indeed the effect
which Pudovkin’s “analytic penchant” and his “weaken[ing] of the verisimilitude
of the diegetic spatial continuum” (1979:87) has upon the spectator of his films,
as Burch has noted.
In classical cinema, the system of the suture is used to avoid the breakdown of
the imaginary unity of the spectator with the image by suturing the gap between
the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders in the spectator’s psyche; this permits the
“reality effect” to exist even with analytical editing and rapid cutting. Pudovkin,
by contrast, fragmented the diegetic spatial continuum by analytical editing, but
did not use the system of the suture to fully stitch the gap between the Imaginary
and the Symbolic in the spectator’s psyche. Pudovkin’s famous use of slow-
motion134 at moments of emotional or rhetorical intensity (for example, when the
firing squad turns in unison in Storm Over Asia (1928)) is characteristic of how
far he was prepared to take the linearisation of the filmic discourse in pursuit of
his aim of controlling the viewer’s attention. For Pudovkin, the reality effect could
be suspended in the interests of controlling the signification process. As Pudovkin
himself claimed, “Slow motion in montage is not a distortion of an actual process.
It is a portrayal that is both more profound and more precise, deliberately guiding
the attention of the audience” (Pudovkin 2006:190). As Burch puts it,
Pudovkin’s analytical penchant, his concern to make each picture into a
“brick” as elementary as possible in a chain of signification which he can
control as closely as possible, does indeed lead him to weaken the verisimil-
itude of the diegetic spatial continuum. (1979:87; original emphasis)
Burch seems to regard this as being a result of Pudovkin’s failure to understand
the contradiction between his pushing of the linearisation of the iconographic
signifiers as far as possible in the interests of a maximal control over the produc-
tion of meaning, and the supposed requirement to maintain the “reality effect” of
classical cinema:
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Pudovkin fails to see that the enunciation characteristic of the system [of
classical cinema] is not simply a succession of signs, as decomposed as
possible, but that it is founded on a dialectic between such “stripped-down”
images and a more complex spatiality offering complementary guarantees.
(Burch 1979:88)
Burch even calls this “the Pudovkin contradiction” (1979:88). In effect, though he
does not mention the system of the suture, Burch is accusing Pudovkin of failing
to understand the suturing process of classical cinema. However, it is not the case
that Pudovkin intended to adopt the methods of classical cinema tout court. Like
all of the Soviet montage directors in their various ways, he was adopting some of
the methods and devices of classical cinema, but not others. The linearisation of
the iconographic signifiers – “stripping-down” the images and arranging them as
a linear succession of signs – was one of the methods which Pudovkin, following
Kuleshov’s example, adopted from classical cinema. However, unlike Kuleshov,
he did not wish only to create an easily read filmic discourse by suturing the
spectator into the filmic text. It is not that Pudovkin was unaware of classical
cinema’s creation of a self-consistent diegetic space-time, nor that he lacked the
skills as a director to create such a diegetic space-time; rather, he had no wish to
render the enunciation of his montage films invisible. The system of the suture
conceals the enunciation of a film, so that the fiction of the film seems to speak
itself, to use Dayan’s phrase, rather than being spoken. Pudovkin – along with
Eisenstein and Vertov too – wished to foreground the rhetoric of his films and
to make the spectator conscious of its ideological effect. This implied that the
enunciation of his films had to be rendered visible, which further implied that
the spectator of his films could not be fully “stitched in” to the filmic text. The
weakening of the suturing process in Pudovkin’s films has the effect of weakening
the reality effect created by that process, as Burch notes, but this was in fact a
deliberate weakening of the illusionism characteristic of classical cinema:
in many sequences of his silent films diegetic space is reduced to such an
abstraction that important effects such as the illusion of the presence of
characters to each other are considerably weakened. (1979:88; original em-
phasis)
Pudovkin was exerting control over the spectator every bit as despotic as that
of the system of the suture, but he was not concealing that despotic control. He
had no wish to naturalise the ideology embedded in his films, and therefore had
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no real interest in sustaining the “reality effect” produced by the system of the
suture.
Burch’s claim that Pudovkin “fails to see” the incompatibility between the lin-
earisation of the iconographic signifiers in “stripped-down” images and the con-
struction of a self-consistent diegetic space-time (1979:88) implies that Burch
assumes that Pudovkin was essentially trying merely to improve on the model of
classical cinema in some evolutionary sense, adopting classical cinema tout court
as his starting-point. The montage film-makers adopted many of the continuity
devices of classical cinema, but (with the possible exception of Kuleshov) they
did not adopt its ethos of illusionism, a seamless narrative or the reality effect,
all of which are the result of classical cinema’s use of the system of the suture.
In fact, if the montage film-makers had actually striven to create the sort of in-
visible enunciation and seamless narrative characteristic of classical cinema, then
such aesthetic advances as Eisenstein’s “montage of attractions” or his “intellec-
tual montage”, or Vertov’s radical montage experiments in The Man with a Movie
Camera, would hardly have been possible. As Bordwell has emphasised, “Soviet
montage cinema constituted a challenge to classical narrative and decoupage on
almost every front” (1985:73). Burch seems to acknowledge this when he describes
the montage film-makers’ “derogations from the seamlessness of the representa-
tional fabric” and states that “this type of construction in one way or another was
a major concern of nearly all the important Soviet directors” (Burch 1979:89-90),
which implies that the “Pudovkin contradiction” was in fact a deliberate one.
Given the assumption that Pudovkin was aware of what he was doing, and given
the fact that he was not trying to fully suture the spectator into his filmic texts,
it follows that there is actually no contradiction between Pudovkin’s adoption
of the linearisation of the iconographic signifiers and his lack of concern with
maintaining the illusionism of a self-consistent diegetic space or time. Indeed,
Pudovkin saw great advantages in not constructing a self-consistent diegetic spa-
tial or temporal continuum, as he noted when describing the making of The End
of St Petersburg :
In the normal plot film the montage is not so complicated. Everything is
subordinated to literary sequence. People meet, they converse, they part.
All the senses develop within the confines of the logic of real time and space.
[. . . ] It is much more complicated when there is essentially no ‘scene’ at all.
There is only the cinematic development of a theme, for instance, a factory
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or the stock-exchange, or the trenches at night. Here everything depends
on rhythm. [. . . ] From the outset all of us working on the film set ourselves
the task of constructing almost everything on non-diegetic [vnesiuzhetnyi ]
raw material. (Pudovkin 2006:132)
What Pudovkin means by “literary sequence” here is not the linearisation of the
iconographic signifiers, “just as one would describe them in sequence in a literary
work” (2006:46), but rather a particular way of constructing a narrative out
of the movements and actions of characters in a self-consistent diegetic spatial
continuum in which “[a]ll the senses develop within the confines of the logic of
real time and space”. He specifically denies that this is his method of constructing
a film, hence his use of the phrase “non-diegetic raw material” in describing his
actual method, a method which is clearly not consistent with the use of classical
cinema’s system of the suture.
The function of the close-up in montage cinema
One would expect that such an intense linearisation of a film’s meaning and the
restriction of its possible ways of being read would tend to valorise the close-up
above the establishing long shot, and this indeed is precisely what we find in
Pudovkin’s films and in his theoretical writings. In classical cinema, the close-
ups are in principle excerpted from the diegesis and then inserted into the filmic
discourse. Pudovkin, by contrast, regards the close-ups not as excerpts from
some (abstract) pre-existing diegetic scene, but as elementary “bricks” out of
which the film’s discourse (but not necessarily a self-consistent diegetic space-
time) is to be constructed: “All the details relating to the scenes [. . . ] should
not be ‘inserted’ into the scene, rather the scene must be constructed from them”
(2006:47). To Pudovkin, montage was essentially constructive and its purpose “is
to show graphically the development of the scene, directing the viewer’s attention
first to one, then to another individual element” (2006:58).
Eisenstein’s attitude towards the close-up was similar to Pudovkin’s in the
sense that he did not regard it as an excerpt from a pre-existing diegetic scene,
but differed from Pudovkin’s in the sense that he did not use the close-ups as
“bricks” out of which to construct his montage films. Rather, to Eisenstein the
close-up was a magnification rather than a drawing near, a means of emphasising
a particular meaning or underlining a particular rhetorical point. In Aumont’s
words,
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the close shot has almost nothing to do with a cinema of scenic space:
as Amengual puts it, “the close-up in Eisenstein is not a closer shot, it
is a magnified shot,” (in “Eisenstein and Hieroglyphs”). For Eisenstein,
the transition to the close-up is not the adoption of a different point of
view on the object from within the same scenic perspective: it is an actual
“magnification,” or affirmation of a meaning and its articulation (probably
not without some figurative function besides). (1987:188)
This use of the close-up was actually a throw-back to an earlier stage of cinema’s
development. As Burch has noted, “For Méliès, close-ups were always “giant
faces”: the screen, he felt, was the only plane a film could contain” (1979:81,n.4).
Classical cinema employed the close-up as an integral element in the construc-
tion, through analytical editing, of a diegetic scene with a self-consistent spatial
continuum. Eisenstein explicitly repudiated such a function for the close-up in his
montage films, and by implication in the montage films of Pudovkin and Vertov
too, when he wrote that
[w]e say: an object or face is photographed in “large scale,” i.e., large.
The American says: near , or “close-up.”
[. . . ]
Among Americans the term is attached to viewpoint .
Among us – to the value of what is seen.
[. . . ] the principal function of the close-up in our cinema is – not only
and not so much to show or to present , as to signify , to give meaning , to
designate. (Eisenstein 1977:237-38; original emphasis)
The close-up could also be used in montage cinema to emphasise the indexicality
(in the Peircean sense) of the image itself, due to the close-up’s detachment from
a self-consistent diegetic spatial continuum:
the effect of the close-up [in The Old and the New ] is fully felt: abstracted
from any context, the shots serve exactly as abstractions – there is, for
example, no object in the frame to give a sense of scale, and thus, from the
point of view of the figuration, the miniature cascades of milk are strictly
equivalent to gigantic waterfalls. (Aumont 1987:101)
This was true not merely for Eisenstein but for Vertov too: the spinning reel of
metal wire in The Man with a Movie Camera is only one example. Such non-
objective “abstract moments”, as Malevich called them (Tupitsyn 2002a:66), were
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also a significant means by which the montage film-makers could subvert the
suturing process, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter.
“Cubist art principles on film”
This refusal to join close-ups or other montage fragments together into a seam-
less construction is summed up by Eisenstein’s advice to “[a]lways [. . . ] choose
pieces of shots that do not fit” (Mayer 1972:13). A famous example of such a
practice occurs in Potemkin, in the sequence in which an officer’s plate is an-
grily smashed by the sailor who is washing it. Eisenstein shows the dish being
smashed twice in quick succession, once after the sailor raises it above his left
shoulder and again after he raises it above his right shoulder (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2).
David Mayer identifies this technique with what he calls “cubist art principles
Figure 6.1: Still from Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin: the sailor smashes the
dish, first by throwing it down from over his left shoulder. . .
on film” (1972:13). Cubist painting often presents an object as seen from several
different perspectives simultaneously. In the case of this sequence from Potemkin,
however, the same event is not merely seen from multiple perspectives; rather,
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Figure 6.2: Still from Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin: . . . and then from over
his right shoulder.
the event which Eisenstein presents in the film sequence is impossible within a
self-consistent diegetic space and time. The dish cannot have been simultane-
ously raised above both the sailor’s left and right shoulders, and it cannot have
been smashed twice. Eisenstein is here deliberately creating precisely the kind
of “sudden jerk” and “abrupt shift” which Kuleshov took such pains to avoid.
Rather than striving to create the “impression of a smooth transition”, Eisenstein
was deliberately “irritat[ing] the eye” of the spectator in order to wind up the
tension of the sequence and to achieve rhetorical effect by disrupting and thereby
foregrounding the enunciation of the filmic text. This is not really a cinematic
parallel to cubism, as Mayer claims, but can be better understood as a deliberate
violation of the system of the suture, a refusal to stitch the spectator into a self-
consistent diegetic space and time. The enunciation of the film becomes visible,
the ideology embedded in that enunciation is denaturalised and made explicit,
and the rhetorical and emotional effect of the sequence is enhanced.
There is a similar example in Vertov’s film The Man with a Movie Camera,
about 20 minutes into the film, when a woman opens the same window shutters
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twice in quick succession. She is seen first seen from one angle, then from another;
the same event is seen repeatedly from two different perspectives, the film flicking
back and forth between the two spatial perspectives and back and forth in time
(Figs. 6.3 and 6.4). The “impossibility” in this case is not in the diegetic space-
Figure 6.3: Still from Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera: a woman opens
the same shutters from one perspective. . .
time itself, but in the spectator’s positioning within that diegetic space-time.
Just as in the sequence from Potemkin, the effect is to rupture the spectator’s
suturing into the filmic text, to foreground the film’s enunciation and prevent it
from becoming invisible to the spectator.
Moreover, whereas in the system of the suture the constitution of the mean-
ing of the shot depends upon the spectator being successfully sutured into the
filmic text, the constitution of the meaning of a montage fragment in Eisenstein’s
montage films depends upon the preservation of the discontinuity between the
montage fragments. In Aumont’s words, “the meaning of the proposition emerges
only if the spatial disjunction of the two shots is clearly and distinctly preserved”
(1987:158). Aumont calls this the “absolute liberation of the action from its
determination by time and space”. Without the disjunction between the shots,
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Figure 6.4: Still from Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera: . . . and again
from another perspective.
without the detachment of the montage fragments from their place in the diegetic
spatial and temporal continuum, the metaphoric meaning could neither be con-
stituted nor communicated to the spectator. The montage fragment showing the
slaughter of a bull, which is juxtaposed against the diegetic scene of the striking
workers being massacred by Tsarist troops in Strike, is perhaps the most obvious
example of this – not being part of the diegetic scene of the film, the slaughter
of the bull must be interpreted metaphorically and thereby acquires tremendous
rhetorical power.
Eisenstein’s concept of “organicism”
However, Eisenstein specifically warned against the practice of a montage based
on attributing an independent meaning to each fragment:
the danger of this form of montage would be that of falling, through laziness,
into the practice of a montage based on a “meaning” attributed to each
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fragment. That, Eisenstein says, would lead back to the most primitive
phases of the development of the art. (Aumont 1987:204,n.2)
Eisenstein’s tendency to “[a]lways [. . . ] choose pieces of shot that do not fit”
(Mayer 1972:13) was balanced by a tendency throughout his career to place an
increasing emphasis on the Hegelian totality of the filmic text, as Aumont has
pointed out:
it could almost be said that the fragment does not exist outside of this
system of its relations to the other fragments (to the whole of the text).
The idea that it could be autonomized and extracted as a unit of meaning
is completely contrary to that constant preoccupation with the systematic
[. . . ] and whose culmination will be seen [. . . ] with the notion of organi-
cism. (1987:36)
Far from being in direct contradiction to his earlier emphasis on fragmentation
and disjunction, Eisenstein’s increasing emphasis on the organic totality of the art
work as the ultimate source of the meaning of the individual elements of the work
was actually a logical development of his earlier positions. I am therefore denying
the validity, at least in the form originally proposed by Bordwell (1975), of Eisen-
stein’s supposed “epistemological shift” in the late 1920s. Bordwell had argued
that while Eisenstein’s early work was based on a “fusion of Pavlovian physi-
ology and dialectical materialism” (1975:39), his later work had a significantly
different aesthetic and theoretical basis: an “empiricist epistemology and organic
aesthetic” (1975:43). His conclusion was that “[w]e are left, then, with not one
but two Eisensteins. The earlier theorist grounds his system in physiology and
dialectical materialism, the later in psychology and empiricism” (1975:44) and
that this is reflected in his actual film-making practice, in “the marked stylistic
and formal differences between his silent and sound films, between the dialectical,
epic ‘intellectual’ cinema and the synesthetic ‘operas’ of court intrigue” (1975:44).
Aumond, among others, has criticised this “received” idea that there is not one
Eisenstein but two and that the later Eisenstein contradicts and renounces the
earlier one (1987:151-56). Even Bordwell himself has retreated from the position
put forward in his Screen article.135
Montage fragments, as Kuleshov made clear with his famous Mozzhukhin
experiment, have no meaning in themselves; instead, they acquire meaning by
juxtaposition with other montage fragments. The logical conclusion of this idea
is that each montage fragment only has meaning in relation to the totality (not
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merely the sum but the “product” of all the montage fragments, as Eisenstein put
it) of the filmic text itself. Indeed, even according to the system of the suture
itself, the meaning of a given shot is only established retrospectively, from its
juxtaposition relative to subsequent shots.
This increasingly important concept of “organicism” in Eisenstein’s writings
and in his films had the important effect that for Eisenstein the montage frag-
ments, such as close-ups, could be separated from their diegetic context but could
never be completely detached from their context within the filmic text itself with-
out losing their meaning altogether. An example of such a montage fragment
which is detached from the diegetic space-time of the film but is not detached
from the filmic text itself is of course the famous sequence in Strike in which a bull
is slaughtered while, in the film’s diegetic scene, the striking workers are being
massacred by Tsarist troops. The montage fragment does not fit into the diegetic
scene, but its presence at this point in the filmic text works in juxtaposition with
the surrounding montage fragments to generate metaphoric meaning.
Aumont has even suggested that Eisenstein’s concept of “organicism” operated
in the same sort of way as the system of the suture:
organicism appears to be something that miraculously sews up the rents in
the fabric of the work created by fragmentation, suturing together the film
fragments, those bits and pieces “ripped from the highly colored body of
nature” – and it is therefore what protects against the breaking up of that
“body,” what insures its unity. (1987:65)
This would imply that Eisenstein did not so much subvert or reject the system of
the suture as substitute his own concept of “organicism” in its place, an organicism
which would constitute the meaning of each individual montage fragment within
the totality of the film itself. In my view, however, this would be to misinterpret
what Eisenstein understood by the concept of “organicism”. In the essay on
which he was working on the day of his death, Eisenstein wrote about what he
considered to be the necessary balance between the disruption of the “reality
effect”, the refusal to entirely suture the viewer into the film, and the organic
totality of the film which gives context to and constitutes the meaning of the
individual montage fragments:
There is a widepread, but, to my mind, erroneous, opinion about utilizing
the expressive medium of the cinema, which holds that a film is good when
one does not hear the music, when one does not notice the labor of the
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cinematographer, when the mastery of the director goes unacknowledged.
[. . . ] What this point of view conventionalizes is the inability to control
all the expressive means that contribute to the organically unified filmic
oeuvre. (Qtd. in Aumont 1987:221,n.33)
This statement encapsulates Eisenstein’s rejection of the transparency of the
enunciation of the filmic text, a position he maintained even to the end of his
career. This position implied the rejection of the system of the suture, since the
aim of that system is precisely the invisibility of the enunciation of the filmic text
and the creation of a smooth narrative continuity without aporia or disjunctions
to jolt the spectator. There is therefore a fundamental difference between the
system of the suture and Eisenstein’s concept of the “organicism” of a work of
art. For Eisenstein, “organicism” need not automatically exclude the existence
of conflict or disjunction between the individual elements of the organic totality,
nor did it require or imply the invisibility of the enunciation of the filmic text.
Constructivist camera angles and ruptured screens
The identification of the spectator with the camera which is characteristic of
the system of the suture, while it is usually an unconscious part of the suturing
process, can be made visible by unusual framings or camera angles. Indeed,
this is what Vertov frequently does in his films, particularly The Man with a
Movie Camera. As Metz has pointed out, “The ordinary framings are finally felt
to be non-framings: I espouse the film-maker’s look (without which no cinema
would be possible), but my consciousness is not too aware of it” (1982b:55). It is
precisely this suturing process, this lack of consciousness of the tricks by which the
commercial cinema poisons (as Vertov saw it) the mind of the spectator, which
Vertov sought to undermine. One of the means by which he attempted to do this
was the use of unusual camera angles or framings of the image, in particular by
shooting tall buildings or structures from low angles (see Fig. 6.5 for an example
of this). The use of low camera angles in urban scenes was also characteristic
of the photographic work of Alexander Rodchenko, a Constructivist artist who
often collaborated with Vertov and designed many of the posters for his films.
The effect of such camera angles has been described by Metz, who suggested
that “precisely because it is uncommon, the uncommon angle makes us more
aware of what we had merely forgotten to some extent in its absence: an identi-
fication with the camera (with ‘the author’s viewpoint’)” (1982b:55). Metz also
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Figure 6.5: Still from Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera: an example of
Vertov’s use of Constructivist camera angles and framings.
makes the interesting point that such unusual camera angles can function as a
means of controlling the spectator’s attention, directing their gaze in a manner
diametrically opposed to the deep-focus long-take cinematography advocated by
Bazin:
The uncommon angle reawakens me and (like the cure) teaches me what I
already knew. And then, it obliges my look to stop wandering freely over
the screen for the moment and to scan it along more precise lines of force
which are imposed on me. Thus for a moment I become directly aware of
the emplacement of my own presence-absence in the film simply because it
has changed. (1982b:55)
An example of the same effect from Eisenstein’s films is the battleship steaming
towards the viewer at the end of Potemkin, seen from a low angle, making the
viewer conscious of his or her position as a spectator by towering over them,
splitting the screen open and threatening to catastrophically bridge the distance
between the voyeuristic spectator and the diegetic scene (Fig. 6.6). One thinks
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Figure 6.6: Still from Eisenstein’s Potemkin: the battleship rupturing the cinema
screen.
also of the legendary story of the first audience of the Lumière brothers’ short film
The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station, who fled from the building when the
train seemed about to burst out of the screen and crush them. Eisenstein seems
to atavistically evoke an earlier stage in the development of cinema, a stage before
the system of the suture had been developed, in order to produce a traumatic
rupture of the suturing process to symbolise the revolution breaking through the
historical process just as the battleship Potemkin symbolically breaks through
the cinema screen to end the film.
6.3 The system of the suture and “non-objective
cinema”
The subversion of the suturing process at the level of the enunciation is a sig-
nificant aspect of montage cinema’s nature as political rhetoric. The refusal to
entirely suture the spectator into the filmic text, like the analyst’s refusal to su-
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ture (Heath 1981:85), is what enabled the montage film-makers to de-naturalise
the ideology embodied in the enunciation of their films and enabled their films
to function as agitation propaganda rather than integration propaganda, to use
Ellul’s terminology (1973:75). Its use of the suturing process is what enables Hol-
lywood cinema to function so well as integration propaganda (Bernays 2005:166).
In fact, socialist realism, which was to displace all other methods of artistic cre-
ation in the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s onwards, also functioned as such
an integration propaganda. Soviet cinema in general gradually shifted from being
an agitation propaganda during the revolutionary period of the 1920s to being an
integration propaganda along the same lines as Hollywood cinema by the 1930s
(though far more explicit in its functioning as propaganda). That shift in the
function of Soviet cinema from agitation to integration was accompanied by a
corresponding shift away from the subversion of the suturing process undertaken
by montage cinema towards a return to the system of the suture and its associated
illusionistic system of representation and its naturalisation of ideology.
However, attempting to (in Lacanian terms) open the gap between the Imag-
inary and Symbolic orders in the spectator’s psyche by refusing to construct a
self-consistent diegetic space and time was merely one method of subverting the
suturing process. The fundamental root of the naturalisation of ideology in the
spectator’s mind is the “reality effect” produced by the system of the suture; that
is, the illusionistic system of representation which presents ideology as being part
of nature, part of reality itself, rather than a social and political construct. In
Dayan’s words,
the image of an object must be understood to be the pretext that the painter
uses to illustrate the system through which he translates ideology into per-
ceptual schemes. The object represented is a “pretext” for the painting as
a “text” to be produced. The object hides the painting’s textuality by pre-
venting the viewer from focusing on it. However, the text of the painting
is totally offered to view. It is, as it were, hidden outside the object. It
is here but we do not see it. We see through it to the imaginary object.
Ideology is hidden in our very eyes. (1974:26)
What Dayan wrote concerning classical painting applies with equal force to clas-
sical cinema. The illusionistic representation of objects – the reality effect of
the suturing process – is at the root of the naturalisation of ideology which is
characteristic of integration propaganda. Dayan raises the essential question:
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Can there be a cinematography not based upon the system of represen-
tation? This is an interesting and important question which cannot be
explored here. It would seem that there has not been such a cinematogra-
phy. (1974:28)
In fact, such a cinematography was actually proposed in the 1920s by one of the
artists most responsible for ending the hegemony of the illusionistic representation
of objects in easel painting, Kazimir Malevich. He claimed that Soviet montage
cinema itself was, or at least showed the potential to become, the cinematography
“not based upon the system of representation” for which Dayan was later to call.
Chapter 7
Soviet Film Montage and
“Non-objective Cinema”
Dayan has pointed out that both classical painting and classical cinema are organ-
ised by “the system of representation”, which he suggested functions as a means
of concealing the operations of ideology behind the illusionistic representation of
objects presented for a subject to gaze upon, using the system of the suture to
create the “reality effect” (1974:26). The implication of this position is that by
rejecting the illusionistic representation of objects in favour of treating images
in the same sort of way that abstract painting treats images, montage cinema
could in principle subvert the system of the suture and thereby make the specta-
tor conscious of the operations of ideology both in montage films and in reality
itself. Dayan asked whether there can be such a cinematography not based on
the system of representation (1974:28). While the potential of the Soviet mon-
tage cinema of the 1920s to be such a non-representational cinema never fully
materialised, that potential was recognised at the time by one of the leading fig-
ures of avant-garde art, Kazimir Malevich. Just as Dayan has emphasised the
connection between the codes of classical painting and those of the single frame
or the static shot of classical cinema, so Malevich described some of the frames
or shots of montage cinema as “abstract moments” sharing much in common with
non-objective Suprematist painting.
This chapter will therefore examine Malevich’s concept of “non-objective cin-
ema” and investigate to what extent montage cinema conforms to Malevich’s
concept and what implications this has for the political and ideological function-
ing of montage cinema.
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7.1 Malevich on cinema and politics
Malevich’s interest in cinema may seem rather surprising at first glance. After
all, Malevich was a polemical advocate for the cause of abstract, “non-objective”
art and had founded Suprematism for that purpose, whereas cinema has as its
technical basis the mechanical recording of images of the physical world. Cinema
as an artistic medium would therefore seem to be inevitably based on mime-
sis rather than abstraction. Nonetheless, Malevich seems to have believed that
for Suprematism to make progress as an artistic movement it had to extend its
activities in the direction of a fusion of space and time through movement, an
extension for which cinema was obviously ideally suited as an artistic medium.136
Malevich may also have been attracted to cinema as an artistic medium partly
by the nature of the cinema screen itself. A bare white space usually formed the
ground of Suprematist paintings and, as Shatskikh says, “The similarity between
the white cinema screen and the white ground of a Suprematist picture (‘a sheet
of white canvas’) is clear – both possess the same qualities, both are exponents
of spatial relativity, and both are simultaneously flat and fathomless, seen as ei-
ther receding away from or coming towards the viewer” (1993:477). Margarita
Tupitsyn has also pointed out that at his 0,10 exhibition in 1915, Malevich’s
famous abstract painting Black Square (Fig. 7.1) “looked like a screen with a flat
‘black image,’ as if it were a projection. Furthermore, Malevich’s placing of other
paintings in vertical rather than horizontal alignment, could trigger in the mind
of the viewer an association with a filmstrip hanging loosely above an editing
table” (2002a:15).
Alexandra Shatskikh has described Malevich’s ambitions for both a new kind
of Suprematism and a new kind of cinema:
The logical conclusion of Suprematism would therefore have been to capture
movement itself, fusing time and space into an indissoluble whole [. . . ] a
‘film culture’ would have allowed him to realise this new concept of time
and space. He saw the emergence of a new type of spiritual artist, a ‘film-
painter of dynamic pictures’, as the inevitable result of the introduction of
non-objectivity into cinematographic language. (1993:478)
Malevich was to travel to Germany in 1927 in pursuit of this ambition, and hoped
to collaborate with Hans Richter in the creation of a non-objective Suprematist
cinema. For various reasons, this ambition failed to materialise, however, and
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Figure 7.1: Malevich, Black Square (1920s), oil on canvas. State Russian Mu-
seum, St. Petersburg.
Malevich soon returned to the Soviet Union. His vision of personally creating a
Suprematist cinema remained unfulfilled by the time of his death in 1935.
The essential basis of this hypothetical Suprematist cinema has been sum-
marised by Margarita Tupitsyn when she wrote that “Malevich eventually realized
that the meeting of abstract and real could only be achieved in film” (2002a:30).
Malevich himself described the potential he saw in cinema to enable the Suprema-
tist movement itself to develop further as being due to the fact that “technology
found the way of painting animated images on the screen’s canvas” (Malevich
1968b:233). Before that technological breakthrough,
the artist was only able to fix on the static canvas one impression of this
movement in one still . The artist remained in this hopeless, doomed po-
sition until [. . . ] technology invented cinematography and achieved the re-
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production not of an impression but of an actualmovement [. . . ]. From this
moment art fell into two basic division: some artists became objectivists
(concretists), easel painters [. . . ]; others became non-objectivists (abstrac-
tionists) who [. . . ] rejected the portrait [. . . ]. (Malevich 1968b:233; original
emphasis)
It is significant that Malevich credited cinema rather than photography with the
creation of non-objective abstract art; this is undoubtedly due to the fact that
Malevich regarded the concept of dynamism as an essential aspect of what he
meant by “non-objective art”. It therefore seemed natural to him to wish to
extend the Suprematist movement into cinema.
Before departing for Germany, Malevich wrote several articles in which he ex-
pressed hopes that the Soviet montage film-makers, particularly Eisenstein and
Vertov, might themselves be on the road towards the kind of cinema he hoped
to create himself: non-objective cinema. Malevich seems to have regarded Eisen-
stein and Vertov as the only Soviet film-makers who showed at least the potential
to become such “film-painter[s] of dynamic pictures”, or Suprematist film-makers.
Malevich ignored the work even of other montage directors such as Kuleshov or
Pudovkin, since he did not regard them as having rejected the representational
aspect of classical cinema in a sufficiently radical way. The potential he saw in
Eisenstein and Vertov had to do with the way those film-makers represented ob-
jects in their films, which he saw as the first steps towards the final dethronement
of the tyranny (as he saw it) of objective mimesis in cinema. In his own words,
Eisenstein and Vertov are really first-class artists with leftist tendencies,137
for the first inclines to contrast, the second to the “display of things”, but
there still remains a large section of the path to Cézannism, Cubism, Fu-
turism and Non-objective Suprematism for them to cover, and the further
course of the development of their artistic culture can only be predeter-
mined from the understanding of the principle of this school. (Qtd. in
Shatskikh 1993:474,n.19)
It is clear from these words that Malevich was trying to fit montage cinema into
the tradition of easel painting and that he saw montage cinema as being on an
inevitable trajectory towards “non-objective Suprematism”. Indeed, Eisenstein
certainly agreed with Malevich that montage cinema was part of the tradition of
painting. Eisenstein expressed disapproval of
7.1. Malevich on cinema and politics 193
those who do not regard the pictorial medium of cinema – its dynamic use of
light and montage to make pictures – as a contemporary form of painting.
There actually are such eccentrics who obstinately refuse to understand
this and are totally unable to accept cinema – that miracle of pictorial
potential – as part of the mainstream of the development and history of
painting. This seems to me profoundly unjust: the difference of ‘technology’
is irrelevant. (Eisenstein 1991:83)
However, Eisenstein decisively rejected Malevich’s call for montage cinema to fol-
low the path towards non-objective Suprematism. While he was happy to agree
with Malevich in placing montage cinema in the tradition of painting, Eisenstein
regarded Malevich himself as an easel painter whose aesthetic ideas were irreme-
diably rooted in the institutional framework of easel painting and pictorialism,
and condemned what he saw as Malevich’s application of that pictorialism to
cinema:
To pass judgement on the pictorialism of a shot in cinema is naive. It
is for people with a reasonable knowledge of painting but absolutely no
qualifications in cinema. This kind of judgement could include, for example,
Kazimir Malevich’s statements on cinema. Not even a film novice would
now analyse a film shot as if it were an easel painting. (Eisenstein 1988:191;
original emphasis)
It should be said, however, that Eisenstein’s disdain for Malevich’s “pictorialism”
was perhaps a little disingenuous. Kuleshov was to criticise Eisenstein for what
he perceived to be precisely this tendency towards pictorialism in his own films:
Eisenstein is more a director of the single shot, always pleasing to the eye
and expressive, than of montage and man in movement. His shots are
always more effective than the rest; in the main, it is they that guarantee
the success of his works. It is enough simply to recall the hosing episode in
Strike, the infinite savouring of these photogenic pieces of film, to become
totally convinced of the director’s excellent eye, of his particular fondness
for the plastically expressive shot. (Kuleshov 1987:69)
While a large part of Kuleshov’s criticism of Eisenstein’s practice could be as-
cribed to his adherence to his own somewhat different (and rather more primitive)
version of film montage, nonetheless there is some truth to his criticism. Some
shots of the hosing episode in Strike are indeed almost like abstract composi-
tions, or “abstract moments” as Malevich called them (Tupitsyn 2002a:66), and
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it is actually rather tempting to do what Eisenstein claimed even a “film novice”
would not do: abstract them from the montage and analyse them as if they were
indeed easel paintings. However, easel painting itself was out of favour among
the leftist avant-garde circles with which Eisenstein identified himself in the early
1920s. Eisenstein’s hostility to pictorialism, however consciously or unconsciously
hypocritical it may have been, was consistent with the Russian Constructivists’
rejection of easel painting tout court as essentially regressive.
However, Malevich initially saw much to approve of in Eisenstein’s early films.
In particular, he liked Eisenstein’s use of montage, or the “law of contrasts” as
Malevich called it:
Eisenstein has one advantage over other directors – a certain understanding
of the ‘law of contrasts’, an intensification of which should later lead him
to non-objectivity by purifying the screen of natural and agitational forms.
(Qtd. in Shatskikh 1993:474)
On the surface, this quote seems to display a certain hostility towards documen-
tarism and towards political agitation or propaganda in cinema, qualities which
were actually the basis of Soviet montage cinema itself. Indeed, it might at first
be thought that a “non-objective” art would of necessity be otherworldly and spir-
itual rather than politically committed, and that abstract Suprematist art would
be unsuitable to be used as propaganda or political rhetoric. This is certainly
what Eisenstein believed: in 1929, he wrote in his diary that Malevich’s Supre-
matist movement was “a mixture of mysticism and mystification” (Eisenstein
1988:318,n.52). Eisenstein’s opinion was consistent with the generally accepted
view of Malevich as being interested only in individual spiritual transcendence
rather than political commitment or collective social transformation. However,
this view fails to do justice to Malevich’s complex and sometimes contradictory
artistic career and to his actual political commitment to the Bolshevik regime in
its difficult early years. For example, he joined the Left Wing Federation of the
new Moscow Trade Union of Painters just after the February Revolution, and
was elected deputy director of the art department of the Moscow Soldiers’ Soviet.
After the October Revolution, he was appointed Commissar for the Preserva-
tion of Monuments and Antiquities by the Military-Revolutionary Committee,
the very organisation which had planned and executed the Bolshevik Revolution
(Tupitsyn 2002b:7). Such a career does not suggest an otherworldly disdain for
politics.
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In fact, it was his concern for the communicative and political functions of
art which led him to move away from easel painting in the early years after the
October Revolution and to look to cinema as a way of revitalising the Suprematist
movement itself. In Margarita Tupitsyn’s words,
With this new orientation came the recognition of painting’s inability to
participate in individual or collective promotional campaigns, because it
was not broadly accessible by the masses. This is why as early as 1920
Malevich claimed “There can be no question of painting in Suprematism.
Painting has long been overcome, and the painter himself is a prejudice of
the past.”138 (2002a:15)
In the political environment of the first years of the Bolshevik regime, “individual
or collective promotional campaigns” clearly meant political propaganda, the use
of art to communicate with and to persuade the masses.
Malevich’s political orientation during this period is exemplified by his friend-
ship and collaboration with Alexei Gan, the husband of the documentary film-
maker Esfir Shub and a leading proponent of left-wing avant-garde art. Gan
supported Malevich during the artistic debates of the early 1920s, insisting for
example that he saw “no mysticism” in Malevich’s abstract painting Black Square
(Tupitsyn 2002a:27). And indeed, during this period Malevich was mechanically
reproducing the image of his Black Square in books, pamphlets, posters and other
items in the public sphere. As Tupitsyn notes,
he re-routed the manipulation of Black Square from his own sequence
of priorities to the public spectacle of its perpetual emergence in propa-
ganda paraphernalia: publications, murals, speaker’s rostrums, posters, etc.
(2002a:31)
Malevich was systematically deploying his non-objective painting for propaganda
purposes in the social sphere rather than for private mystical contemplation.
Furthermore, his Design for a speaker’s rostrum (1920) (reproduced in Tupitsyn
(2002a:31)), which combines abstract geometric shapes with an agitative political
function, is directly comparable with Gustav Klutsis’ more famous designs for the
same propaganda tool. Neither design was intended to actually be constructed.
However, the point that should be noted is that both Klutsis (an explicitly po-
litical and agitative artist) and Malevich (who is usually thought of an apolitical
and “mystical” artist) both felt the urge to design the means of production for
propaganda and political rhetoric.
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Margarita Tupitsyn has drawn attention to the importance of Malevich’s col-
laboration with Gan and its implications for Malevich’s status as a political artist:
despite Gan’s known collaboration and support, scholars have chosen to
underplay Malevich’s association with this stalwart Marxist, suggesting at
times that Gan was his ideological opponent. This is understandable, con-
sidering that any linkage of Malevich with materialist thinking would crum-
ble the wall that has, until now, successfully protected him from political
discourse. (2002a:27)
An example of the attempt to maintain that wall is Shatskikh’s assertion that
the creator of Suprematism, angered by efforts to place art at the service
of some idea or other, whether of social welfare, the class struggle, the
aesthetic shaping of life or whatever, saw the gulf which separated him
from artists who believed in the value of serving the political and social
needs of the Soviet state. (1993:475)
Such an assertion of Malevich’s apolitical position can only be sustained by ignor-
ing Malevich’s active role in the artistic institutions of the new Bolshevik state
(Tupitsyn 2002a:7), his creation of several works of propagandistic art (2002a:43-
44) and the political implications of his attack on “the object-oriented canons of
both traditional and Modernist art” (2002a:33). Shatskikh is also mistaken in
her assertion that Malevich “found no supporters on Soviet soil for his research
into ‘non-objective’ cinematography” (1993:476). Alexei Gan actually devoted
significant space in his journal Kino-fot to Malevich’s non-objective Suprematist
art and consistently supported Malevich’s ideas and work.
While Eisenstein may have seen only a mysticism detached from politics or
reality in Malevich’s work, Gan saw something very different in Malevich’s non-
objective art. In Tupitsyn’s words,
Gan’s objective [in founding Kino-fot in 1922], to figure out “how to orga-
nize the life style of the workers’ society,” was already acknowledged by his
contemporaries and gave him the title of “mass agitator.” Thus it is all the
more significant that he focused a large part of the magazine’s fifteen-page
editorial section to the issues of non-objectivity. (2002a:28)
Gan, the fanatical proponent of Constructivism and political agitation as the
main purpose of art, saw no contradiction between Malevich’s abstract, non-
objective Suprematism and his own commitment to politicised art which would
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intervene in and transform everyday life. On the front page of the very first
issue of Kino-fot, Gan printed an image of Rodchenko’s abstract painting Non-
objective Composition no. 47, painted when Rodchenko was still associated with
Malevich, to illustrate his own article ‘Cinematographer and Cinematography’.139
Furthermore, many of Vertov’s polemical writings in favour of his own politically
committed brand of film-making were to appear in the pages of Kino-fot, in par-
ticular his founding manifesto ‘WE: Variant of a Manifesto’. Malevich’s rejection
of easel painting at this period and his personal involvement in the institutions
of the new Communist regime together with his close collaboration with Gan,
all demonstrate his commitment to the creation of political art whose purpose
was to communicate with and to stimulate the broad masses of people to polit-
ical awareness, a “propaganda that stimulates thinking” (Brecht 1966:146). As
Malevich proclaimed, “I regard incitement and thought as the chief foundations
of life” (qtd. in Tupitsyn 2002b:126).
7.2 Malevich, montage cinema and Peircean
semiotics
It is not merely the case that montage cinema had some of the characteristics
of non-objective art; Malevich’s own Suprematist paintings themselves exhibited
some of the characteristics of montage. Malevich himself talked about the “law
of contrasts”, a concept which bears a striking similarity to montage itself. Just
as Eisenstein regarded montage as a basic law of artistic creation, so Malevich
regarded the “law of contrasts” as being fundamental to all his artistic work. In
his own words, “The intuitive feeling found in objects is the energy of dissonance
created by the meeting of two opposite forms,” and he referred to his painting Cow
and Violin (1913) as displaying “a moment of struggle through the confrontation
of two forms, of a cow and a violin in a Cubist construction” (qtd. in Shatskikh
1993:473). As Shatskikh says, “Almost all Malevich’s transrational canvases are
constructed to a greater or lesser degree according to the methods of associative
montage and supported by the ‘law of contrasts’ ” (1993:473). Malevich in his
paintings of the 1910s can therefore be said to have anticipated Eisenstein’s own
use of “associative montage” in his films of the 1920s.
In fact, it could even be claimed on Malevich’s behalf that he directly antic-
ipated Kuleshov’s invention of film montage itself in his early Workshop exper-
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iments. For example, in his designs for the Cubo-Futurist opera Victory over
the Sun (1913),140 Malevich used a film projector as a spotlight to illuminate
fragments of the scenery, stage props and actors one after the other, isolating
them from the surrounding darkness. He was therefore effectively transforming
the stage into a sort of cinema screen onto which he was randomly projecting
fragments of everyday life and everyday objects, unconnected by any narrative.
Shatskikh points out that this procedure “anticipated by a decade the theory
of ‘Montage of Attractions’, which was the springboard for Eisenstein’s ‘leap’
from theatre to film in 1923” (1993:474). Just as remarkably, it also anticipated
Kuleshov’s early experiments with “films without film” of 1922 in which, due to
the absence of useable film stock, short “films” would be performed on a stage
using a spotlight to pick out individual objects and “shots” and to simulate such
cinematic devices as close-up shots and matches on eyeline. It was by performing
such experiments that Kuleshov first invented and then refined the concept of
film montage itself.141 Though I have been unable to find any direct evidence
to support my hypothesis, it is entirely possible that Kuleshov was inspired to
create his staged “films without film” by his knowledge of the 1913 production of
Victory over the Sun and Malevich’s famously innovative use of the spotlight to
fragment the stage space.
Malevich’s belief that montage cinema could and should develop in the direc-
tion of non-objective Suprematism was therefore not entirely without foundation.
The meaning of a film sequence in montage cinema was in the contrasts and in-
terrelationships between shots (which Vertov called the “intervals” between shots
and between movements within successive shots) rather than in the actual content
of the shots themselves, which led to a tendency for the signifiers to become some-
what detached from the signified objects they represented. There was therefore
an intrinsic tendency towards abstraction in montage cinema.
Kepley has described the effect of such an approach:
The image’s new relationship with contiguous images in an editing sequence
displaced its association with its original referent. Kuleshov’s shot of the
White House in his ‘Fabricated Landscape’ sequence no longer referred
innocently to a building in Washington, but to a building that existed in a
fictional landscape in the minidiegesis of the sequence. (1992:139)
In other words, the images in montage cinema tend to have more in common with
other images than they do with any physical object they supposedly represent.
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It was probably the desire to maintain such a “gap” between the signifier and
its signified which lay behind Eisenstein’s, Pudovkin’s and Grigori Alexandrov’s
rejection of the “talkies” in which synchronised sound merely reinforces “a cer-
tain ‘illusion’ of people talking, objects making a noise, etc.” and their assertion
that “[t]he first experiments in sound must aim at a sharp discord with the visual
images [. . . ] that will result consequently in the creation of a new orchestral coun-
terpoint of visual and sound images” (Eisenstein 1988:113-14) in their collective
‘Statement on Sound’. As Hollis Frampton has noted,
complete dissynchrony between sound and image is to be maintained [. . . ],
since the permanent “adhesion” of sound to a given image, as of a name to its
referent, increases that image’s “inertia” and its independence of meaning.
(1981:63)
That is, the sound of an object should not be directly visually connected with the
image of the object which supposedly makes that sound, but must be drawn into
the montage of images as another “voice” in the counterpoint, as a sign detached
from its signified object. In Plantinga’s words, “sounds are not only recorded
(or manufactured), but placed within a textual system for certain rhetorical pur-
poses” (1997:79). Vertov agreed with Eisenstein, Pudovkin and Alexandrov that
sounds could and should be detached from the images of the objects which pro-
duce those sounds. However, he differed from them in his insistence that the
sounds used in the montage construction of a film must be indexical recordings
of the sounds created by real objects in the real world. The asynchronous use
of such indexical sound recordings with indexical images would, he believed, al-
low him to construct an abstract symbolic discourse which could reveal the inner
truth of the sounds and images of actuality. In his own words,
Neither synchronization nor aynchronization of the visible with the audi-
ble is at all obligatory, either for documentary or for acted films. Sound
and silent shots are both edited according to the same principles and can
coincide, not coincide, or blend with one another in various, essential com-
binations. (Vertov 1984:106; original emphasis)
Vertov asserted that while shooting and editing Enthusiasm (1931), he and his
film crew “did not limit ourselves to the simplest concurrence of image with sound,
but followed the line of maximum resistance – under existing conditions – that of
complex interaction of sound with image” (1984:111; original emphasis). Given
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these tendencies within montage cinema, it is not difficult to see why Malevich
initially saw such potential in Soviet montage cinema for it to develop into his
proposed Suprematist “non-objective cinema”.
Victor Tupitsyn has made an explicit connection between Malevich’s non-
objective art and the nineteenth-century American philosopher Charles Sanders
Peirce’s “second trichotomy of signs”142 when he wrote that Malevich
often defines the Suprematist form as a “sign,” a “signal,’ or a “semaphore,”
which is fully in accordance with the rejection of iconism that one would
expect from non-objective art. Preference is given to symbolic and indexical
signs (in Pierce’s [sic] terminology).143 (Tupitsyn 2002b:144)
The same connection could also be made between Soviet montage cinema itself
and Peirce’s semiotics; in fact, Peirce’s “second trichotomy of signs” has already
been applied to cinema in general by Peter Wollen in the early 1970s (1997:116-
54). Peircean semiotics can therefore be used as a conceptual framework within
which both Malevich’s Suprematist painting and the montage cinema of Eisen-
stein or Vertov can be analysed in a commensurate way despite the contrasting
technical bases of easel painting and cinema.
Peirce’s “second trichotomy of signs” was defined by him in the following way:
[T]here are three kinds of signs which are all indispensible in all reasoning;
the first is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or
analogy to the subject of discourse; the second is the index , which like a
pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attention to the particular
object intended without describing it; the third is the general name or
description which signifies its object by means of an association of ideas or
habitual connection between the name and the character signified. (Peirce
1991:181)
In short, “[a] sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol ” (1991:239). By his
own account, Peirce’s trichotomy was based on the different possible relations be-
tween the sign and the thing being signified (1991:183). An icon is a sign which
represents its object mainly by being a representation or likeness of it, an index
is a sign which has a physical or causal connection with its signified object, and
a symbol has only an arbitrary connection with its object by virtue of cultural
tradition, and thereby corresponds to Saussure’s arbitrary signifier. A symbolic
sign requires neither resemblance to the object it signifies, nor any existential
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bond with it. Peirce asserted that photographs combine all three aspects of the
sign, having meanings determined by causality, likeness and arbitrary convention
within the same image.144 Cinema, being essentially a succession of still pho-
tographic images, also combines all three aspects of the sign to some degree or
other.145 The relative importance of these three aspects will, of course, vary from
image to image.
By stating that in Malevich’s art “[p]reference is given to symbolic and in-
dexical signs” (Tupitsyn 2002b:144), Victor Tupitsyn is therefore suggesting that
Malevich is not attempting to create an illusionistic representation of objects
but is more concerned with creating a direct causal connection with the object
itself and with manipulating the abstract symbolic aspect of the sign; in other
words, “to negotiate a meeting point between the abstract and the real” (Tupitsyn
2002a:43).
It is important to note that all three aspects of Peirce’s second trichotomy of
signs are co-present to some degree in all signs; it is merely that for many signs
one aspect or other may be more significant. As Wollen has pointed out,
Peirce did not consider them mutually exclusive. On the contrary, all three
aspects frequently – or, he sometimes suggests, invariably – overlap and are
co-present. (1997:123)
In fact, Wollen has suggested that an ideal cinema would keep all three aspects
of the sign in equal balance, just as “Peirce believed that in the most perfect of
signs the iconic, the indexical and the symbolic would be amalgamated as nearly
as possible in equal proportions” (1997:142). In fact, Wollen saw this balance
between the three Peircean aspects of the cinematic sign as the source of the
aesthetic richness of cinema as an art form (1997:141). This was clearly not the
ideal of Soviet montage cinema, nor indeed was it Malevich’s ideal for a non-
objective Suprematist cinema, which would have downplayed the iconic aspect
of the cinematic sign in favour of its symbolic and indexical aspects (Tupitsyn
2002b:144).
Categorising the cinematic signifiers in terms of Peirce’s second trichotomy of
signs can give a new insight into significant differences between Soviet montage
cinema and mainstream classical cinema. As Wollen puts it, “In the [classical]
cinema, it is quite clear, indexical and iconic aspects are by far the most powerful.
The symbolic is limited and secondary” (1997:140), whereas in montage cinema
the abstract, symbolic aspects are far more important. It can also provide an-
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other way of interpreting Metz’s argument that cinema can be considered to be
a language but not a language system [langue] (1982a:105). Wollen’s statement
that “[u]nlike verbal language, primarily symbolic, the [classical] cinema is [. . . ]
primarily indexical and iconic” (1997:143) confirms, from a different perspective,
Metz’s conclusion that the classical cinema has no language system [langue], but
can nonetheless be considered a language [langage] in the sense that “the film,
by the mere fact that it must always select what it shows and what it does not
show, transforms the world into articulated discourse” (1982a:110,n).
In fact, Wollen provides an example of a kind of cinema which can be consid-
ered as far removed from a non-objective Suprematist cinema as possible, that of
Von Sternberg:
It was the iconic aspect of the sign which Von Sternberg stressed, detached
from the indexical in order to conjure up a world, comprehensible by virtue
of resemblances to the natural world, yet other than it, a kind of dream
world, a heterocosm.146 (1997:137)
This is an extreme example of the Hollywood “Dream Factory”, the “played” cin-
ema which Vertov attacked so vehemently and which he believed to be poisoning
the minds of its working class audiences. As Wollen points out, “the iconic sign
is the most labile; it observes neither the norms of convention nor the physical
laws which govern the index, neither thesis nor nomos” (1997:152). This labile
character of the iconic sign lends itself to fantasy and to the construction of a
dream world, since it lacks either a direct physical connection with the real world
or the logical rigor of abstract discourse. While Von Sternberg’s films are un-
usual even for Hollywood in their emphasis on the iconic aspect of the filmic
signifier and their detachment from the indexical and the symbolic, they share
with mainstream Hollywood films a general neglect of the symbolic aspect of the
sign: “Unlike verbal language, primarily symbolic, the [classical] cinema is [. . . ]
primarily indexical and iconic” (Wollen 1997:143). In other words, mainstream
classical cinema is unable (or, rather, unwilling) to create abstract discourses
out of the filmic signifiers. It is only the symbolic aspect of signs which permits
abstract discourse to be generated, as Peirce himself noted when he wrote that
“the rules of logic [. . . ] have no immediate application to likenesses or indices,
because no arguments can be constructed of these alone, but do apply to all
symbols” (Peirce 1991:30). Furthermore,
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Symbols afford the means of thinking about thoughts in ways in which we
could not otherwise think of them. They enable us, for example, to create
Abstractions, without which we should lack a great engine of discovery.
(1991:251)
Its ability and willingness to construct abstract discourses is one of the most im-
portant respects in which Soviet montage cinema differed from mainstream clas-
sical cinema, which prefers to construct seamless narratives rather than abstract
symbolic discourses. Eisenstein aspired to create a form of “intellectual mon-
tage”, and even planned to turn Karl Marx’s Das Kapital into a film (Eisenstein
et al. 1976), while Vertov used montage to construct abstract political arguments
from documentary material, as Hicks (2007) has convincingly demonstrated. In
Peircean terms, this required, in Eisenstein’s case, a concentration on the sym-
bolic as well as iconic aspects of the filmic signifier. In Vertov’s case, there was
an emphasis on the image’s symbolic and indexical aspects rather than its iconic,
representational aspect; the precise opposite of the “dream world” conjured up by
Von Sternberg’s illusionistic iconic cinema.
The symbolic aspect of the filmic signifier is associated with the “language” of
cinema (Saussurean langage rather than langue), with the communication of ab-
stract ideas and arguments, and with persuasion and rhetoric. Roland Barthes’
distinction between a photograph’s “denotations” and its “connotations” corre-
sponds approximately to the distinction between the photograph’s iconic and
indexical aspects on the one hand (denotation) and its symbolic aspect on the
other (connotation). As Plantinga puts it,
no photograph used for communication exists purely as denotation; all carry
heavy connotational meaning. This ‘photographic paradox’ makes images
a rhetorically powerful means of communication, because, for Barthes, the
‘denotated image naturalizes the symbolic message, it innocents the seman-
tic artifice of connotation, which is extremely dense’. (1997:62)
The “innocenting” of its connotation by the denotation of a photograph is anal-
ogous to the way in which the “reality effect” created by the suturing process
of classical cinema conceals the operations of ideology in the filmic text. Ver-
tov’s aim was to dis-illusion that “innocence” by using montage to subvert the
suturing process, using the “[d]ialectical interaction between ontological authen-
ticity of shots/documents [. . . ], and their cinematic connotation built by montage
structure” (Petrić 1978:39).
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The association of the symbolic aspect of the filmic signifier with language is
paralleled by Malevich’s own perception of the need for an “additional element”
to be added to his Black Square painting to enable it to communicate an ab-
stract symbolic discourse to its viewer – Margarita Tupitsyn has described “black
monochrome’s longing for [. . . ] [a] linguistic ‘additional element,’ which makes
one wonder whether it annihilates or gives birth to a narrative?” (2002a:109).
Malevich first attempted to add this “additional element” by printing a copy of his
Black Square on the cover of his booklet From Cubism and Futurism to Supre-
matism. A New Painterly Realism (1916), and by enclosing the image of the
Black Square in a frame and repeating its framed image inside brochures and
other printed publications so that it began to function as a sign rather than an
art object and could therefore be “read” as part of a discourse (2002a:17-19). As
Malevich wrote in 1918, “Clearly, to [the] intelligentsia [. . . ] picture frames are
more readable than paintings” (qtd. in 2002a:17). Vertov’s emphasis on the sym-
bolic aspect of the cinematic signifiers in his films also revealed itself in his prolific
use of intertitles as an integral part of the rhetoric of his films, a characteristic
which Wollen has also noted:
Vertov (or rather Rodchenko, who collaborated with him) was the first to
realise the importance of the titles and to integrate them into the film as
an element in its construction, rather than as troublesome interruptions.
(1997:41)
It is likely that Vertov’s and Rodchenko’s use of intertitles was at least partly
guided by the example of Mayakovsky’s famous ROSTA windows, a series of
captioned illustrations similar to a comic strip, each with a pointed political
message. Viktor Shklovsky has described these ROSTA windows:
Each drawing had a textual significance. The text connected the draw-
ings. If the window posters had been printed without drawings, the text
would have had to be changed; otherwise it couldn’t have been understood.
(1972:142)
Similarly, the images which Vertov intercut with intertitles themselves had textual
significance, the “additional element” of symbolic discourse which Malevich tried
to add to his own abstract compositions.147 The Man with a Movie Camera
is unusual among Vertov’s silent films in not having any intertitles, but it has
instead a long written manifesto displayed at the start of the film which sets
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the conceptual context for the film experiment which is to follow. Indeed, The
Man with a Movie Camera represented the achievement of Vertov’s long term
aspiration to eliminate intertitles altogether from his silent films and allow the
images to “speak” for themselves through montage.
The Soviet montage directors were trying to achieve the same thing that
Wollen describes Brecht as aiming for with his “epic theatre”: to penetrate the
surface appearances of reality in order to enable the spectator to reach an abstract
understanding of reality rather than merely a superficial recognition of it:
Brecht wanted to find a concept of ‘representation’ which would account for
a passage from perception/recognition to knowledge/understanding, from
the imaginary to the symbolic:148 a theatre of representation, mimesis even,
but also a theatre of ideas. [. . . ] Ideas, therefore language: it is only with a
symbolic (rather than iconic) system that concepts can be developed, that
there can be contradiction and hence argument. (Wollen 1976:18-19)
It is worth noting that Brecht’s plays are themselves often interrupted by “interti-
tles”, a practice which he borrowed from the silent cinema of the time and which
he used to frame each tableau and contextualise its meaning. A cinema which
emphasised the indexical and symbolic aspects of the sign rather than its iconic
aspect was in fact ideally suited to achieve a “cinema of ideas” corresponding to
Brecht’s “theatre of ideas”, as it could combine the direct indexical impression of
reality itself with an abstract symbolic discourse concerning that reality.
Malevich’s explicit rejection of “representation” in both painting and in cinema
can therefore be interpreted in Peircean terms as a rejection of the iconic aspect
of the sign. As Malevich himself said,
the motion picture remains fixed in a three-dimensional illusory realm of
of painterly representation. The latter – i.e., painterly “representation”
– should encounter resistance just like theatrical art, since the painterly
interferes with the cinematic and affects composition and the montage of
frames to form a whole. (Malevich 2002:147)
Malevich’s position regarding cinema was therefore that insofar as cinema laid
claim to being an art form, it should reject the mere depiction of the surface
appearances of objects and people in everyday life and instead strive for non-
objective abstraction just as easel painting had done, culminating (in Malevich’s
view) in Suprematism. In Shatskikh’s words, “Malevich called on all film directors
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to strive towards non-objectivity” (1993:474), and he explicitly condemned the
cinema of his time for displaying “the ugly face of life in the form of art” (qtd.
in 1993:472), in other words for merely representing the surface appearances of
things.
7.3 Malevich and the “abstract moments” of
montage cinema
The precise terms in which Malevich commended Vertov’s films are significant.
Malevich claimed that
I found a tremendous number of elements (frames) of a specifically Cubo-
Futurist nature in The Man with a Movie Camera. [. . . ] anyone who has
seen The Man with a Movie Camera remembers a number of episodes at-
testing to shifts (sdvigi)149 in street and streetcar traffic, all sorts of objects
shifting in the various directions of their movement, where the structure of
movement goes not only further toward the horizon but also develops ver-
tically. (Malevich 2002:155-56)
According to Margarita Tupitsyn,
Quick to link Eleventh Year to Futurism and The Man with a Movie Cam-
era to Cubo-Futurism, Malevich praised Eleventh Year for achieving “a
significant percentage of ‘abstract moments’ . . . ” and The Man with a
Movie Camera for “magnificently underst[anding] the idea or the task of
the new montage which expresses a shift [sdvig ] that did not exist previ-
ously.” (2002a:66)
And she asserts that Malevich “watched Soviet films with the sole desire of locat-
ing ‘the abstract moments’ – film stills that he mentally converted into surrogate
paintings” (2002a:124).
What Malevich meant by the phrase “abstract moments” can best be under-
stood within the conceptual framework of Productivism, a short-lived offshoot of
Constructivism with which Rodchenko was closely associated:
the Soviet idea of Productivism, which was theorized in the early 1920s
as a way of constructing the notion of abstraction as a collective and in-
dustrial rather than an individual and studio enterprise. Never put into
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mainstream practice, this idea manifested itself on a symbolic level when
concrete objects in photographs and film stills dissolved into surfaces of
complete abstraction, and heavy machinery turned into ethereal shapes.
(2002a:96)
This is in fact precisely the kind of sign, with its symbolic and indexical aspects
emphasised above its iconic aspect, which Victor Tupitsyn has identified as be-
ing characteristic of Malevich’s non-objective art (2002b:144) and which I have
identified as also being characteristic of Vertov’s montage films. The Productivist
abstract image is a dialectical unity of abstraction and actuality – the direct im-
pression of material, physical reality become abstract. The direct, causal imprint
of an object is not a representation of that object, but is an abstract symbolic
pattern, the texture or faktura as the Constructivists termed it, of that object.
For example, if an object is placed directly onto the surface of a photosensitive
material and is then exposed to light, the resulting photogram will be a direct
impression of the object – the image will have an indexical or causal connection
with the object itself, and will not be an illusionistic representation of that object.
The image will have an abstract, textural quality which has no iconic connection
with the object which formed that image.150 This kind of image or sign is what
Tupitsyn has described as the “meeting point between the abstract and the real”
(2002a:43) in which abstraction and actuality are no longer merely contradictory
opposites but are dialectically linked together in a new “unity of opposites”. As
Malevich put it, “We would see not the image of an object but the new content
thereof” (Malevich 2002:151). Peirce himself gave an example of a sign which
combines symbol and index but not icon: “That footprint that Robinson Crusoe
found in the sand [. . . ] was an Index to him that some creature was on his is-
land, and at the same time, as a Symbol, called up the idea of a man” (Peirce
1991:252). It is precisely such images in Vertov’s films which Malevich referred to
as “abstract moments”. Such a moment occurs in The Man with a Movie Camera
when a spinning reel of wire fills the screen and becomes an abstract texture of
light and shade, a sign whose iconicity has vanished to leave only its significance
as symbol and index (Fig. 7.2). In Bazin’s words, “Thanks to the cinema and to
the psychological properties of the screen, what is symbolic and abstract takes on
the solid reality of a piece of ore” (2005:168). Vertov was seeking a union of the
indexical and the symbolic in his films, a dialectical “unity of opposites”. This
combination of abstraction and indexicality into a dialectical unity of opposites
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was an essential aspect of his use of montage to construct a rhetorical political
discourse.
Figure 7.2: Still from Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera.
Similar “abstract moments” occur in Eisenstein’s The Old and the New, in
particular during the famous “cream separator” scene (Figs. 7.3 and 7.4). As
Aumont has said of this scene,
the preceding fragments have had almost nothing to do with the codes of
realism or figurative codes. It is only at this point that the objects become
recognizable as spatial/volumetric figurations, hence making it possible to
establish their referent.
There is an emphatic stress on these indices of reality [. . . ]. These objects
nonetheless still remain largely unnameable – or even [. . . ] unidentifiable.
[. . . ] It is thus difficult to situate their referent “in reality.” (1987:103)
In his article on the system of the suture, Dayan has drawn a connection between
the codes of enunciation of classical painting and those of a single frame or static
shot in classical cinema:
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Figure 7.3: Still from Eisenstein’s The Old and the New.
the filmic image considered in isolation, the single frame or the perfectly
static shot, is [. . . ] equivalent to the classical painting. Its codes, even
though “analogic” rather than figurative, are organized not merely as an
object that is seen, but as the glance of a subject. (1974:27-28)
However, Dayan did not speculate as to whether there could be a cinematic equiv-
alent of the codes of enunciation of avant-garde painting, particularly abstract
painting. Such a cinema could well constitute the “cinematography not based
upon the system of representation” which Dayan wished for (1974:28). It was in
fact Malevich who drew the connection between the non-objective paintings of
Suprematism and certain single frames or static shots of Soviet montage cinema,
which he called the “abstract moments” of montage cinema (qtd. in Tupitsyn
2002a:66), and who raised the possibility that montage cinema itself might be
an example of a cinematography not based on the system of representation, a
cinema which (in the terminology of Oudart and Dayan) did not use the system
of the suture to produce an illusionistic “reality effect”, but had a direct indexical
connection with reality itself. As Eisenstein put it, the Moscow Art Theatre
7.3. Malevich and the “abstract moments” of montage cinema 210
Figure 7.4: Still from Eisenstein’s The Old and the New.
string their emotions together to give a continuous illusion of reality. I take
photographs of reality and then cut them up so as to produce emotions
[. . . ]. I get away from realism by going to reality. (Qtd. in Wollen 1997:65)
Whereas classical cinema uses the iconic aspect of the cinematic image to cre-
ate narratives whose enunciation is invisible and which therefore seem to speak
themselves, Vertov had a tendency to suppress the iconic aspect of the image in
favour of its indexical and symbolic aspects in order to create abstract political
discourses whose enunciation was foregrounded. Rather than an illusionistic rep-
resentation of the world, Vertov’s films present a direct indexical impression of
the world rather like a photogram, an impression from which montage can cre-
ate an abstract symbolic discourse, a political rhetoric to teach the viewer “the
communist decoding of the world” (Vertov 1984:42). As Tupitsyn puts it,
Stressing his distance from the realism of traditional cinematography, Ver-
tov settled on the border between [. . . ] abstraction and realism [. . . ]. In
the end, Vertov converged on the unity between the formalism of “dynamic
geometry, the race of points, lines, planes, volumes,” and “the poetry of
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machines, propelled and driving.” (2002a:30)
Vertov’s distance from Constructivism, pace Petrić’s claim (1987) that Vertov’s
work represents “Constructivism in film”,151 is made clear by Tupitsyn when she
describes how
Vertov’s program of “dissecting” the Soviet collective body (“millions of
‘I’ ”) by the laws of geometry replaced the Constructivist agenda of building
Soviet reality by way of implantation of man-made utilitarian things and
structures. [. . . ] Vertov discarded the notion of the Constructivist predmet
(thing) as a structural agent of film, and thus, to use Malevich’s expression
with regard to Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera, he “de-objectified
the city center.” (2002a:30)
Vertov can therefore be regarded as being at least as much a Suprematist film-
maker as a Constructivist one. His rejection of the Constructivist object as a
structural agent of film contrasts with Rodchenko’s use of Constructivist ob-
jects in his design for Kuleshov’s film The Female Journalist (1927) (sometimes
also known as Your Acquaintance or The Presswoman), in which, as Khan-
Magomedov has pointed out,
Rodchenko, who had a shrewd understanding of the role of objects in a film
and the kind of influence they wielded over the audience, did everything he
could to use The Presswoman to promote his new household articles and
office equipment. (Khan-Magomedov 1986:191)
This “objective Constructivism” (to coin a phrase) was clearly in danger of be-
coming almost indistinguishable from the kind of “product placement” which is
endemic in the capitalist cinema industry.
Vertov’s emphasis on the indexicality of the image in his films corresponds
to what Esfir Shub called the “ontological authenticity” of the cinematic mate-
rial used by Vertov to construct his films. The term “ontological authenticity”
(or “onto-authenticity”) was coined by Shub while assembling her documentary
films from authentic newsreel footage dating back to Tsarist times. She described
herself as “in the final instance, Vertov’s pupil”, and used the term “ontological
authenticity” to describe certain qualities of her own and Vertov’s films (Petrić
1978:43,n.11). Petrić’s gloss on the concept of ontological authenticity is problem-
atic, however: he claims that ontological authenticity “implies the illusionistic as
well as factual denotation of motion picture photography” and that “[b]y its very
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nature (i.e. ontology), the motion picture projected on the big screen makes the
viewer believe that the events occur ‘for real.’ ” (1978:43,n.11). This, it seems to
me, makes the concept of “ontological authenticity” almost indistinguishable from
the “reality effect” of classical cinema. Neither Shub nor Vertov were striving for
an “illusionistic” cinematic image; in fact, they both regarded illusionistic fictional
film-making with hostility. Furthermore, even Hollywood movies want “to make
the viewer believe that the events occur ‘for real.’ ” The source of this blurring
of the distinction between ontological authenticity and the reality effect seems
to be Petrić’s confusion regarding the ontological aspect of the concept. Petrić
claims that it is the ontology of the cinematic apparatus to which the concept
refers, whereas in my view it is clearly referring to the ontology of the profilmic
actuality. Shub did not mean that her films and those of Vertov respected the
ontology of the cinematic apparatus, whatever that might signify;152 rather, she
meant that their films respected the ontology – the profilmic actuality – of what
they filmed or of the old newsreel they used.
In his diary, Vertov insisted that
[i]f an artificial apple and a real one are filmed so that you can’t tell them
apart, that shows not skill but the lack of it.
A real apple must be filmed so that any imitation would be impossible. You
can bite and eat a real apple but not an artificial one. A good cameraman
should make this visible. (Vertov 1984:198)
His opposition to the illusionistic representation of objects and his faith in the
indexical authenticity of the filmed image of real objects could not be clearer.
Rather than constructing an illusionistic representation of reality, Vertov re-
spected the authenticity of his raw material, the indexical link between the film
footage he or his cameraman had shot and the profilmic actuality. He refused to
play the illusionistic narrative games of mainstream cinema, or rather he tried to
reveal those games for what they were: the sweet poison of the bourgeoisie.
7.4 The political implications of non-objective
cinema
Malevich used the word “non-objective” [bespredmetnyi ] to refer not merely to
abstract art, in the sense of art which does not have representational subject
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matter, but to art which is committed to the de-objectification of aesthetics. In
Tupitsyn’s words,
In this context of objectless culture, film practices emerge as an art form
that provides the conditions for “de-reified” activity, which in this case
places itself outside the purview of the object-oriented canons of both tra-
ditional and Modernist art, entering fluid and perpetually transforming
cine-forms (kino-formy).153 “The greater reality of his [Lenin’s] portrait,”
Malevich confirms, “is in the cinema. . . . ” (2002a:33)
This attack by Malevich on the “thingness” of modern life was essentially an
attack on the reification inherent in the capitalist relations of production, and
was therefore a political position as much as an aesthetic one. The concept
of reification had first been advanced by Marx, who had written about “this
personification of things and reification of the relations of production” and claimed
that reification “imputes social relations to things as inherent characteristics, and
thus mystifies them” (Marx 1973:687). Lukács later wrote of reification that
[i]ts basis is that a relation between people takes on the character of a
thing and thus acquires a “phantom objectivity”, an autonomy that seems
so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fun-
damental nature: the relation between people. (Lukács 1971:83)
Marx emphasised the way in which reification creates a form of “false conscious-
ness” by concealing the actual relations and meanings of society behind objects:
“To [the producers], their own social action takes the form of the action of objects,
which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them” (Marx 2000:475). It is
this concept of reification which underlies Dayan’s statement that classical paint-
ing conceals the true relations and meanings of society itself behind the objects
which the painting presents to the viewer:
The object represented is a “pretext” for the painting as a “text” to be
produced. The object hides the painting’s textuality by preventing the
viewer from focusing on it. However, the text of the painting is totally
offered to view. It is, as it were, hidden outside the object. It is here but
we do not see it. We see through it to the imaginary object. Ideology is
hidden in our very eyes. (1974:26; original emphasis)
The same process also occurs in classical cinema, according to Dayan. The fact
that Malevich recognised that his aesthetic attack on reification had a political
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dimension is indicated by his statement that “[t]he greater reality of his [Lenin’s]
portrait is in the cinema” (Tupitsyn 2002a:33). Tupitsyn has described how
Malevich, as part of a competition for monuments dedicated to Lenin,
“proudly exhibited a huge pedestal composed of a mass of agricultural and
industrial tools and machinery. On top of the pile was the ‘figure’ of Lenin
– a simple cube without insignia.” Still unrecorded in any known published
or unpublished documents, this symbolization of Lenin was in tune with
Malevich’s own assertion that heroic people and leaders were “pure object-
less people [bespredmetniki ] who do not submit to an image or a brush.”
(2002a:43-44)
This “de-reification” of political propaganda would clearly require a new way of
presenting Lenin’s image to the masses: not as an object to be fetishised but
as a sign combining symbolic and indexical but not iconic qualities, creating a
“symbolization of Lenin” rather than a likeness of him. In this respect, Malevich
regarded montage cinema, with the exception of some of the films of Vertov, as
having failed to de-objectify the human image. Tupitsyn points out that
[i]n his text about Lenin, Malevich returned to the word lik [‘iconic image’]
to describe the representation of the human face that he urged must be
“de-represented” and “de-objectified.” In “And Faces are Painted on the
Screens,” he used lik in derogatory terms with respect to the close-up of
faces he observed while watching such films as Eisenstein’s The Strike and
Vertov’s Cine-Truth. (2002a:74)
Soviet montage cinema itself could be said to have originated with a close-up of a
human face – Mozzhukhin’s blank face in Kuleshov’s famous montage experiment
onto which emotion and meaning were projected by the spectator – and never
achieved, or even aspired to achieve, the true blankness of the faces in some of
Malevich’s easel paintings, smooth surfaces which refuse to receive such projected
emotions or meanings.
What Malevich actually meant when he talked about “purifying the screen of
natural and agitational forms” (qtd. in Shatskikh 1993:474) can now be properly
understood. Rather than expressing hostility towards documentarism or towards
the use of cinema for political purposes, Malevich was actually expressing hostility
towards the iconic representation of objects (“natural forms”) and the fetishised
political icon, the Big Brother-like faces of political leaders on every street and
in every office which was to become such an inescapable feature of Soviet society
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(“agitational forms”). Malevich actually saw the cinema, especially the montage
cinema of Vertov, as the art form which could best provide the means to “de-reify”
the way people saw reality. This was a political project as well as an aesthetic
or spiritual one, and required a new kind of political rhetoric and a new kind of
propaganda.
It would therefore be incorrect to assert that Malevich was essentially hostile
to the idea of art being used as any kind of political rhetoric or propaganda.
Rather, he was hostile only to a particular form of political propaganda, that
which involved the “objective” representation of political figures such as Lenin
as fetishised icons. His portrayal of Lenin as an abstract cube atop an indexical
pile of work tools and his portraits of peasants with blank ovals instead of faces
are symptomatic of this approach, strangely reminiscent of some portrayals of
the Prophet Mohammed in Islamic art (itself a kind of political propaganda) as
a human figure with no face. Malevich detected the same tendency in the films
of Vertov: a rejection of iconic representation in favour of the indexicality of the
image (the “ontological authenticity” of the film footage, as Esfir Shub called it)
and its assemblage into a symbolic discourse by means of montage. This can
be contrasted with Eisenstein’s “blasphemous” attempt in October to represent
Lenin using the non-professional actor Vasili Nikandrov. This attempt to create
an illusion of Lenin’s presence, an iconic representation of Lenin using a “type”
who looked like Lenin but was not Lenin (i.e. an icon but not an index of Lenin)
drew a furious response from Mayakovsky and the other Futurists of LEF. In fact,
Eisenstein’s representation of Lenin in October is symptomatic of the fact that
what Vertov called “played film”, fictionalised film, puts an emphasis on the iconic,
illusionistic representation of reality (corresponding to the reality effect generated
by the suturing process in classical cinema) rather than on the indexical transfer
of reality itself onto the cinema screen (Vertov’s “kino-pravda” or film-truth).
By contrast, Vertov presented Lenin using only actual newsreel footage of Lenin
– this newsreel footage was the direct imprint made by Lenin himself on the
photographic emulsion154 (or rather, the direct imprint made by the light rays
scattered off his body) and was therefore not an iconic representation of Lenin,
but was simultaneously an index of Lenin’s erstwhile presence and a symbol of
Lenin as founder of the Soviet state. It is this indexical “kino-pravda” coupled
with the symbolic discourse generated by montage which constituted an example
of the politicised “non-objective cinema” which Malevich aspired to create and
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believed Soviet montage cinema might develop into.
7.5 Eisenstein contra Malevich
Analysing Soviet montage cinema from Malevich’s perspective has therefore re-
vealed an important distinction between the cinema of Eisenstein and that of
Vertov: their contrasting attitudes towards the representation of the object.
Malevich identified Vertov’s approach as tending towards the “non-objective cin-
ema” which he saw as the necessary development of the Suprematist movement,
whereas Eisenstein’s approach was essentially representional and objective. It was
Eisenstein’s obsession with things and their iconic representation which Malevich
disapproved of. Eisenstein’s film October manifested this tendency to an extreme
degree, so much so that Viktor Shklovsky jokingly referred to it as “a Baroque
film about the uprising of dishes” in a letter to Eisenstein (Tsivian 1997:53).
In fact, it was not just Eisenstein who came out badly from the comparison
with Vertov. Malevich lambasted Walter Ruttmann’s film Berlin: Symphony of
a Great City (1927), claiming that
Ruttmann “went junky” (“shurum-burum”). Instead of a dynamic, he showed
the junk of day-to-day life falling asleep and waking up. And he, like a “cine-
junk collector,” used cinematic techniques in order to show all the junk he
had collected in “the city of Berlin” to a flea market’s frequenters (audience)
“in a symphonic perspective.”
The Man with a Movie Camera, essentially, has no such tendency. Rather,
its tendency is to de-objectify the city center without linking any of the
elements into a single idea that flows through. Everything there results
from shifts, everything comes unexpectedly. Here, for the first time, the
elements could not be tied together into a whole in order to express the
petty gossip of daily living.155 (Malevich 2002:158-59)
Malevich expresses his distaste for the “junk” of everyday life very clearly, and he
claims for Vertov the same project which Malevich himself famously attempted
during his Vitebsk period (1919-22): the “de-objectification” of a city centre.
Malevich and his students had created abstract posters and other decorations,
gone out into the streets of Vitebsk and superimposed those abstract geometric
shapes directly over the old world of everyday objects. In Tupitsyn’s words, “Here
the ‘Suprematist apparatus,’ like Vertov’s camera, performed the act of the non-
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objectification of reality by the means of geometric modules” (2002a:31). This
was an act which transformed the private abstract sign of a painting like Black
Square into a public act of intervention in society itself; that is, into a political
act. Malevich believed that our perception of reality must be de-objectified,
“de-reified” to express it in Marxist terms, if it is to regain its spiritual aspect.
Malevich’s concept of “non-objective cinema” was therefore both a spiritual and
(which is less often recognised) a political endeavour: “Having trained our camera
lens on the yet-to-be-experienced dynamic of metallic, industrial-socialist life, we
will be able to see a new world that has not been mediated until now” (Malevich
2002:159).
Eisenstein unequivocally rejected such a “de-objectification” of reality and
emphasised instead the importance of the representation of objects:
A generalisation from which the purely representational element has been
removed would be a bare, non-objective abstraction dangling in mid-air.
[. . . ] so generalised as to be deprived not of the compositional outline
[. . . ] but of the actual picture, and retaining only the ‘image-expressing’
zigzag line of its contour. All the ‘pictorial’ and ‘expressive’ qualities would
instantly evaporate from the sketch, while the zigzag itself might not be
interpreted as a barricade but as [. . . ] anything you like: as a graph of the
rise and fall of prices, or as a seismographic trace of subterranean tremors,
and so on and so forth. It would be open to all these interpretations until
the abstraction reverted (as in our case) to the representation of some
concrete, objective subject matter. (Eisenstein 1991:97)
However, he also emphasised the importance of the symbolic aspect of the sign
as well as the iconic, using the phrase “the generalised image”156 to describe
this abstract, symbolic aspect of the image-sign: “if a grouping of objects aims
to depict a barricade, then their disposition should be such that their overall
contours indicate an intrinsic, generalised image of what a barricade implies:
struggle” (Eisenstein 1991:26). He also asserted that it is the unity of the symbolic
and the iconic aspects of the sign (to use Peirce’s terminology) which is the essence
of art:
I believe it is in the existence of these two elements – the specific instance of
depiction and the generalising image which pervades it – that the implaca-
bility and the all-devouring force of artistic composition resides. (Eisenstein
1991:27; original emphasis)
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Eisenstein was therefore arguing in essence that the detachment of signifiers from
their signified objects, which I have previously noted as an inherent tendency
of montage cinema, should not be carried too far lest the process of abstraction
(or “generalisation” as he terms it) makes it impossible to communicate definite
ideas. Eisenstein believed that there must be “objective” representation in cin-
ema (as in art generally) in order for there to be an effective political rhetoric.
Eisenstein approvingly quoted “the great realist sculptor Mark Antokolsky”, who
claimed that “[t]here are two extremes which are bad in art: one is to reduce art to
abstraction, the other is blindly to subordinate oneself to nature” (qtd. in Eisen-
stein 1991:27). Interestingly, this is almost precisely the position which socialist
realism was to claim for itself in the 1930s: steering a middle course between
formalism and naturalism (Arvon 1973:42-43). His willingness to also adopt this
position, apparently sincerely, suggests that Eisenstein was better able to adapt
himself to the strictures of socialist realism than Vertov not merely because of a
greater willingness to compromise himself or to abandon his previous aesthetic
positions, but because he genuinely had some significant areas of agreement with
the principles of socialist realism itself.
Eisenstein did not merely reject Malevich’s condemnation of the representa-
tion of objects; even more importantly, he dismissed the ultimate raison d’être
of Malevich’s non-objective Suprematist art – the spiritual transcendence of the
material world – as metaphysical nonsense. In 1929, Eisenstein wrote in his diary
that Malevich’s Suprematist movement was “a mixture of mysticism and mysti-
fication” (Eisenstein 1988:318,n.52). He clearly regarded it as a non-materialist
and apolitical worldview, inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism. For Eisenstein,
art must exert a definite social and political influence on the masses. Montage cin-
ema, rather than being the exemplar of a putative “non-objective cinema”, should
be the vehicle by which the “general line” of the Party could be summarised and
propagated to the masses. It was no accident that he originally titled his film
about the collectivisation of Soviet agriculture The General Line (1929), nor was
it an accident that Stalin forced him to change its title to The Old and the New.
Eisenstein interrupted the shooting of The General Line to complete October in
time for the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The resulting hiatus
in the shooting schedule of The General Line meant that the actual “general line”
of the Party concerning the collectivisation of agriculture had changed between
Eisenstein starting the film and finishing it, so its original title was therefore no
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longer appropriate.
Malevich himself seems to have become progressively disillusioned with Eisen-
stein as a potential harbinger of “non-objective cinema”. The terms in which he
expressed this disillusionment are very revealing. Malevich accused Eisenstein
of being one of the Peredvizhniki, or ‘Wanderers’, a group of nineteenth century
Russian artists famous for their naturalistic portrayal of the everyday life of the
peasantry:
Eisenstein with all his innovations is an old peredvizhnik [Wanderer] who
seeks not only to introduce something new into film but also to use all of
cinema’s technical resources to come up with a picture of the old Wanderers’
variety. (Malevich 2002:149)
What Malevich objected to was Eisenstein’s concern for the representation of
objects, which he associated particularly with AKhRR,157 a movement of which
he said, “at their base they have ‘representation’ [izobrazitel’nost’ ], and at ours –
science and life itself” (Tupitsyn 2002b:73). In a letter to Eisenstein in 1928, he
wrote: “You took Mayakovsky’s AKhRR leftist line158 and I do not agree with
that line and therefore decline to give you material” (qtd. in Shatskikh 1993:475).
Malevich therefore ultimately sided with Vertov against Eisenstein, rather as
the LEF group did, though for different reasons. Unlike the LEF group, it was not
Vertov’s “documentarism” which he endorsed, but rather the tendency which he
perceived in Vertov’s films towards non-objectivity, the “abstract moments” and
Vertov’s emphasis on the symbolic and indexical aspects of the cinematic sign.
And also unlike the LEF group, it was not Eisenstein’s use of “played” material
which he condemned, but rather his emphasis on the iconic, representational
aspect of the cinematic sign as well as its symbolic aspect.
7.6 Vertov’s “kino-eye” and non-objective cinema
Despite his growing disillusionment with Eisenstein’s work, Malevich nonetheless
retained his faith in Vertov as a potential harbinger of a specifically non-objective
cinema. The basis of Malevich’s faith can be defined in Peircean terms: Male-
vich’s concept of non-objective cinema, like Suprematist easel painting itself, em-
phasised the indexical and symbolic aspects of the sign (Tupitsyn 2002b:144).
Eisenstein’s cinema was primarily iconic and symbolic, while Vertov’s was pri-
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marily indexical and symbolic and was therefore closer to being non-objective
than Eisenstein’s.
The indexical aspect of Vertov’s film-making was exemplified by his respect
for the raw materials out of which he constructed his “film-objects”: the celluloid
of the film-strip itself and, more importantly, the flow of actuality itself, “life as it
is”, which it was his task to capture on film by “catching life unawares”. Esfir Shub
referred to the “ontological authenticity” of the raw material of Vertov’s films; in
Peircean terms, this authenticity was guaranteed by the causal link between the
image on the celluloid and the actuality which had passed in front of the camera
lens, in other words by the indexicality of the image: “life, passing through the
camera lens, does not vanish forever, leaving no trace, but does, on the contrary,
leave a trace, precise and inimitable” (Vertov 1984:45).159
Eisenstein was much less concerned with such indexicality and was fully pre-
pared to theatrically stage his films using actors and artificial sets. By placing
greater emphasis on the iconic and symbolic aspects of the image than on its
indexical aspect, Eisenstein was concerned primarily with the iconic represen-
tation of objects and events and their symbolic manipulation using montage to
“plough over the audience’s psyche” (Eisenstein 1988:62). This is what he called
his “kino-fist”, in deliberate and ironic contrast to Vertov’s “kino-eye”.160
Vertov did not start with a pre-conceived, abstract idea which he imposed
on the material, staging and adapting it to fit his pre-conceived schema. Vertov
emphatically asserted his refusal to start a film from a written scenario:
Kinopravda doesn’t order life to proceed according to a writer’s scenario,
but observes and records life as it is, and only then draws conclusions from
these observations. (Vertov 1984:45; original emphasis)
Such a procedure was to become highly problematic once socialist realism had
been established by 1934 as the only permissible method of artistic creation in the
Soviet Union. In cinema, one of the strictures of the socialist realist method was
that the director had to begin with an “iron scenario” [zheleznyi stsenarii ] which,
after being approved by the proper authorities, would become a “steel scenario”
[stal’nyi stsenarii ], which could not be altered: the director would be obliged to
follow it precisely while shooting his film.161 Needless to say, Vertov found it all
but impossible to continue making films under these conditions. But while he
was still allowed to do so, Vertov would begin with the indexical recording of “life
as it is” and move from that to the rhetorical expression of an abstract, symbolic
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interpretation of that raw material. Vertov saw this movement as a process of
decoding, in fact “the communist decoding of the world” (1984:42). As he put
it, “We have come to show the world as it is, and to explain to the worker the
bourgeois structure of the world” (1984:73). This movement from the indexical
aspects of the cinematic image to its symbolic aspects, linking them together by a
process of decoding and explanation is what Vertov referred to as the “kino-eye”: a
mechanical eye which did not merely passively record actuality but conceptualised
and decoded it, indissolubly linking the indexical and the symbolic aspects of the
image.
Eisenstein, however, regarded Vertov’s film-making methods as being little
more than “primitive Impressionism. With a set of montage fragments of real
life (of what the Impressionists called real tones), whose effect has not been
calculated, Vertov weaves the causes of a pointillist painting” (Eisenstein 1988:62).
Even Pudovkin regarded Vertov’s practice of starting from the indexical recording
of actuality as a hopelessly deficient procedure:
We rejected the method of lying in wait [podsterezhenie], the method of the
Cine-Eye. If you track events that unfold beyond your control and then
show them on the screen, all that you are giving the viewer is raw material.
(Pudovkin 2006:20)
Of course, both Eisenstein’s and Pudovkin’s criticism of Vertov’s work is based
on a misinterpretation of what Vertov was actually trying to do. Far from being
a mere Impressionist, Vertov was using montage to construct rational, abstract
arguments out of his indexical raw material, as Hicks (2007) has clearly demon-
strated; indeed, Vertov asserted that he applied montage to the raw material even
during the shooting process itself (Vertov 1984:72).
But Vertov’s starting point was always the indexical raw material drawn from
life itself. Vertov always used the method, as he asserted, of “[p]roceeding from
the material to the film-object (and not from the film-object to the material)”
(Vertov 1984:35). It was the fact that he always began with the indexical image
of life itself which, in his own view, enabled Vertov to achieve the successful
“decoding of the world”. The words of Jean Epstein are perhaps apposite here:
I am certain [. . . ] that if a high-speed [i.e. slow motion] film of an accused
person under interrogation were to be made, then from beyond his words,
the truth would appear, writ plain, unique, evident; [. . . ] there would be
no further need of indictment, of lawyers’ speeches, nor of any proof other
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than that provided from the depths of the images. (Qtd. in Michelson
1984:xliv-xlv)
Epstein was asserting the authenticity of the indexical cinematic image of reality,
its inherent ability to capture the truth (the “kino-pravda”) of the object. Vertov
himself cited his leap from the first floor of a grotto in Moscow in 1918, filmed
in slow-motion, as evidence that the indexical recording of reality by a camera
could reveal inner existential states such as indecision, tension or relief (Tode and
Wurm 2006:82,n.4).162 Vertov summarised his conclusions from the experiment
in 1935:
The results. From the point of view of the ordinary eye it goes like this:
the man walked to the edge of the balcony, bowed, smiled, jumped, landed
on his feet and that is all. What was it in slow motion? [. . . ] On the man’s
face are clearly seen his thoughts. (Qtd. in Feldman 1977:36)
This revelation of the normally hidden truth was the entire raison d’être of the
kino-eye:
Not “filming life unawares” for the sake of the “unaware,” but in order to
show people without masks, without makeup, to catch them through the
eye of the camera in a moment when they are not acting, to read their
thoughts, laid bare by the camera. (Vertov 1984:41)
This revelatory power of the camera which Vertov believed he had discovered
could be regarded as the inverse of the Kuleshov Effect. Vertov claimed that the
camera reveals what is already there but hidden beneath surface appearances,
whereas Kuleshov claimed that the spectator projects what is not there onto
the blank surface of the actor’s expressionless face. What Vertov understood by
“kino-pravda” was precisely the capability of the camera to draw out the inner
truth of an object, to reveal and inscribe that truth on the object’s surface, or
rather on the surface of the indexical image of that object. Clearly, if the object
being filmed is a mere stage-prop, a fake, then it will possess no inner truth to
be revealed and the kino-eye will fail to work its magic. Vertov used the example
of the filming of an apple to make this point:
[i]f an artificial apple and a real one are filmed so that you can’t tell them
apart, that shows not skill but the lack of it.
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A real apple must be filmed so that any imitation would be impossible. You
can bite and eat a real apple but not an artificial one. A good cameraman
should make this visible. (Vertov 1984:198)
The process of grasping reality both perceptually and conceptually through the
kino-eye will therefore only be successful if it is applied to material which is
genuinely derived, by an indexical process of mechanical recording, from everyday
life itself.163 Any staged or “played” material will reveal nothing but its own
vacuity to the kino-eye. But with the right material, Vertov believed that the
movie camera could be a cognitive instrument of unrivalled power which he could
use to reveal political truths about the structure of reality. Vertov’s ultimate
ambition in striving for the dialectical unity of perception and abstract thought by
unifying the indexical and symbolic aspects of the cinematic image was essentially
the same as that of Marx: “The eye has become a human eye when its object
has become a social, human object produced by man and destined for him. Thus
in practice the senses have become direct theoreticians” (Marx 2000:100). In
Feldman’s words,
To be able to perceive the meaning of images the way Newton was able to
perceive the meaning of a falling apple and Pavlov that of a salivating dog
still serves as a definition of the function of what Vertov would later call
the “Cinema Eye.”164 (1977:30)
This is the precise opposite of the illusionistic representation of objects which the
“played” cinema which Vertov so despised aims to achieve. Vertov wanted not
illusion but truth, not to represent but to reveal.
Vertov’s use of slow-motion as a device to better reveal the inner truth of his
leap from the balcony is significant. Vertov believed that the movie camera could
enhance and extend the human senses. The ability of the movie camera to slow
down or speed up the passage of time, to magnify or reduce objects, to capture the
present moment in a way which the unaided human eye cannot, is what enables
it, in Vertov’s view, to interrupt the continuity of the surface flow of actuality and
reveal the normally hidden inner truth of objects and people and inscribe it sym-
bolically on the indexical cinematic image, to be read and decoded by the cinema
audience. The desire to capture the passing moment, often using slow-motion, in
order to analyse and conceptualise it is actually characteristic of Soviet montage
cinema in general. Barthes described Eisenstein’s cinema as being, like Brecht’s
theatre, a “series of pregnant moments” (1977:73), and Pudovkin’s films contain
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many instances in which slow-motion is used to enhance the affective qualities of a
scene or to focus the spectator’s attention on a specific detail; for example, when
the firing squad which is about to execute Bair in Storm Over Asia (1929) turn in
unison, the film momentarily slows down to extend and emphasise that moment.
Indeed, Pudovkin was later to write that “it occurred to me that temporal as well
as spatial constructions can be used to focus the viewer’s attention on details”
(Pudovkin 2006:185) and “a person who scrutinises, studies and absorbs some-
thing changes spatial and temporal relationships: he brings closer what is distant
and slows down what is fast” (2006:187; original emphasis). He concluded that
“[s]low motion in montage is not a distortion of an actual process. It is a portrayal
that is both more profound and more precise, deliberately guiding the attention
of the audience” (2006:190). However, both Eisenstein and Pudovkin regarded
slow-motion as merely a handy cinematic technique to be deployed whenever a
particular rhetorical point needed to be underlined; neither of them regarded it
as in itself a means of revealing the inner truth of reality in the same way that
Vertov did. Vertov was obsessed with the ability of the “kino-eye” to manipulate
the passage of time, slowing it down, speeding it up, even reversing or freezing
it altogether. In 1922, Vertov had even proposed to the authorities that he be
allowed to make a documentary film to be called Time Stood Still, which would
portray “cross-sections of life in Moscow suddenly suspended in frozen time” (Tode
and Wurm 2006:93); however, the proposal was rejected by the authorities.165 In
fact, Vertov regarded the “film-object” itself as in some sense transcending the
temporal flow: a film can be projected over and over again, exactly repeating the
same scenes and events. Each passing moment in a film therefore loses its quality
of being a unique, ungraspable and unrepeatable moment in the temporal flow
and becomes conceptually graspable by the spectator.166 This concept may be
part of what underlies Burch’s assertion that The Man with a Movie Camera can
only be grasped by a spectator who has seen it multiple times and therefore has
“a completely topological grasp of the film as a whole” (1979:94); Burch’s use of a
spatial rather than a temporal metaphor is significant, since it ascribes a timeless
quality to the film when it is properly “grasped” by the spectator.
Hicks has correctly noted that
Vertov [. . . ] maintained a [. . . ] dual commitment, on the one hand to
the capacity of cinema to record as a starting point, and on the other
to exploring and unleashing its creative, persuasive, analytical potential.
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(2007:10)
However, he also claims that “[t]here is always a compromise between a search
for new and more striking visual – and, later, sound – solutions, on the one
hand, and the need to articulate a message, on the other” (2007:3). In my view,
however, there is no such “compromise” in Vertov’s work: the two aspects of his
film-making – the indexical recording of actuality and the symbolic articulation
of an argument from that raw material – are essentially complementary rather
than contradictory activities. It was the indexical recording power of the movie
camera which ensured the ontological authenticity of the raw material of his films,
and it was his use of montage to break up the continuity of the surface flow of
actuality which enabled him to reveal the hidden meanings of the real world and
to construct an abstract rhetorical argument from that raw material. As Petrić
has said of Vertov,
his concept of how to construct a genuine “film-thing” in the documen-
tary cinema was meant to be dialectical on the phenomenological as well
as the structural level. In other words, “Truth” presented on the screen
must be essential and not mechanical, ideologically functional rather than
commercially entertaining. (1978:32)
Only montage could achieve this aim, by fragmenting the surface flow of actuality
and reassembling it into an abstract ideological discourse about the world. As
Vertov put it, “the film is not only the sum of the facts recorded on film, or, if
you like, not merely the sum, but the product, a ‘higher mathematics’ of facts”
(Vertov 1984:84).167 There was therefore no contradiction between the indexical
“content” of his films and their rhetorical “form”; rather, there was a fundamental
unity of content and form, as Vertov himself claimed (1984:183), based upon the
dialectical unity of the indexical and symbolic aspects of the cinematic image.
The belief that, according to Marxist principles, the surface appearance of reality
can be misleading led Vertov – an avowedly Marxist film-maker – to try to reveal
the truth concealed behind those surface appearances by slowing, fragmenting,
analysing and reassembling the indexical images captured by the movie camera.
It is the same belief which lay behind Brecht’s famous comment about the photo-
graph of a Krupp factory revealing nothing about the actual economic and social
reality behind that “realistic” image:
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The situation has become so complicated because the simple ‘reproduction
of reality’ says less than ever about that reality. A photograph of the Krupp
works or the AEG reveals almost nothing about these institutions. Reality
as such has slipped into the domain of the functional. The reification of
human relations, the factory, for example, no longer discloses those rela-
tions. So there is indeed ‘something to construct’, something ‘artificial’,
‘invented’. Hence, there is in fact a need for art. But the old concept
of art, derived from experience, is obsolete. For those who show only the
experiential aspect of reality do not reproduce reality itself. (Silberman
2000:164-65).
The means by which those hidden relations might be revealed was actually sug-
gested by Lenin himself in his Philosophical Notebooks :
We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupt-
ing continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling
that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought
always makes coarse, kills – and not only by means of thought, but also by
sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept. And in
that lies the essence of dialectics. And precisely this essence is expressed by
the formula: the unity, identity of opposites. (Lenin 1976:259-60; original
emphasis)
Lenin’s rather Hegelian position168 is that in order to grasp reality conceptually
(and, by implication, artistically), it is necessary to interrupt its continuity, to
freeze its dialectical self-movement in order to analyse it. He suggests that these
frozen “moments” of conceptualisation are in fact the essence of the dialectical
method and involve the “unity of opposites”. There is an interesting parallel here
with Malevich’s cherry-picking of “abstract moments” from montage films, and the
unity of indexical authenticity and symbolic abstraction in such moments. And
Lenin’s insistence on the necessity of “interrupting continuity” almost implies an
endorsement of montage as a dialectical method of grasping and revealing the
truth about the world.
In Vertov’s view, montage – which Malevich referred to as “the law of con-
trasts” – was required to reveal (not to represent) the internal contradictions
and structures of exploitation concealed beneath surface appearances. Plantinga
has claimed that “I see no reason why, if a subject is complex and contradic-
tory, it cannot be represented as such in a seamless, unified representation that
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proclaims its complexity” (1997:198). However, the “seamless, unified representa-
tion” which Plantinga favours – for example, the seamless narratives of classical
cinema, whose diegetic illusionism is underpinned by the system of the suture
– cannot reveal the workings of its own ideology to the spectator, and cannot
penetrate the iconic likeness of things to reveal the internal contradictions and
conflicts concealed by those surface appearances. Plantinga is correct in stating
that a film’s discourse need not imitate the form of its projected world. However,
Vertov was not attempting to imitate or represent the surface appearance or even
the structure of the world in his films; rather, he was attempting to reveal it. The
rhetorical strategy of Vertov’s film-making was therefore intimately linked with
his Marxist political ideology and with his tendency towards what Malevich called
“non-objective cinema”, a cinema which does not represent the world but instead
seeks to reveal it.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Summary of the conclusions
The Russian Revolution of 1917 created a political environment which placed a
much higher value on propaganda than had existed previously. The experiences
of montage film-makers such as Kuleshov, Pudovkin, Eisenstein and Vertov as
participants in the propaganda endeavours of the Bolshevik regime, for example
on board the “agit-trains” or shooting short agitki films on the various fronts of
the Civil War, meant that they were acutely aware of the propaganda potential
of cinema, and indeed perceived the main purpose of cinema to be to serve as a
propaganda medium for the new, embattled Soviet state.
The Soviet montage film-makers also learned much about how to use cinema
to exert a rhetorical effect on an audience from the work of D. W. Griffith, whose
impact, I have argued, was not so much in terms of his aesthetic or technical
breakthroughs in the art of film-making than in his demonstration at a cru-
cial moment in cinema’s development that it could be used to produce powerful
political and emotional effects on a mass audience. This demonstration had a
particularly strong effect on Pudovkin, though Griffith exerted a strong influence
over all the Soviet montage directors with the important exception of Vertov.
Griffith, through his epic film Intolerance (1916) in particular, had a decisive im-
pact on the development of the Soviet montage film-makers as rhetoricians and
propagandists.
They were also affected by artists closer to home, of course. Vertov in particu-
lar regarded himself as a disciple of Vladimir Mayakovsky and was influenced both
by his aesthetic ideas as well as by his insistence on the political tendentiousness
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of art. The Cubo-Futurists’ poetic device of zaum was particularly important
for Vertov, especially with regard to the way in which zaum concentrated on the
juxtaposition of signifiers with each other rather than on the signifiers’ reference
to their signifieds. This was also to become a general tendency of montage cinema
itself, and reinforced its status as an integral part of the astonishing ferment of
the artistic avant-garde in 1920s Soviet Russia.
The Soviet montage directors all perceived themselves to be propagandists as
well as (or in Vertov’s case, instead of) artists. However, the definition of propa-
ganda is a contentious one. Propaganda is actually a complex phenomenon with
many different modalities and strategies, a fact which has important implications
for Soviet montage cinema’s functioning as a medium for political propaganda.
I concluded that the usual definitions of propaganda tend to be too narrowly
restrictive and have too many ideological presuppositions to properly encompass
the full range of uses for which propaganda was being employed in the Soviet
Union in the 1920s. In particular, the reciprocal relationship between propaganda
and its recipient is often neglected in most analyses of propaganda. Propaganda
tends to be viewed as a one-way process, as the mere imposition of the propagan-
dist’s views on the propagandee’s passive psyche. Richard Taylor’s study of the
film propaganda of the Soviet Union and of Nazi Germany (Taylor 1998) seems
to me to suffer from this failing, despite its other great merits. His somewhat
restrictive and almost entirely negative view of the nature of propaganda leads to
his statement that “[t]he ‘propagandist’ deals not in the drugs of stimulation but
in those of sedation” (1998:13) and his assertion that it is always aimed at ending
the thought process of the propagandee rather than stimulating it. Actually, there
is a transactive relationship between the propagandist and the propagandee and
a more nunanced view of propaganda, one which takes into account its various
modalities and strategies as well as its transactive nature, is therefore required if
the nature of Soviet montage cinema as propaganda is to be properly understood.
In particular, I have both affirmed and investigated the link between propa-
ganda and rhetoric as a means of constructing persuasive discourses. This link is
often denied, for example by Bennett and O’Rourke (2006), who contrast “good”
rhetoric, which they claim appeals to reason, with “bad” propaganda, which they
claim appeals to the emotions. This distinction was simply not recognised by the
Soviet montage film-makers. If rhetoric is incorporated into our understanding
of the nature of propaganda, this can enrich our definition of propaganda suffi-
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ciently to enable us to properly analyse the ways in which Kuleshov, Pudovkin,
Eisenstein and Vertov, in their various ways, used montage in the enunciation of
their filmic texts in order to achieve a rhetorical and propagandistic effect on the
spectator.
In this respect, it has proven useful to divide the concept of propaganda into
two categories: agitation propaganda and integration propaganda (Ellul (1973:70-
79) and Jowett and O’Donnell (1992:8)). This is a distinction based on the differ-
ing audience response which the two categories of propaganda attempt to evoke.
The essential deficiency of Taylor’s approach can therefore be seen to be his failure
to make a distinction between agitation propaganda and integration propaganda;
instead, he implicitly categories all propaganda as integration propaganda. In
fact, while Hollywood cinema operates essentially as an integration propaganda,
Soviet montage cinema is a form of agitation propaganda.
It is also helpful to divide propaganda into two further categories: vertical
propaganda and horizontal propaganda (Ellul 1973:79-82). This proved useful
in distinguishing between the different approaches towards propaganda taken by
Eisenstein and Pudovkin on the one hand and by Vertov on the other. This
difference was rooted in their view of the appropriate relationship between the
propagandist and the propagandee. Eisenstein’s and Pudovkin’s approach was
based on the idea that a propaganda film should communicate the propagandist’s
pre-existing message as clearly as possible, while the spectator’s role was to be
an unfree (though not passive) recipient of that message. Vertov’s approach,
by contrast, was far less coercive and relied more on the spectator’s active and
creative co-constitution of the “message” of his propaganda films. Eisenstein and
Pudovkin were using the methods of vertical propaganda while Vertov was using
the methods of horizontal propaganda.
By regarding propaganda as a complex phenomenon with various modalities
and strategies rather than taking the restricted and undifferentiated definition
usually employed in studies of Soviet cinema, it is possible to gain greater insight
into the different and sometimes conflicting modes of propaganda being used by
the Soviet montage directors. In particular, it is now possible to classify the films
of Eisenstein and Pudovkin as transactive, vertical agitation propaganda and the
films of Vertov as transactive, horizontal agitation propaganda.
The nature of the actual mechanism by which the filmic text interacts with
the spectator in order to cause a change in that spectator’s psyche, the change
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that will constitute the rhetorical effect of the film on the spectator, was investi-
gated. My conclusion was that a plausible candidate for such a mechanism has
been proposed by Marshall W. Alcorn (1987). I applied Alcorn’s model to the
“Kuleshov Effect” montage experiment in order to investigate the appropriateness
of the model for an analysis of the way in which Soviet montage cinema achieves
its rhetorical effect on a spectator.
The role of the spectator in the constitution of the rhetorical effect of the
montage films is so problematic that a transactive model of their rhetorical ef-
fectivity is clearly necessary. I found that Alcorn’s approach is capable, in my
view, of providing such a transactive model. The essence of his model, expressed
in cinematic rather than literary terms, is that a filmic text bring rhetorical pres-
sure to bear on the spectator while the spectator simultaneously brings his or
her “projective idealization” to bear on the filmic text. The subjectivity of the
spectator therefore constitutes the signification of the filmic text while the filmic
text simultaneously modifies the subjectivity of the spectator. The meaning of
the filmic text is thereby generated by a transactive rhetorical process.
This transactive model for rhetorical effectivity permits a more complex and
nuanced view of the operation of propaganda than the more one-sided interpre-
tations of propaganda as essentially a one-way process, as is the case with Kenez
(1985) or Taylor (1998), for example, who implicitly portray the Soviet people
as passive receptacles for Bolshevik propaganda (Kenez 1985:255). The implica-
tion of such a rather impoverished description of the way in which propaganda
actually operated in the Soviet Union is that the spectator is nullified as a polit-
ical subject; political intervention becomes a redundancy because the meanings
of the filmic text are unalterably fixed by the film-maker and cannot be consti-
tuted or challenged by the spectator. The montage directors, however, wanted to
stimulate the spectator into becoming an active political agent.
Applying Alcorn’s model of transactive rhetoric to Soviet montage cinema
has also helped to clarify the aesthetic strategies being used by, for example,
Vertov in his film The Man with a Movie Camera. Vertov exploits the mismatch
between the spectator’s projection of their narrative expectations (their “projec-
tive idealization”) onto the filmic text and the rhetorical pressure exerted by the
film’s actual signifiers by deliberately triggering and then frustrating their pro-
jected expectations. Vertov was, in effect, absorbing the spectator’s projective
forces and deflecting them towards ideological and political ends. This provides
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a potentially more fruitful way of analysing Vertov’s strategy in The Man with
a Movie Camera than Williams’ formalist analysis (1979), as it foregrounds the
actual interaction between the filmic text and the spectator.
The application of Alcorn’s model to the Kuleshov Effect experiment has
shed light on the problematic status of the Effect itself, in particular the general
lack of success of attempts to reproduce the Effect under scientifically rigorous
conditions (Prince and Hensley 1992). My conclusion is that the deterministic and
manipulative interpretation of the Effect which Kuleshov himself proposed, based
on a crudely understood scientism and a mechanicist materialism, is inadequate
for a proper analysis of his own Effect. Furthermore, the application of Alcorn’s
model to Kuleshov’s montage experiment actually has implications for Alcorn’s
model itself. Since the meaning of the iconographic signifiers in the film footage
used in the experiment is produced by the juxtaposition of those signifiers, it
follows that, contrary to Alcorn’s assertion, it is not the signifiers of the filmic text
in themselves which impose their “authority” on the spectator, but the montage
of those signifiers which imposes its “authority” by exerting rhetorical pressure
on the spectator’s projective idealisations and thereby changing the spectator’s
“linguistic constitution of the self”.
The relationship between Soviet montage cinema and classical cinema can by
no means be reduced to one of simple opposition. In fact, the Soviet montage
directors were reacting against some of the characteristics of Russian Tsarist
cinema more than against classical cinema, which had not yet completed its full
development when film montage was first being established (Bordwell et al. 1985).
In order to explore the complex and sometimes contradictory relationship between
Soviet montage cinema and classical cinema, it was therefore necessary to examine
the nature both of the classical cinema and of Tsarist cinema, which itself differed
in significant ways from the classical style. In fact, many of the methods of the
new Hollywood classical style seemed to the Soviet montage film-makers to be
ideally suited for the purposes of propaganda. Their aim was therefore to take
those elements of classical cinema which they regarded as the most progressive
and change their function from merely providing entertainment and diversion to
the communication and reinforcement of political ideology. In the terminology
used in the analysis of the classical style by Bordwell (1985:1-84), the Soviet
montage directors adopted (and adapted) many of the devices of the continuity
style, but did not adopt its systems (narrative, time and space), nor its relations
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of systems (1985:6).
Furthermore, the “system of the suture”, which has been theorised as a defin-
ing characteristic of classical cinema (Oudart (1978), Dayan (1974)), must be
employed in order to understand the way in which the ideology of a film exists
not merely on the level of the fiction or narrative of a film, but also on the level
of the enunciation of the filmic text itself; that is, the process by which fragments
of raw film footage are transformed into meaningful cinematographic statements.
The theory behind the system of the suture asserts that the ideological effect of a
classical film on its audience is not primarily through its fiction or the content of
the film, but through its enunciation. The process by which the spectator is su-
tured or “stitched into” the filmic text is analogous to the Althusserian ideological
interpellation of the individual as a subject and has the effect of naturalising the
ideology of the film, making it seem to be an inevitable and inescapable aspect
of reality itself, something to be taken for granted. The fiction of a classical film
might therefore not be overtly ideological, but its enunciation is always ideologi-
cal. As Eisenstein himself said of montage cinema, “Form is always ideology. And
form always turns out to be real ideology. That is, ideology that really applies
and not what passes for ideology in the idle prattle of the talkers” (Eisenstein
1988:241; original emphasis). It is this embedding of ideology into the enuncia-
tion of the filmic text which enables classical Hollywood cinema to successfully
function as a form of integration propaganda. My conclusion was that the system
of the suture applies to montage cinema as well as to classical cinema, albeit in
a modified form and in a manner which continually subverts that system, and
that it is this which enables montage cinema to function specifically as a form of
agitation propaganda rather than integration propaganda.
The system of the suture can therefore provide a new way of understanding
the difference between Soviet montage cinema and classical continuity cinema at
the level of enunciation rather than merely in terms of their technical procedures
or political content. In particular, the Kuleshov Effect can be interpreted in
terms of the system of the suture. This has two benefits. Firstly, the system of
the suture can potentially reveal new ways of understanding the psychoanalytic
basis of the Kuleshov Effect itself, and can perhaps make it more plausible that
such an effect does indeed exist (an assumption which has been challenged in
recent years, for example by Aumont (1986) and Prince and Hensley (1992)). And
secondly, the Kuleshov Effect (assuming it does exist) could potentially illuminate
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aspects of the system of the suture itself. In particular, the Kuleshov Effect poses
in a particularly acute form the question raised by Dayan: “what happens to
the spectator-image relation by virtue of the shot-changes peculiar to cinema?”
(1974:28). Analysing the work of the different montage directors in terms of the
system of the suture has also given a new perspective on their different positions
with respect to classical cinema and the system of the suture. The subversion
of the suturing process at the level of the enunciation is a significant aspect of
montage cinema’s nature as political rhetoric. Just as the analyst’s refusal to
suture (Heath 1981:85) can enable the analysand to be “cured”, the montage
film-makers’ refusal to entirely suture the spectator into the filmic text enables
them to de-naturalise the ideology embodied in the enunciation of their films and
thereby free the spectator from the “trap” of being ideologically interpellated by
the suturing process.
Dayan has pointed out that both classical painting and classical cinema are
organised by “the system of representation”, which functions as a means of con-
cealing the operations of ideology behind the illusionistic representation of objects
presented for a subject to gaze upon, using the system of the suture to create the
“reality effect” (1974:26). Dayan asked whether there can be a cinematography
not based on the system of representation, and answered his own question in the
negative (1974:28). However, Dayan did not speculate as to whether there could
be a cinematic equivalent of the codes of enunciation of avant-garde painting,
particularly abstract painting. Such a cinema could well constitute the “cine-
matography not based upon the system of representation” which Dayan wished
for (1974:28). In film montage, the signification of a cinematic sequence is not in
the images themselves but in their juxtaposition. This means that the interre-
lationship between the signifiers matters more than the relationship between the
signifiers and their signifieds, which implies that there was therefore an intrinsic
tendency towards abstraction present in montage cinema. In fact, just as Dayan
has emphasised the connection between the codes of classical painting and those
of the single frame or the static shot of classical cinema, so Kazimir Malevich,
one of the leading figures of avant-garde art at that time, described some of the
frames or shots of montage cinema as “abstract moments” sharing much in com-
mon with non-objective Suprematist painting. While the potential of the Soviet
montage cinema of the 1920s to be such a non-representational cinema never fully
materialised, that potential was recognised at the time by Malevich. I therefore
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examined Malevich’s concept of “non-objective cinema” and investigated to what
extent montage cinema conformed to Malevich’s concept and what implications
this had for the political and ideological functioning of montage cinema.
I found it necessary to challenge widespread misconceptions about Malevich
in order to clarify the connection between Malevich’s ideas and those of the mon-
tage film-makers. Malevich is usually regarded as a “mystical” artist interested
primarily in personal spiritual transcendence rather than the political transfoma-
tion of society (see, for example, Shatskikh (1993)). In fact, Malevich was a more
politically committed artist than is generally believed, and was far from being
an isolated figure in 1920s Soviet Russia; for example, Shatskikh is mistaken in
her assertion that Malevich “found no supporters on Soviet soil for his research
into ‘non-objective’ cinematography” (1993:476). Furthermore, the attack on the
“thingness” of modern life which Malevich’s “non-objective art” represented was
essentially an attack on the reification inherent in the capitalist relations of pro-
duction, and was therefore a political position as much as an aesthetic one. It is
this concept of reification which underlies Dayan’s statement that classical paint-
ing (and classical cinema) conceals the true relations and meanings of society
itself behind the objects which the painting presents to the viewer.
In fact, it is not merely the case that montage cinema had some of the char-
acteristics of non-objective art; Malevich’s own Suprematist paintings themselves
exhibited some of the characteristics of montage, as Shatskikh has correctly
pointed out (1993:473). Indeed, Malevich’s non-objective art and Soviet mon-
tage cinema can be theoretically related to each other using Peircean semiotics.
Victor Tupitsyn (2002b:144) has made an explicit connection between Malevich’s
non-objective art and C. S. Peirce’s “second trichotomy of signs” (based on the
different possible relations between the sign and the thing being signified), in
which the sign can be classified as either an icon, an index or a symbol. Further-
more, Peircean semiotics has been applied to cinema in general by Peter Wollen
in the early 1970s (Wollen 1997:116-54). I therefore used Peircean semiotics as
a conceptual framework within which both Malevich’s Suprematist painting and
montage cinema could be analysed in a commensurate way despite the contrasting
technical bases of easel painting and cinema.
Malevich’s explicit rejection of “representation” in both painting and in cinema
can be interpreted in Peircean terms as a rejection of the iconic aspect of the sign
in favour of its indexical and symbolic aspects. This kind of image or sign is what
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Tupitsyn has described as the “meeting point between the abstract and the real”
(2002a:43) in which abstraction and actuality are no longer merely contradictory
opposites but are dialectically linked together in a new “unity of opposites”.
Malevich originally regarded only Eisenstein and Vertov as potential Supre-
matist film-makers; however, he gradually became increasingly disillusioned with
Eisenstein’s work and eventually regarded only Vertov as a potentially proponent
of non-objective cinema. Whereas classical cinema uses the iconic aspect of the
cinematic image to create narratives whose enunciation is invisible and which
therefore seem to speak themselves, Vertov had a tendency to suppress the iconic
aspect of the image in favour of its indexical and symbolic aspects in order to
create abstract political discourses whose enunciation was foregrounded. This
combination of abstraction and indexicality into a dialectical unity of opposites
was an essential aspect of his use of montage to construct a rhetorical political
discourse. It is this indexical “kino-pravda” coupled with the symbolic discourse
generated by montage which constituted an incipient example of the politicised
“non-objective cinema” which Malevich aspired to create and believed Soviet mon-
tage cinema might develop into. I would suggest that Vertov can therefore be
regarded as being at least as much a Suprematist film-maker as a Constructivist
one (Petrić 1987).
Eisenstein believed that there must be “objective” representation in cinema (as
in art generally) in order for there to be an effective political rhetoric. Vertov, on
the other hand, would begin with the indexical recording of “life as it is” and move
from that to the rhetorical expression of an abstract, symbolic interpretation of
that raw material. This movement from the indexical aspects of the cinematic
image to its symbolic aspects, linking them together by a process of decoding
and explanation is what Vertov referred to as the “kino-eye”: a mechanical eye
which did not merely passively record actuality but conceptualised and decoded
it, indissolubly linking the indexical and the symbolic aspects of the image. There
was therefore no contradiction between the indexical “content” of his films and
their rhetorical “form”; rather, there was a fundamental unity of content and
form, based upon the dialectical unity of the indexical and symbolic aspects of
the cinematic image.
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8.2 Possible future research
There are several avenues for future research in the area explored by this the-
sis. For example, the model of transactive rhetoric developed by Alcorn (1987)
could be applied to various film sequences of the montage directors. In particu-
lar, Vertov seems to have been deliberately exploiting the mismatch between the
spectator’s narrative expectations which he or she projects onto a film and the ac-
tual signifiers (or rather, the montage of those signifiers) in his film The Man with
a Movie Camera, by deliberately triggering and then frustrating those narrative
expectations. Vertov was, in effect, absorbing the spectator’s projective forces –
their usual habits of reading a commercial movie – and deflecting them towards
political ends – a political reading of the real world rather than a narrative read-
ing of a fictional world. While Alan Williams (1979) analyses Vertov’s strategy
within a formalist framework, it might be illuminating to analyse it instead using
Alcorn’s model of transactive rhetoric. Such an analysis would have the benefit
of foregrounding the interaction between the spectator and the filmic text rather
than focusing solely on the text itself, as is done in the formalist analysis, and
could perhaps give greater insight into the psychoanalytic mechanisms by which
Vertov’s rhetorical strategy operates on the spectator.
Another avenue for possible future research concerns the intriguing parallel
between the retrospective creation of the meaning of a shot or montage fragment,
according to the theory of the system of the suture, and C. S. Peirce’s idea that
every thought is a sign without meaning in itself until that sign is interpreted
by a subsequent thought, which he called an “interpretant”, so that the meaning
of a thought is arrived at by retrospectively interpreting the thought as a sign
of a determining object. The meaning of our thoughts is therefore established
retrospectively, just like the meaning of a shot in the system of the suture. There
may also be a connection here with Eisenstein’s belief that montage form was a
reconstruction of the processes of human thought itself. Eisenstein had hoped to
base such a montage reconstruction of the thought process on his use of “inner
monologue”, whose theoretical basis was to be the concept of “pre-logical thought”
as developed by Lévy-Bruhl. Unfortunately for Eisenstein, Lévy-Bruhl himself
later abandoned his own concept of “pre-logical thought” (Aumont 1987:64) and
this fact, together with the dangerous accusations of “Idealism” and subjectivism
which Eisenstein’s suggestion had attracted from hostile Soviet critics, led to his
theory of inner monologue being very short-lived. It occurs to me that rather
8.2. Possible future research 238
than basing the montage reconstruction of the thought process on a dubious lin-
guistic model of “pre-logical thought”, it might be given a more secure theoretical
foundation by basing it on a semiotic model using the Peircean categorisation
of thoughts as signs whose meaning is produced retrospectively, in an analogous
way to the method by which the system of the suture retrospectively produces
the meaning of a shot. The enunciation of a montage film (i.e. the way meaning-
ful cinematographic statements are constructed out of montage fragments) could
then in principle reconstruct the enunciation of human thought (i.e. the way
meaning is constructed out of fragmentary thought-signs). This would allow the
analysis of Eisenstein’s concept of “intellectual montage” to go beyond a Joycean
stream-of-consciousness model or Eikhenbaum’s formalist model for such thought
processes to a Peircean semiotic model, which would perhaps be better suited to
cinematic rather than literary enunciation. Such an analysis might help to illumi-
nate the way in which montage cinema, especially the “intellectual montage” and




1The montage films which Taylor examines are Eisenstein’s October (1927) and Alexander
Nevsky (1938), and Vertov’s Three Songs of Lenin (1934), the other Soviet film examined being
the non-montage film The Fall of Berlin (Chiaureli, 1949).
2Although Lev Kuleshov stated in 1965 that “[a]lready, in Tsarist Russia there were two
progressive directors: Bauer and Protazanov” (Kuleshov 1973:67), to my knowledge these were
the only two Tsarist film-makers ever praised by any of the Soviet montage directors.
3See Jay Leyda, ‘Between Explosions (An Attempt to Repair a Mistaken Judgement)’, Film
Quarterly, July 1970, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 33-38, reprinted as ‘A Correction’ in Leyda (1983:11-
16). Leyda was referring specifically to the films made by pre-revolutionary film-makers in the
first few months and years after the October Revolution; but since until at least 1919 most film
stock, cameras and projection equipment remained in the hands of film-makers and production
companies which had been active in the pre-revolutionary period, the period of “Tsarist cinema”
can be said to have overlapped that of “Soviet cinema” for at least several years.
4Gorky published the review, entitled ‘Beglye zametki. Sinematograf Lyum’era’ [Fleeting
Notes: The Lumière Cinematograph], in Nizhegorodskii listok [The Nizhn Novgorod Newsletter],
no. 182, 4 July 1896, p. 3, under the pseudonym ‘I. M. Pacatus’.
5Yuri Tsivian has suggested that the use of the term “illusion” [illyuzion] to describe the
cinematograph was a regional variant, confined to the south of Russia (1998:21).
6In the Catalogue Général des Vues Cinématographiques Positives de la Collection Lumière
(published in 1900), each scene of Couronnement du Czar is listed as a separate item in the
catalogue (items 300 to 307 inclusive) (Leyda 1983:405); this is symptomatic of the fact that
it was not the film itself which was the “text” of early cinema, but the cinema exhibition as a
whole. At this early stage, even the fact that a single event was being filmed (the coronation of
a monarch) did not suffice to cohere the film into a single unit in the minds of the cataloguers
and (presumably) the exhibitors of the film(s). Each scene was still thought of as being, in an
important sense, a separate film. This is probably also related to the fact that each scene itself
had been shot in a single, unedited take; it was only once the idea had been established that
each individual scene of a film could itself be cut into fragments and then reassembled that it
really became possible for multiple scenes to be unified into a single cinematic experience. As
Yuri Tsivian has explained, “text boundaries were redefined. It was more and more the film
itself (now a multi-shot unit) rather than the film performance that was considered the ‘master
text’ of cinema” (1998:130). For further details of this process, see Tsivian (1998:130-34).
7Nicholas II had his own private cinema-theatre installed in the palace at Tsarskoe Selo
(Leyda 1983:67). Furthermore, he created the post of “court cinematographer”, the occupants
of which over the years accumulated a cinematic record of the Romanov family which, in terms
of sheer volume, was unparalleled among European royalty at that time.
8Nicholas II wrote this comment in the margin of a police report concerning the correspon-
dence of a Duma deputy and an American movie-making company in 1913 (Kenez 2001:24,n.23).
9Named after a famous nineteenth-century Russian general, the Skobelev Committee was
founded in November 1904 by his sister, Princess N. D. Belosel’skaia-Belozerskaia, as a chari-
table institution to help the veterans of the Russo-Japanese War. The Committee established
NOTES 240
a film section in March 1914. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Skobelev Committee de-
tached itself from the Russian state and continued to make newsreels as a private ‘co-operative’.
The political viewpoint of the Skobelev Committee at that time was Socialist Revolutionary
(SR) and Menshevik, and it was therefore hostile to the Bolshevik government. The Sko-
belev Committee was closed down and its property confiscated when the Bolsheviks dispersed
the Constituent Assembly and suppressed all rival political parties (Roberts (1999:12-14) and
Kenez (2001:25,n.45,29)).
10The same strategy of deliberate deception in newsreel films was also being employed in
America in the early years of cinema, as Carl Plantinga has pointed out: “every major [Ameri-
can] news film producer in the period 1894-1900 faked news film as a matter of habit” (1997:36).
11For Kuleshov’s description of his actual “fabricated landscape” montage experiment see
Kuleshov (1987:137), and for an examination of recently discovered footage of the original
experiment see Tsivian et al. (1996). The most ambitious use of the montage principle of the
“fabricated landscape” is probably Dziga Vertov’s The Man with a Movie Camera (1929), which
presents a “montage city” constructed from fragments of three real cities – Moscow, Kiev and
Odessa (though some material was also filmed in Donbas and in Yalta (Roberts 2000:x)).
12Throughout this thesis, the Julian Calendar is used to date the Revolutions of February
and October 1917, since these are the months by which the Revolutions are most widely named,
though they actually occurred in March and November 1917 by the Gregorian Calendar. The
Gregorian Calendar is used for all other dates.
13See Leyda (1983:142) for an English translation of the text of the nationalisation decree.
14For more details of this protracted process of nationalisation of the Soviet cinema industry
see, for example, Taylor (1979:43-50,152-57).
15The “agit-steamboat” Red Star towed a barge-cinema that could seat an audience of 800
people and included a team of cameramen who filmed the entire three-month voyage, the footage
being returned to Moscow and edited by Dziga Vertov (Leyda 1983:138-39).
16Eisenstein also had the more general ambition of achieving a “synthesis of art and science” in
his films, which would unite the emotional and intellectual effects of montage in an indissoluble
unity (Eisenstein 1977:62-63). This would also imply the dissolution of the distinction between
agitation and propaganda made by Plekhanov and Lenin.
17See Taylor (1979:27-28), (1998:28-29) and Kenez (1985:7-8) for further details.
18Jay Leyda has described how “[t]he Russians were shown film programmes almost exclusively
French in origin. The first film companies represented in Russia were Pathé Frères (in 1904) and
Gaumont, and these pioneers held on to the entire market. If there were other film companies
or countries other than France making films, Russian audiences were not aware of them. Pathé
particularly occupied a strategic position through the entire period of the pre-revolutionary
cinema, developing from the chief Russian distributor to one of the chief Russian producers”
(Leyda 1983:24).
19See, for example, Leyda (1983:111-20) for further details.
20Moisei Aleinikov was the head of the Mezhrabpom-Rus studio, which produced Pudovkin’s
film Mother (1926).
21See Eisenstein (1988:144-46) for further details.
22Eisenstein’s memoir Immoral Memories contains a brief description of his childhood (1983:8-
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10).
23Esfir Shub (1894-1953) was a Soviet documentary film-maker and editor, and the wife of
the Constructivist Alexei Gan. She met Vertov in the early 1920s, and worked with Eisenstein
for Goskino as a film re-editor, censoring and re-editing Western films for Soviet release. Her
most famous films, compiled from old Tsarist-era newsreels, include The Fall of the Romanov
Dynasty (1927), The Great Road (1927) and Lev Tolstoy and the Russia of Nikolai II (1927).
She directed the first Soviet documentary film to use sound. Her work influenced that of both
Eisenstein and Vertov, but she claimed she was “in the final instance, Vertov’s pupil” (Petrić
1978:43,n.11).
24Alexander Nikolayevich Ostrovsky (1823-1886) was a Russian writer, famous for his care-
fully crafted realistic plays and comedies.
25Sometimes translated as The Sage.
26For more details concerning Eisenstein’s production ofWiseman see, for example, Eisenstein
(1977:3-17), Gerould (1974) and Gordon (1978). See also Kuiper (1961) for details of the general
theatrical antecedents of Eisenstein’s film theories.
27Glumov’s Diary was later incorporated into Kinopravda No. 16 by Vertov, who was thereby
parodying Eisenstein’s parody of his work. See Feldman (1977:116,n.120) for further details.
28Vertov later Russified his Jewish patronymic to “Arkadevich” some time after 1918.
29His brother Mikhail Kaufman became Vertov’s cameraman during the 1920s before they
quarelled after making The Man with a Movie Camera. Another brother, Boris, also a camera-
man, emigrated to Belgium and then France with Vertov’s parents in 1919 and worked with Jean
Vigo before moving to Hollywood and working on such films as On the Waterfront (1954) (for
which he won an Academy Award) and Twelve Angry Men (1957). Vertov and his brother were
briefly reunited in 1929 during Vertov’s trip to western Europe. See Feldman (1977:111,n.60)
and Gillespie (2000:67) for further details.
30Dziga Vertov wrote an eponymous Futurist poem about his chosen name in September






years of yoke jigger
tombs topple






A transliterated version of the original is as follows: “Dziga Vertov / zdes ni zgi / verte – / veki
iga i / grobov verigi / prosto vetrov / gibel / veka na vertel / no – dzin’ ! – vertet / diski /
gong v dver aort / i – ô-go-gó! avtovizgi / vertep rtov / Dziga Vertov” (Tsivian 2004:33).
31Several of the other students at the Psychoneurology Institute were also to become leading
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figures in the Soviet film industry – the director Abram Room, the cinema historian Grigori
Boltyansky and the journalist and writer Mikhail Koltsov (who was to give Vertov his initial
opportunity to work in cinema, though initially only as a clerk (Roberts 1999:17)) (Tode and
Wurm 2006:12).
32The city was later renamed Stalingrad, and is now known as “Volgograd”.
33The group founded by Vertov was known as Kino-glaz, which means “Kino-Eye” or “Cine-
Eye”. I have used the term “Cine-Eye” to denote Vertov’s group in order to avoid possible
confusion with his compilation film Kino-Eye [Kino-glaz, 1924]. The members of the Cine-Eye
group were known as kinoki (singular kinok), which is an abbreviated neologism compounded
from the modern Russian word “kino” and the archaic Slavonic word “oko”, meaning “eye” (see
Vertov (1984:5,n) and Hicks (2007:17) for further details).
34It should be noted that there seems to be some uncertainly as to the exact membership of
the Council of Three. It is generally assumed to have consisted of Vertov himself, his brother
Mikhail Kaufman and Vertov’s wife Elizaveta Svilova. However, Annette Michelson has noted
that Georges Sadoul, in his Histoire générale du cinéma: L’art muet, vol. 5 (Paris: Editions
Denoël, 1975), lists in addition a man called Belyaev, a painter (Vertov 1984:12,n). Yuri
Tsivian has also named Ivan Beliakov as another member of the Council of Three (Tsivian
2004:24,98,n.7,168,n.5). It is therefore unclear whether the Council of Three actually contained
three, four or five members, and it is also unclear whether the number or identity of the members
changed over time.
35Mikhail Kaufman is referring to the Cine-Eye group.
36For a breakdown by genre of Soviet-made films between 1922 and 1933, see Table 4 in
Youngblood (1992:33).
37Denise Youngblood has expressed it best: “Young Soviet filmmakers may have changed the
face of world cinema, but the unvarnished truth is that Soviet audiences in the twenties did
not like the pictures that made film history, finding them dull and difficult to understand. Few
pictures from the revolutionary avant-garde can be labelled box-office successes with any degree
of confidence, not even Potemkin, although there was a concerted effort undertaken at the time
to correct the record” (1992:5). See also Taylor (1979:95-96) and Roberts (1999:156,n.39).
38For details of the numbers of foreign imports compared to Soviet-made films between 1921
and 1933, see Table 1 in Youngblood (1992:20).
39For a list of some of the agitki released in 1919, see Leyda (1983:135-36). For a detailed
description of the content of some representative agitki films, see Kenez (2001:32-33,41-43).
40Despite this formative influence on Soviet montage cinema, however, Graham Roberts has
stated that “the fictional agitki of the civil war years were failures in artistic and functional
terms” (Roberts 1999:20), implying that it was the fictional aspects of the agitki which ham-
strung them as propaganda and that newsreel was more effective at communicating political
points.
41See also Tsivian (2004:81-82) for further details of the organisation and methods of work
of the kinoki.
42Alexander Medvedkin toured the Soviet Union in a “film-train” as late as 1932. While
strictly speaking not an agit-train (the Order of the People’s Commissariat of Transportation
of 29 December 1931 described it as the “the first Soviet film-train”), this “film-train” was
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essentially an agit-train devoted solely to cinema, and which could function as a fully-equipped,
autonomous and mobile film studio (Leyda (1983:286-87) and Roberts (1999:118-20)).
43From the Russian agitatsionnyi punkt, an agitational point.
44The Acta Diurna [Daily Acts] date back to 131 BC, and were presented on message boards
in public places such as the Forum of Rome. Their content included the outcomes of trials
and legal proceedings, public notices and announcements of prominent births, marriages and
deaths. See, for example, the entry for “Acta Diurna” in the Encyclopaedia Britannica Eleventh
Edition.
45Vertov had considered the abbreviated neologisms kinkor and kinorabkor before settling
on kinok to describe his cinema worker-correspondents (Hicks 2007:17). B. Nebyletskii had
even written to Vertov in 1926 asking to become a “cine-correspondent” [kino-korrespondent ]
(2007:141,n.56).
46See Hicks (2007:16-18) for further details of the parallelism between the “worker-correspond-
ent” movement and Vertov’s Cine-Eye group.
47See Tode and Wurm (2006:197-98) for Vertov’s sketches and descriptions of the central
“Creative Laboratory” where Vertov proposed the films of the kinoki network would be edited.
See also Vertov (1984:137-42) for his description of the proposed “Creative Laboratory”.
48For further details concerning the growth of the network of commercial cinemas in Tsarist
Russia, see Leyda (1983:17-89), Taylor (1979:1-25), Tsivian (1998:15-49) and Kenez (2001:9-25).
49See Drew (1986:129-31) for details of the use of Intolerance as propaganda for an explicitly
political campaign against Prohibition. The political effects of Griffith’s film Birth of a Nation
(1915) are so notorious as to require no further elaboration here; see, for example, Geduld
(1971:116-17).
50This censorship worked both ways, of course: the Soviet montage films were themselves re-
edited and censored before being released in the West, also for ideological and political reasons.
51Kuleshov’s film The Death Ray (1925), made in collaboration with Pudovkin.
52For example, Jay Leyda has even claimed that “[n]o Soviet film of importance made
within the following ten years was to be completely outside Intolerance’s sphere of influence”
(1983:143).
53In his Order to the Arts Army (1918), he proclaimed:
Comrades!
Man the barricades!
barricades of souls and hearts.
[...]
The streets are the brushes we’ll use,
our palettes the city squares.
[...]
Futurists, out on the street –
drummers and makers of rhyme! (Mayakovsky 2000:32-33).
54In the language of Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde, Mayakovsky was calling for
the re-integration of the autonomous institution of art into the praxis of everyday life (Bürger
1984).
55See also Henderson (1978:161,n.4).
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56See Henderson (1973) for further details of the role of cinema in Mayakovsky’s artistic
career.
57See Petrić (1987:32,n) for further details. Two of Mayakovsky’s unproduced film scenarios
have been translated and published in Screen, Winter 1971/2, Volume 12, Number 4, pp. 122-
49.
58The New Economic Policy (NEP) was an economic policy implemented in the Soviet Union
between 1921 and 1928 to prevent the Soviet economy from collapsing in the aftermath of the
Civil War. Allowing some private ventures, the NEP allowed small businesses to reopen for
private profit while the state continued to control banks, foreign trade, and large industries.
59Kino-fot was a film journal edited by Aleksei Gan, the Constructivist theorist and husband
of Esfir Shub, which championed the cause of avant-garde cinema.
60Petrić is quoting Annette Michelson here (1984:lxi).
61Vertov is making a pun here on the Russian word mayak, or “beacon”.
62The word zaum could be translated as “beyonsense”. It was used to describe the creation
of poetic neologisms with no literal meaning in Russian Futurist poetry.
63This extreme limit of the complete detachment of signifiers from their signifieds cannot
actually be reached, of course, without the signifiers ceasing to exist as signifiers. As Saussure
emphasised, there can be no signifiers without signifieds.
64See, for example, Miller (2005:14).
65As Mark Crispin Miller has noted, “propaganda was a term so unimportant that there is
no definition for it in the great 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica (which does include a short entry
for propagate)” (Miller 2005:11).
66Taylor is citing J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brain-
washing, Harmondsworth 1963, p. 21.
67As Ellul has noted, Goebbels “never stopped battling for propaganda to be as accurate
as possible. He preferred being cynical and brutal to being caught in a lie. He used to say:
‘Everybody must know what the situation is.’ [...] All this is so true that pinning the title of
Big Liar on Goebbels must be considered quite a propaganda success” (1973:54,n).
68Unfortunately, Trotsky’s vision of cinema replacing vodka as the “opium of the people”
never did come true. As Kenez notes, “At the end of the 1920s, the yearly income from the
vodka monopoly was approximately a half-billion roubles, while movies brought in a paltry 15
million” (1985:219).
69Mosselprom was a state-run department store in Moscow.
70The official Soviet news agency was known as ROSTA, the Russian Telegraph Agency
(Rossiiskoe telegrafnoe agenstvo), during the first half of the 1920s and thereafter as TASS,
the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union at the USSR Cabinet of Ministers (Telegrafnoe
agenstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza pri kabinete ministrov SSSR).
71Kuleshov is almost certainly referring to the idea expressed in Eisenstein’s 1929 article
entitled ‘Perspectives’:
The principle of the organisation of thinking is in actual fact the ‘content’ of a work.
A principle that materialises in the sum total of socio-physiological stimulants and for
which form serves as a means of disclosure.
Nobody believes that the content of a newspaper consists of a report about the Kellogg
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Pact, a scandal from the Gazette de France or an account of an everyday event like a
drunken husband murdering his wife with a hammer on waste ground.
The content [soderzhanie] of a newspaper is the principle by which the contents [soderzhi-
moe] are organised and processed, with the aim of processing the reader from a class-
based standpoint.
Herein lies the production-based inseparability of the sum total of content and form from
ideology.
Herein lies the gulf that separates the content of a proletarian newspaper from the content
of a bourgeois newspaper even though their factual contents are the same. (Eisenstein
1988:154)
72Ellul contrasts his own distinction between agitation propaganda and integration propa-
ganda with Lenin’s distinction (following Plekhanov) between “agitation” and “propaganda”,
claiming that his distinction “corresponds in part to the well-known distinction of Lenin be-
tween ‘agitation’ and ‘propaganda’ – but here the meaning of these terms is reversed” (Ellul
1973:71). It is therefore important not to conflate the concepts of “agitation” and “agitation
propaganda”, as defined here.
73The Americans themselves were among the first to acknowledge this. Edward Bernays
asserted in 1928 that “[t]he American motion picture is the greatest unconscious carrier of
propaganda in the world today. It is a great distributor for ideas and opinions” (2005:166).
74Kenez also specifically decides not to make a distinction between “agitation” and “propa-
ganda”, stating that “[t]he distinction between agitation and propaganda is not a helpful one”
(1985:8).
75Presumably, in Taylor’s view the “real value” of the films in question would not include
their value as propaganda.
76In John Ford’s Western The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962), the journalist tears up
the pages on which his colleague has written down the old senator’s true story and tells him:
“In the West, when the legend is more beautiful than the truth, we print the legend.”
77Ivan Beliakov (1897-1967) was a cameraman, animator and graphic artist who was a mem-
ber of Dziga Vertov’s “Council of Three” from 1922 (Tsivian 2004:24;98,n.7;168,n.5). He col-
laborated with Alexander Rodchenko to create the intertitles for many of Vertov’s films, most
notably Kinopravda (1922-1925) and Kino-Eye (1924) (2004:60), and was an assistant camera-
man for several of Vertov’s films of the 1920s.
78Graham Roberts has noted the irony of the fact that Vertov and Kaufman were barred from
the conclusion of the SRs’ trial which they had worked so hard to publicise (Roberts 1999:23).
It may have been the fact that he was prevented from filming the conclusion of the trial which
prompted Vertov to stage the street scenes.
79Jacques Aumont quotes Eisenstein as saying about the figure of Ivan the Terrible: “The
image, we are the ones who make the image. We should show our feelings about him (the
character).” As Aumont says, “That was Eisenstein’s way of responding to the implied reproach
that he was not sticking closely enough to the ‘historical sources.’ It is quite clear – he preferred
to produce them himself” (1987:216,n.58).
80As O’Shaughnessy has pointed out, “The identity of propaganda in the late twentieth cen-
tury shifted fundamentally in so many ways. It is especially true that propaganda is now no
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longer the exclusive prerogative of the holders of power: communications technology, partic-
ularly the internet, makes self-authorship possible. Everybody now can be a propagandist.
Not even money is entirely necessary. All that is needed is determination” (2004:33). Ellul’s
distinction between vertical and horizontal propaganda is therefore even more valid now that
when he formulated it in the 1960s.
81As Richard Taylor has noted (1998:224,n.33), the Russian verb zarazhat’ can mean either
“to infect” or “to poison”. Tolstoy was famously ambivalent about the moral value of art and
its “infectiousness” towards the end of his life.
82Bacon was responding less to the montage in Eisenstein’s films than to their pictorialism,
to what Kuleshov called Eisenstein’s “infinite savouring of these photogenic pieces of film”
(Kuleshov 1987:69), a quality which was apparent even in his first film Strike.
83Pudovkin’s first full-length film was a documentary about the Russian physiologist Ivan
Pavlov’s work on conditioned reflexes, The Mechanics of the Brain. See, for example, Sargeant
(2000:29-54) for an analysis of the film and of the relationship between Russian physiology and
Pudovkin’s earliest theoretical ideas about film montage. However, unlike Eisenstein, Pudovkin
never explicitly formulated an account of the effectivity of film montage in terms of reflexology.
84Boris Sokolov’s film Russian Ark (2002) is a notable exception, having been filmed in a
single unedited take on a digital video camera.
85See Denkin (1977) for a brief analysis of the application of linguistic models to cinema by
Eisenstein and Vertov.
86The “system of the suture” (see, for example, Oudart (1978) and Dayan (1974)), based
as it is on concepts from Lacanian psychoanalysis, explicitly evokes the entry of the subject
into the Symbolic order and thereby into language during the mirror stage of an infant’s devel-
opment. The mirror stage in Lacanian psychoanalysis could be described, without too much
exaggeration, as “the linguistic construction of the self”.
87See Russell (2005) for an analysis of the Kuleshov Effect in terms of Barthes’ concept of
the “death of the Author”.
88It must always be borne in mind that Eisenstein’s interest in Freud was not merely abstract
or apolitical; as Nesbet has pointed out, “Eisenstein’s emphasis was to be on exploiting, rather
than merely ‘exposing’ the subconscious: the discoveries of Freud were to be put to work in
the service of Marx” (Nesbet 2007:13). This political use of Freud’s work is indicative of the
fact that Eisenstein, unlike the Soviet government itself, saw no contradiction between Freudian
psychoanalysis and Marxism.
89Lapsley and Westlake are quoting Heath (1981:88).
90Projection was defined by Sigmund Freud in ‘Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of
Defence’ (1896), the Schreber case history (1911), ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’ (1915) and
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920). It was later further refined by his daughter Anna Freud.
91See Dickinson and de la Roche (1948:37) and Sargeant (2000:143-49) for further details.
92It is doubtful whether there is in fact any kind of film which does not require the active
participation of the spectator’s subjectivity in constituting the film’s signification as discourse,
though the spectator may not be conscious of that activity. For example, David Bordwell has
reminded us of the extent to which even watching a Hollywood movie in the “classical style”
requires the active (though largely non-conscious) participation of the spectator (Bordwell et al.
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1985:37-41).
93André Bazin asserted that “[t]he well-known experiment of Kuleshov with the shot of
Mozhukhin in which a smile [sic] was seen to change its significance according to the image
that preceded it, sums up perfectly the properties of montage” (Bazin 2005:25).
94These other montage experiments could of course also be analysed using Alcorn’s concept
of projective idealisation; doing so here, however, would constitute too much of a digression.
95In his address to the Film Society in Stewart’s Café, Regent Street, London on 3 February
1929, Pudovkin stated that “Kuleshov and I conducted an interesting experiment” (Pudovkin
2006:160 and 309-10,n.116).
96Signifiers cannot be completely separated from their signifieds, of course, without losing
their status as signifiers. As Saussure emphasised, there can be no signifiers without signifieds,
and vice versa.
97I shall examine this aspect of Soviet montage cinema in more detail in chapter 7 of this
thesis.
98See Yampolsky (1991) for an examination of the importance of the theory of acting to the
early development of film montage in the Kuleshov Workshop.
99Prince and Hensley ultimately conclude that “Kuleshov’s claims to empirical truth cannot
be verified for the simple reason we can never again precisely replicate the sample of people to
whom he showed his original footage” (1992:73).
100See Prince and Hensley (1992:67-68) for an analysis of this issue.
101See Bordwell et al. (1985:1-84) for a summary of the nature and influence of the Hollywood
continuity style.
102In an interview in 1965, Kuleshov described his early film Engineer Prite’s Project (1917)
as “the first Russian film made according to the conception of montage, with images deliberately
planned and assembled according to the laws of editing” (Kuleshov 1973:67-68).
103The same process was happening in reverse during the same period: for example, the
agitka film Brigade Commander Ivanov (1923) was censored and edited before being released
to American audiences (Kenez 2001:42,46,n.60). In Britain, public exhibition of Eisenstein’s film
Battleship Potemkin (1926) was banned altogether until the 1950s, with only private showings
of the film being permitted.
104Kuleshov stated that Yevgeni Bauer and Yakov Protazanov were the only two “progressive”
film directors in Tsarist cinema (Kuleshov 1973:67). In this context, Kuleshov was using the
word “progressive” primarily in its aesthetic sense. Protazanov in particular could never have
been accused of being politically progressive.
105Tsivian notes that “the average shot length of Yevgeni Bauer’s Silent Witnesses (1914) is
50 seconds at projection speed 20 fps” (Tsivian 1998:80).
106As Kristin Thompson describes, “[d]uring the primitive period [...] [e]ven dreams, visions,
and memories were seen in superimposition over only part of the frame, with the character
still visible in the long shot, thus minimizing the subjective effect and keeping the narration
omniscient” (1985:162-63).
107This nostagia manifested itself in the Soviet Union in cinema architecture as well as film-
making technique, as Tsivian has pointed out: “There was a clear tendency in the cinema
architecture of the 1920s to return to the proto-Constructivist simplicity of the sciolistic period
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of pre-1908. ‘Laying bare’ the technology was central to both the first and the last periods of
silent film culture (albeit for completely different reasons)” (1998:45).
108As Vance Kepley has pointed out, “[t]he familiar story that Intolerance first reached the
USSR after it somehow slipped through an anti-Soviet blockade is apocryphal. In fact the
film was imported well before the revolution. [...] Italian Jacques Cibrario, who headed the
Transatlantic film distribution firm, brought Intolerance into Russia in 1916. [...] Consequently,
the film gathered dust on a shelf somewhere in Russia until after the revolution. Not until 1918
did a special government decision clear the way for Intolerance to be shown commercially in the
USSR” (Kepley 1979:24). See also Semen Ginzburg, Kinematografiia dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii,
Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1963, pp. 273-74. The apocryphal story is repeated in, most notably, Leyda
(1983:142) and Mast (1971:190). Cibrario, of course, later became notorious for embezzling
more than a million dollars from the Soviet government in a fraudulent business deal to acquire
much-needed film stock from the United States. See, for example, Leyda (1983:126-28) for the
sordid details.
109It is this process, of course, which qualifies the cinematic institution as one of Althusser’s
Institutional State Apparatuses (ISAs) (Althusser 2008:16-22).
110See Taylor (2003) and Nelson (1980) for further details of Taylor’s system of “scientific
management”.
111For a recent study of Gastev and Soviet Taylorism, see Vaingurt (2008).
112Film studios were always known as “film factories” [kinofabriki ] in Russia, even in Tsarist
times. It was only on 4 January 1936 that they were officially renamed as “film studios”
[kinostudii ], probably as part of Boris Shumyatsky’s abortive ambition to establish a “Soviet
Hollywood” on the Black Sea coast (Taylor and Christie (1988:xvi), Pudovkin (2006:305,n.80)).
113The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.
114See, for example, Burch (1979:82) and Metz (1982a:7) for further details.
115In this respect, I regard it as significant that Kuleshov was fascinated by the fast-paced slap-
stick comedies of Mack Sennett or Harold Lloyd, far more than by the feature-length character-
based narrative films which were also becoming popular in America at that time. See, for
example, his praise of Chaplin (Kuleshov 1987:56-57) and his belief that the way forward for
cinema as an artistic medium was to emulate those American films which appealed most of all to
the uneducated lower-class audience – comedies and thrillers which concentrated on movement
and action. As Kuleshov put it, “The pivot of any suspense story, and especially of an Ameri-
can thriller script, is the rapidly mounting intensity of action, and nothing is so detrimental to
film as the literary psychological drama, i.e., an apparently actionless plot. American films are
successful because they focus on the cinematic: maximum movement and heroic romantic ad-
venture” (Kuleshov 1987:40). Psychologism and individualism were deprecated by the montage
directors.
116Of course, the additional factor of deliberate obtuseness on the part of Eisenstein due to
his personal dislike of Vertov cannot be ruled out.
117See Lacan (1977) for more details, and see also Heath (1981:77-84) for a basic exposition
of the aspects of Lacanian psychoanalysis relevant to the concept of “suture”.
118There is, according to Lacan, a third order: the Real. Lacan defines the Real as that which
the Imaginary seeks to image and which the Symbolic seeks to symbolise. The Real eludes all
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such attempts to imagine or symbolise it, however, while still having an effectivity.
119Jean-Louis Baudry has pointed out the similarity between the situation of the infant during
the mirror stage and that of a spectator in the cinema: “for this imaginary constitution of the
self to be possible, there must be [...] two complementary conditions: immature powers of
mobility and a precocious maturation of visual organization [...]. If one considers that these
two conditions are repeated during cinematographic projection – suspension of mobility and
predominance of the visual function – perhaps one could suppose that this is more than a simple
analogy” (Baudry 1999:353).
120Lacan himself examined only the development of the male child. Later work has been done
by feminist critics to apply Lacanian psychoanalytic principles to the development of the female
infant (see, for example, Mulvey (1975) and Grosz (1990)). For the purposes of this thesis, I
shall follow Lacan and examine only the mirror stage in the development of the male child and
apply it to male spectatorship of the cinema.
121As Heath also points out, there has always been a link between psychoanalysis and language:
“psychoanalysis, the ‘talking-cure’, developed precisely as an acute attention to the movement
of the subject in the signifying chain” (1981:79). In Dayan’s words, “The psychoanalyst’s task
is, through the patient’s speech, to re-link the patient to the symbolic order, from which he
has received his particular mental configuration” (1974:24). Lacan’s analysis of the linguistic
construction of subjectivity is therefore more a change of emphasis rather than a radical break
with Freudian psychoanalysis.
122Lacan uses the term “Other” to make a distinction between the Imaginary and Symbolic
orders. The lower-case ‘o’ (petit-a) refers to the imaginary relations with the “other” that occur
within the Imaginary, whereas the capital ‘O’ represents the Law of the Father and the threat
of castration; that is, “decapitation”, being decapitalised from ‘O’ to ‘o’.
123Barry Salt, in his analysis of the textual procedures of classical cinema, has demonstrated
that the shot/reverse-angle shot comprises only 30-40 percent of the total number of cuts in
Hollywood narrative films from the 1930s onwards (Salt 1977:52).
124Since the subject does not pre-exist its constitution by ideology, the pre-ideological indi-
vidual is an abstraction with no concrete existence since, in Althusser’s words, “ideology has
always-already interpellated individuals as subjects [...]: individuals are always-already subjects.
Hence individuals are ‘abstract’ with respect to the subjects which they always-already are”
(Althusser 2008:49-50; original emphasis).
125See Althusser (2008:44-51) for further details.
126Edward Said recalled watching Hollywood movies as a boy and always siding with the white
colonialist hero against the native population (Lapsley and Westlake 2006:258).
127Ellul was referring specifically to “public and human relations” when he made his comment,
but since his description of the functioning of public and human relations applies equally well
to cinema as an institution, his conclusion that they are a form of propaganda also applies to
cinema.
128The repetition of the two-shot kernel of the Kuleshov Effect experiment with different
images in shot one (e.g., a bowl of soup, a coffin, a young woman, etc.) and Mozzhukhin’s
identical blank face in shot two serves to demonstrate that different emotions can be ascribed
to the same footage of Mozzhukhin’s expressionless face by the viewer. For the purposes of
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analysing the Kuleshov Effect in terms of the system of the suture, however, only the two-shot
kernel itself is strictly necessary.
129As Bazin put it, “The meaning is not in the image, it is in the shadow of the image projected
by montage onto the field of consciousness of the spectator” (2005:26).
130Dayan refers here to the suturing process in Baroque painting, but his assertion applies
equally well to classical cinema.
131It is important not to conflate the Brechtian concept of Verfremdung, which is often trans-
lated as “alienation”, with the Russian Formalists’ concept of ostranenie, or “making strange”,
which represented a purely aesthetic renewal of perception. Brechtian Verfremdung is specifi-
cally political and social rather than merely aesthetic in its effect.
132“Syntagmatic” refers to the relationship between linguistic units in a construction or se-
quence, such as the relationship between the letter “n” and its adjacent letters in the words
“not”, “ant” and “ton”. “Paradigmatic” refers to the set of substitutional or oppositional rela-
tionships a linguistic unit has with other units, such as the relationship between the letter “n”
in the word “not” and other letters which could be substituted for it in the same context, such
as “t” or “p”.
133Although Bordwell is correct when he asserts that “[c]lassical films call forth activities on
the part of the spectator. These activities may be highly standardized and comparatively easy
to learn, but we cannot assume that they are simple” (1985:7), such activities are largely non-
conscious. Pudovkin is referring to the conscious activity required of a spectator watching a
montage film.
134Pudovkin sometimes refers to the slow-motion effect as “Zeitlupe”, which was the German
term for a high-speed camera used to produce such slow-motion effects (2006:313,n.153).
135He now calls it “[d]eeply mistaken in many ways”, noting that “some writers think I still hold
to views expressed here – neglecting my refinement of them in The Cinema of Eisenstein.” See
Bordwell’s website: http://www.davidbordwell.net/essays/annotated.php. Retrieved 3 July
2008.
136As Bazin rather dialectically put it, “It is because cinema as the art of space and time is
the contrary of painting that it has something to add to it” (2005:143).
137Malevich is using the phrase “leftist tendencies” to imply specifically that they were ar-
tistically avant-garde rather than necessarily politically left-wing, though of course they were
actually both.
138Malevich later reversed his negative judgement of easel painting. In a 1927 letter to Moholy-
Nagy, Malevich wrote that “the machine cannot express spiritual sensations, cannot be consid-
ered a good medium, when both brush and pencil are superlative to it in a technical sense,
for through them various sensations can flow in all their force” (Malevich 1978:158). This ten-
dency to reverse earlier judgements and to make contradictory statements at different times
was somewhat characteristic of Malevich; Charlotte Douglas talks of the way in which the ap-
parent reversals of Malevich’s ideas and painting styles, his reversion to earlier positions, would
“annoy” and “embarrass” future art historians (1978:301).
139The image of Rodchenko’s painting was actually printed upside-down in Kino-fot, almost
certainly unintentionally.
140The music for the opera was composed by Mikhail Matiushin and the main text was by
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Alexei Kruchenykh, with a prologue written primarily by Velimir Khlebnikov. The opera
was performed as part of a double bill with Mayakovsky’s autobiographical play Vladimir
Mayakovsky. A Tragedy. Victory over the Sun was a Cubo-Futurist parody of Russian Sym-
bolism, a literary movement whose adherents often used the image of the Sun as a symbol of
their transcendence over the material world. For example, one of the published collections of
Konstantin Balmont’s Symbolist poetry was titled We Shall Be As the Sun (1903). The “vic-
tory over the Sun” was therefore a symbolic victory by the Cubo-Futurists over the Symbolist
movement itself.
141See, for example, Kepley (1986) for further details.
142Peirce categorised signs into three “trichotomies” or typologies, each containing three classes,
depending respectively on (i) the sign itself, (ii) the sign’s relation to its signified object, and
(iii) the sign’s relation to its interpretant. According to Peirce, every sign falls under one class
or another within all three of the trichotomies (Peirce 1991:31).
143Victor Tupitsyn is referring here to the semiotic categories devised by C. S. Peirce. See
Peirce (1991) for his own description of his “second trichotomy of signs”, and Wollen (1997:116-
54) for an application of Peirce’s semiotics to cinema.
144The conventional, symbolic aspect of the photographic image is due, among other causes, to
the fact that the photographic apparatus is based on the principles of Renaissance perspective
(see, for example, Baudry (1999:347)) and uses those conventional principles to render a three-
dimensional image on a flat two-dimensional surface.
145André Bazin based much of his film criticism on the indexicality of the photographic and
cinematic image. Although he did not use Peirce’s terminology, his meaning is unambiguous:
“The photograph as such and the object in itself share a common being, after the fashion of a
fingerprint” (Bazin 2005:15).
146This definition of the iconic aspect of the cinematic image differs significantly from that
given by Plantinga, who claims that “[t]he photograph, whether still or moving, functions as an
icon when it presents visual information similar to that available to an observer at the profilmic
scene” (Plantinga 1997:53). Wollen’s definition of the icon seems to me to be closer to that
intended by Peirce: the likeness of an object, its illusionistic representation, which need have no
necessary connection with what a hypothetical observer would have experienced at the profilmic
scene. I shall therefore follow Wollen’s usage rather than Plantinga’s.
147See Vertov (1990) for the full text of the intertitles to Vertov’s film Three Songs of Lenin,
with accompanying stills.
148The word “symbolic” is here being used in its Lacanian psychoanalytic sense rather than in
its Peircean semiotic sense.
149Malevich was using a neologism invented by Aleksei Khruchenykh, who defined it as follows:
“Sdvig conveys the movement and space. Sdvig gives polysemantic and diversity. Sdvig is the
style of contemporaneity [...]” (qtd. in Tupitsyn 2002a:164,n.146).
150The creation of photograms was an artistic technique used by El Lissitzky and Rodchenko,
both of whom were associated with the Productivist movement.
151Petrić, despite the title of his 1987 book, does not unequivocally regard Vertov as a Con-
structivist film-maker. He had earlier written that “Vertov, unlike Kuleshov, never wished to
apply the extreme Constructivist approach to cinema, regardless of the fact that he conceived
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many of his films ‘constructively.’ ” (Petrić 1978:34). Graham Roberts has also denied that
Vertov should be regarded as essentially a Constructivist film-maker: “by the time of The
Man with the Movie Camera Vertov [...] had developed a visual style which is not so much
Constructivist as productionist” (Roberts 2000:93; original emphasis), by which Roberts means
something distinct from the Productivist avant-garde movement of the 1920s.
152Petrić seems to think its ontology is such that it thereby automatically convinces the specta-
tor (by what means, Petrić does not make clear) that the events shown on the screen “occur[ed]
‘for real’ ”; in fact, what he describes is more like the “reality effect” produced by the system
of the suture in classical cinema – the diametrical opposite of what Vertov stood for – than
anything else.
153Malevich adopted the term “cine-form” from Alexei Gan.
154The newsreel footage of Lenin could therefore be thought of as a “veronika”, a true image
not made by human hands, in the same way that the Turin Shroud, to those who consider it a
genuine religious relic, is a direct imprint of Christ, an indexical sign of divinity. Bazin makes
the same comparison between the photographic or cinematic image and the Turin Shroud in
his essay ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’: “the Holy Shroud of Turin combines the
features alike of relic and photograph” (2005:14,n).
155Malevich is here referring to bytie, the mundane everyday life (or “life’s ugly mug” as he
called it (Malevich 1968a:226)), a concept to which Mayakovsky and other avant-garde artists
of the time in Russia also often referred. It usually held negative connotations for them, and
represented the unworked raw material of lived experience which had to be transformed into
something worthwhile by art or by politics.
156Sometimes also translated as “the global image”.
157AKhRR was the acronym for Assotsiatsia Khudozhnikov Revolutsionnoi Rossii [Associa-
tion of Artists of Revolutionary Russia] (1922-28), which later became known as AKhR, or
Assotsiatsia Khudozhnikov Revolutsii [Association of Artists of the Revolution] (1928-33). The
group actually formed within the Peredvizhniki [Wanderers] movement before 1917 (for exam-
ple, the last chairman of the Peredvizhniki movement, Pavel Radimov, was a founder member
of AKhRR) and was firmly opposed to avant-garde art, preferring a realist treatment of social
themes. During the cultural revolution of 1932-33, AKhRR served as the nucleus of the Stalinist
Union of Artists of the USSR before itself being liquidated as an organisation.
158Mayakovsky’s “AKhRR leftist line” to which Malevich refers was a politically rather than
an aesthetically leftist position; Malevich regarded AKhRR as politically leftist but artistically
reactionary. By aligning himself with AKhRR in the late 1920s, Mayakovsky was widely seen
as having implicitly renounced his own earlier position on the artistic avant-garde.
159The concept of the “ontological authenticity” of the indexical image is very similar to Bazin’s
belief in the “credibility” of the photographic image: “This production by automatic means has
radically affected our psychology of the image. The objective nature of photography confers on
it a quality of credibility absent from all other picture-making” (Bazin 2005:13).
160Pudovkin followed Eisenstein in wishing to start with a pre-existing concept and shape the
raw material to embody that concept, to impose a particular viewpoint on the raw material
and on the spectator. In his own words, he wished “to force even people with opposing views
to be disturbed, directly and against their will” (Pudovkin 2006:23).
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161See, for example, Kenez (2001:70-71) and Pudovkin (2006:301,n.24) for further details.
162Feldman gives a slightly different account of Vertov’s famous slow-motion leap, describing
it as a leap “from the second story balcony of the Kino Committee’s headquarters” (1977:36).
163Bazin has made similar claims, asserting that “[i]t is only an increased realism of the im-
age that can support the abstraction of montage” (2005:39). By “realism”, Bazin essentially
meant the Peircean indexicality of the image, which he sometimes called the “mummy-complex”
(2005:14,n), rather than iconic representation.
164Feldman was commenting on one of Vertov’s early Futurist poems, Start (1917):
Not like Pathé
Not like Gaumont.
Not how they see,










We blow up cinema,
For
CINEMA
to be seen. (Qtd. in Tsivian 2004:35)
165See Tode and Wurm (2006:93) and Michelson (1979) for further details.
166The endless repeatability of a film is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s myth of “eternal recurrence”,
in which the endless and exact repetition of a temporal sequence has the effect of removing the
quality of temporality from each passing moment, creating a sense of timelessness while still
(unlike simply freezing time) allowing human experience to unfold.
167Bazin declared the role of montage in revealing the truth about reality when he wrote in
his essay ‘The Virtues and Limitations of Montage’: “Take, for example, a documentary about
conjuring! If its object is to show the extraordinary feats of a great master then the film must
proceed in a series of individual shots, but if the film is required subsequently to explain one of
these tricks, it becomes necessary to edit them. The case is clear, so let us move on!” (2005:51).
Bazin is implying here that the long take is best at representing reality, whereas to reveal the
tricks hidden behind the surface appearances of reality, editing and montage are called for.
Vertov’s treatment of the scenes involving the Chinese conjurer in Kino-Eye and The Man with
a Movie Camera is significant: he uses montage to reveal the conjurer’s tricks, in the same way
that he also reveals the illusionistic tricks of commercial fictional cinema.
168For details concerning Lenin’s growing interest in the philosophy of Hegel after 1914, see
Anderson (1995).
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